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Encrypted Email and Online File Storage - Cryptoheaven
Adam: Kurzawa writes: "CryptoHeaven is a new online service offering secure services: secure free mail, secure file sharing, distribution and storage secure instant messaging, secure discussion lists, automatic key and contact management, no third party key holder, all services integrated into one user interface, accessible anywhere, anytime CryptoHeaven uses the AES symmetric cipher Rijndael with 256 bit symmetric key, public-key cryptography with 2048-4096 bit asymmetric keys (user selectable) and SHA-256 message digest function. Free and premium accounts are available. Source code is available for download free of charge."
It has all of the facilities to do "access from anywhere" computing, except to do that, you have to store your private key on the server (or at least be able to get access to it from anywhere).
If the private key is on the server, then the system is potentially compromisable, and it would appear to lose the it's main selling point.
OK, fine, then don't store your private key on the server. But that means that you are restricted as to where you view the data from, or you must have some means of transporting the private key. But if you are going to restrict yourself to this, then why not just store the secure data on this secure machine? So that appears to be another class of people eliminated...
OK, so then, who is left. I can see how people would like to use this as an anomyous service, but to do that, you have to leave the private keys on the server, otherwise they can pin the account to you. But, this seems inherently dangerous, since one can sniff the password from the server, decrypt your private key, and use/abus your account.
So again I ask, what are the target demographics here? As far as I can tell it is not the security conscious, and it is not the truly paranoid. So who?
A subscription service, so, you mean, an opensource company... making money? Blasphemy!
"...no third party key holder..."
Actually, according to the web page, they do offer to act as the third party keyholder:
"The private portion of the key is encrypted with user's pass-code and stored on the local computer or sent to the server at user's choice."
If the private key is not sent to the server, then what is the benefit over any other service that allows remote email & storage (assuming others actually send emcrypted email and the user stores encrypted files)?
Now, because their service agreement requires users not to store any illegal material, users cannot really store anything that is dangerous to governments. I don't know the details of Canadian law enough, but I would suspect that the RCMP (or other appropriate agency) would be able to collect
the secret key and therefore decrypted data if they really wanted. Can someone tell me otherwise?
Perhaps this is worth further investigation...
The user interface is written in Java, and requires a 1.3 or higher runtime installed. The Windows installer has an optional 1.3 runtime included. By virtue of the Java client-side implementation, your private key is never sent, or seen by the server unless you choose to upload it in encrypted form. If you do decide to upload your private key, thereafter you rely only on SSL, presumably, to protect the password for your encrypted private key stored remotely.
It's been awhile since I looked at Java's crypto. The 1.2 stuff was pretty lame, especially the keystore. But this implementation does at least seem to use RSA keys for Java, which means that the container may be better too.
I dunno if I'd ever advise anyone to allow their keys to be stored on the server, no matter how many reassurances they get. However, for someone who simply wishes to share private mail with someone else, it might be nice.
Things that remain unclear to me are:
1. Can encrypted mail be sent to someone who does not have an account, using a ordinary PGP public key, for example?
2. What protocol does the service use? Is it standard SMTP? (possibly with verification)
3. Where does the encryption/signing of the delivered email actually occur? Presumably always on the client. 4. The Service Agreement seems pretty, uh, tight. If you displease them in any way, all your rights, including access to your existing mail, is cutoff.
Anyone actually using this service?
What's going on? Did the ./ editors just pick up a copy of Cryptonomicon today? First a story on Van Eck Phreaking, now the Crypt?
---- Just another spud server.
This is a client-server application with the server running at the Secure Data Center. A direct connection to the Internet is required.
From what i gather, the product targets individuals in need of security and privacy working together in small groups. Software includes features like instant messaging, chat, and file sharing. Unique feature is an ability to securely share data folders between groups of people combined with remote storage.
The source code is freely downloadable for anyone that cares to verify the claims. Asymmetric crypto is based on RSA and for a symmetric cipher, it uses Rijndael. Freely available source is very reassuring, it looks like it was released in hope that it would be put to the test by the cryptographic community. The crypto looks very strong and has multiple levels of encryption and hierarchies. I suppose when enough people review it, the software should gain broader popularity.
It does have some features over and above a person-to-person pgp email (or hushmail, or ziplip). It is meant to be a much more user friendly environment for data exchange within trusted groups, without sacrificing security.
Register your address on a keyserver, get a good email client, and off you go!
from the License Agreement:
"You hereby agree to not use the Service to:
1. transmit or store any Content that is unlawful, harmful, threatening, abusive, harassing, tortious, defamatory, vulgar, obscene, libelous, invasive of another's privacy, hateful, or racially, ethnically or otherwise objectionable
2. defame, abuse, harass, stalk, threaten or otherwise violate the legal rights of others;
3. harm minors in any way;
4. impersonate any person or entity, or falsely state or otherwise misrepresent your affiliation with a person or entity;
5. email or otherwise transmit any Content that you do not have a right to transmit under any applicable law or under contractual or fiduciary relationships (such as inside information, proprietary and confidential information learned or disclosed as part of employment relationships or under nondisclosure agreements);
6. post, email or otherwise transmit any Content that infringes any patent, trademark, trade secret, copyright or other proprietary rights of any party;
7. upload, post, email or otherwise transmit any unsolicited or unauthorized advertising, promotional materials, "junk mail," "spam," "chain letters," "pyramid schemes," or any other form of solicitation;
8. upload, post, email or otherwise transmit any material that contains software viruses, trojan horses, worms, time bombs, or any other computer code, files or programs designed to interrupt, destroy or limit the functionality of any computer software or hardware or telecommunications equipment;
9. interfere with or disrupt the Service or servers or networks connected to the Service, or disobey any requirements, procedures, policies or regulations of networks connected to the Service;
10. intentionally or unintentionally violate any applicable local, state, national or international law;
11. harvest or otherwise collect information about others, including email addresses, without their consent"
...how would they know what I'm sending, if it's encrypted? Or was that just for law purposes?
-- There are two kind of sysadmins: Paranoids and Losers. (adapted from D. Bach)
Hushmail stores the private key on the server, but always encrypted with the passphrase, so your security is as strong as the passphrase. When the private key is needed, it is sent encrypted (and over secure channel) to the Java client, which decrypts it with the passphrase and uses it to decrypt email. Neither the passphrase, nor the plaintext private key, ever travel over the network. (They have a neat trick to prevent attackers from getting your encrypted private key for the purpose of a dictionary attack on the passphrase: The server stores a hash of your passphrase, and will only send the key to the client if the client sends the correct hash. As far as preventing the server operator from running a dictionary attack on your passphrase, you'll either have to trust them, or pick a really good one.)
If I recall, Hushmail has patent pending for the system described above (portable client that computes all encryptions/decryptions, private key and email/etc. stored on server).
They don't know and do not have any way of knowing what you are sending. This is just to cover their asses for the purpose of complying the the applicable laws.
If you read the service agreement you have with your ISP, I am sure you'll see it says something along the same lines.
The CryptoHeaven is unique in the sense that it does not send the encrypted private key with the hash of the passphrase during the account creating. It does so after the account is created and secure connection already established, but only at the users choice. The encrypted private key does not have to be stored on the server at all, it can be stored in a file on your local computer -- in that sense, CryptoHeaven offers much higher security.
There is a challenge where the user must send the partial hash for authentication, which also originates from the passphrase but is computed independently from the hash (and other sources) which is used to encrypt the private key, in order to retrieve his encrypted private key. This way the encrypted private key is not send to anyone who does not pass this challenge. That only applies if the private key resides on the server.
Ather distinctions to the Hushmail is the generation of the hash where the user name and additional salt plays a role. Certain data and user input are combined together and used to generate a pass-code which is more involved in the process of creating accounts and establishing secure connections later on than passphrase is. For more details regarding the process I would refer to the source code.
It would have been wise to mention "Windows only" in the piece.
ZipLip meets my needs quite well for now.
These guy's main cipher was approved today as the next government standard. Inspires some confidence.