Watch the demo. Listen to WW. Spore is not multiplayer. It is "massively singleplayer". You play the game all by your lonesome, but the game can connect online and automatically download new creatures, buildings, or entire civilizations from other players and put them into your world. They are *not* controlled by the other players, they are run automatically by the game AI. Any griefing that takes place is done to you by the computer, not some jackass 14-year-old.
You can most certainly create a site that doens't allow access to black people. Or Jews. Or fat chicks. Whatever group floats your boat. It's your private property, you can discriminate all you want.
Only public property and private property that is meant as a public gathering place such as malls are subject to anti-discrimination laws.
I'll echo another poster on this article:
"IF Google is profitting off of child porn by advertising it,
AND the law firm is profitting off of Google by suing them,
THEN the law firm is making money off of child porn."
Repeat this for any news venues that are reporting the lawsuit, etc. You can justify claiming that *anyone* is profitting off of child porn.
The important thing is if Google is willingly and purposely making money off of the exploitation of children for porn, and also if they have reasonable access to means to stop it, but are not using them.
Obviously, Google is not making child porn, so the first part is out.
As for the second part, Google's advert program is a vast, automated system. There is no way for Google to actually review every single AdWords request that goes through. That being said, they *do* stop obvious childporn stuff, and they *do* review and remove ads that are reported to them. And they do this in a timely manner.
Now, if the lawsuit were addressing what I just said specifically, it might be a different story. But the submitter of the lawsuit is a moron who admitted that he had no clue that Google had a SafeSearch filter or whether or not his own computer had a filter either.
Note - none of the methods you cited are 'breaking' the crypto. They are all bypassing it. Anything can by bypassed, but QC is truly unbreakable (assuming a truly random bit generator, no unforeseen quantum loopholes, blah blah blah...).
Even if you have a dedicated fiber link, you can't ever be quite sure that there isn't an eavesdropper. QC uses certain quantum properties to ensure that if someone does eavesdrop on the link, it'll screw up the key that you are transmitting and you'll know.
Up a bit, I have a nice detailed explanation of QC that doesn't presuppose any knowledge of quantum stuff. Hopefully it's nice and understandable - my wife hates quantum stuff and was able to understand this easily.
Unless and until we invent quantum repeaters, it will be impossible for QC to work on a traditional network - the key transmission requires an unbroken fiber link. Of course, if we do invent quantum repeaters, it renders QC useless - QC is based on every reading changing the stream, which means that any interception will result in an incorrect stream. A quantum repeater, obviously, is a device that can read a stream and retransmit it faithfully.
Re:Regarding the attraction of this species
on
An Alternate Human
·
· Score: 1
It depends. A goodly bit of attraction is genetically based - this is why you get brightly colored males and such. However, the lion's share of attraction is culturally determined. You like who you are raised around.
So, as long as the homo novus individuals were brought up around each other, they should be fine.
Wee! I just registered for Slashdot. I had posted this previously as a coward, but here it is under my own name.
First, the important thing about quantum encryption is the generation of the key. The actual message can be encrypted any old way - it doesn't matter. In this case, the key is used as a one-time pad.
Now, here's how it works:
First, you have some sort of quantum particle. The exact nature of the particle doesn't matter, you just need two different ways to encode a 0 or 1. We'll call these two methods A and B. If you encode a bit using method A, and the receiver uses method A, it should correctly tell you that the bit is a 0 or 1. If, however, the receiver attempts to use method B to decode the particle, it should randomly report a 0 or 1, so the receiver has no idea which is right.
Now, here's the method. First, the sender creates a random string of 0s and 1s, and encodes them using a random sequence of encoding methods (the A or B methods). He sends this to the receiver, who attempts to decode it with a random sequence of A or B methods. This gives the receiver a key, though anytime the receiver used a different method than the sender, the particular bit may be incorrect (50% chance). Then, the receiver sends his sequence of decoding methods to the sender, who then checks it against his sequence and tells the receiver which ones were guessed correctly.
So, now both the sender and receiver know which bits of the sequence were received successfully, and which bits were randomized by the receiver's attempt at decoding. They both ignore the randomized bits, and whatever is left over is used as the cipherkey.
Voila! Both sender and receiver have the cipherkey, and the sender then encodes the text, transmits it, and the receiver unencrypts it.
Now, why is this secure? Because of wave-function collapse. Remember when we created two methods of encoding 0s and 1s? That was very important. Due to the nature of quantum information, if you use the wrong method to decode the bit, the bit is set to whatever it happened to return. Basically, if you encode a bit with method A, then decode it with method B, it then acts like it was encoded with B forevermore. If you try using method A on it, you'll just get another random value. You can't get it back to the pre-measurement state. Thus, there are no do-overs. You measure it wrong once, and you can never try again with the other method. So, if an eavesdropper happens to ever guess wrong when the receiver guesses right, there is no way to correct the mistake. That bit is now random, with a 50% chance of being right and a 50% chance of being wrong. The eavesdropper can easily tell whether or not it's random by listening to the sender and receiver exchange decoding methods, but he can never tell what the correct value is.
Thus, if they guess wrong once, their code has a 50% chance of having one bit wrong. That's easy enough to test - just try to decode the ciphertext twice. But if they guess wrong twice, there are two random bits in their key. That means four possible keys. Three wrong guesses yields 8 possible keys. You see where this is going. If you have a long enough key, the eavesdropper is bound to guess wrong lots of times, giving him too many keys to effectively test. On average, 1/4 of the of the guesses will be wrong (1/2 will be invalid because the receiver guessed wrong, and 1/2 of the remaining will be guessed wrong by the eavesdropper), so a quarter of the guesses will be random. 30 random guesses gives a billion possible keys. 40 gives a trillion. With a codebit for every messagebit (which is how it works in the encoding scheme used by these guys), a video (which consists of millions of bits at minimum) will produce more possible keys for an eavesdropper than there are particles in the universe.
This wave-function collapse thing is how you know if an eavesdropper exists. They receive the bit, decode it with one method or another, then retransmit it. If they guessed wrong, though, then the bit they resend is random, and has a chance of being wrong. Again,
Slashdot Mirror
Watch the demo. Listen to WW. Spore is not multiplayer. It is "massively singleplayer". You play the game all by your lonesome, but the game can connect online and automatically download new creatures, buildings, or entire civilizations from other players and put them into your world. They are *not* controlled by the other players, they are run automatically by the game AI. Any griefing that takes place is done to you by the computer, not some jackass 14-year-old.
You can most certainly create a site that doens't allow access to black people. Or Jews. Or fat chicks. Whatever group floats your boat. It's your private property, you can discriminate all you want. Only public property and private property that is meant as a public gathering place such as malls are subject to anti-discrimination laws.
I'll echo another poster on this article: "IF Google is profitting off of child porn by advertising it, AND the law firm is profitting off of Google by suing them, THEN the law firm is making money off of child porn." Repeat this for any news venues that are reporting the lawsuit, etc. You can justify claiming that *anyone* is profitting off of child porn. The important thing is if Google is willingly and purposely making money off of the exploitation of children for porn, and also if they have reasonable access to means to stop it, but are not using them. Obviously, Google is not making child porn, so the first part is out. As for the second part, Google's advert program is a vast, automated system. There is no way for Google to actually review every single AdWords request that goes through. That being said, they *do* stop obvious childporn stuff, and they *do* review and remove ads that are reported to them. And they do this in a timely manner. Now, if the lawsuit were addressing what I just said specifically, it might be a different story. But the submitter of the lawsuit is a moron who admitted that he had no clue that Google had a SafeSearch filter or whether or not his own computer had a filter either.
Note - none of the methods you cited are 'breaking' the crypto. They are all bypassing it. Anything can by bypassed, but QC is truly unbreakable (assuming a truly random bit generator, no unforeseen quantum loopholes, blah blah blah...).
Even if you have a dedicated fiber link, you can't ever be quite sure that there isn't an eavesdropper. QC uses certain quantum properties to ensure that if someone does eavesdrop on the link, it'll screw up the key that you are transmitting and you'll know. Up a bit, I have a nice detailed explanation of QC that doesn't presuppose any knowledge of quantum stuff. Hopefully it's nice and understandable - my wife hates quantum stuff and was able to understand this easily. Unless and until we invent quantum repeaters, it will be impossible for QC to work on a traditional network - the key transmission requires an unbroken fiber link. Of course, if we do invent quantum repeaters, it renders QC useless - QC is based on every reading changing the stream, which means that any interception will result in an incorrect stream. A quantum repeater, obviously, is a device that can read a stream and retransmit it faithfully.
It depends. A goodly bit of attraction is genetically based - this is why you get brightly colored males and such. However, the lion's share of attraction is culturally determined. You like who you are raised around. So, as long as the homo novus individuals were brought up around each other, they should be fine.
Wee! I just registered for Slashdot. I had posted this previously as a coward, but here it is under my own name. First, the important thing about quantum encryption is the generation of the key. The actual message can be encrypted any old way - it doesn't matter. In this case, the key is used as a one-time pad. Now, here's how it works: First, you have some sort of quantum particle. The exact nature of the particle doesn't matter, you just need two different ways to encode a 0 or 1. We'll call these two methods A and B. If you encode a bit using method A, and the receiver uses method A, it should correctly tell you that the bit is a 0 or 1. If, however, the receiver attempts to use method B to decode the particle, it should randomly report a 0 or 1, so the receiver has no idea which is right. Now, here's the method. First, the sender creates a random string of 0s and 1s, and encodes them using a random sequence of encoding methods (the A or B methods). He sends this to the receiver, who attempts to decode it with a random sequence of A or B methods. This gives the receiver a key, though anytime the receiver used a different method than the sender, the particular bit may be incorrect (50% chance). Then, the receiver sends his sequence of decoding methods to the sender, who then checks it against his sequence and tells the receiver which ones were guessed correctly. So, now both the sender and receiver know which bits of the sequence were received successfully, and which bits were randomized by the receiver's attempt at decoding. They both ignore the randomized bits, and whatever is left over is used as the cipherkey. Voila! Both sender and receiver have the cipherkey, and the sender then encodes the text, transmits it, and the receiver unencrypts it. Now, why is this secure? Because of wave-function collapse. Remember when we created two methods of encoding 0s and 1s? That was very important. Due to the nature of quantum information, if you use the wrong method to decode the bit, the bit is set to whatever it happened to return. Basically, if you encode a bit with method A, then decode it with method B, it then acts like it was encoded with B forevermore. If you try using method A on it, you'll just get another random value. You can't get it back to the pre-measurement state. Thus, there are no do-overs. You measure it wrong once, and you can never try again with the other method. So, if an eavesdropper happens to ever guess wrong when the receiver guesses right, there is no way to correct the mistake. That bit is now random, with a 50% chance of being right and a 50% chance of being wrong. The eavesdropper can easily tell whether or not it's random by listening to the sender and receiver exchange decoding methods, but he can never tell what the correct value is. Thus, if they guess wrong once, their code has a 50% chance of having one bit wrong. That's easy enough to test - just try to decode the ciphertext twice. But if they guess wrong twice, there are two random bits in their key. That means four possible keys. Three wrong guesses yields 8 possible keys. You see where this is going. If you have a long enough key, the eavesdropper is bound to guess wrong lots of times, giving him too many keys to effectively test. On average, 1/4 of the of the guesses will be wrong (1/2 will be invalid because the receiver guessed wrong, and 1/2 of the remaining will be guessed wrong by the eavesdropper), so a quarter of the guesses will be random. 30 random guesses gives a billion possible keys. 40 gives a trillion. With a codebit for every messagebit (which is how it works in the encoding scheme used by these guys), a video (which consists of millions of bits at minimum) will produce more possible keys for an eavesdropper than there are particles in the universe. This wave-function collapse thing is how you know if an eavesdropper exists. They receive the bit, decode it with one method or another, then retransmit it. If they guessed wrong, though, then the bit they resend is random, and has a chance of being wrong. Again,