There were SSN's of 770,000 taxpayers plus 64,000 state employees that together were 7.3% of the state population. Nowhere does it say that 7.3% of the population was working for the state government.
And if the computer can do it, he said, a baby can, too.
Really now? My computer, being a rather old and low end one can do a lot of things that I know a baby can't do,
I think you misunderstand what is being rejected. Some have argued that assembling a phonemic inventory from exposure to speech sounds is impossible for any machine, so that there must be a innate inventory of speech sounds. A machine that can assemble such an inventory from exposure is conclusive evidence that the premise of that argument is false, and therefore that the conclusion cannot be justified by that premise.
It does not demonstrate that a baby is capable of doing it, what it demonstrates is that it is not categorically impossible that a baby might do it for the reason that had been previously suggested, since that reason is demonstrably false.
It, as is the normal case of empirical science, disproves one explanation rather than proving another.
And what about this "hard wired vs soft wired" stuff? What is this supposed to prove?
It disproves the conjecture (which has apparently been a focus of some dispute without conclusive evidence previously) that this particular element of language acquisition is too complex to be done by a any possible machine in response to simply hearing language used, and therefore the knowledge must be innate and not acquired.
Since it has now been demonstrated to be possible with a computer, it is manifestly not impossible with a machine. This does not prove that the baby does it the same way that the computer does, or even that the baby does it at all. The inventory of sounds could still be innate. But it does disprove the conjecture on the basis of which it was suggested that the inventory must be innate and not acquired, and for people interested in that subject, that's not without significance.
Its not really that hard to understand. The last line of TFA sums up the significance perfectly:
"In the past, people have tried to argue it wasn't possible for any machine to learn these things, and so it had to be hard-wired (in humans)," he said. "Those arguments, in my view, were not particularly well grounded."
I guess at this point it's a matter of definitions, but I would still say we don't have the device yet. You were right; I was wrong; we do have 'Turing-Plus' devices. However, we don't know *yet* what specific Turing-plus device can give of the behavior of the human brain.
Well, yes, but that's a very different than only having available classes of devices that provably are inadequate to the task.
We can hook up cameras and thermometers to Turing machines, but somehow we haven't yet come up with AI.
Well, since we don't have a rigorous definition of what generalized AI needs to do (we have mostly negative tests, but even using our own Turing-plus minds we can't formulate a concrete description of the processing involved, and its not even clear that we could, short of actually developing AI, actually come up with such a description) we're essentially left with trial and error and attempts to mimic some of the smaller component processes without fundamentally understanding them except as black boxes. This is a hard problem where progress is understandably slow. But developments of machines that can do things that are components of intelligence that AI naysayers have, in the past, said machines could not ever do aren't that uncommon. General AI is, I suspect, always going to seem far off until and unless other limited AI technologies converge to form it; I don't think there will be a point where General AI will be widely seen as "imminent" before it occurs, because we won't understand the connections until they are made.
I'm not saying its likely at any time soon, though.
And I suspect that a Turing-plus device may not even be what gives us AI. I think we might get a device that can solve strong AI problems that contains *no* Turing machine. But, i also do believe that the human machine contains at least one Turing machine, so a complete re-creating of the mind would contain a Turing machine.
You seem to be using an odd definition of "Strong AI problem" here. If you mean the kind of problems that are conjectured to be "AI-complete" (requiring generalized human-level intelligence even if they appear to be narrower problems), then if the human machine includes a subsystem that can be modelled by a Turing machine, any machine that could solve such problems must necessarily do so as well.
But solving particular problems is what characterizes "Weak AI" in the original distinction vs. "Strong AI", which involves having characteristics like "consciousness" independent of the ability to solve particular problems.
If they're under pressure why would they say that??
What do you expect them to say if they are under pressure from users? "We hate the frigging GPLv3 and love our old license, but you stupid nasty users are all whining about it, so we're switching. Fine." You can't say someone didn't make a decision under pressure just because they announce it in terms that looks like they did for their own independent reasons. Would you reject the possibility that an official was forced out of office just because their official announcement was that they were leaving "to spend more time with the family".
No, we religious types know that intelligence can be created. But we also know that intelligence is not material in nature, and therefore that it can't be built out of material substance.
Not all of "we religious types" believe that, and arguably none could know it, even if it were true (but that quickly descends into a thorny epistemological debate.)
I don't think we coined the term though. The term was probably coined by graduate students researching with neural networks, who wanted it to sound to the girls like they were on the verge of building HAL 9000.
"Strong AI" and "Weak AI", as I recall from my Intro to Philosophy class years ago, were coined by John Searle, a philosoper. IIRC, the initial distinction was essentially metaphysical (i.e., Searle argued, in effect, that even if it could pass a Turing test, an AI could not be 'really' thinking and would still not be a 'Strong AI'). Though "Strong AI" vs. "Weak AI" is now used often to distinguish, in a very fuzzy way, the level of generality of an AI rather than the "really thinking" distinction, and frequently the two are conflated as if generality were equivalent to "really thinking".
Can you give me a few examples? Are they ones that depend on input from human beings?
Most computing devices used by humans "depend on input from human beings", however, any that have any loops between an output and an input that include a process that isn't equivalent to a Turing machine are Turing-plus without considering the human interface, even if we don't particularly have any idea to apply that to general reasoning. Heck, a modern computer where the operating system or BIOS (any software that the CPU runs, at any rate) interfaces with a heat sensor to monitor the system's temperature and control fan speeds is Turing-plus, since the output it sends to control the fan affects the input it receives on the heat sensor through a process that cannot be fully modelled by a Turing machine.
Of course, we don't apply that process for generalized reasoning, and that's true of most such output-input loops, they are usually parts of fairly-specialized control subsystems. But that's a matter of understanding ways to apply the non-Turing features that are inherent in such systems, not a matter of our present computing devices being strictly Turing machines.
It may not be deep, but it does have serious implications for AI and computers. It means that if you want to have a conversation with a computer, or have true face recognition, or solve any hard-AI problem, we have to invent a new type of machine first.
No, it doesn't.
We don't have any computing device that's *not* completely a Turing machine.
Any existing computer that has both inputs and outputs to the outside world, where the outputs can affect the inputs through intermediary physical processes that cannot be completely modeled by a Turing machine, is, if you take the whole system of interactions into account, a computing device that is not a Turing machine, even though it contains one.
We don't have any 'Turing-Plus' devices;
Actually, we have quite a lot of them. You probably have several in your home.
The compilers don't matter... what does matter is that GPL3 code is incompatible with GPL2 code so you cannot copy this code into GPL3 programs you write unless Intel re-licenses it as GPL2/GPL3 code.
That depends on what you mean by "copy". Since it uses the "runtime exception", you can link to the library in a program released under any licensing models you want, you just can't modify the library itself and distribute it other than under the GPL.
All I'm saying is that the mind is not a Turing machine (though it probably would have to have a Turing machine in it somewhere). It's a different *kind* of machine, not a super-powerful Turing machine.
Which isn't really all that deep of a statement. If you wire a computer that is a Turing machine up to an input whose source cannot itself be modelled as a Turing machine, the combined system is not a Turing machine, but contains a Turing machine. Whatever the human mind is "internally", it clearly has a wide array of environmental inputs, the sources of at least some of which we can state with some confidence can't be modelled completely by Turing machines.
The upshot of all this is the statement that the human mind, in practice, does things that a Turing machine cannot do, even if irrefutably true (I'm not sure that's a correct application of Goedel's theorems, but that's not the important question, IMO) does not suffice to refute the possibility of strong AI (that is, AI with at least the capacities of human intelligence) via digital computers with appropriate interfaces to the outside world, since such systems, while they contain Turing machines are not strictly Turing machines and may or may not, as complete systems, be limited to what a Turing machine can do.
Anyone telling you you can't use and distribute GPL'ed software commercially is in violation of the GPL.
Anyone telling you that is wrong, perhaps, but the GPL doesn't impose a universally-applicable limit on free speech which makes anyone who says it a violator of the GPL. (Someone distributing software that they got under the GPL who asserts a license term say you can't use their distribution/modification of that GPL software in commercial software might be in violation of the GPL, but most people who say that you can't do that aren't in that class, or doing so in that context.)
Incidentally, adherence to the original license would be a shield against litigation by Intel. In other words, Intel would not be permitted to rely upon modifications to the contract (in equity, under the doctrine of estoppel / detrimental reliance).
I don't think that works if the original license wasn't the one Intel distributed. If Intel distributed the original license and tried to foist a modification off, promissory estoppel might limit the effect given to the revision (or at least a shield against some remedies for violation of it), given the irrevocability term in the license.
That explanation is a fairly succinct recapitulation of the FSF position, mostly quoting and interpreting the FSF General Counsel's description. He's hardly the only lawyer that's written on the issue, and others have taken contrary views, or mixed views.
The thing is, there isn't one set of law (even in the US) that applies to determining whether an agreement is a contract, there are different ones. And the content of the written instrument isn't the only thing relevant to make that determination. Its not an entirely simple question, and there are many ways in which the GPL skates along boundaries where general pronouncements that aren't applying specific laws may not hold generally.
Its also important to note that if Moglen's position (which is highlight to rebut the idea that the GPL is risky because it might be specifically enforced to "pry open" proprietary code) is correct, the pledge by the copyright holder that the license is irrevocable may not itself by enforceable in all cases by a downstream distributor/developer, since the idea that it is rests largely on a contract foundation, since a gratuitous license (one not supported by consideration and therefore not a contract) is revocable at will in, at least, most US jurisdictions. The downstream developer/distributor might have some protection against action on revocation of the license through the doctrine of promissory estoppel, but that is not the kind of full protection that a contract obligation is.
It may also be worth noting, on the issue of risks associated with the GPL as a pure license, that, expressly under US law, only a signed nonexclusive licenses prevails against a transfer of the underlying copyright (17 USC 205(e)).
Thus, I expect that a court would find that Intel would be bound to the verbatim GPLv2 (which has "or any later version")
No, if anything, in that case, Intel would be guilty of copyright violation on the license. Forcing them to adhere to the original license (assuming their product doesn't incorporate anything licensed under the unmodified license) would be an extraordinarily improbable remedy, in that case.
But, anyway, you're wrong: the GPLv2 doesn't contain an "or any later version" clause, it has a provision (in Section 9) that, among other things, specifies what rules apply if a Program released under the GPLv2 itself specifies "or any later version". IOW, it gives those using the license the option of including an "or any later version" clause. But, since this Intel release chooses not to take that option, those rules don't apply. Intel has chosen not to buy into future versions of the GPL sight-unseen.
Convincing, well argued - and entirely irrelevant. The GPL is a license, not a contract.
Actually, whether the GPL is generally a contract or a "pure" license is a matter about which there has been no small amount of debate in legal circles, and the answer in specific cases may depend not only on the jurisdiction whose law applies, but also the situation of the parties in a particular case. But, in any case, contract principles are often applied to a degree in the construction of agreements that are not contracts.
There are no mutually agreed terms
Yes, there are. Mutual agreement is established by acceptance of an offer. The GPL is expressly an offer, and expressly states how it may be accepted. The terms are, therefore, mutually agreed through offer and acceptance.
no goods or services exchanged for monies or in kind, no penalties for non-delivery, no exit clauses.
While the first of those items is a way to meet a requirement for a valid contract (consideration), none of those is categorically a requirement for a contract.
I mean outside of it being "it's a neat thing I can do to it", it's not going to have serious practical implications for 99.9% of users.
Slashdot is called "News for nerds" not "News for 99.9% of users".
It's neat, sure, but I don't see this sort of hack as being the Holy Grail for making the phone better that so many people think it is.
"Better" is subjective. For people who would want to run things like Python, Apache, and Vim (or things those enable) on their multifunction handheld gadget (which, I expect, is a much higher percentage of the Slashdot audience than it is of the general public), it certainly is the Holy Grail for making the iPhone better. For other people, perhaps not so much.
I know this comes as a great surprise, but the OSes and processors this runs on are limited [intel.com]. If you want your programs to run on non-Intel platforms, or on any of the BSDs, I suggest you skip it and use something else.
Since its GPLv2 rather than closed, to the extent that it is a useful library and easier to adapt to other processors/OS's than implement the API or an equally useful one from scratch, there is at least the potential of community-driven implementations for other environments.
Ok, copyrights apply to derivative works. But how do you prove it is a derivative work if they won't tell you?
The same way you prove most things in a legal dispute, with evidence which tends to reinforce that conclusion even if it is isn't conclusive. Legal proof isn't the same thing as logical proof.
As it has been mentioned before in many threads, anytime the ability is given to verify your vote at a later time opens the ability for fraud as well.
This is true in many cases, but its quite possible to have a system where the voter has the information to verify their vote, but no one else can with any certainty verify the voters vote, even with the voters receipt. Of course, such a system necessarily cannot be used to by the voter to challenge the results if their is fraud, it can only provide personal confidence (which is valuable in itself.)
Not so, fortunately. Think about it. You can verify a signed object against a public key without knowing who owns the corresponding private key. There is nothing in the key pair itself which carries identity.
Of course, someone know who owns the corresponding private key, unless identity is not provided in order to have the key issued, or the key and the provided identity are never connected in the process.
Even the threat that they might be connected covertly by government could have a distorting effect on voting, even if the system in fact managed to wall the identity and key off from each other so that they were not associated.
There are ways around this in voting systems, but one must be careful, since they both need to be secure, reliable, and anonymous and be seen to be secure, reliable, and anonymous.
I think what it means is that you automatically get a license unless you belong to that group of violators
It may intend that, but there is no such express restriction in Section 10. The problem is the license at sometimes seems to treat itself as a license agreement (a thing that is offered and accepted in particular transactions), and sometimes reads more as if it views itself as a kind of universal law under which people have rights independently of particular transactions, under which people have rights independent of particular transactions.
This isn't entirely surprising since it comes from people who view its provisions essentially as reflecting universal moral principles that they seek to enforce by leveraging copyright and license law.
So, you can copyright source code, no problem. I know there is a bit of confusion about the meaning of the term "derivative work" and here's an example.
Let's say I have a trivial program, say, "Hello World" or something like that. What exactly is the copyrighted bit here? Is it the source - that is, the exact language representation used - say, C++ or Pascal or Assembly?
Certainly.
Or is it the instructions generated by that source?
Provided that you (the copyright holder) generate them (by running the compiler/linker/etc.), certainly, they are included as part of the original copyrighted work (or perhaps another copyrighted work, the distinction is probably unimportant in most cases, though for copyright time limits it may be important if the source is recompiled differently at a later time.)
How many different source code versions of "hello world" can compile into the same executable?
An infinitely large number. But copyrights aren't patents, so if someone else happens to generate the same executable from their own independently developed source that I developed from my copyrighted source, we could both have copyright on our own soure, and each have a independent copyright to the identical executable.
The reason I'm not sure it's the "instructions generated by that source" is because that means that the copyright can extend to things that do not yet exist.
Copyrights do extend to things that don't exist at the time the original work is created; all derivative works, for instance, by definition do not exist when the original work is created, yet are covered by copyright.
Let's say I have a copyrighted bit of code. Then let's say that some guy comes along 3 years later and writes, for a brand-new architecture that didn't exist when I obtained my copyright, in a different language, some library that performs the functionality of my code and compiles it. Now let's say someone compiles my code on the new machine and the compiled version of my library is the same as the "independently developed" code (which is possible in certain cases).
So here's the question - did the guy developing for the new architecture violate my original copyright or not?
No, because while identical, the code is not in fact derived from your original expression. This is where copyrights differ from patents (aside from the kind of things they apply to), because the latter covers even independent inventions, while copyright only protects copies, not coincidences.
It's quite important, because if you can only copyright source code and not the binaries - then that is an interesting situation. If the copyright really applies to the compiled binaries that's another interesting situation. It seems, however, that the current take is that it applies to both things simultaneously.
It applies to both, but not to independently developed works, however similar (though proving that a work is independently developed may be a challenge if the similarities are so strong as to make coincidence seem unlikely.)
Another odd situation - what happens if I reverse-compile a copyrighted program and then distribute the reverse compilation. I generated a new, different work than the original source code and a different "work" than the compiled binary. Or did I?
You did create a new, different work. However, it is a derivative work, and thus probably violates copyright unless some special exception applies.
Is that different than me going to a museum and sketching The Scream?
No, not really.
The only conclusion I can make at this point is that the artificial constructs of copyright need some work.
Slashdot Mirror
Is your reading comprehension:
There were SSN's of 770,000 taxpayers plus 64,000 state employees that together were 7.3% of the state population. Nowhere does it say that 7.3% of the population was working for the state government.
I think you misunderstand what is being rejected. Some have argued that assembling a phonemic inventory from exposure to speech sounds is impossible for any machine, so that there must be a innate inventory of speech sounds. A machine that can assemble such an inventory from exposure is conclusive evidence that the premise of that argument is false, and therefore that the conclusion cannot be justified by that premise.
It does not demonstrate that a baby is capable of doing it, what it demonstrates is that it is not categorically impossible that a baby might do it for the reason that had been previously suggested, since that reason is demonstrably false.
It, as is the normal case of empirical science, disproves one explanation rather than proving another.
It disproves the conjecture (which has apparently been a focus of some dispute without conclusive evidence previously) that this particular element of language acquisition is too complex to be done by a any possible machine in response to simply hearing language used, and therefore the knowledge must be innate and not acquired.
Since it has now been demonstrated to be possible with a computer, it is manifestly not impossible with a machine. This does not prove that the baby does it the same way that the computer does, or even that the baby does it at all. The inventory of sounds could still be innate. But it does disprove the conjecture on the basis of which it was suggested that the inventory must be innate and not acquired, and for people interested in that subject, that's not without significance.
Its not really that hard to understand. The last line of TFA sums up the significance perfectly:
Well, yes, but that's a very different than only having available classes of devices that provably are inadequate to the task.
Well, since we don't have a rigorous definition of what generalized AI needs to do (we have mostly negative tests, but even using our own Turing-plus minds we can't formulate a concrete description of the processing involved, and its not even clear that we could, short of actually developing AI, actually come up with such a description) we're essentially left with trial and error and attempts to mimic some of the smaller component processes without fundamentally understanding them except as black boxes. This is a hard problem where progress is understandably slow. But developments of machines that can do things that are components of intelligence that AI naysayers have, in the past, said machines could not ever do aren't that uncommon. General AI is, I suspect, always going to seem far off until and unless other limited AI technologies converge to form it; I don't think there will be a point where General AI will be widely seen as "imminent" before it occurs, because we won't understand the connections until they are made.
I'm not saying its likely at any time soon, though.
You seem to be using an odd definition of "Strong AI problem" here. If you mean the kind of problems that are conjectured to be "AI-complete" (requiring generalized human-level intelligence even if they appear to be narrower problems), then if the human machine includes a subsystem that can be modelled by a Turing machine, any machine that could solve such problems must necessarily do so as well.
But solving particular problems is what characterizes "Weak AI" in the original distinction vs. "Strong AI", which involves having characteristics like "consciousness" independent of the ability to solve particular problems.
What do you expect them to say if they are under pressure from users? "We hate the frigging GPLv3 and love our old license, but you stupid nasty users are all whining about it, so we're switching. Fine." You can't say someone didn't make a decision under pressure just because they announce it in terms that looks like they did for their own independent reasons. Would you reject the possibility that an official was forced out of office just because their official announcement was that they were leaving "to spend more time with the family".
Most computing devices used by humans "depend on input from human beings", however, any that have any loops between an output and an input that include a process that isn't equivalent to a Turing machine are Turing-plus without considering the human interface, even if we don't particularly have any idea to apply that to general reasoning. Heck, a modern computer where the operating system or BIOS (any software that the CPU runs, at any rate) interfaces with a heat sensor to monitor the system's temperature and control fan speeds is Turing-plus, since the output it sends to control the fan affects the input it receives on the heat sensor through a process that cannot be fully modelled by a Turing machine.
Of course, we don't apply that process for generalized reasoning, and that's true of most such output-input loops, they are usually parts of fairly-specialized control subsystems. But that's a matter of understanding ways to apply the non-Turing features that are inherent in such systems, not a matter of our present computing devices being strictly Turing machines.
No, it doesn't.
Any existing computer that has both inputs and outputs to the outside world, where the outputs can affect the inputs through intermediary physical processes that cannot be completely modeled by a Turing machine, is, if you take the whole system of interactions into account, a computing device that is not a Turing machine, even though it contains one.
Actually, we have quite a lot of them. You probably have several in your home.
That depends on what you mean by "copy". Since it uses the "runtime exception", you can link to the library in a program released under any licensing models you want, you just can't modify the library itself and distribute it other than under the GPL.
Which isn't really all that deep of a statement. If you wire a computer that is a Turing machine up to an input whose source cannot itself be modelled as a Turing machine, the combined system is not a Turing machine, but contains a Turing machine. Whatever the human mind is "internally", it clearly has a wide array of environmental inputs, the sources of at least some of which we can state with some confidence can't be modelled completely by Turing machines.
The upshot of all this is the statement that the human mind, in practice, does things that a Turing machine cannot do, even if irrefutably true (I'm not sure that's a correct application of Goedel's theorems, but that's not the important question, IMO) does not suffice to refute the possibility of strong AI (that is, AI with at least the capacities of human intelligence) via digital computers with appropriate interfaces to the outside world, since such systems, while they contain Turing machines are not strictly Turing machines and may or may not, as complete systems, be limited to what a Turing machine can do.
Anyone telling you that is wrong, perhaps, but the GPL doesn't impose a universally-applicable limit on free speech which makes anyone who says it a violator of the GPL. (Someone distributing software that they got under the GPL who asserts a license term say you can't use their distribution/modification of that GPL software in commercial software might be in violation of the GPL, but most people who say that you can't do that aren't in that class, or doing so in that context.)
I don't think that works if the original license wasn't the one Intel distributed. If Intel distributed the original license and tried to foist a modification off, promissory estoppel might limit the effect given to the revision (or at least a shield against some remedies for violation of it), given the irrevocability term in the license.
That explanation is a fairly succinct recapitulation of the FSF position, mostly quoting and interpreting the FSF General Counsel's description. He's hardly the only lawyer that's written on the issue, and others have taken contrary views, or mixed views.
The thing is, there isn't one set of law (even in the US) that applies to determining whether an agreement is a contract, there are different ones. And the content of the written instrument isn't the only thing relevant to make that determination. Its not an entirely simple question, and there are many ways in which the GPL skates along boundaries where general pronouncements that aren't applying specific laws may not hold generally.
Its also important to note that if Moglen's position (which is highlight to rebut the idea that the GPL is risky because it might be specifically enforced to "pry open" proprietary code) is correct, the pledge by the copyright holder that the license is irrevocable may not itself by enforceable in all cases by a downstream distributor/developer, since the idea that it is rests largely on a contract foundation, since a gratuitous license (one not supported by consideration and therefore not a contract) is revocable at will in, at least, most US jurisdictions. The downstream developer/distributor might have some protection against action on revocation of the license through the doctrine of promissory estoppel, but that is not the kind of full protection that a contract obligation is.
It may also be worth noting, on the issue of risks associated with the GPL as a pure license, that, expressly under US law, only a signed nonexclusive licenses prevails against a transfer of the underlying copyright (17 USC 205(e)).
No, if anything, in that case, Intel would be guilty of copyright violation on the license. Forcing them to adhere to the original license (assuming their product doesn't incorporate anything licensed under the unmodified license) would be an extraordinarily improbable remedy, in that case.
But, anyway, you're wrong: the GPLv2 doesn't contain an "or any later version" clause, it has a provision (in Section 9) that, among other things, specifies what rules apply if a Program released under the GPLv2 itself specifies "or any later version". IOW, it gives those using the license the option of including an "or any later version" clause. But, since this Intel release chooses not to take that option, those rules don't apply. Intel has chosen not to buy into future versions of the GPL sight-unseen.
Actually, whether the GPL is generally a contract or a "pure" license is a matter about which there has been no small amount of debate in legal circles, and the answer in specific cases may depend not only on the jurisdiction whose law applies, but also the situation of the parties in a particular case. But, in any case, contract principles are often applied to a degree in the construction of agreements that are not contracts.
Yes, there are. Mutual agreement is established by acceptance of an offer. The GPL is expressly an offer, and expressly states how it may be accepted. The terms are, therefore, mutually agreed through offer and acceptance.
While the first of those items is a way to meet a requirement for a valid contract (consideration), none of those is categorically a requirement for a contract.
Or maybe just the time it takes to get them on the slow boat from the Brazil plant to Sweden to you.
Uh, really? That suggests that there are better $150 laptops on the market for Linux users that can load Linux on a laptop.
Slashdot is called "News for nerds" not "News for 99.9% of users".
"Better" is subjective. For people who would want to run things like Python, Apache, and Vim (or things those enable) on their multifunction handheld gadget (which, I expect, is a much higher percentage of the Slashdot audience than it is of the general public), it certainly is the Holy Grail for making the iPhone better. For other people, perhaps not so much.
Since its GPLv2 rather than closed, to the extent that it is a useful library and easier to adapt to other processors/OS's than implement the API or an equally useful one from scratch, there is at least the potential of community-driven implementations for other environments.
The same way you prove most things in a legal dispute, with evidence which tends to reinforce that conclusion even if it is isn't conclusive. Legal proof isn't the same thing as logical proof.
Of course, someone know who owns the corresponding private key, unless identity is not provided in order to have the key issued, or the key and the provided identity are never connected in the process.
Even the threat that they might be connected covertly by government could have a distorting effect on voting, even if the system in fact managed to wall the identity and key off from each other so that they were not associated.
There are ways around this in voting systems, but one must be careful, since they both need to be secure, reliable, and anonymous and be seen to be secure, reliable, and anonymous.
It may intend that, but there is no such express restriction in Section 10. The problem is the license at sometimes seems to treat itself as a license agreement (a thing that is offered and accepted in particular transactions), and sometimes reads more as if it views itself as a kind of universal law under which people have rights independently of particular transactions, under which people have rights independent of particular transactions.
This isn't entirely surprising since it comes from people who view its provisions essentially as reflecting universal moral principles that they seek to enforce by leveraging copyright and license law.
Certainly.
Provided that you (the copyright holder) generate them (by running the compiler/linker/etc.), certainly, they are included as part of the original copyrighted work (or perhaps another copyrighted work, the distinction is probably unimportant in most cases, though for copyright time limits it may be important if the source is recompiled differently at a later time.)
An infinitely large number. But copyrights aren't patents, so if someone else happens to generate the same executable from their own independently developed source that I developed from my copyrighted source, we could both have copyright on our own soure, and each have a independent copyright to the identical executable.
Copyrights do extend to things that don't exist at the time the original work is created; all derivative works, for instance, by definition do not exist when the original work is created, yet are covered by copyright.
No, because while identical, the code is not in fact derived from your original expression. This is where copyrights differ from patents (aside from the kind of things they apply to), because the latter covers even independent inventions, while copyright only protects copies, not coincidences.
It applies to both, but not to independently developed works, however similar (though proving that a work is independently developed may be a challenge if the similarities are so strong as to make coincidence seem unlikely.)
You did create a new, different work. However, it is a derivative work, and thus probably violates copyright unless some special exception applies.
No, not really.
Given your admitted ignorance of copyright,
Perhaps one could believe that slashdot isn't a hive mind.
Its strange that the most prominent accusation of Slashdot groupthink are from people alleging that the groupthink is self-contradictory.