Slashdot Mirror


Behind the scenes: Metal Gear Solid 2

Kevin Lomax writes "GameSpot has posted another one of its Final Hours stories, this time detailing the development story behind Metal Gear Solid 2 for the PlayStation 2. They did one on Black & White earlier this year and this one looks just as good with lots of interesting quotes from the developers in Japan about how they built the game."

15 of 129 comments (clear)

  1. first fist by Anonymous Coward · · Score: -1, Offtopic

    first fist is when you fist someone first in quake 3 arena

    1. Re:first fist by Anonymous Coward · · Score: -1, Offtopic

      lies, it's mine
      (i'm karma whoring for a good cause)

  2. pf by Anonymous Coward · · Score: -1, Offtopic

    ps0t tha fr1st!

    SONS of liberty r0x0rs boyee!

  3. Wow! by Anonymous Coward · · Score: -1, Offtopic
    I got a first post on Thanksgiving.

    Happy first-posting holidays!

    1. Re:Wow! by Anonymous Coward · · Score: -1, Offtopic

      no, sir, you did not.

  4. Back door discovered ! by Anonymous Coward · · Score: -1, Offtopic

    My boyfriend had been going on at me for a long time about wanting anal sex with me. Initially I was quite shocked, but perhaps not surprised as he had gone to a well known public school, and I knew what they got up to!

    I started to look up websites and read articles about anal sex on the Internet, and I was surprised how interesting I found the subject - I was even intrigued that the Americans call the women 'back door girls'.

    One evening, after a few too many glasses of wine, I said that I would agree to it, on the condition that if it hurt or I did not like it he would stop immediately. My boyfriend is very considerate and he fully agreed to my demands. I said that I would have a bath, and see him in the bedroom.

    I made sure that I carefully scrubbed my bottom in readiness, and with some trepidation walked into the bedroom. My boyfriend did nothing to hide his erection and he said that he was getting really excited at the prospect of taking me from the rear. He gave me a long and passionate kiss, his tongue probing deep into my mouth. He then cupped my breasts and started to lick and suck my nipples, which made them stand out like stalks. I could feel the moisture starting to flow from my pussy. He then got me to kneel on the carpet with my bottom sticking straight up at him. I am rather proud of my bottom, and he praised its plump roundness.

    His tongue started to lick up and down my crack, I could feel his saliva dribbling down over my gaping pussy lips. My hand went to seek out my clit, and I rubbed it hard. Then he eased his cock to my puckered little hole, and ever so gently pushed it in. I let out a gasp, and tried to relax my muscles he slid further inside me. It was an incredible sensation, feeling his stiff cock gliding in and out of my bottom as my finger masturbated my clit.

    Soon he cried out that he was going to cum, and my hand was in a frenzy rubbing my swollen bud, as I too felt my orgasm start. He groaned as with a final thrust up my bottom he spurted his delicious hot cream deep inside me. That was enough to send me over the top and I came with a violent shuddering spasm.

    As a thank you to me, he gave my juicy pussy a good licking, and I had another lovely orgasm. I am now a fully paid up 'back door girl'!

  5. Machiavelli by Anonymous Coward · · Score: -1, Offtopic

    The other and better course is to send colonies to one or two places,
    which may be as keys to that state, for it is necessary either to do
    this or else to keep there a great number of cavalry and infantry. A
    prince does not spend much on colonies, for with little or no expense
    he can send them out and keep them there, and he offends a minority
    only of the citizens from whom he takes lands and houses to give them
    to the new inhabitants; and those whom he offends, remaining poor and
    scattered, are never able to injure him; whilst the rest being
    uninjured are easily kept quiet, and at the same time are anxious not
    to err for fear it should happen to them as it has to those who have
    been despoiled. In conclusion, I say that these colonies are not
    costly, they are more faithful, they injure less, and the injured, as
    has been said, being poor and scattered, cannot hurt. Upon this, one
    has to remark that men ought either to be well treated or crushed,
    because they can avenge themselves of lighter injuries, of more
    serious ones they cannot; therefore the injury that is to be done to a
    man ought to be of such a kind that one does not stand in fear of
    revenge.

    But in maintaining armed men there in place of colonies one spends
    much more, having to consume on the garrison all the income from the
    state, so that the acquisition turns into a loss, and many more are
    exasperated, because the whole state is injured; through the shifting
    of the garrison up and down all become acquainted with hardship, and
    all become hostile, and they are enemies who, whilst beaten on their
    own ground, are yet able to do hurt. For every reason, therefore, such
    guards are as useless as a colony is useful.

    Again, the prince who holds a country differing in the above respects
    ought to make himself the head and defender of his less powerful
    neighbours, and to weaken the more powerful amongst them, taking care
    that no foreigner as powerful as himself shall, by any accident, get a
    footing there; for it will always happen that such a one will be
    introduced by those who are discontented, either through excess of
    ambition or through fear, as one has seen already. The Romans were
    brought into Greece by the Aetolians; and in every other country where
    they obtained a footing they were brought in by the inhabitants. And
    the usual course of affairs is that, as soon as a powerful foreigner
    enters a country, all the subject states are drawn to him, moved by
    the hatred which they feel against the ruling power. So that in
    respect to those subject states he has not to take any trouble to gain
    them over to himself, for the whole of them quickly rally to the state
    which he has acquired there. He has only to take care that they do not
    get hold of too much power and too much authority, and then with his
    own forces, and with their goodwill, he can easily keep down the more
    powerful of them, so as to remain entirely master in the country. And
    he who does not properly manage this business will soon lose what he
    has acquired, and whilst he does hold it he will have endless
    difficulties and troubles.

    The Romans, in the countries which they annexed, observed closely
    these measures; they sent colonies and maintained friendly relations
    with[*] the minor powers, without increasing their strength; they kept
    down the greater, and did not allow any strong foreign powers to gain
    authority. Greece appears to me sufficient for an example. The
    Achaeans and Aetolians were kept friendly by them, the kingdom of
    Macedonia was humbled, Antiochus was driven out; yet the merits of the
    Achaeans and Aetolians never secured for them permission to increase
    their power, nor did the persuasions of Philip ever induce the Romans
    to be his friends without first humbling him, nor did the influence of
    Antiochus make them agree that he should retain any lordship over the
    country. Because the Romans did in these instances what all prudent
    princes ought to do, who have to regard not only present troubles, but
    also future ones, for which they must prepare with every energy,
    because, when foreseen, it is easy to remedy them; but if you wait
    until they approach, the medicine is no longer in time because the
    malady has become incurable; for it happens in this, as the physicians
    say it happens in hectic fever, that in the beginning of the malady it
    is easy to cure but difficult to detect, but in the course of time,
    not having been either detected or treated in the beginning, it
    becomes easy to detect but difficult to cure. This it happens in
    affairs of state, for when the evils that arise have been foreseen
    (which it is only given to a wise man to see), they can be quickly
    redressed, but when, through not having been foreseen, they have been
    permitted to grow in a way that every one can see them, there is no
    longer a remedy. Therefore, the Romans, foreseeing troubles, dealt
    with them at once, and, even to avoid a war, would not let them come
    to a head, for they knew that war is not to be avoided, but is only to
    be put off to the advantage of others; moreover they wished to fight
    with Philip and Antiochus in Greece so as not to have to do it in
    Italy; they could have avoided both, but this they did not wish; nor
    did that ever please them which is for ever in the mouths of the wise
    ones of our time:--Let us enjoy the benefits of the time--but rather
    the benefits of their own valour and prudence, for time drives
    everything before it, and is able to bring with it good as well as
    evil, and evil as well as good.

    [*] See remark in the introduction on the word "intrattenere."

    But let us turn to France and inquire whether she has done any of the
    things mentioned. I will speak of Louis[*] (and not of Charles[+]) as
    the one whose conduct is the better to be observed, he having held
    possession of Italy for the longest period; and you will see that he
    has done the opposite to those things which ought to be done to retain
    a state composed of divers elements.

    [*] Louis XII, King of France, "The Father of the People," born 1462,
    died 1515.

    [+] Charles VIII, King of France, born 1470, died 1498.

    King Louis was brought into Italy by the ambition of the Venetians,
    who desired to obtain half the state of Lombardy by his intervention.
    I will not blame the course taken by the king, because, wishing to get
    a foothold in Italy, and having no friends there--seeing rather that
    every door was shut to him owing to the conduct of Charles--he was
    forced to accept those friendships which he could get, and he would
    have succeeded very quickly in his design if in other matters he had
    not made some mistakes. The king, however, having acquired Lombardy,
    regained at once the authority which Charles had lost: Genoa yielded;
    the Florentines became his friends; the Marquess of Mantua, the Duke
    of Ferrara, the Bentivogli, my lady of Forli, the Lords of Faenza, of
    Pesaro, of Rimini, of Camerino, of Piombino, the Lucchese, the Pisans,
    the Sienese--everybody made advances to him to become his friend. Then
    could the Venetians realize the rashness of the course taken by them,
    which, in order that they might secure two towns in Lombardy, had made
    the king master of two-thirds of Italy.

    Let any one now consider with that little difficulty the king could
    have maintained his position in Italy had he observed the rules above
    laid down, and kept all his friends secure and protected; for although
    they were numerous they were both weak and timid, some afraid of the
    Church, some of the Venetians, and thus they would always have been
    forced to stand in with him, and by their means he could easily have
    made himself secure against those who remained powerful. But he was no
    sooner in Milan than he did the contrary by assisting Pope Alexander
    to occupy the Romagna. It never occurred to him that by this action he
    was weakening himself, depriving himself of friends and of those who
    had thrown themselves into his lap, whilst he aggrandized the Church
    by adding much temporal power to the spiritual, thus giving it greater
    authority. And having committed this prime error, he was obliged to
    follow it up, so much so that, to put an end to the ambition of
    Alexander, and to prevent his becoming the master of Tuscany, he was
    himself forced to come into Italy.

    And as if it were not enough to have aggrandized the Church, and
    deprived himself of friends, he, wishing to have the kingdom of
    Naples, divides it with the King of Spain, and where he was the prime
    arbiter in Italy he takes an associate, so that the ambitious of that
    country and the malcontents of his own should have somewhere to
    shelter; and whereas he could have left in the kingdom his own
    pensioner as king, he drove him out, to put one there who was able to
    drive him, Louis, out in turn.

    The wish to acquire is in truth very natural and common, and men
    always do so when they can, and for this they will be praised not
    blamed; but when they cannot do so, yet wish to do so by any means,
    then there is folly and blame. Therefore, if France could have
    attacked Naples with her own forces she ought to have done so; if she
    could not, then she ought not to have divided it. And if the partition
    which she made with the Venetians in Lombardy was justified by the
    excuse that by it she got a foothold in Italy, this other partition
    merited blame, for it had not the excuse of that necessity.

    Therefore Louis made these five errors: he destroyed the minor powers,
    he increased the strength of one of the greater powers in Italy, he
    brought in a foreign power, he did not settle in the country, he did
    not send colonies. Which errors, had he lived, were not enough to
    injure him had he not made a sixth by taking away their dominions from
    the Venetians; because, had he not aggrandized the Church, nor brought
    Spain into Italy, it would have been very reasonable and necessary to
    humble them; but having first taken these steps, he ought never to
    have consented to their ruin, for they, being powerful, would always
    have kept off others from designs on Lombardy, to which the Venetians
    would never have consented except to become masters themselves there;
    also because the others would not wish to take Lombardy from France in
    order to give it to the Venetians, and to run counter to both they
    would not have had the courage.

    And if any one should say: "King Louis yielded the Romagna to
    Alexander and the kingdom to Spain to avoid war, I answer for the
    reasons given above that a blunder ought never to be perpetrated to
    avoid war, because it is not to be avoided, but is only deferred to
    your disadvantage. And if another should allege the pledge which the
    king had given to the Pope that he would assist him in the enterprise,
    in exchange for the dissolution of his marriage[*] and for the cap to
    Rouen,[+] to that I reply what I shall write later on concerning the
    faith of princes, and how it ought to be kept.

    [*] Louis XII divorced his wife, Jeanne, daughter of Louis XI, and
    married in 1499 Anne of Brittany, widow of Charles VIII, in order
    to retain the Duchy of Brittany for the crown.

    [+] The Archbishop of Rouen. He was Georges d'Amboise, created a
    cardinal by Alexander VI. Born 1460, died 1510.

    Thus King Louis lost Lombardy by not having followed any of the
    conditions observed by those who have taken possession of countries
    and wished to retain them. Nor is there any miracle in this, but much
    that is reasonable and quite natural. And on these matters I spoke at
    Nantes with Rouen, when Valentino, as Cesare Borgia, the son of Pope
    Alexander, was usually called, occupied the Romagna, and on Cardinal
    Rouen observing to me that the Italians did not understand war, I
    replied to him that the French did not understand statecraft, meaning
    that otherwise they would not have allowed the Church to reach such
    greatness. And in fact is has been seen that the greatness of the
    Church and of Spain in Italy has been caused by France, and her ruin
    may be attributed to them. From this a general rule is drawn which
    never or rarely fails: that he who is the cause of another becoming
    powerful is ruined; because that predominancy has been brought about
    either by astuteness or else by force, and both are distrusted by him
    who has been raised to power.

    CHAPTER IV

    WHY THE KINGDOM OF DARIUS, CONQUERED BY ALEXANDER, DID NOT REBEL
    AGAINST THE SUCCESSORS OF ALEXANDER AT HIS DEATH

    Considering the difficulties which men have had to hold to a newly
    acquired state, some might wonder how, seeing that Alexander the Great
    became the master of Asia in a few years, and died whilst it was
    scarcely settled (whence it might appear reasonable that the whole
    empire would have rebelled), nevertheless his successors maintained
    themselves, and had to meet no other difficulty than that which arose
    among themselves from their own ambitions.

    I answer that the principalities of which one has record are found to
    be governed in two different ways; either by a prince, with a body of
    servants, who assist him to govern the kingdom as ministers by his
    favour and permission; or by a prince and barons, who hold that
    dignity by antiquity of blood and not by the grace of the prince. Such
    barons have states and their own subjects, who recognize them as lords
    and hold them in natural affection. Those states that are governed by
    a prince and his servants hold their prince in more consideration,
    because in all the country there is no one who is recognized as
    superior to him, and if they yield obedience to another they do it as
    to a minister and official, and they do not bear him any particular
    affection.

    The examples of these two governments in our time are the Turk and the
    King of France. The entire monarchy of the Turk is governed by one
    lord, the others are his servants; and, dividing his kingdom into
    sanjaks, he sends there different administrators, and shifts and
    changes them as he chooses. But the King of France is placed in the
    midst of an ancient body of lords, acknowledged by their own subjects,
    and beloved by them; they have their own prerogatives, nor can the
    king take these away except at his peril. Therefore, he who considers
    both of these states will recognize great difficulties in seizing the
    state of the Turk, but, once it is conquered, great ease in holding
    it. The causes of the difficulties in seizing the kingdom of the Turk
    are that the usurper cannot be called in by the princes of the
    kingdom, nor can he hope to be assisted in his designs by the revolt
    of those whom the lord has around him. This arises from the reasons
    given above; for his ministers, being all slaves and bondmen, can only
    be corrupted with great difficulty, and one can expect little
    advantage from them when they have been corrupted, as they cannot
    carry the people with them, for the reasons assigned. Hence, he who
    attacks the Turk must bear in mind that he will find him united, and
    he will have to rely more on his own strength than on the revolt of
    others; but, if once the Turk has been conquered, and routed in the
    field in such a way that he cannot replace his armies, there is
    nothing to fear but the family of this prince, and, this being
    exterminated, there remains no one to fear, the others having no
    credit with the people; and as the conqueror did not rely on them
    before his victory, so he ought not to fear them after it.

    The contrary happens in kingdoms governed like that of France, because
    one can easily enter there by gaining over some baron of the kingdom,
    for one always finds malcontents and such as desire a change. Such
    men, for the reasons given, can open the way into the state and render
    the victory easy; but if you wish to hold it afterwards, you meet with
    infinite difficulties, both from those who have assisted you and from
    those you have crushed. Nor is it enough for you to have exterminated
    the family of the prince, because the lords that remain make
    themselves the heads of fresh movements against you, and as you are
    unable either to satisfy or exterminate them, that state is lost
    whenever time brings the opportunity.

    Now if you will consider what was the nature of the government of
    Darius, you will find it similar to the kingdom of the Turk, and
    therefore it was only necessary for Alexander, first to overthrow him
    in the field, and then to take the country from him. After which
    victory, Darius being killed, the state remained secure to Alexander,
    for the above reasons. And if his successors had been united they
    would have enjoyed it securely and at their ease, for there were no
    tumults raised in the kingdom except those they provoked themselves.

    But it is impossible to hold with such tranquillity states constituted
    like that of France. Hence arose those frequent rebellions against the
    Romans in Spain, France, and Greece, owing to the many principalities
    there were in these states, of which, as long as the memory of them
    endured, the Romans always held an insecure possession; but with the
    power and long continuance of the empire the memory of them passed
    away, and the Romans then became secure possessors. And when fighting
    afterwards amongst themselves, each one was able to attach to himself
    his own parts of the country, according to the authority he had
    assumed there; and the family of the former lord being exterminated,
    none other than the Romans were acknowledged.

    When these things are remembered no one will marvel at the ease with
    which Alexander held the Empire of Asia, or at the difficulties which
    others have had to keep an acquisition, such as Pyrrhus and many more;
    this is not occasioned by the little or abundance of ability in the
    conqueror, but by the want of uniformity in the subject state.

    CHAPTER V

    CONCERNING THE WAY TO GOVERN CITIES OR PRINCIPALITIES WHICH
    LIVED UNDER THEIR OWN LAWS BEFORE THEY WERE ANNEXED

    Whenever those states which have been acquired as stated have been
    accustomed to live under their own laws and in freedom, there are
    three courses for those who wish to hold them: the first is to ruin
    them, the next is to reside there in person, the third is to permit
    them to live under their own laws, drawing a tribute, and establishing
    within it an oligarchy which will keep it friendly to you. Because
    such a government, being created by the prince, knows that it cannot
    stand without his friendship and interest, and does it utmost to
    support him; and therefore he who would keep a city accustomed to
    freedom will hold it more easily by the means of its own citizens than
    in any other way.

    There are, for example, the Spartans and the Romans. The Spartans held
    Athens and Thebes, establishing there an oligarchy, nevertheless they
    lost them. The Romans, in order to hold Capua, Carthage, and Numantia,
    dismantled them, and did not lose them. They wished to hold Greece as
    the Spartans held it, making it free and permitting its laws, and did
    not succeed. So to hold it they were compelled to dismantle many
    cities in the country, for in truth there is no safe way to retain
    them otherwise than by ruining them. And he who becomes master of a
    city accustomed to freedom and does not destroy it, may expect to be
    destroyed by it, for in rebellion it has always the watchword of
    liberty and its ancient privileges as a rallying point, which neither
    time nor benefits will ever cause it to forget. And whatever you may
    do or provide against, they never forget that name or their privileges
    unless they are disunited or dispersed, but at every chance they
    immediately rally to them, as Pisa after the hundred years she had
    been held in bondage by the Florentines.

    But when cities or countries are accustomed to live under a prince,
    and his family is exterminated, they, being on the one hand accustomed
    to obey and on the other hand not having the old prince, cannot agree
    in making one from amongst themselves, and they do not know how to
    govern themselves. For this reason they are very slow to take up arms,
    and a prince can gain them to himself and secure them much more
    easily. But in republics there is more vitality, greater hatred, and
    more desire for vengeance, which will never permit them to allow the
    memory of their former liberty to rest; so that the safest way is to
    destroy them or to reside there.

    CHAPTER VI

    CONCERNING NEW PRINCIPALITIES WHICH ARE ACQUIRED
    BY ONE'S OWN ARMS AND ABILITY

    Let no one be surprised if, in speaking of entirely new principalities
    as I shall do, I adduce the highest examples both of prince and of
    state; because men, walking almost always in paths beaten by others,
    and following by imitation their deeds, are yet unable to keep
    entirely to the ways of others or attain to the power of those they
    imitate. A wise man ought always to follow the paths beaten by great
    men, and to imitate those who have been supreme, so that if his
    ability does not equal theirs, at least it will savour of it. Let him
    act like the clever archers who, designing to hit the mark which yet
    appears too far distant, and knowing the limits to which the strength
    of their bow attains, take aim much higher than the mark, not to reach
    by their strength or arrow to so great a height, but to be able with
    the aid of so high an aim to hit the mark they wish to reach.

    I say, therefore, that in entirely new principalities, where there is
    a new prince, more or less difficulty is found in keeping them,
    accordingly as there is more or less ability in him who has acquired
    the state. Now, as the fact of becoming a prince from a private
    station presupposes either ability or fortune, it is clear that one or
    other of these things will mitigate in some degree many difficulties.
    Nevertheless, he who has relied least on fortune is established the
    strongest. Further, it facilitates matters when the prince, having no
    other state, is compelled to reside there in person.

    But to come to those who, by their own ability and not through
    fortune, have risen to be princes, I say that Moses, Cyrus, Romulus,
    Theseus, and such like are the most excellent examples. And although
    one may not discuss Moses, he having been a mere executor of the will
    of God, yet he ought to be admired, if only for that favour which made
    him worthy to speak with God. But in considering Cyrus and others who
    have acquired or founded kingdoms, all will be found admirable; and if
    their particular deeds and conduct shall be considered, they will not
    be found inferior to those of Moses, although he had so great a
    preceptor. And in examining their actions and lives one cannot see
    that they owed anything to fortune beyond opportunity, which brought
    them the material to mould into the form which seemed best to them.
    Without that opportunity their powers of mind would have been
    extinguished, and without those powers the opportunity would have come
    in vain.

    It was necessary, therefore, to Moses that he should find the people
    of Israel in Egypt enslaved and oppressed by the Egyptians, in order
    that they should be disposed to follow him so as to be delivered out
    of bondage. It was necessary that Romulus should not remain in Alba,
    and that he should be abandoned at his birth, in order that he should
    become King of Rome and founder of the fatherland. It was necessary
    that Cyrus should find the Persians discontented with the government
    of the Medes, and the Medes soft and effeminate through their long
    peace. Theseus could not have shown his ability had he not found the
    Athenians dispersed. These opportunities, therefore, made those men
    fortunate, and their high ability enabled them to recognize the
    opportunity whereby their country was ennobled and made famous.

    Those who by valorous ways become princes, like these men, acquire a
    principality with difficulty, but they keep it with ease. The
    difficulties they have in acquiring it rise in part from the new rules
    and methods which they are forced to introduce to establish their
    government and its security. And it ought to be remembered that there
    is nothing more difficult to take in hand, more perilous to conduct,
    or more uncertain in its success, then to take the lead in the
    introduction of a new order of things. Because the innovator has for
    enemies all those who have done well under the old conditions, and
    lukewarm defenders in those who may do well under the new. This
    coolness arises partly from fear of the opponents, who have the laws
    on their side, and partly from the incredulity of men, who do not
    readily believe in new things until they have had a long experience of
    them. Thus it happens that whenever those who are hostile have the
    opportunity to attack they do it like partisans, whilst the others
    defend lukewarmly, in such wise that the prince is endangered along
    with them.

    It is necessary, therefore, if we desire to discuss this matter
    thoroughly, to inquire whether these innovators can rely on themselves
    or have to depend on others: that is to say, whether, to consummate
    their enterprise, have they to use prayers or can they use force? In
    the first instance they always succeed badly, and never compass
    anything; but when they can rely on themselves and use force, then
    they are rarely endangered. Hence it is that all armed prophets have
    conquered, and the unarmed ones have been destroyed. Besides the
    reasons mentioned, the nature of the people is variable, and whilst it
    is easy to persuade them, it is difficult to fix them in that
    persuasion. And thus it is necessary to take such measures that, when
    they believe no longer, it may be possible to make them believe by
    force.

    If Moses, Cyrus, Theseus, and Romulus had been unarmed they could not
    have enforced their constitutions for long--as happened in our time to
    Fra Girolamo Savonarola, who was ruined with his new order of things
    immediately the multitude believed in him no longer, and he had no
    means of keeping steadfast those who believed or of making the
    unbelievers to believe. Therefore such as these have great
    difficulties in consummating their enterprise, for all their dangers
    are in the ascent, yet with ability they will overcome them; but when
    these are overcome, and those who envied them their success are
    exterminated, they will begin to be respected, and they will continue
    afterwards powerful, secure, honoured, and happy.

    To these great examples I wish to add a lesser one; still it bears
    some resemblance to them, and I wish it to suffice me for all of a
    like kind: it is Hiero the Syracusan.[*] This man rose from a private
    station to be Prince of Syracuse, nor did he, either, owe anything to
    fortune but opportunity; for the Syracusans, being oppressed, chose
    him for their captain, afterwards he was rewarded by being made their
    prince. He was of so great ability, even as a private citizen, that
    one who writes of him says he wanted nothing but a kingdom to be a
    king. This man abolished the old soldiery, organized the new, gave up
    old alliances, made new ones; and as he had his own soldiers and
    allies, on such foundations he was able to build any edifice: thus,
    whilst he had endured much trouble in acquiring, he had but little in
    keeping.

    [*] Hiero II, born about 307 B.C., died 216 B.C.

    CHAPTER VII

    CONCERNING NEW PRINCIPALITIES WHICH ARE ACQUIRED EITHER
    BY THE ARMS OF OTHERS OR BY GOOD FORTUNE

    Those who solely by good fortune become princes from being private
    citizens have little trouble in rising, but much in keeping atop; they
    have not any difficulties on the way up, because they fly, but they
    have many when they reach the summit. Such are those to whom some
    state is given either for money or by the favour of him who bestows
    it; as happened to many in Greece, in the cities of Ionia and of the
    Hellespont, where princes were made by Darius, in order that they
    might hold the cities both for his security and his glory; as also
    were those emperors who, by the corruption of the soldiers, from being
    citizens came to empire. Such stand simply elevated upon the goodwill
    and the fortune of him who has elevated them--two most inconstant and
    unstable things. Neither have they the knowledge requisite for the
    position; because, unless they are men of great worth and ability, it
    is not reasonable to expect that they should know how to command,
    having always lived in a private condition; besides, they cannot hold
    it because they have not forces which they can keep friendly and
    faithful.

    States that rise unexpectedly, then, like all other things in nature
    which are born and grow rapidly, cannot leave their foundations and
    correspondencies[*] fixed in such a way that the first storm will not
    overthrow them; unless, as is said, those who unexpectedly become
    princes are men of so much ability that they know they have to be
    prepared at once to hold that which fortune has thrown into their
    laps, and that those foundations, which others have laid BEFORE they
    became princes, they must lay AFTERWARDS.

    [*] "Le radici e corrispondenze," their roots (i.e. foundations) and
    correspondencies or relations with other states--a common meaning
    of "correspondence" and "correspondency" in the sixteenth and
    seventeenth centuries.

  6. Happy Thanksgiving !!! by Anonymous Coward · · Score: -1, Offtopic

    you bunch of cocksuckers

  7. "lots of interestin quotes from japan" by Anonymous Coward · · Score: -1, Offtopic

    i hope one of them is not


    all your base are belong to us! bwahahahaha

  8. Let me get this straight... by Anonymous Coward · · Score: -1, Offtopic

    The worst terrorist attack in recorded history occurred in September, and now we're involved in a WAR against the Islamic faith (against the holiest of Muslim clerics and scholars, the beloved Taliban leaders of the Afghanistan people) during the holy month of Ramadan (that kind of sounds like the name of a soup mix, don't you think?) and you people have the gall to be discussing Metal Gear Solid???? My *god*, people, GET SOME PRIORITIES!

    The bodies of the thousands of innocent civilians who died (and will die) in these unprecedented events could give a good god damn about Metal Gear Solid, your childish Lego models, your nerf toy guns and whining about the lack of a "fun" workplace, your Everquest/Diablo/D&D fixation, the latest Cowboy Bebop rerun, or any of the other ways you are "getting on with your life" (here's a hint: watching Cowboy Bebop in your jammies and eating a bowl of Shreddies is *not* "getting on with your life"). The souls of the victims are watching in horror as you people squander your finite, precious time on this earth playing video games!

    You people disgust me!

    1. Re:Let me get this straight... by Anonymous Coward · · Score: -1, Offtopic

      What a lame troll... Your template is showing

  9. Re:Software Development by Anonymous Coward · · Score: -1, Offtopic

    No, they're there because of all the wanking. He probably tugs many times a day in front of his monitor. I know I do.

  10. From the article... by Anonymous Coward · · Score: -1, Offtopic

    Hideo Kojima: "When I would play hide-and-go-seek, I remember flattening myself against the wall and looking around the corner to see if anyone was there," he admits with a laugh, followed by a light cough. [...] The mix of Kojima's laughter and coughing is a telling juxtaposition that represents both the joy and hardship he has been through these past three years

    No, the coughing is a telling sign of living in Japanese society, where there is NO rights for non-smokers. Either Kojima is a stupid tobacco smoking moron (causing people like ME to breathe in their filthy, disgusting, health problem inducing 2nd hand smoke), or Kojima is himself a victim of those selfish smoking motherfuckers.
    I work in a Japanese company and I have to smell that fucking noxious shit ALL DAY LONG. Fortunately there is a so-called ventilated smoking room which takes most of the poisons out, but it has no closing door and is right beside the entrance door, so enough fumes to make it annoying enter the workplace. Still, at some other Japanese companies they still allowing smoking AT YOUR DESK. Thank god I don't have to put up with THAT fucking shit.

    Don't get me started on train stations, restaurants, bars, etc. If you ask for a non-smoking section in many restaurants, you are looked with incredulity. I just can't understand people who need to smoke in a restaurant. I mean, the average stay in a place is what, 20 minutes? THEY CAN'T BE FUCKING PATIENT!? What about when they finish their meal -- they have one final smoke, and then immediately leave. WHY THE FUCK DID YOU RUIN *MY* FUCKING MEAL!? WHY THE FUCK CAN'T YOU JUST GO OUTSIDE AND SMOKE, YOU COCKSUCKING FUCKING FAGGOTS?

    Kojima: If you are one of those selfish, cocksucking FUCKING smoking motherfuckers, I hope your game flops and you die a horrendous, painful death from lung cancer. If, however, you are an innocent victim of 2nd hand smoke, you have my undying sympathy. Our only consolations from the attacks on the WTC buildings of September 11th is that fortunately, many many smokers who worked therein will not be polluting anyone else's lungs anytime soon.
    By the way, this has been another fine quality post from the "Get some Priorities" guy.

  11. pubic service announcement by Anonymous Coward · · Score: -1, Offtopic

    I'm going to metamod whoever modded this as "troll" into oblivion.

  12. Re:This game blew by The_Messenger · · Score: 0, Offtopic
    LOL... that scene confuses the hell out of me. I mean, what pretense did he (Prez) have for grabbing Raiden's crotch if he (Prez) assumed Raiden was a chick?

    Oh, wait. If Clinton taught us anything, it's that the President doesn't need an excuse... :-)

    --

    --
    I like to watch.