What's wrong with our school system that so many kids prefer working 40 hours a week instead?
While there is plenty, at least arguably, wrong with our schools, the most likely reason people would drop out of high school to work is that there is something wrong with our economy where increasingly families can't adequately provide for children while they are in school; the economy that has been doing well in aggregate terms hasn't been doing well in distributional terms.
Of course no OPEC nations are going to get in on this. It's in their interest that this project fail.
Certainly not true of OPEC countries like Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, who've amassed massive overseas investments by using their oil wealth intelligently, and therefore do quite well (perhaps even better; certainly Kuwait did prior to the Iraqi invasion in 1990—one of the reasons for that invasion, in fact—though some of its wealth went into postwar rebuilding) when oil prices are lower than when they are higher.
Most likely, no OPEC nations are involved because they weren't invited; still, as it gets closer to practical commercialization, I'm sure that some OPEC states will find ways to invest in commercial fusion and its supporting industries: not doing so, of course, would be suicide.
And the ASCII problem isn't just bad because it forces people to use inefficient encodings like UTF-8 (THREE bytes per character?)
UTF-8 can actually take up to four bytes per character (or 6 using the apparently-common, from the Unicode FAQ, but nonstandard, conversion of characters that take "surrogates" in UTF-16 into pairs of three-byte sequences instead of single four-byte sequences in UTF-8.)
But ASCII dependency has little to do with the number of bytes required, representing lots of characters does; if you can find a way to communicate characters in a 21-bit character set with an integer number of bytes less than 3 in all cases, that's pretty impressive.
UTF-8 is actually particularly efficient because of ASCII compatibility, when the data is mostly latin text, since in that case it is mostly 1 byte per character.
I'd like to know exactly who is insisting on this "inclusiveness".
Countries "in the Middle East and Asia", probably in part because they use non-Latin alphabets without a single universally accepted mapping to the Latin alphabet so that Latin-alphabet names are extremely inconvenient.
Sometimes, compromises have to be made for the sake of practicality, even if those compromises aren't culturally sensitive. For example, the internationally accepted language for civilian air communications is English. Can you imagine the result if everyone insisted talking only their own language?
Familiarity of domain names (and URLs more generally) to people who speak a different language from the domain operator is not anything at all like consistency of safety messages in air traffic.
If we're going the internationalization route with domain names, I'd say we'd be better off just using IP numbers. Domain names were supposed to make navigating to (and remembering) web sites more convenient
And internationalization does that: not all users are, after all, English users, and internationalization allows those selecting domains to select domains that are convenient for their intended audience.
Yeah, its bad when people are detached from reality and create their own realities. Though, really, I wonder why Bill O'Reilly is more worked up about video gamers than, say, people that think like this:
"We're an empire now, and when we act, we create our own reality. And while you're studying that reality--judiciously, as you will--we'll act again, creating other new realities, which you can study too, and that's how things will sort out. We're history's actors . . . and you, all of you, will be left to just study what we do."
One might argue that granting the message board defamation immunity is a way to encourage (or at least not discourage) speech
One might, but as is apparent from the labels of both the broad title of law (the "Communications Decency Act") and the specific applicable subsection ("Protection for "Good Samaritan" blocking and screening of offensive material"), encouraging free speech is the precise opposite of Congress' intent with this liability shield, it was indeed intended to discourage content that Congress didn't like. Congress just made the judgement lies which demonstrably cause specific harm to specific people were less undesirable than nekkid pictures on the internet, and decided to protect the former in the hopes that it might promote actions which would limit exposure to the latter.
Publishers like newspapers, magazines and tv broadcasters are held liable for everything that their employees produce, post, and broadcast, so why shouldn't those who publish materials on the web be held to a similar standard?
"Shouldn't", I dunno, but they don't get the same treatment because they were clever enough to go to Congress and convince them that immunizing them against libel liability would somehow be useful to protecting kids against pornography. The broad liability shield in the CDA was specifically lobbied-for on the basis that it would protect online services using (and, in the process, republishing the descriptions published by) content blocking/screening services from liability for defamatory false descriptions provided by those services, and thereby encourage online services to make use of content blocking systems to protect children from "harmful" matter.
This may also set new precedents for libel in print. Newspapers and publishers can now simply claim a piece was submitted by a third-party...
Except publishers of newspapers will have a lot of trouble arguing that they aren't the publishers of the information, whereas online services and their users are, explicitly, under federal statute, legally defined as not being "publishers" or "speakers" of information they make available online if that information originated with someone else.
This case applied a very specific statutory liability shield. "Offline" publishers are the class from which online services and their users are distinguished by the statute in question, so this ruling is extremely unlikely to have any weight at all as legal precedent for any immunity for offline publishers.
If I am understanding this correctly then it is quite different from the normal case of the carrier (unmoderated host,search engine,forum,blog...) being immune from being sued but it is now also making the the poster of content (aka the person who actually put it on the site) immune as well, now only leaving the person who first created the content liable (and they can hide behind anonminity)
This is correct.
If this is case it is a very very bad ruling which turns the web from a place where "freedom of speech is allowed" to a place where "freedom to lie without repercussions is allowed"
I agree that it is "bad" in the sense of being an undesirable result, OTOH, I dont think it is "bad" in the sense of being legally incorrect. The plain language of the Communications Decency Act immunizes users of online systems from liability as the "publisher" or "speaker" (thus barring slander/libel liability) for online-published material where the information originated with a third party, under any circumstances. Presuming the constitutionality of that portion of the CDA (which seems likely under the Insterstate Commerce Clause), any state law libel liability that would exist for such publication is preempted by federal law, and the court had no choice but to rule as it did.
It may be a bad law, but it is not the job of a state court (or any court in the US system), to judge whether a law is "good" or "bad" so long as it is within the Constitutional power of the legislative body that made the law.
Working at a University, this is not a subject I'm not unfamiliar with.
I think you intended a double, rather than triple, negative here, though, in that case, you could have just avoided negation altogether and said, "Working at a University, this is a subject I'm familiar with."
If it was "rather clearly" a case of copyright infringement, then every single computer shop and manufacturer on the planet is going to jail for installing Windows XP onto their clients computers.
That's at least the third time that argument's been made in this thread. And it is still wrong: both because OEM licenses specifically allow such loading (so manufacturer's have express permission to do that, and aren't forced to attempt to rely on "fair use" or any other exception to copyright), and, on top of that, there is an express exception to copyright separate from "fair use" allowing making a copy of a computer program (and only a computer program) that is essential to the use of that program with a particular machine (see 17 USC 117), even without express permission from the copyright holder.
IANAL, but I did work at mp3.com. AFAIK, any copying of copywrited work in a commercial setting violates copywright.
This is not true. Obviously, copying with the copyright holder's permission does not, even in a commercial setting. Now, commercial purpose weighs against a finding of "fair use" (but does not, in and of itself, preclude such a finding) when you are attempting to rely on that particular exception to copyright instead of acting with the permission of the copyright holder.
There are also other exceptions to copyright besides fair use, some of which are applicable in commercial settings (though none appear to be directly relevant to the DVD-iPod ripping service at issue here.)
Installing Windows as you describe is within a specific exception which exists solely for computer programs (and not other copyright-protected works) at 17 USC 117, and which allows the owner to make or authorize the making of a copy that "is created as an essential step in the utilization of the computer program in conjunction with a machine".
They can argue that in court that they are making an archival copy of each DVD they have in inventory,
A (movie) DVD is probably not a computer program under copyright law, and (aside from the special rules applicable to libraries or archives, which don't apply to this kind of company), the only exception for archival copying in copyright law is for computer programs (17 USC 117).
Your computer shop down the street is allowed to sell a copy of Windows pre-installed on a machine, if they include the original CD, right?
Not because of copyright law that is broadly applicable beyond computer programs, but because (1) the license for Windows specifically grants that right, and (2) there is a special provision of copyright law allowing making a copy or adaptation of a computer programs necessary to run the program in the ordinary way.
But its not copying by the end user for noncommercial use. Its copying for commercial purposes by a vendor, which is rather clearly a violation of copyright.
It is the merchant who performs the copying -- note that he is neither in possession of the original copy nor of the one generated, the end user is -- who is making money.
Yes, and it is the merchant who is making the copy, for commercial purposes, and then transferring possession of both the original and the copy to the end user. Which is precisely why any case law that protects noncommercial copying performed by the end user doesn't protect this action (not that the case law is really clear on this particular type of format shifting even if it was done by the end user for noncommercial purposes.)
If what you say is true, Kinko's and all other copiers would be shut down.
No, if what I say is true, Kinko's and all other commercial copying services would not be protected in making copies of copyright-protected materials without permission of the copyright holder by exceptions to copyright protection which allow end-users to make copies for noncommercial purposes. Of course, you'll notice that (1) there are few such exceptions applicable to printed material in the first place, and (2) Kinko's and other commercial copying services generally have policies that require anyone seeking to use their services to make copies of copyright-protected material to also provide documentation of consent of the copyright holder for the copying, where they aren't the copyright holder.
Really, Kinko's is irrelevant to the issues in this case.
ER, the problem is that this isn't within that exception, since its not about the device, but the use to make a recording (which itself doesn't stop it from being protected), but:
(1) its not an audio or digital music recording, but movies, (2) the use to make the recording is not "by a consumer of such a device or medium", (3) the use is not "noncommercial".
Anyone of those three would be enough to make the provision you quote inapplicable.
If I do this format shifting copy myself its 'fair use'
Maybe. There is a little case law on "space shifting", but it can be distinguished from format shifting being done here, so its not clear that "format shifting" is clearly "fair use" to start with, legally.
but if I think its a pain and would rather pay a service to go through the effort for me then it isn't fair use anymore
When it stops being noncommercial, personal copying for personal use, the case for considering it "fair use" gets considerably weaker.
But I thought it was understood as far as copyright goes that the purchaser (licensee) of a work make a copy for their own use on the understanding that if they resell the original then the copy must be transferred with the original or destroyed.
This is not generally the case, though there are specific rules very much along those lines for computer programs when either necessary for use or a single archival copy, and somewhat different rules allowing copying by libraries and archives.
No, copyright is about making money distributing copies.
Its about both, and even doing either without making money, which is why all of those are exclusive rights protected under copyright.
The one doing the copying is not making a copy of their own DVD, they are making a copy of the customer's DVD for the customer.
Right. They are selling the service of making the copy along with the goods (the source and target media.) It therefore is not noncommercial copying by the end-user for personal use, and insofar as there may be exceptions for noncommercial format-shifting for personal use (a disputed point!) that would cover DVD ripping, this is not covered by them.
Making a backup copy of a copyrighted work is completely legal and is explicitly spelled out in copyright law.
Really, where? At least in the US, this is a popular myth, not a fact: "a library or archives" has a right to make backup copies with certain limits (see 17 USC 108), and the making of an archival copy of a computer program is expressly allowed (17 USC 117), but this is not generally the case for copyrighted works.
If you don't own or don't know how to run a CD burner, is paying someone to make the backup copy for you illegal?
Since the exception for archival copies states "... it is not an infringement for the owner of a copy of a computer program to make or authorize the making of another copy or adaptation of that computer program provided...", probably not, where it is legal to make a backup in the first place.
Not that the copy being made here is for archival purposes, nor would a court probably find that it is of a computer program, though that's less clear. (A DVD contains principally, of course, one or more audiovisual works, it also includes some instructions that might make it a computer program. I don't know if whether the 17 USC 117 exception applies to DVDs has been litigated.)
There's a reason the MPAA is invoking the DMCA, and that's because the DMCA is what makes breaking encryption illegal even if the actions performed thereafter are legal under copyright law.
No, because the MPAA is charging infringement as well as DMCA violation and seeking remedies for both; the DMCA expressly does not change the scope of any of the provisions or exceptions to infringement, so adding the DMCA claim does nothing to help their other claims.
"It shall be legal for the LEGAL OWNER of the original distributed copy of a DVD, CD, or other media, including legally purchased or aquired electronic media downloaded from the interent or other distribution meduim, to make AS MANY COPIES, IN AS MANY DIFFERENT FORMATS as the owner wishes, to support their personal use. Ownership of any of these copies is dependent upon ownership of the original distribution copy: IF the DVD, CD or other original distributed copy is sold of given away, ALL copies made from that original or generational copies thereof, regardless of format and storage medium, must accompany the original distribution copy, or be destroyed immediately upon transfer of the original." Very simple, crafted in plain English, and does not in any way undermine copyright.
Actually, it does, unless you include a notice requirement of the status of copies to the recipient, who otherwise has either (1) just become free to distribute all the copies separately, or (2) will be held accountable for a law he could not have known he was violating (and if the law is phrased the second way, chances are the courts will enforce it the first way.)
More importantly, the prohibition of copying is the core of copyright (hence the name), because as a practical matter the proliferation of copies virtually guarantees that they become dispersed.
Even more importantly, your provision wouldn't allow what was being done here, because the initial format-shifted copies were not made to support anyone's "personal use", they were made to add resale value to a commercial product.
Much as this sounds like a convenient service, I think the MPAA is completely legally right here: making copies is an exclusive right under copyright, so this is a regular copyright violation; copies for noncommercial format shifting purposes by the end-user might be "fair use"—IIRC, format-shifting hasn't been conclusively litigated—but that's not what is happening here. And DVD copy protection is pretty clearly covered under the DMCA, and bypassing it is a DMCA violation.
Should the law be changed to allow this? Perhaps, certainly I wouldn't object to deep sixing the DMCA, or to writing some kind of reasonable express format-shifting protection into the law, though its difficult to craft without undermining copyright entirely (unless you require destruction of the original before transfer.)
Your first example doesn't address any kind of practical performance, its a vague handwave about processing power of the Core 2 Duo vs. the Cell.
In the second, the poster of the same article posts, in the thread, a breakdown which is specifically a cost effectiveness comparison, though the initial comment seemed more general.
If those are the best examples you can find, I'd suggest your "rebutting" a strawman.
And if these people go into the cattle cars, those instituting this ethnic cleansing will be most happy to remove them "by other means".
Likewise with those who have advocated "transfer" from the Israeli side.
But the main reason that people associated with the hard line tend to win elections, when they are held, on both sides is that the mass of the people, on either side, is quite happy living in peace with the other side, but sees their own hardliners as the only people willing to get tough enough to deal with the other sides hardliners, even if they don't agree with the underlying motivation of the hardliners they vote for.
The fundamental problem is establishing trust between the mainstream on both sides, because without that, the other side will always seem more of a threat then each sides own hardliners seem to the mainstream on each side (and, yes, the the Palestinian mainstream is probably more radicalized than the Israeli mainstream, because Israel's victimization by real terrorism notwithstanding, the civilian Palestinian population has been the victim of far worse.)
In contrast, the call for such ethnic cleansing against Israel is a very strong position among several major players in that area.
The major players—that is, the states egging on the conflict—seek to perpetuate the conflict because it gives their population something to be angry about besides their own totalitarian regimes. But the "major players" aren't the people at the center of the fight, they are people using the fight to advance an unrelated agenda.
Unless you get beyond them and deal with the legitimate interest of the mainstream on both the Israel and the Palestinian side, you do nothing but play into the hands of the very same people you would criticize for embracing the rhetoric of genocide.
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While there is plenty, at least arguably, wrong with our schools, the most likely reason people would drop out of high school to work is that there is something wrong with our economy where increasingly families can't adequately provide for children while they are in school; the economy that has been doing well in aggregate terms hasn't been doing well in distributional terms.
Certainly not true of OPEC countries like Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, who've amassed massive overseas investments by using their oil wealth intelligently, and therefore do quite well (perhaps even better; certainly Kuwait did prior to the Iraqi invasion in 1990—one of the reasons for that invasion, in fact—though some of its wealth went into postwar rebuilding) when oil prices are lower than when they are higher.
Most likely, no OPEC nations are involved because they weren't invited; still, as it gets closer to practical commercialization, I'm sure that some OPEC states will find ways to invest in commercial fusion and its supporting industries: not doing so, of course, would be suicide.
UTF-8 can actually take up to four bytes per character (or 6 using the apparently-common, from the Unicode FAQ, but nonstandard, conversion of characters that take "surrogates" in UTF-16 into pairs of three-byte sequences instead of single four-byte sequences in UTF-8.)
But ASCII dependency has little to do with the number of bytes required, representing lots of characters does; if you can find a way to communicate characters in a 21-bit character set with an integer number of bytes less than 3 in all cases, that's pretty impressive.
UTF-8 is actually particularly efficient because of ASCII compatibility, when the data is mostly latin text, since in that case it is mostly 1 byte per character.
Countries "in the Middle East and Asia", probably in part because they use non-Latin alphabets without a single universally accepted mapping to the Latin alphabet so that Latin-alphabet names are extremely inconvenient.
Familiarity of domain names (and URLs more generally) to people who speak a different language from the domain operator is not anything at all like consistency of safety messages in air traffic.
And internationalization does that: not all users are, after all, English users, and internationalization allows those selecting domains to select domains that are convenient for their intended audience.
One might, but as is apparent from the labels of both the broad title of law (the "Communications Decency Act") and the specific applicable subsection ("Protection for "Good Samaritan" blocking and screening of offensive material"), encouraging free speech is the precise opposite of Congress' intent with this liability shield, it was indeed intended to discourage content that Congress didn't like. Congress just made the judgement lies which demonstrably cause specific harm to specific people were less undesirable than nekkid pictures on the internet, and decided to protect the former in the hopes that it might promote actions which would limit exposure to the latter.
"Shouldn't", I dunno, but they don't get the same treatment because they were clever enough to go to Congress and convince them that immunizing them against libel liability would somehow be useful to protecting kids against pornography. The broad liability shield in the CDA was specifically lobbied-for on the basis that it would protect online services using (and, in the process, republishing the descriptions published by) content blocking/screening services from liability for defamatory false descriptions provided by those services, and thereby encourage online services to make use of content blocking systems to protect children from "harmful" matter.
Except publishers of newspapers will have a lot of trouble arguing that they aren't the publishers of the information, whereas online services and their users are, explicitly, under federal statute, legally defined as not being "publishers" or "speakers" of information they make available online if that information originated with someone else.
This case applied a very specific statutory liability shield. "Offline" publishers are the class from which online services and their users are distinguished by the statute in question, so this ruling is extremely unlikely to have any weight at all as legal precedent for any immunity for offline publishers.
This is correct.
I agree that it is "bad" in the sense of being an undesirable result, OTOH, I dont think it is "bad" in the sense of being legally incorrect. The plain language of the Communications Decency Act immunizes users of online systems from liability as the "publisher" or "speaker" (thus barring slander/libel liability) for online-published material where the information originated with a third party, under any circumstances. Presuming the constitutionality of that portion of the CDA (which seems likely under the Insterstate Commerce Clause), any state law libel liability that would exist for such publication is preempted by federal law, and the court had no choice but to rule as it did.
It may be a bad law, but it is not the job of a state court (or any court in the US system), to judge whether a law is "good" or "bad" so long as it is within the Constitutional power of the legislative body that made the law.
I think you intended a double, rather than triple, negative here, though, in that case, you could have just avoided negation altogether and said, "Working at a University, this is a subject I'm familiar with."
That's at least the third time that argument's been made in this thread. And it is still wrong: both because OEM licenses specifically allow such loading (so manufacturer's have express permission to do that, and aren't forced to attempt to rely on "fair use" or any other exception to copyright), and, on top of that, there is an express exception to copyright separate from "fair use" allowing making a copy of a computer program (and only a computer program) that is essential to the use of that program with a particular machine (see 17 USC 117), even without express permission from the copyright holder.
This is not true. Obviously, copying with the copyright holder's permission does not, even in a commercial setting. Now, commercial purpose weighs against a finding of "fair use" (but does not, in and of itself, preclude such a finding) when you are attempting to rely on that particular exception to copyright instead of acting with the permission of the copyright holder.
There are also other exceptions to copyright besides fair use, some of which are applicable in commercial settings (though none appear to be directly relevant to the DVD-iPod ripping service at issue here.)
Installing Windows as you describe is within a specific exception which exists solely for computer programs (and not other copyright-protected works) at 17 USC 117, and which allows the owner to make or authorize the making of a copy that "is created as an essential step in the utilization of the computer program in conjunction with a machine".
A (movie) DVD is probably not a computer program under copyright law, and (aside from the special rules applicable to libraries or archives, which don't apply to this kind of company), the only exception for archival copying in copyright law is for computer programs (17 USC 117).
Not because of copyright law that is broadly applicable beyond computer programs, but because (1) the license for Windows specifically grants that right, and (2) there is a special provision of copyright law allowing making a copy or adaptation of a computer programs necessary to run the program in the ordinary way.
Neither of these is applicable to DVDs.
But its not copying by the end user for noncommercial use. Its copying for commercial purposes by a vendor, which is rather clearly a violation of copyright.
Yes, and it is the merchant who is making the copy, for commercial purposes, and then transferring possession of both the original and the copy to the end user. Which is precisely why any case law that protects noncommercial copying performed by the end user doesn't protect this action (not that the case law is really clear on this particular type of format shifting even if it was done by the end user for noncommercial purposes.)
No, if what I say is true, Kinko's and all other commercial copying services would not be protected in making copies of copyright-protected materials without permission of the copyright holder by exceptions to copyright protection which allow end-users to make copies for noncommercial purposes. Of course, you'll notice that (1) there are few such exceptions applicable to printed material in the first place, and (2) Kinko's and other commercial copying services generally have policies that require anyone seeking to use their services to make copies of copyright-protected material to also provide documentation of consent of the copyright holder for the copying, where they aren't the copyright holder.
Really, Kinko's is irrelevant to the issues in this case.
ER, the problem is that this isn't within that exception, since its not about the device, but the use to make a recording (which itself doesn't stop it from being protected), but:
(1) its not an audio or digital music recording, but movies,
(2) the use to make the recording is not "by a consumer of such a device or medium",
(3) the use is not "noncommercial".
Anyone of those three would be enough to make the provision you quote inapplicable.
Maybe. There is a little case law on "space shifting", but it can be distinguished from format shifting being done here, so its not clear that "format shifting" is clearly "fair use" to start with, legally.
When it stops being noncommercial, personal copying for personal use, the case for considering it "fair use" gets considerably weaker.
This is not generally the case, though there are specific rules very much along those lines for computer programs when either necessary for use or a single archival copy, and somewhat different rules allowing copying by libraries and archives.
Its about both, and even doing either without making money, which is why all of those are exclusive rights protected under copyright.
Right. They are selling the service of making the copy along with the goods (the source and target media.) It therefore is not noncommercial copying by the end-user for personal use, and insofar as there may be exceptions for noncommercial format-shifting for personal use (a disputed point!) that would cover DVD ripping, this is not covered by them.
Really, where? At least in the US, this is a popular myth, not a fact: "a library or archives" has a right to make backup copies with certain limits (see 17 USC 108), and the making of an archival copy of a computer program is expressly allowed (17 USC 117), but this is not generally the case for copyrighted works.
Since the exception for archival copies states "... it is not an infringement for the owner of a copy of a computer program to make or authorize the making of another copy or adaptation of that computer program provided...", probably not, where it is legal to make a backup in the first place.
Not that the copy being made here is for archival purposes, nor would a court probably find that it is of a computer program, though that's less clear. (A DVD contains principally, of course, one or more audiovisual works, it also includes some instructions that might make it a computer program. I don't know if whether the 17 USC 117 exception applies to DVDs has been litigated.)
No, because the MPAA is charging infringement as well as DMCA violation and seeking remedies for both; the DMCA expressly does not change the scope of any of the provisions or exceptions to infringement, so adding the DMCA claim does nothing to help their other claims.
Actually, it does, unless you include a notice requirement of the status of copies to the recipient, who otherwise has either (1) just become free to distribute all the copies separately, or (2) will be held accountable for a law he could not have known he was violating (and if the law is phrased the second way, chances are the courts will enforce it the first way.)
More importantly, the prohibition of copying is the core of copyright (hence the name), because as a practical matter the proliferation of copies virtually guarantees that they become dispersed.
Even more importantly, your provision wouldn't allow what was being done here, because the initial format-shifted copies were not made to support anyone's "personal use", they were made to add resale value to a commercial product.
So I don't think you solved the problem posed.
You are mistaken. The first sale doctrine means that the purchaser is free to transfer the physical copy they have received, not to make copies of it.
Much as this sounds like a convenient service, I think the MPAA is completely legally right here: making copies is an exclusive right under copyright, so this is a regular copyright violation; copies for noncommercial format shifting purposes by the end-user might be "fair use"—IIRC, format-shifting hasn't been conclusively litigated—but that's not what is happening here. And DVD copy protection is pretty clearly covered under the DMCA, and bypassing it is a DMCA violation.
Should the law be changed to allow this? Perhaps, certainly I wouldn't object to deep sixing the DMCA, or to writing some kind of reasonable express format-shifting protection into the law, though its difficult to craft without undermining copyright entirely (unless you require destruction of the original before transfer.)
Your first example doesn't address any kind of practical performance, its a vague handwave about processing power of the Core 2 Duo vs. the Cell.
In the second, the poster of the same article posts, in the thread, a breakdown which is specifically a cost effectiveness comparison, though the initial comment seemed more general.
If those are the best examples you can find, I'd suggest your "rebutting" a strawman.
Likewise with those who have advocated "transfer" from the Israeli side.
But the main reason that people associated with the hard line tend to win elections, when they are held, on both sides is that the mass of the people, on either side, is quite happy living in peace with the other side, but sees their own hardliners as the only people willing to get tough enough to deal with the other sides hardliners, even if they don't agree with the underlying motivation of the hardliners they vote for.
The fundamental problem is establishing trust between the mainstream on both sides, because without that, the other side will always seem more of a threat then each sides own hardliners seem to the mainstream on each side (and, yes, the the Palestinian mainstream is probably more radicalized than the Israeli mainstream, because Israel's victimization by real terrorism notwithstanding, the civilian Palestinian population has been the victim of far worse.)
The major players—that is, the states egging on the conflict—seek to perpetuate the conflict because it gives their population something to be angry about besides their own totalitarian regimes. But the "major players" aren't the people at the center of the fight, they are people using the fight to advance an unrelated agenda.
Unless you get beyond them and deal with the legitimate interest of the mainstream on both the Israel and the Palestinian side, you do nothing but play into the hands of the very same people you would criticize for embracing the rhetoric of genocide.