Did you somehow conveniently "overlook" all the Germans im there? (INB4 no true Scotsman)
You obviously don't understand how cultural enrichment works.
It's as if you're pointing to a bunch of ISIS fighters and yelling "But look, they have some white American-looking guys in there! And they married a bunch of chicks from England!"
Depends on your definition of European. Both of the YouTubers are middle eastern in origin (a Turk and an Arab) so it looks like that whole "bring in 1 million refugees" plan has succeeded in enriching Germany with some foreign culture.
They would be technically, yes:) but on the 737 the trim system moves the entire horizontal stab instead of the elevators, and I'm pretty sure that's just one surface.... though come to think of it I'm not even sure if that technically falls into the "control surfaces" category. It's certainly not one of the primaries.
That's not an engineering error, it's a safety feature. The only way the plane knows it's on the ground is via WOW switches. If those are telling you that you're not on the ground, sure, you can't use reverse thrust, which means you might hit something, and that's bad. You know what's worse? Accidentally engaging reverse thrust while you're still in the air.
One will do some damage to the plane, the other will probably kill everyone and leave a smoking crater.
The autopilot wouldn't be using the vane angle-of-attack sensor, they would be using air data and the inertial reference system
I'm going to be generous and say it may depend on the aircraft type. I've worked on several aircraft which definitely have the AOA signal feeding into the autopilot. Maybe whatever aircraft you're familiar with don't. I don't have any experience on the 737 MAX and I presume you don't either, so I can't conclusively say whether it does or not.
Finally, you have identified the real source of the problem - the media!
Incorrect; the real source of the problem is idiots who credulously believe everything they're told by a talking head with a microphone. The media wouldn't be an issue if you weren't simultaneously so gullible and so self-assured.
So you are saying that Canada imposing a 300% tariff on Boeing unless it accepts to build it's airplanes in Canada would be fair competition ?
It would be if Boeing received massive subsidies from the US government and then sold their airplane in Canada for less than what it costs to manfucature them. You bet your ass the Canadian government would be slappign tariffs on them.
For capitalism to function sanely it requires relatively sane consumers. Same as democracy requiring relatively sane voters. Either system can fail if those prerequisites aren't met.
Anyway it's not much of a concern in this case because the people screaming about this really have no clue what's going on, no idea how to fix it, and no way of knowing whether or not their wishes were followed. This goofball might be up in arms about there not being AOA indication in the cockpit, but he really has no clue why, and certainly wouldn't recognize it if I put him in front of one. A year from now he'll have forgotten all about it and will go back to buying whatever tickets are cheapest. And that works; in the end people just want cheap flights and don't want to be bothered with the details.
Communism is basically the same, except there's less competition and nobody pretends to care what the consumer wants.
Sure, but there are literally hundreds if not thousands of sensors on a modern aircraft. Once you start down the road of "why not three?" how do you justify which of those should be triplicated?
This isn't even just an issue of adding another sensor for each system; you have to add wiring, you have to modify the boxes which read those sensors (and, hell, since the boxes are often duplicated, you'll probably want to triplicate them also), you have to add more circuit breakers... it adds up fast. And the biggest concern isn't even cost; it's weight.
At the end of the day the aerospace industry as a whole has decided that duplication is sufficient. There has been some movement away from that recently - some of the newer Airbus aircraft have far more sensors - but this is still a rare exception rather than the rule. As we move more and more towards aircraft designed to fly themselves it may actually be a good idea to have extra sensors so that the autopilot doesn't have to kick off when there's a problem, but for human pilots the existing sensors have thusfar been sufficient.
If these aircraft had had the AOA disagree indicator and said indicator had activated in flight(the previous Lion Air flight), then when they landed the pilots would have written up that the indicator triggered and the AOA sensors would have been examined and probably replaced by the AMT overnight
Hilarious. The AOA sensor issue was present for multiple flights. It WAS reported on the previus flight, and the sensor WAS replaced. And yet none of that required an AOA disagree light.
Issues don't necessarily have to be reported by aircrew, BTW; modern aircraft have computers which record far more information than what is presented to pilots, and can be downloaded by maintenance after every flight. The 737 MAX specifically introduced a system called OMF which allows technicians to easily download all fault data each time the plane lands. I don't know if Lion Air has been doing that, but if they haven't then they should be. In my own experience working on different aircraft it is not at all uncommon for pilots to report "good plane, no issue", but for the download to show multiple problems which require repair.
It's literally nothing like that. What in the world makes you think that purchasing an "AOA disagree" light would have allowed them to easily fix the problem?
It's not the media, it's most aviation authorities that have grounded this specific model.
It's the media and uninformed laymen who are screaming about AOA indication being optional; the response from the experts/authorities is generally a shrug.
Yes, there's a reason these aircraft were grounded. The fact that two crashes which both seem to have been related to trim control happened within less than a year of each other is plenty of reason to ground them while we investigate. It is not, however, a good reason to think that AOA indication would have made any difference, or to start claiming that AOA indication is a "safety critical system", let alone to start blaming Boeing for not including it as standard.
You want to criticize Boeing for their legitimate fuckups, go right ahead. This isn't one of them.
And you still don't know if lack of AOA indication "is bad to us". All you know is that the newspaper man told you that these airplanes didn't have it, and that sounded scary to you. You have absolutely no clue whether such indication would have made a difference in either of these accidents, or in any others. I've already presented an argument for why they would have made absolutely no difference in either of these crashes; I've yet to see anyone present anything resembling a well informed argument for the contrary position.
Because it's always had two sensors. They're used by the autopilot. They may also be used to trigger a stall warning (not sure about the 737 specifically, it might have other ways of detecting stalls).
Because there have always only been two sensors. It isn't an issue normally because if the autopilot senses a disagreement it will usually just kick itself off and tell the pilots to fly the plane. The issue here isn't that there are only two sensors; it's that this system was designed to function without actually knowing whether the data it was getting was any good.
That's a worthy effort, but any pilot who was fighting against an out of control trim system and thought to himself "hem, let's look in the book to see what to do about my AOA indication" would be an utter retard. The correct way to deal with a malfunctioning trim system is to immediately disable electrical control of the trim system. Figuring out how to deal with faulty AOA indication wouldn't be anywhere near your top ten concerns at that point in time.
Imagine that you're driving down the highway, and suddenly your car starts to accelerate out of control. You, of course, scan the dash, see that the check engine light is on, and think to yourself "let me check the manual and see what to do about a check engine light".
That's the kind of thing you're suggesting here....
The features. Plural. Redundant 2nd sensor, comparator, and indicator. It's a package deal.
Well, sure, if you're willing to just pull "facts" out of your ass, then may as well claim that the wings were also optional. Package deal and all that.
Over in the real world, the only bits that were optional out of all the shit you named is the indication; specifically an "AOA disagree" light and actual AOA indication on the display.
So you were confused. I'll clarofy for you: we are talking about indication here, not the sensor, and not MCAS. Again, please tell me how this indication would have prevented these crashes from occurring.
Indication has the ability to override the pilots?
You seem terribly confused, but let's go with it. Please explain to me how the lack of an "AOA disagree" light overrode the pilots, and how the presence of such a light would have prevented these crashes. I can't wait to learn more!
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Did you somehow conveniently "overlook" all the Germans im there? (INB4 no true Scotsman)
You obviously don't understand how cultural enrichment works.
It's as if you're pointing to a bunch of ISIS fighters and yelling "But look, they have some white American-looking guys in there! And they married a bunch of chicks from England!"
Depends on your definition of European. Both of the YouTubers are middle eastern in origin (a Turk and an Arab) so it looks like that whole "bring in 1 million refugees" plan has succeeded in enriching Germany with some foreign culture.
They would be technically, yes :) but on the 737 the trim system moves the entire horizontal stab instead of the elevators, and I'm pretty sure that's just one surface .... though come to think of it I'm not even sure if that technically falls into the "control surfaces" category. It's certainly not one of the primaries.
That's not an engineering error, it's a safety feature. The only way the plane knows it's on the ground is via WOW switches. If those are telling you that you're not on the ground, sure, you can't use reverse thrust, which means you might hit something, and that's bad. You know what's worse? Accidentally engaging reverse thrust while you're still in the air.
One will do some damage to the plane, the other will probably kill everyone and leave a smoking crater.
The autopilot wouldn't be using the vane angle-of-attack sensor, they would be using air data and the inertial reference system
I'm going to be generous and say it may depend on the aircraft type. I've worked on several aircraft which definitely have the AOA signal feeding into the autopilot. Maybe whatever aircraft you're familiar with don't. I don't have any experience on the 737 MAX and I presume you don't either, so I can't conclusively say whether it does or not.
Finally, you have identified the real source of the problem - the media!
Incorrect; the real source of the problem is idiots who credulously believe everything they're told by a talking head with a microphone. The media wouldn't be an issue if you weren't simultaneously so gullible and so self-assured.
To be fair it's not "control surfaces", it's a single control surface. Granted it's a pretty important one.
You're right though. They went from 0.6 degrees of movement on paper to a full 5 degrees in practice. That's insane.
A second sensor that is disabled without the upgrade.
You do realize that repeating a lie multiple times doesn't actually make it true, right?
So you are saying that Canada imposing a 300% tariff on Boeing unless it accepts to build it's airplanes in Canada would be fair competition ?
It would be if Boeing received massive subsidies from the US government and then sold their airplane in Canada for less than what it costs to manfucature them. You bet your ass the Canadian government would be slappign tariffs on them.
I'm sure he'll get lots, because it's a horrible description.
For capitalism to function sanely it requires relatively sane consumers. Same as democracy requiring relatively sane voters. Either system can fail if those prerequisites aren't met.
Anyway it's not much of a concern in this case because the people screaming about this really have no clue what's going on, no idea how to fix it, and no way of knowing whether or not their wishes were followed. This goofball might be up in arms about there not being AOA indication in the cockpit, but he really has no clue why, and certainly wouldn't recognize it if I put him in front of one. A year from now he'll have forgotten all about it and will go back to buying whatever tickets are cheapest. And that works; in the end people just want cheap flights and don't want to be bothered with the details.
Communism is basically the same, except there's less competition and nobody pretends to care what the consumer wants.
I'm 5 solo hours away from mine.
That's adorable. Talk to me in a few thousand hours.
I wish I had the answer to that. It certainly seems like a pretty big screwup. I would love to be able to ask the engineers who worked on the system.
Sure, but there are literally hundreds if not thousands of sensors on a modern aircraft. Once you start down the road of "why not three?" how do you justify which of those should be triplicated?
This isn't even just an issue of adding another sensor for each system; you have to add wiring, you have to modify the boxes which read those sensors (and, hell, since the boxes are often duplicated, you'll probably want to triplicate them also), you have to add more circuit breakers ... it adds up fast. And the biggest concern isn't even cost; it's weight.
At the end of the day the aerospace industry as a whole has decided that duplication is sufficient. There has been some movement away from that recently - some of the newer Airbus aircraft have far more sensors - but this is still a rare exception rather than the rule. As we move more and more towards aircraft designed to fly themselves it may actually be a good idea to have extra sensors so that the autopilot doesn't have to kick off when there's a problem, but for human pilots the existing sensors have thusfar been sufficient.
If these aircraft had had the AOA disagree indicator and said indicator had activated in flight(the previous Lion Air flight), then when they landed the pilots would have written up that the indicator triggered and the AOA sensors would have been examined and probably replaced by the AMT overnight
Hilarious. The AOA sensor issue was present for multiple flights. It WAS reported on the previus flight, and the sensor WAS replaced. And yet none of that required an AOA disagree light.
Issues don't necessarily have to be reported by aircrew, BTW; modern aircraft have computers which record far more information than what is presented to pilots, and can be downloaded by maintenance after every flight. The 737 MAX specifically introduced a system called OMF which allows technicians to easily download all fault data each time the plane lands. I don't know if Lion Air has been doing that, but if they haven't then they should be. In my own experience working on different aircraft it is not at all uncommon for pilots to report "good plane, no issue", but for the download to show multiple problems which require repair.
It's literally nothing like that. What in the world makes you think that purchasing an "AOA disagree" light would have allowed them to easily fix the problem?
It's not the media, it's most aviation authorities that have grounded this specific model.
It's the media and uninformed laymen who are screaming about AOA indication being optional; the response from the experts/authorities is generally a shrug.
Yes, there's a reason these aircraft were grounded. The fact that two crashes which both seem to have been related to trim control happened within less than a year of each other is plenty of reason to ground them while we investigate. It is not, however, a good reason to think that AOA indication would have made any difference, or to start claiming that AOA indication is a "safety critical system", let alone to start blaming Boeing for not including it as standard.
You want to criticize Boeing for their legitimate fuckups, go right ahead. This isn't one of them.
First intelligent response. Thank you.
And you still don't know if lack of AOA indication "is bad to us". All you know is that the newspaper man told you that these airplanes didn't have it, and that sounded scary to you. You have absolutely no clue whether such indication would have made a difference in either of these accidents, or in any others. I've already presented an argument for why they would have made absolutely no difference in either of these crashes; I've yet to see anyone present anything resembling a well informed argument for the contrary position.
Because it's always had two sensors. They're used by the autopilot. They may also be used to trigger a stall warning (not sure about the 737 specifically, it might have other ways of detecting stalls).
Because there have always only been two sensors. It isn't an issue normally because if the autopilot senses a disagreement it will usually just kick itself off and tell the pilots to fly the plane. The issue here isn't that there are only two sensors; it's that this system was designed to function without actually knowing whether the data it was getting was any good.
That's a worthy effort, but any pilot who was fighting against an out of control trim system and thought to himself "hem, let's look in the book to see what to do about my AOA indication" would be an utter retard. The correct way to deal with a malfunctioning trim system is to immediately disable electrical control of the trim system. Figuring out how to deal with faulty AOA indication wouldn't be anywhere near your top ten concerns at that point in time.
Imagine that you're driving down the highway, and suddenly your car starts to accelerate out of control. You, of course, scan the dash, see that the check engine light is on, and think to yourself "let me check the manual and see what to do about a check engine light".
That's the kind of thing you're suggesting here ....
The features. Plural. Redundant 2nd sensor, comparator, and indicator. It's a package deal.
Well, sure, if you're willing to just pull "facts" out of your ass, then may as well claim that the wings were also optional. Package deal and all that.
Over in the real world, the only bits that were optional out of all the shit you named is the indication; specifically an "AOA disagree" light and actual AOA indication on the display.
So you were confused. I'll clarofy for you: we are talking about indication here, not the sensor, and not MCAS. Again, please tell me how this indication would have prevented these crashes from occurring.
Indication has the ability to override the pilots?
You seem terribly confused, but let's go with it. Please explain to me how the lack of an "AOA disagree" light overrode the pilots, and how the presence of such a light would have prevented these crashes. I can't wait to learn more!