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Biometrics in Airports
asv108 writes: "Extremetech has an article by renowned security expert Bruce Schneier about why face recognition in public places such as airports is not a good idea." Schneier is being generous - real world results show that facial recognition systems are a lot less than 99.99% accurate even under laboratory conditions (people posing for the camera under ideal lighting).
Finally, the moderation you deserve.
Visit someone online.
Hasn't this system shown its bugs when used in the past at major events like the Super Bowl?
Even if they manage to improve its accuracy, the most important ingredient in better airport security is better-paid, more-reliable personnel. At many major airports, like New Orleans where I live, the scanner folks start at minimum wage and get about three hours of training. Ouch.
When airlines start taking security seriously - and stop trying to increase profit margins by paying people squat - then we'll have a safer system.
Somehow we coming to the conclusion that there's no substitute for thorough searching of passenger's baggage and carry-on items. Though this is an invasion of privacy and an inconvenience to travelers, this is needed to avoid another tragedy like the events of Sept. 11th.
Face recognition should come into play if there is suspicion aroused from some other means of security.
I like fire ants. They are very spicy!
The photos of the hijackers were on file. And they were very good ones too, not those taken from 1000 yards away. If we had put a face recognition system whereby everyone who boards a plane is scanned and compared to terrorist photos on file we may very well have prevented it. Ditto for scanning faces during entry into the US.
Remember you don't own the airplane. The airline have every right to know who's boarding their $100 million toys.
Any terrorist prepared to commit suicide is going to think nothing of having reconstructive surgery if that's what it takes to foil such a system.
If the system were 99.99% accurate and it indicated a match, wouldn't you want to pull the person out for closer inspection? (this is not to say that you treat him like a terrorist)
After all, airports already arbitrarily subject people to random inspection of their luggage.
Regardless of whether the face scanning software was 100% accurate (as pointed out already by various people and the article itself, we aren't even close to that), who says that potential terrorists/criminals are even going to be in the comparison database. All you have to do is ensure that this is going to be your first offence, and you won't even be in there.
...
Again we are attempting to find a series of high tech solutions (at very high expense), when we really need to be applying a bit more low tech, hands-on investigative work. You can't automate everything (certainly not yet anyway)
I imagine that airport patrons identified as "terrorists" by the face recognition system would be detained by security, have their ID rigorously checked and have their luggage rigorously inspected. (With high levels of accuracy, this would amount to a few people per airport per day.) I do not imagine that they would be shot on sight. Inconveniencing (and embarrassing) a few patrons at each airport every day is certainly not a good thing, but it is hardly self-evident that it would be intolerable.
I am not a big fan of universal use of face recognition technology for the reasons outlined in Phil Agre's excellent essay on that subject (linked at the bottom of the Schneier piece as well). But we all understand that some compromises have to be made to make air travel secure. If this is the best argument against using face recognition at airports, it's not a good one.
The important thing is that the surviellence information must be handled in the right way; it's way too easy nowadays for companies in the name of profits to pool customer databases together and generate a large profile on you without you knowing. If surviellence is being used for government purposes, then only the government should have access to it; furthermore, if you are detained only because the computer indicated a match but you are otherwise innocent, there should be no record about this made in the computer beyond doing a $missed++ increment on the global database.
Thus, any sort of increased surviellence absolutely needs some sort of public oversight to make sure the information is not abused or that information that should not be stored isn't. Frequent inspections of the use of biometrics, unrestricted access to the computer files and data collected, all done by private citizens with NDAs, is necessary before these systems should be in place.
"Pinky, you've left the lens cap of your mind on again." - P&TB
"I can see my house from here!" - ST:
You obviously didn't read the article and see why Bruce says your still wrong.
False alarms and technical problems (mentioned even in the slashdot summary) make it ineffective.
Please read and think before you write.
Do you think that the people implementing this kind of thing do so because they think it improves security and safety?
If so I think you have made a mistake. They are implementing it because they think it will make the public think that it improves security and safety.
Giving the public what they think is best is always easier that giving them what is actually best. (and of course you might be wrong about whats best and the public right but thats another issue)
The only solution to this kind of thing is to reduce the gap between the real best solution and the publics belief of what the best solution is.
That means two things. Unlazy authorities and education of the people. Don't hold your breath on the former. Help out yourself with the latter.
-- MartinG To mail me: echo kewyjlcxyzvjfxbqwh | tr bcefhjklqvwxyz
Biometrics are much easier to implement when the person's alledged identity is known. If the person claims to be X, the system need only compute B(X) and compare that to a precomputed data base entry B'(X). These values will almost never be identical due to noisy real world systems (different lighting, microphone noise, dirt on the fingerprint/retina scanner, etc.). Instead a statistical comparison must be made. If B(X) is statistically similar to B'(X), admit entry, otherwise call the firing squad.
In the article, Bruce assumes his readers understand this. His explanation of why face recognition systems cannot find the rare targets in large populations is quite good. The same logic applies to voice matching for projects like Eschelon.
And, of course, this wouldn't prevent individuals from using their own valid IDs to access public areas. The assumption of most security systems is that the intruder wants to commit a crime and get out while minimizing the probability of detection. A suicidal terrorist does not have this goal. He/she seeks to enter an area, commit a crime, and then die in the attempt. The tools developed for normal security may not be appropriate for suicidal terrorists or individuals on shooting sprees.
Given one hour to live, the student replied: "I'd spend it with professor FP who can make an hour seem like a lifetime."
Damn, you're right. I always wanted to be (potentially at least) constantly monitored by the government whenever I'm in a public place. I'm sure no one operating such systems would ever abuse them, or send the KGB (er, Office of Homeland Security) to roust someone just because they were looking suspicious. And of course the error rate on facial recognition must be one in a billion...right?
Also, this erosion of our natural (and Constitutional) right to privacy wouldn't send us further down the slippery slope to ever more intrusive and totalitarian government monitoring...right?
Fool.
"Those that can give up essential liberty to obtain a little temporary safety deserve neither liberty nor safety."
--Ben Franklin--
Power corrupts. Absolute power corrupts absolutely.
--unknown (by me at least;)--
299,792,458 m/s...not just a good idea, its the law!
Galileo: "The Earth revolves around the Sun!"
Score: -1 100% Flamebait
There is an article in yesterdays (Thurs 9/27/01) Wall Street Journal about how Biometrics wouldn't have helped in the terrorism case, that is, it wouldn't have worked in picking up the faces of the two guys who they have on tape passing through Maine's airport. Basically the article says that face recognition technology doesn't work as effective as they hawk it out to. Actually following the hijackings the companies developing biometric products went on record saying that if their products had been in place then this would have been averted and their stocks rocked up. The WSJ puts a doubt on that. Their point, or the point of the person they interview who agues that it doesn't work that well is that cameras would have to zoom in and cover each face for longer than a camera in an open space like an airport or a football stadium possibly could be expected to.
It actually puts some stats to the Superbowl Biometrics scam where they used face-recognition at last years SB. Turns out that of the 11 or howeverthefuckmany people they said they nabbed, most, were not correct matches.
I used to get mad at the opening track on Mos Def's Black on Both Sides when he says
You got a lot of socities and governments
tryin to be God, wishin that they were God
They wanna create satellites and cameras everywhere
and make you think they got the all-seein eye
Eh.. I guess The Last Poets wasn't, too far off
when they said that certain people got a God Complex
I believe it's true
I don't get phased out by none of that, none of that
helicopters, the TV screens, the newscasters, the..
satellite dishes.. they just, wishin
They can't really never do that
Hell yeah they can! Well, at least for now, maybe they can't. In any event, if you have a WSJ from yesterday lying around. A very good piece.
The point of the article was to combat this fallacy. A system may be 99.99% accurate overall, but for the people it identifies as terrorists, only .01% accurate. And who wants to waste their time with a system that's .01% accurate? It's definitely not as good as random searches which, being truly random, have a good deterrent value.
I know this may seem paradoxical, but you can read the article for the details.
Wouldn't it make more sense and be much easier to simply link the FBI "watch list" to the airlines computers? Many of the hijackers were on this list. It seems incredible to me that a person on the list could buy a one-way ticket with cash without the system bringing up all sorts of warnings. Some of the hijackers (not all) fall into this category.
The following things should cause there to be extra scrutiny (especially if you do/are more than one of them):
It seems that doing a lookup on a name in a database is much quicker/easier/less expensive than installing facial recognition systems all over the place. Why not implement a simple solution that would have caught these guys first instead of a complex on that might not work?
If you feel that we must use high-tech solutions, maybe a smart card put into passports and driver's licenses would make more sense and be more accurate. Once simple solutions are implemented then we can worry about the crazy complex ones.
Lasers Controlled Games!
But the point is that the terrorist aren't supposed to know they are on the 'known' list. Otherwise they can just select their operatives by seeing who's NOT on the FBI list.
I understand your frustration with people who aren't open to ideas without having any to replace them. However, I'm going to do just that. The converse of that idea is that we just do anything regardless of whether it helps or not.
I'm terrified by the reaction of this country far more than terrorists. I'm wondering what "terrorist" means. The wierd totalitarian things that have happened here have fueled my paranoia. The White House issuing a statement telling people they have to "watch what they say" has me wondering if "terrorist" might mean anyone who dares dissent.
I'd rather let things cool down for awhile. The way terrorist cells operate is that after an action everybody flees and goes back into cover. We have awhile to think about this. I think it would be a very good thing to let these decisions come at a more cool headed time.
But then - the best biometric system in the world wouldn't have stopped the WTC attack - the hijackers were passengers with tickets and many used their real names anyway so
You do know that the FBI was busy looking for several of the terrorists even as the planes hit the WTC, right? They got into the country and disappeared- a face check at the gate might have flagged them and possibly prevented the attacks. The terrorists would have at least been delayed enough to stop some of the attacks.
You're right: biometrics is coming. This could be a very good thing if we drive the technology to good use. Fingerprint check when I use a credit card: why not? I'd love it if the store *knew* I was the owner of that card- I've had my number stolen before. Ever spoken with someone who's had their identity stolen? It's a multi-year nightmare of wrecked credit, endless phone calls and general heartburn.
Realize that we have almost no privacy anyway. Various large companies know a *lot* about me. They know personal details down to my last dollar, my taste for mint chip ice cream and the fact my wife and I are infertile. The government has run at least 3 background checks on me that I know of, the most recent within the last month. (I got my pilot's license recently: the FBI has already visited the airports I used to pull my records.)
Biometrics won't change that-what we need to do is make sure the transparancy goes both ways.
Eric
"Seven Deadly Sins? I thought it was a to-do list!"
Putting aside the fact that there are numerous terrorists who aren't Arab (which may be appropriate in this select case), is it really that easy to pick out an Arab versus some other ethnic group if they dress and groom themselves in a westernized manner? I doubt it. There's such a huge variety of ethnicities in America that it can be nearly impossible to say with certainty where someone is from just by looking at them, even if you're trained to do so. If Mr. Atta were going by the name of Mr. Mancini or Peres or Rodriguez, I bet hardly anyone would have thought of him as Arab.
---If you can't trust a nerd, who can you trust?
I think alot of people are missing the point here. This system is supposed to 'stop terrorists by identifying potential terrorists'. The only way to catch a potential terrorist is if that individual has been caught or spotted and had his/her picture taken to compare. Of the 19 suspected terrorist that commited the Sept. 11 attacks only TWO of them had any kind of profile the rest were unknowns. So, someone please explain to me how exactly biometrics would have helped us here. Sure 2 of the terrorists would have potentialy been stoped, but the other 17 terrorists would have boarded the plane without much of a problem. Im sure biometrics might stop things for a small amount of time, but the terrorists will adapt quickly and all we are left with is a billion dollar step twords big brother is watching. There are sleeper agents all over the world, guys who have never been seen talking to a known terrorist, have been living in thier respective country for 5-10-15 years, have wives, kids, successfull careers, just waiting for thier 'phone call'. How exactly is a biometrics system going to solve that problem?
Our entire travel itinerary is already tracked electronically. Adding one more means of tracking is not really that big of an issue. The statistics in Schneier's article is a much bigger thing to worry about in terms of our rights. I don't want to go to court to prove that I am not a terrorist. This would cost me a nontrivial amount of money and time and would result in no improvement in the number of terrorists in the world. In short, only injustice would be served.
Healthcare article at Kuro5hin
4: Attach a /bin/laden mask to the back of someone's back and watch the fireworks
Wouldn't the back of someone's back be the front?
Which leads to a good point. How "suspect" do I have to be before you restrict my ability to move around and basically live a normal life?
If you stick to putting only known foreign terrorists in the database, fair enough. If you put known escaped US felons and bail jumpers in as well, again fair enough.
But the September the 11th terrorists were only suspects; we knew they were here, but they were here legally and openly, so we had nothing to charge them with. These are the people we want to stop, so we have to put them in and, what? Stop them flying? Search and question them? OK, lives are at stake, let's do that. it sucks, but it's necessary.
So, what's the criteria for putting a US citizen in? You don't have enough evidence to charge me. Am I an acknowledged activist, spouting anti-American slogans and calling for the end of US involvement in the Holy Land (pesky old 1st Amendment)? Or do I just have an uncle in Afghanistan who likes to send me encrypted mail? What are the criteria?
Do you stop me flying altogether, or do you just search me every time? If I'm not trusted on a plane, am I trusted with a gun? With access to explosives, or the materials to make them? Do you stop me using encryption? Or do you just watch me closely? Do I even know that I'm in the database at effectively wearing a big "suspicious" label because of my ethnicity, religion, family or political leanings?
I'm not against this technology (assuming we can get it to work), but I am very concerned that there be a clear, open procedure for who goes in the database. Specifically, I want to know:
If you were blocking sigs, you wouldn't have to read this.
And that, people, is why systems like this don't work.
By that logic, metal detectors are a lousy system. Anecdotally, at least 50% of the passengers trip off the metal detector. Note that it's not there to detect metal, but weapons. If 1 in 1000 people are carrying weapons, then the metal detectors are giving 500 false positives per 1000 people.
That, is of course, why the metal detector isn't a system. It is a part of the system; security officers and protocols are the remainder of the system. As such, tripping off the metal detector isn't a huge deal, but it does require further securing you (emptying pockets, etc.) until you no longer trip it.
Similarly, facial recognition software is a bad system when used alone. When used in conjunction with a security officer, it can be damned effective. I suggest in another post that the software's response to finding a match is showing the security officers the snapshot it matched to. Let the officer quickly check the real person against a mug shot, and most false positives won't even be noticed by the passenger falsely matched. Those who are incorrectly detained are detained because an officer thinks you look like a particular mug shot, regardless of what the machine says. As a society, we regard that as an acceptable risk, otherwise we wouldn't post faces in post offices.
It's not the technology, it's the way that you use it.
--The basis of all love is respect
bryguy
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