here's a little insight from the other side of the checkpoint:
that test has been going on since before TSA took over from the woefully inadequate system run to death by the airlines
an x-ray image is an x-ray image, and no amount of finageling with the software can alter what a trained screener sees on the monitor as far as real objects are concerned
when a test object identifies as such and clears (which didn't work this time), a record is generated regarding the pass/fail status of the screener's reaction and the screener STILL has to look for any real threats in the bag
in summary:
1. projecting innocuous items won't hide real threat items -- opaque items generate an automatic bag check
2. we are not allowed to become innured to test objects -- too many failures get a screener repremanded
personally, I regard the test software to be merely harassment by management to appear to be doing something about terrorism
Slashdot Mirror
here's a little insight from the other side of the checkpoint: that test has been going on since before TSA took over from the woefully inadequate system run to death by the airlines an x-ray image is an x-ray image, and no amount of finageling with the software can alter what a trained screener sees on the monitor as far as real objects are concerned when a test object identifies as such and clears (which didn't work this time), a record is generated regarding the pass/fail status of the screener's reaction and the screener STILL has to look for any real threats in the bag in summary: 1. projecting innocuous items won't hide real threat items -- opaque items generate an automatic bag check 2. we are not allowed to become innured to test objects -- too many failures get a screener repremanded personally, I regard the test software to be merely harassment by management to appear to be doing something about terrorism