Red Hat 'Piranha' Security Risk - And Fix
patrixmyth writes "A default password of "Q" in the standard Red Hat 6.2 installation of the Piranha module opens a Web server to intrusion, according to Internet Security Systems. The problem was discovered during a review of Open Source code, and the fix is already available. Another victory for Open Source!
The MSNBC article is here.
The fix is here, or you could just reset the password yourself for the Piranha module."
Pray tell, what default password would have been safe?
Even if it had been 2048 characters of line noise, the fact that it was the default password means that anyone else using the same software knows what it is.
Safety does not lie in more difficult default passwords; safety lies in changing default passwords after you install the software.
--
Sheesh, evil *and* a jerk. -- Jade
As far as I can understand that, "Piranha" is not installed by default and you have it only if you *want* it; and once you took the pain to install it, the least thing would be to change the default password.. is it really a backdoor or a lazy user? If s/he's got enough insight to install the thing in the first place, that seems quite unprobable to me that s/he would leave it at that.
God did not appoint us to suffer wrath but to receive salvation through our Lord Jesus Christ --1Thes5:9
There have been a few responses to this, which I'd like to draw together:
1) The victory is that the problem was found. It was found quickly, before any damage was done, and it was found expressly because a member of the community had free and easy access to the code.
The gentleman who found the flaw frets that "Anybody else who's viewed the source code could have found the vulnerability and been exploiting it all along," but this ignores the community-spiritedness of opensource as well as the loose lips of most crackers. Things like this go public. And. . .
2) The problem can be fixed, in a variety of ways, by anyone. No waiting for patches from The Source.
3) This reflects very well on open source. But it is a blow to Redhat.
If a Linux for serious hackers shipped with a few holes, the make-rs might reasonably claim that their product wasn't meant to be polished and perfect (they'd be asses not to abase themselves and offer a fix, though).
But Redhat,, which even more than other distros claims to make Linux easy and user-friendly, desperately needs to be just that. They're the ones who should be allowing users to trade up-to-the-minute kewlness for reliability and security. There's no shame in that, but there is shame in doing it badly.
Summary:
Redhat screwed up. Open source fixed it.
- Michael Cohn
The bad do bad because the bad is rewarded. The good do good because the good is rewarded.
-----
Go ahead, blame me... I voted for Nader!
Would any good sysadmin allow beta (0.4) code on a production box? ...
Which brings up another point ... If RedHat or any of the other distros want to avoid this type of hype, include only production-quality code in the distro.
Porco RossoSilpon Designs
Scented Paper Products
!seineew era sreenigne erawkcalS
Another victory maybe... but what stupid arse done that in the first place? Yes, I know, people make mistakes all the time. However, if we want open source to be taken seriously, we at least need to try. Look at how many people laughed at the Microsoft Web Server backdoor not long ago. Isn't this error just as idiotic?
Now weary traveller, rest your head. For just like me, you're utterly dead.
So what do we have now?
Instead of kicking Rhat's but for slack in Quality Control we sing praises to open source. This is getting fscking out of hand. Slashdot has to get some bias control after all.
Baker's Law: Misery no longer loves company. Nowadays it insists on it
http://www.sigsegv.cx/
Microsoft "backdoor": Hurray for open source!
Redhat backdoor: Hurray for open source!
Now the question is, will ESR write an article about the dangers of Open Source? Or will the open source community set another wonderful hypocritical example?
A great example of this is if an application needs to create a temporary file. Temp directories are publically accessible, they need to be. But this means more than one user has access to them (if your OS can handle multiple users :) and this provides a place where malicious users can interfere. There's a lot of bending over backwards you can do to detect or avoid the problem, but the so-called experts seem to think that everybody should learn every trick and apply it manually. Why not provide API calls that allow a programmer to SecureFileOpen() and get a secure open file?
So, I haven't read the source for this Piranha web admin package to see why the default password Q was in there, but I suspect the coder working on it put it in as a convenience to herself for development purposes, so she could test things without having to create accounts every time. But, every app with passwords needs to do this because it is just as tedious as for every programmer. So why not build pseudo test accounts into the platform just for this purpose, rather than into the app?
Anyone that doesnt change a non-unique, default password, that is documented 8 ways from sunday, deserves whatever he gets.
-=Bob
Okay, hands up anyone that's never used software that creates an account with a dumb password when it's intsalled?
:-)
:-)
Two notable examples are Oracle's database (I've been told that it's set to change_this by default - my apologies if that is no longer the case), and MS SQL Server (the admin account has no password set by default - we were using it like that for at least the first 6 months that I was at the company before someone thought to change it...)
There is absolutely no reason whatsoever for creating an account with either no password or a default one. To not prompt the user to enter a password smacks of laziness and/or thoughtlessness. Someone at RedHat needs to have a good, long talk to whoever there is responsible about good security practice. Unfortunately, the same can be said of a good few other companies, too.
As for the second flaw, that you can cause arbitrary commands to be executed by the user running the web server when using piranha to change the password, that is utterly inexcusable. Assuming that the server is not running as root, then it is not too serious, (as long as you don't mind your website being deleted/defaced), but it displays an almost breathtaking lack of thought on the part of the person responsible.
I assume that the password is changed by way of a call to passwd, and that the "hack" is to append a "; arbitrary commands go here" to the end of the password field. If this is the case, then why on earth isn't the string checked for that sort of thing?
This has to be the oldest way of attacking a web site in the book; ever since the concept of CGIs was invented, people have been trying to get arbitrary commands run on servers in this way. (Another common first attack is to do a similar thing to any input field that looks like it'll be used to construct an SQL query - just end the field with '; (single-quote semi-colon) and insert your own commands. A coleague and I very nearly had one of our SQL servers play ball when we did it to one of the sites that he'd developed using SiteServer Commerce edition - the code being executed was in a SiteServer module, not something that he'd written. IIRC it was only the max length being set on the field that stopped us, and we couldn't be bothered to write a perl script to bypass the html page...)
I know that everyone makes mistakes, but this really is very basic stuff indeed. I'm no security expert, and even I know about it
In this day and age of entire businesses depending on the security of machines that are open to attack 24/7 (and have to be up 24/7, too), people really do need to be more security conscious.
Okay, rant over - I just needed to get that off my chest
Cheers,
Tim
It's official. Most of you are morons.
Quote from the story: A second flaw, also discovered by Internet Security Systems, could then allow a user to gain full control of the computer. In this second flaw, an intruder working inside the Piranha console can select the "change password" option, then tack a line of computer instructions on the end of the new password. The code, which can do anything the Web server itself can do, will then be executed by the computer, according to researcher Allen Wilson, who discovered both flaws.
This is the serious part of the security issue, obviously. Just resetting the password, as is suggested above, is not going to solve the problem.
========
<sig>Guvf vf abg n frperg zrffntr
I just read the article on ZDNN, and knew that something like that would come up here at Slashdot. Oh man, this is a victory for open source??!?! Just a few days ago tons of people were bashing Microsoft for a very minor security hole. And I mean really bashing Microsoft.
So this "backdoor" comes up, minor also, but it would apppear quite a bit more serious then MS's. And what do we get? That's a victory! We found the bug! That's why open source is king! Jeez people, that's one big way of making open source look bad, and I mean really bad. Is it all just the hype and total biasing?
If we want to bring more respect to the Open Source initiative, then we have to treat these things the same way another OS is treated. If we don't, then it just helps to convince the world that it's just all hype.
You know, there should be a contest. I'd love to stick in a mischievious backdoor and see if people could find it in thousands/millions of lines of code.
I do not understand where the security hole is.
I use 'Q' as password really often, it is a FAR better password that 'E' or 'W'. Trust me, with 'Q' you are secure, don't be afraid.
Fetchez la vache !