looks like quantum cryptography is not far off
on
Fiber Optic vs Copper
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· Score: 1
Quantum cryptography, originally proposed and demonstrated by Charles Bennett at the IBM T.J. Watson Research Center, provides a way to communicate with complete security over an insecure channel such as an unguarded optical fiber. The security is guaranteed by the fundamental quantum properties of light rather than by computational complexity or physical barriers to interception.
The basic flaws of skype are tricking a Skype user to click on a specially crafted URL asking Skype user to import a malicious vCard. It does not take care of the MAC level siging up. Do you expect these from a mediocre hacker then better not call him a hacker..lol
1)User Interface Issues:
The back, stop, and refresh buttons don't always work.
Since Ajax applications generate pages dynamically, there generally aren't static links available for bookmarking or sharing with others.
Pages don't always print well.
Applications don't run offline.
Clicks and actions generally don't get included into a browser's history table.
We need to be aware of issues like this, but we have fixes for many of these already, and more are coming.
2) Ajax requiring JavaScript and ActiveX on IE
ok..Is that such a huge issue these days? And IE 7 will have native support for XHR at least.
If we keep coming up with quality Ajax applications, then that will be the reason to have JavaScript turned on!
3)Perceived application performance
It is easy to make something slow, or seem slow. However, you only need to play with Yahoo! Mail beta to see how a fully functional app runs like a charm. So, we can do it, and it will only get better for us!
There are definitely issues, and there are MANY things that we all wish we had. But, none of these should scare us.
anyone with a reader can query any passport chip for its unique manufacturer ID number, and the chip will respond if it's in range no matter what kind of encrypted info it may be carrying.
There is a different anticollision protocol, described under ISO 14443A, which requires that a random number be returned from the chips as opposed to the static numbers referenced above. This is the one that Schneier advocates to close this loophole. Whether DoS will listen is anyone's guess.
I regret that I am unable to provide further technical details on the actual standards and collision-avoidance protocols. The documents describing said details are not freely available (the lowest cost I found was $220 per copy).
I have two opinions on this whole situation. First, I don't think chipping passports is going to make our borders any more secure. Any criminal (including terrorists) with the determination and resources to forge passports is going to find a way to do so no matter what obstacles DoS throws at them.
Second, I question whether the "vulnerability" represents the privacy threat that Bruce Schneier thinks it does. The only way I could see it being abused would be to track a person's movements, and even that will be sharply limited or curtailed the moment they close their passport and/or slip it into that wonderful little shielding bag.
Even if the chip's manufacturer ID does get read by someone other than Customs authorities, how in the Multiverse would whoever's doing the reading tie personal information about the holder to it? They'd either have to have access to the Customs computer system (unlikely if they don't work for Customs), or they'd have to literally engage their desired target in conversation, and start asking questions which would make nearly anyone suspicious.
One thing I'd like to know is whether anyone is going to cut back or eliminate international trips due to a perceived fear of being tracked. I'm certainly not going to...
security is a process
on
RSA-640 Factored
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· Score: 1, Insightful
this shows security is process then of a black box sloution...lol
Slashdot Mirror
Quantum cryptography, originally proposed and demonstrated by Charles Bennett at the IBM T.J. Watson Research Center, provides a way to communicate with complete security over an insecure channel such as an unguarded optical fiber. The security is guaranteed by the fundamental quantum properties of light rather than by computational complexity or physical barriers to interception.
The basic flaws of skype are tricking a Skype user to click on a specially crafted URL asking Skype user to import a malicious vCard. It does not take care of the MAC level siging up. Do you expect these from a mediocre hacker then better not call him a hacker ..lol
this looks like so called open source is moving towards GPL3
1)User Interface Issues:
The back, stop, and refresh buttons don't always work.
Since Ajax applications generate pages dynamically, there generally aren't static links available for bookmarking or sharing with others.
Pages don't always print well.
Applications don't run offline.
Clicks and actions generally don't get included into a browser's history table.
We need to be aware of issues like this, but we have fixes for many of these already, and more are coming.
2) Ajax requiring JavaScript and ActiveX on IE
ok..Is that such a huge issue these days? And IE 7 will have native support for XHR at least.
If we keep coming up with quality Ajax applications, then that will be the reason to have JavaScript turned on!
3)Perceived application performance
It is easy to make something slow, or seem slow. However, you only need to play with Yahoo! Mail beta to see how a fully functional app runs like a charm. So, we can do it, and it will only get better for us!
There are definitely issues, and there are MANY things that we all wish we had. But, none of these should scare us.
what is this mess is /. here for giving the update news of s/w which gives automatic updates
think of matrix musical drama lol.. neo agents chasing neo with a symphony background
anyone with a reader can query any passport chip for its unique manufacturer ID number, and the chip will respond if it's in range no matter what kind of encrypted info it may be carrying.
There is a different anticollision protocol, described under ISO 14443A, which requires that a random number be returned from the chips as opposed to the static numbers referenced above. This is the one that Schneier advocates to close this loophole. Whether DoS will listen is anyone's guess.
I regret that I am unable to provide further technical details on the actual standards and collision-avoidance protocols. The documents describing said details are not freely available (the lowest cost I found was $220 per copy).
I have two opinions on this whole situation. First, I don't think chipping passports is going to make our borders any more secure. Any criminal (including terrorists) with the determination and resources to forge passports is going to find a way to do so no matter what obstacles DoS throws at them.
Second, I question whether the "vulnerability" represents the privacy threat that Bruce Schneier thinks it does. The only way I could see it being abused would be to track a person's movements, and even that will be sharply limited or curtailed the moment they close their passport and/or slip it into that wonderful little shielding bag.
Even if the chip's manufacturer ID does get read by someone other than Customs authorities, how in the Multiverse would whoever's doing the reading tie personal information about the holder to it? They'd either have to have access to the Customs computer system (unlikely if they don't work for Customs), or they'd have to literally engage their desired target in conversation, and start asking questions which would make nearly anyone suspicious.
One thing I'd like to know is whether anyone is going to cut back or eliminate international trips due to a perceived fear of being tracked. I'm certainly not going to...
this shows security is process then of a black box sloution ...lol