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There. I've quoted my law. Care to quote the law you've based your opinion on?

Heh, my opinion is based on the same law actually. Lets look at how lawyers, courts, and the legal system actually treat it...

http://nationalparalegal.edu/p...

excerpt:

For example:

Tiger, an avid golfer, goes down to the local course and begins to play. He intends for his first shot to land on the fairway and the shot lands perfectly in the middle of the fairway. Unfortunately, and unbeknownst to Tiger, the land that the fairway is on does not belong to the golf course. It belongs to Arnold. Tiger will be liable here because he intended for the ball to land on Arnoldâ(TM)s property. It is true that Tiger did not know that the fairway was on Arnoldâ(TM)s property but, for purposes of intent, Tiger did intend to hit the ball onto Arnoldâ(TM)s property. Therefore, he is liable.

As you can see from this example, the intrusion onto the plaintiffâ(TM)s land can be committed by personal entry onto the property, or it can be committed by causing some object (or another person) to enter the property. See Rogers v. Board of Road Commissioners 30 N.W.2d 358 (Mich. 1948).

http://www.lawteacher.net/lect...

TRESPASS TO LAND
DEFINITION

Trespass to land occurs where a person directly enters upon another's land without permission, or remains upon the land, or places or projects any object upon the land.

Here's another... this time an actual appeals case:

http://caselaw.findlaw.com/ma-...

Since 1981, the defendants have owned and operated a private golf course in Rehoboth known as the Middlebrook Country Club (Middlebrook). â In the late 1990's, the plaintiffs moved into newly constructed homes adjacent to the ninth hole of the course. â After moving into their homes, both plaintiffs discovered that errant golf balls struck by golfers playing the course came onto their properties with alarming frequency, and after unsuccessfully attempting to negotiate a mutually acceptable resolution with the defendants, the plaintiffs âsought injunctive relief and damages in the Superior Court. â After a trial without a jury, a judge of that court concluded that the defendants' operation of the golf course did not support the plaintiffs' nuisance claim, denied the requested relief, and directed entry of judgment dismissing the complaint.3 âBecause the recurrent entry by golf balls onto the plaintiffs' properties constitutes a continuing trespass, we conclude that the trial judge erred in denying injunctive relief âSee Hennessy v. Boston, 265 Mass. 559, 561, 164 N.E. 470 (1929); âFenton v. Quaboag Country Club, Inc., 353 Mass. 534, 538, 233 N.E.2d 216 (1968).

emphasis mine... plenty of others.

The criminal code as written has LONG been interpreted by the courts to treat a 'the person enters or remains on or in property of another' as including invasions by objects that the person controls.

At this point, I think you've got to agree with me that the drone can absolutely be ruled a trespass to land if it is low enough to violate the property owners airspace. What exactly that height is, is up in the air, but court precedent including one to the supremes give us property rights to at least 80'

A direct cause means, if I take action A, then the result is B. There is no other factor that influences the process. If I drink a quart of concentrated sulfuric acid, nothing about my mental state, previous training or knowledge or physical ability will change the resulting course of events.

An indirect (or if you'd like some finer shades of grey, Proximate, Unforeseeable, and Remote Causes) cause is one that is a contributing factor. Some small number of people who ingest cannabis, when combined with OTHER FACTORS, do things that are stupid, or possibly dangerous or deadly to themselves or others. Tens of thousands of people ingest cannabis every day, without jumping out of windows or hurting themselves or others in any way. Actually, "tens of thousands" is probably a very low estimate. According to a 2013 National Survey on Drug Use and Health, there were 19.8 million past-month users.

If cannabis use was a direct cause of people jumping out windows, or harming themselves or others, why are there so few such incidents when compared to the rate of usage?

Yes, in the USA you can craft _valid_ contracts, that are against the law.

Um, no, you can't

... He is guilty. He admits what he's done. We can argue about what the law should be, but not what the law is. It's illegal to take classified documents...

A legitimate defense to any accusation of a crime is the necessity defense. Basically, it means if you have to commit a smaller crime to prevent a greater wrong, then what you did is excusable and not even a crime. For example, if you have a passenger in your car who is bleeding to death, and while you are headed to the hospital you encounter a red light, legally, you can run the light and you would *not* be breaking the law.

Show me one of these hiring contracts signed by a minor and not their legal guardian. This is a problem many child actors face; contracts that their legal guardians signed are binding to them even if they had no knowledge or willingness to participate in the contract. There are certain contracts minors can sign but they are limited.

There are a 6 exceptions to the warrant requirement.

http://nationalparalegal.edu/conlawcrimproc_public/protectionfromsearches&seizures/extowarrantreq.asp

As I understand, the Constitution gives Congress the power to create executive offices, the President the power to appoint, Congress the power to confirm, and the Judiciary the power to review. The power to appoint and to remove go hand-in-hand, so the president can fire an appointee almost at will. Congress could slow down removal through forced testimony but couldn't actually block it. Congress could also dissolve the office itself except those designated by the Constitution. The only power they have to remove an individual officer would be through impeachment. I was surprised to learn that Congress could theoretically impeach any executive officer. Some useful info here: http://nationalparalegal.edu/conlawcrimproc_public/federalism/presidentialpowers.asp

The cumulative effect argument discussed above was firmly established by the Court in Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942). 7 U.S.C.S. 1281 and 1340 (the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938) established production quotas for wheat farmers and imposed a penalty on excess production. Filburn, a farmer in Montgomery County, Ohio, was not engaged in growing wheat for commercial purposes on a large scale. Instead, he grew wheat “to sell a portion of the crop; to feed part to poultry and livestock on the farm, some of which is sold; to use some in making flour for home consumption; and to keep the rest for the following seeding.” Wickard at 114. Under the Act, Filburn’s 1941 allotment was 11.1 acres of wheat, for a total of approximately 223 bushels. But Filburn harvested 23 acres in total, which yielded 239 bushels in excess of his quota. In accordance with the Act he was subject to a penalty of 49 cents per bushel, which he refused to pay. Wickard is important because while Filburn harvested more than double his quota it is nonetheless clear that his extra 239 bushels of wheat could not, of itself, have any significant impact on interstate commerce. Furthermore, the excess wheat in question was not intended to be placed into the stream of commerce, but rather was to be used primarily for home consumption. The rationale for finding Congressional authority to regulate this activity pursuant to the Commerce Clause comes from cumulative effect that many similar farmers raising wheat for their personal use would have on the demand for wheat purchased in the marketplace. “Home-grown wheat in this sense competes with wheat in commerce [and] would have a substantial effect in defeating and obstructing the purpose of the Act". Wickard at 128-129. So even if an activity in itself does not have a substantial effect on interstate commerce, Congress may still regulate the activity if there is a substantial cumulative economic effect on interstate commerce.

See: http://nationalparalegal.edu/conlawcrimproc_public/CongressionalPowers/SubstantialEffect.asp