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Have a look at Process software's PreciseMail if you want a commercial solution.
We use it and it really does wonders for my inbox.

And please, don't be put off by VMS because DCL = your first exposure to a VMS system - feels more awkward than bash (in many ways, it certainly is!). It's in the underlying architecture of the OS where the fruits of tight engineering are really demonstrated.

Not quite true. The Messaging component is by far the best part of this solution. We still continue to use iMS 5.x (iPlanet Messaging Server from Sun). By default there is no open relays and it supports RBLS. The iMS 5.2 p2 version also supports SpamAssassin/Brightmail. Much of the code for this platform comes from PMDF http://www.process.com/ and these people "know" mail servers.

The stability, security and scalibility of this messaging server is amazing!!! In fact, bigger ISP's (such as Shaw, still continue to use iMS on their backend mail servers).

The messaging server contains:

- SMTP Server (this was mainly from code from pmdf)

- Web Server (this is a stripped down, yet quite powerful version of the Netscape/Sun (iPlanet) Web server which runs ME (or Messaging Express). It's the webmail component of this platform. Extremely fast, efficient and can run circles around any PHP/JAVA webmail solution.

- Mail Store (this is derived from work on cyrus imapd). There are many utils that allow you to backup, manage, and export users (which are kept in the LDAP db)

If given a choice, I would pick iMS (or in this case Netscape/Redhat's OpenSourced solution anytime!!). If you browse around to the public mailing list archives located at http://ims.balius.com/, you'll see folks who have mail volume of over 10 million email/hr.

This is by far the most fantastic piece of software which has really never been marketed properly.

Erm, you're not using DCL correctly. You wanted to remove older versions of the file? You wanted the "PURGE" command, not DEL.
Like most things computery, it helps to use the correct command.

"...OpenVMS and IRIX aren't."

You are overlooking the fact that most OpenVMS installations use third party TCP/IP stacks, generally Multinet or TCPware from Process Software (the CMU stack being largely defunct now), which do not suffer from this defect. This is largely because the initial implementation of DEC's TCP/IP stack, UCX, was buggy as hell and lacked many features, although it is finally starting to catch up.

Not that it matters much anyway. This predictable ISN weakness only threatens systems configured to trust others based solely upon their IP address (a bad idea). The only ways to crack a properly configured OpenVMS system currently involve (1)physical access to the console, (2) "social hacking" (tricking someone into telling you their password), or (3) packet sniffing for protocols which pass unencrypted passwords such as POP3 and telnet (easily solved by disabling such nonsecure protocols); three vulnerabilities which pose a threat to any OS, no matter how well designed. Nice having an OS which cannot be compromised via buffer overflow exploits (OpenVMS discards data from buffer overflows and raises an exception, always. Overflowing data cannot be executed).

"...OpenVMS and IRIX aren't."

You are overlooking the fact that most OpenVMS installations use third party TCP/IP stacks, generally Multinet or TCPware from Process Software (the CMU stack being largely defunct now), which do not suffer from this defect. This is largely because the initial implementation of DEC's TCP/IP stack, UCX, was buggy as hell and lacked many features, although it is finally starting to catch up.

Not that it matters much anyway. This predictable ISN weakness only threatens systems configured to trust others based solely upon their IP address (a bad idea). The only ways to crack a properly configured OpenVMS system currently involve (1)physical access to the console, (2) "social hacking" (tricking someone into telling you their password), or (3) packet sniffing for protocols which pass unencrypted passwords such as POP3 and telnet (easily solved by disabling such nonsecure protocols); three vulnerabilities which pose a threat to any OS, no matter how well designed. Nice having an OS which cannot be compromised via buffer overflow exploits (OpenVMS discards data from buffer overflows and raises an exception, always. Overflowing data cannot be executed).

"...OpenVMS and IRIX aren't."

You are overlooking the fact that most OpenVMS installations use third party TCP/IP stacks, generally Multinet or TCPware from Process Software (the CMU stack being largely defunct now), which do not suffer from this defect. This is largely because the initial implementation of DEC's TCP/IP stack, UCX, was buggy as hell and lacked many features, although it is finally starting to catch up.

Not that it matters much anyway. This predictable ISN weakness only threatens systems configured to trust others based solely upon their IP address (a bad idea). The only ways to crack a properly configured OpenVMS system currently involve (1)physical access to the console, (2) "social hacking" (tricking someone into telling you their password), or (3) packet sniffing for protocols which pass unencrypted passwords such as POP3 and telnet (easily solved by disabling such nonsecure protocols); three vulnerabilities which pose a threat to any OS, no matter how well designed. Nice having an OS which cannot be compromised via buffer overflow exploits (OpenVMS discards data from buffer overflows and raises an exception, always. Overflowing data cannot be executed).