Handing Over Root Passwords to Clients and Contractors?
waa asks: "I have a client who's system I remotely administer. This particular machine has been up performing its various duties 'problem-free' for 4 months (since last kernel patch/fix). The client has, on-site, a consultant who pretends to know things he certainly does not know; Linux systems administration for one, and they now have requested the root password. Since it is their system, I'd imagine they have every right to the root account, however I know for sure that as soon as this is handed over, things will start to mysteriously malfunction, and I will get an emergency call to get them back in service (or worse, I will be blamed; ie: back-stabbed). I'd rather not have to troubleshoot and fix a completely preventable, and possibly complex problem. What are peoples' experiences regarding this situation? How have you handled it? Is some form of 'release from responsibility' contract in order? I need some advice soon" In situations like this, communication with the client is important. If you ever run into a situation like this, talking to the client and informing them of the potential problems is always a good idea. If any problems happen afterward. Start documenting them, and pass them back to the actual client if things start to become a problem. Anyone else care to weigh in?
First backup the hole system as is and keep a copy for yourself. If that isn't possible, backup the configuration files and any data files you can fit.
Tripwire is your friend. Run tripwire on all files (even ones known to change). Save the tripwire file on both the system and keep a backup copy. When you get a support call you can use this to check what the guys have changed. For the most part you can run tripwire without checking checksums, just length, data, perms, etc. This will give you a list of new, changed, and deleted files. Not doing the chacksums lessens some of the utility of tripwire, but it gets you a list fast as tripwire dosen't have to read the file in.
Security tool can be used for your bennifit. They aren't just for security. When administering systems for developers who have root I always use tripwire on their systems. Often it tells me what they are changing so I can keep on top of their needs.
Not sure about in private environments, but in academia-land, we (previous position) setup a tiered support level.
... that's in academia-land, where customers aren't paying (at least here). Tell your client, "if he fubars the machine, don't look at me" ... whether they go with that or not, who knows. doesn't hurt to ask
Tier 1: only we (comp supp group) have the root pw. for nt, we would also be the only ones with the local admin password
Tier 2: root password is shared. on nt, local admin password is shared, or they (customer) has the local admin password and we still have domain admin rights; all 9x machines and macs
Tier 3: we have no root/admin access at all.
Depending on the tier determined when we would get to them. If a grad student installs some software and hoses the machine, but it's tier 3, it may be a few weeks until we get to it. tier 1 machines we'd get to that day, or the next. tier 2 was generally in a few days.
Like I said
Change the name of the user with UID 0, and create a user account called "root". :)
Give them the password
GM hires EDS to do all their sys admin stuff. They wrote it into the contract that GM doesn't have the root password, only EDS. However, some machines that are not EDS maintained only GM has the password. There may be other machines where GM and EDS share the password.
In any case, anytime only EDS has the password, these are the machines that get maintained in the most timely manner. Machines where EDS does not have the root password, or where the root password is shared don't get as much service. So it is to GM's advantage to have most of their machines be purely EDS managed, as those are the machines where the serivce level agreements are pretty much guaranteed.
My journal has hot
Aside from the legal implications involved in "making a backup of the system", it woul dbe a good idea to have everything you consider important backed up for safe keeping now. Especially configs, dbs, etc...
Also, you shouldn't have a problem setting a fake root via chroot and jail. From what you've mentioned about the experience lvel of the thier local tech, he/she/it probably won't know the difference...
Finally, in a perfect situation you wouldn't have to keep clients that you wouldn't believe you for problems that they may have caused, but you've made the right step by recognize the chance of it happening. I would recommend alerting them to the implications of having shared admins on production machines... It leads to more technological and social subversion, and by explaining the downfalls of and your concerns, you may find they rethink their decision...
- tre
http://piclabs.com
Express your concern about stability to your client. Find out from your client what they want to use the password for. Explain the difference between routine administration (e.g. adding users) and server maintenance (e.g. kernel patches) and suggest that you set-up psuedo root access for routine tasks and then backup the files the psuedo account can change.
It is not uncommon to provide clients with a 'root' account that lets them configure the services they use (e.g. POP3, Samba) without giving full access to things like 'make'. Understanding how to do this is left as an exercise for the reader.
Some people have a way with words, and some people, um, thingy.
I've been working as a student systems administrator for a computer lab at Cornell for the last 3 years on linux and NT systems. We've got lots of students with root access to some machines quite critical to the operation of the lab. We have had, on many occasions, situations where a lack of communication and multiple people working on the same project/server/whathaveyou, shall I say, stepped on eachother's toes. I'm not sure if we ever implemented any of these, but I've done some thinking about it! (especially after a day's worth of work on a config file gets blown away by a vi edit from another guy with root who doesn't know what he's doing....) Anyway, here's a few things you could do...
1) Set up a cron job to backup configuration files
You could either write a simple script to tar up
2) Use the "wheel" group
to allow only certain users to perform administrative functions on files you chown root.wheel. You could also do this for a "web" group (#chgrp -R web
3) Setup sudo
Edit
4) Use process accounting
5) Set up a simple kerberos5 installation
This allows you to give root [or any other administrative-type account function] access to certain users via a ".k5login" file. This allows you [root] to simply add users who are allowed root access [to kerberized services] by putting their principal [system user account name] in root's
6) Tell them to make backups before they change anything or implement a CVS system
on all config files that anyone would want to changeCVSing config files would force documentation and allow you to revert to any previous incarnation of your system if something somehow "broke."
Hope this helps!
You need, notarized and in writing, an admission from them that everything is working fine right now, another stipulation of all the things that can go wrong when running as root, and that they fully understand and accept those dangers, and you need a lawyer to make sure it's worded so that it'll stand up in court.
You're in the crosshairs of fate. Time to shop for Kevlar.
I see even classic Slashdot is now pretty much unusable on dial up anymore.
The system belongs to the customer. It's just root. Give it to them. If it breaks, you fix it. If they break it, you fix it. That's what you get paid for.
How many people do stupid things to their cars? Have you ever heard a mechanic consider not giving a customer his keys after a repair has been made? Of course not. The mechanic would go out of business. Your job is to fix computers. Do it.
To protect your reputation, however, make sure there are no direct root logons. By making folks logon as themselves first then su'ing to root, you know whose pecker tracks are all over the issue.
InitZero
Find out if sudo will be sufficient. Sudo can be setup to allow any given user to have "rootly powers", except that everything is logged.
Check out the related Ask Slashdot Keeping Audit Trail of Activities from Root Login?.
I'd certainly get busy and cobble together a "System As Built" document. Describe the server, its configuration, and its functions as completely and concisely as you can. Think of it as a "snapshot" of the system on the day you last had control of it. Try not to leave anything out. Deliver it to your client with a memo saying you can't be responsible for any changes made from this point forward. Remind him of your bill rate without making any further comments.
Tedious? You bet! But you may find such an as-built document goes a long way towards covering your posterior if and when it's left flapping in the breeze.
Then go ahead and hand over the access with a clear mind. Relax and consider that you'll probably be called in to restore order.
Consultants do this quite a bit.
Anne
DUCT TAPE: The Election Supervisors' Secret Weapon
If you do use it for root, make sure it is available in single user mode, or on your primary disk so that you are able to access your system if it goes down. Just a little warning. You can include the script command in your shell rc files in /etc, or place it directly on the user, and have it save the script to /var/log/scripts/(user).(date). This will show everything in the session, including VT100 interactive applications, like IRC and such.
Great way to have time stamped logs, and it's even great to know what changes you made at midnight the night before, in case you forget the next day. Look into it!
Hope this helps,
Pat
My view is sure, give them the root password, but if they want the root password, then they can read root's email.
I find that when we *DO* turn over root/administrator password to customers, that the person its turned over to, has previous experence with unix type boxen. Mostly AS/400 programers oddly........
At my workplace, I have a lot of trouble with clients who think they know what they're doing, but always end up screwing everything. I usually get the blame for everything that happens(I hate this job sometimes), but keeping some logs and some system documentation has saved my butt more than a few times. Luckily for me, my clients have no root access to my Linux systems (or else I'd already be dead), but your case is a very difficult one.
Now, I know you get paid to fix computers, and it _is_ your job to fix this machine in case it breaks, but what about the blame factor?
This "consultant" could very well place the blame on you for anything that happens to the system while he is logged on as root, and this may jeopardize your job...
So keep logs of everything, create some system documentation, backup, get a lawyer, revise your contract... do everything in your reach to protect yourself from a sneaky "consultant"...
No, seriously, I just come here for the articles.
Looking at this from the point of view of the "customer", I think it would definitely be in one's best interest to possess the root password even if you didn't plan to ever use it.
Without it, you are "hostage" to whoever set the thing up for you. What if, for example, there is some sort of a dispute and the customer wants to lock the consultant out of his property (including the computer system). Or fire the consultant (with or without cause) and hire someone else. How can you do that if you don't have the ability to change the root password?
In the final analysis, the computer is the customer's property and should not be held hostage by the consultant.
If you're a zombie and you know it, bite your friend!
This also the way EDS can ensure that their client has trouble changing their outsourced resources. As a consultant, I try to let my work speak for myself, I don't want to get in the habit of trapping clients.
I never voted for Ross Perot, why should he have root?
...let them have it.
But let them have it in a proper way.
First off a disclaimer - I still consider myself a relative Linux newbie, and not a sysadmin - I have a Linux box here at home (what I am using right now), and a Linux based firewall/router I built, plus I do a bit of my own admin on these boxes, but take what I say with a grain of salt, because I might be wrong.
Basically, what you want to do is have them do the whole contract thing, where the contract states that they know the system is running properly right now, and that you are turning root rights over to them in full, and that anything that happens after the fact is their responsibility, and that should they wish to use your services in the future, you will bill at your normal rate x (1.5, 2.0, 3.0?). Plus, the contract should state that they acknowledge that they are the _only_ ones with root access, and they know it.
Then, with the head of IT, or whoever understands enough and is "at-the-top" IT wise, show them that you are removing all (or as many as possible) root level account logins, and show that there are only a few remaining (or "root" alone). Then log in as root, and have the "head dude" change the password on each and every one of them - while you are outside the room. Tell him to pick good passwords (or obscure ones to write down in a log or something - whatever _they_ want - so that you can't guess them). If he is really willing, tell him to try to let you log in, if you can't, then it shows that you _really_ don't know the root passwords (ok, kinda juvenile, but this company sounds that way).
Then ask for your check and leave - hopefully you won't hear back from them, and if you do, it is with the knowledge that while it will be hell to fix whatever they screwed up, at least you will be getting your what it is worth...
Reason is the Path to God - Anon