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Computer Security Criteria
Rolf Marvin Bøe Lindgren writes: "For most human endeavors that involve some sort of risk, there are powerful, recognized public interest groups or even government-appointed organizations that investigate and analyze dangers, prescribe guidelines, determine criteria for acceptable risk, etc. This does not seem to be the case for software! I work for a ship classification company. The purpose of such companies are, very simply put, to determine how safe seagoing vessels are, for instance in order that insurance companies can decide insurance premiums. There are, needless to say, numerous conventions and special interest groups to determine safety at sea. That is, as far as I know (and I would very much like to be proven wrong), except the computer systems that the ships use. there are restrictions, laws and regulations involved in just about any object that goes into a ship except the computer system. Everybody seems to know, for instance, that UNIX is safer that Windows, but there are no safety, reliability or security criteria established by any recognized authority that can be used to defend one computer system over another."
"Now, I could ask Slashdot how to go about to form a recognized body, but I have access to competence in that particular matter. What I would rather like to know, is this:
- What might a set of safety criteria be like (I am just now most interested in criteria for computer systems that would address such issues as vulnerability to worms, viruses and crackers)?
- How should one go about to find competent and interested people who would like to be part of a body like I describe, or consultants to one?
I would venture to guess the reason there are so many regulatory bodies involved in overseeing the safety of such things as highways, seagoing vessels, planes, food, etc. and not software, is that in the former situation human life is directly at risk while in the latter human life, is at best, indirectly at risk and usually not at risk at all.
yes i run a goth/punk/emo porn site.
"How do you find people willing to pontificate about what makes one system more secure than another," he naively asked Slashdot. Then came the deluge.
visit the hwky website for a lyrical genius infusion.
Have you looked at any of the work done by SANS (http://www.sans.org) or NIST (which is not necessarily what you're looking for, but in the area of providing guidance, http://www.nist.gov)?
SANS has been publishing a series of "consensus" documents, asking for feedback from people on topics such as securing Windows and Unix versions. They've also put together a working group (pay to join).
If you have looked at these sources, I would be interested to hear how they do or do not fit in to what the author of the original question is looking for.
I work for a ship classification company.
Big ship..
Little ship..
Big ship..
Medium size ship..
http://twitter.com/onion2k
well, have you checked out these things?
http://www.commoncriteria.org/
http://csrc.nist.gov/cc/pp/pplist.htm
The most secure method is to apply the KISS method. (keep it simple, stupid) The fewer lines of code, the fewer places an attacker can gain access. Use lots of encryption, (check on theoretical attacks mostly), and use physical safeguards for the system. You possibly want to use OpenBSD, because of the history behind it (4 years with no remote exploits on a default installation), but choose your base carefully. Encrypt all communications (ESP networking) and make sure you have double and triple safeguards. Better be paranoid, than exploited.
Sorry for not making a huge long rambling post, but you really should check out the Risks Digest
--xPhase
The following sentence is TRUE. The previous sentence is FALSE.
What might a set of safety criteria be like (I am just now most interested in criteria for computer systems that would address such issues as vulnerability to worms, viruses and crackers)?
While there may not be a body of standards regarding security, there are some de facto standards regarding redundancy of data, the breakdown of different methods of communication(connection versus connectionless protocols) are quite well defined as standards, and the general structure of professional applications. Taking these as a starting point, one could build a list of vulnerabilities for each of these standards. For example, in a connectionless environment, one would be worried about DDOS attacks, and methods for identifying the assailant. In a connection-based environment, physical issues such as allowing someone to get access to a LAN line with a laptop inside the company building would be something that would require at least some preventative measures(ID cards at the door, social policies about bringing in computers, etc.)
How should one go about to find competent and interested people who would like to be part of a body like I describe, or consultants to one?
Be very careful. You will need to find people who are trustworthy AND brilliant. Good luck.
First and formost, keep the computer system closed. Do not hook it up to any outside networks. No networks, no phone lines, no serial connections. That will elimiate quite a bit of risk for attack.
If that is not an option, then run the outside network connection through a very tight firewall.
~Sean
Well I know everyone's going to shoot this one down but I personally see a huge amount of time, effort and expense wasted on my own company's systems to protect them from the "scourge of the internet" when, upon detailed inspection, there is no good reason that 95% of these boxes NEED connectivity. Before you go about inspecting the various methods of combating the madness (firewalls, routers, off the wall OS, tying up the PHB, etc.) ask yourself "do our critical systems need connectivity and if so, to what degree?"
Find out about my new childrens book: SS Death Camp Criminal Batallion Go To Monte Carlo For The Massacre
Closest is the international Common Criteria . It's the indirect descendent of the old military orange book (you know, C2 certified, etc.). The attempt is to come up with multiple standards for each security critical component. The components are evaluated against the standard. A higher rating means they meet the standard to a stricter engineering criteria.
Some sample standards (or "Protection Profiles") include proxy and packet filtering firewalls.
My sense is the folks overseeing the Common Criteria would like industry groups to sponsor Protection Profile development. For example, banks could come up with profiles for wire transfer components, ATMs, etc. The shipping industry could be another.
BTW, if you visit the Website, there is an interesting line of Common Criteria-branded clothing, for the geek who has everything!
This probably means that critical systems on things like ships should not be running any flavor of Windows, nor maybe Linux either. There are a bunch of OS's made for embedded systems, and due to their small size and simplicity they are much smaller, probably faster, and certainly less vulnerable or even completely invulnerable to this kind of attack. If your requirements are that stringent, that's what you should be using.
Scientists restrict study to entire physical universe; creationist
Backup systems have to be in place, and why captains have to be able to navigate manually. Just like how yachts have to have motors in case sails break, etc... and to be able to safely navigate in ports.
The threat of virii could be minimal because the physical security of the ship's navigation systems should be locked down. No internet access, no floppy disk drives, closed systems, etc.
However, there have been failures. I remember a Navy Submarine running Windows NT or something, and it crashed (the OS, not the sub). They had backup systems, of course, but they looked pretty stupid. Windows NT Crash on Navy ship
The key point here is that you can test systems anyway : running for long periods of time, checking memory leakage, hardware failure periods, etc... and bugs that come up are corrected for free, usually, when you're talking about expensive navigation systems.
Sure, you can lose money for being out of action for a few hours, but that could happen due to any number of other mechanical failures too, so you just calculate some kind of percentage chance of failure based on past history of the navigation system?
Conversion Rate Optimisation French / English consultant
And I work for a railroad that moves a half-million people a day. I like to think they're not too dissimilar industries - when my computers shut down, the railroad stops running. I'm guessing that when your computer stops, the ship stops moving. That it doesn't sink or explode (i.e. there are hardware items that relieve excess pressure, etc.)
There are some differences. My trains have low-level hardware (based around gobs of vital relays) that will stop them from running into each other. I doubt ships have anything like this.
The standards for what you or I do are drastically different from what someone writing software for an airplane's fly-by-wire system has to do. There, if the computer stops or starts doing the wrong thing, it falls out of the sky. Scary stuff.
So, it depends on what the computer controls, but you haven't given us this information.
Sounds to me like the shipping industry is behind the times -- there are lots of other industries that have standards for computer systems. The FDA is becoming much more strict about computer validation and there is a great deal of documentation and testing required to implement a validated computer system. There are also many, many recognized Quality Management Systems in existence that apply equally well to a computing environment.
>Everybody seems to know, for instance, that UNIX is safer that Windows
Sorry, I couldn't ignore this... Validation of a computer system is about proving something is fit for purpose. Documenting requirements, design, performance, data integrity etc. It ain't about what OS you run. There's not a sane business person in the world who will rally behind someone masking anti-Microsoft sentiment as "computer security".
Um, hate to break it to you, but how the hell do you hack a system that's on a ship and self contained? everyone's talking about virus this and worm that, who gives a crap? my guess is that the ship's navigation systems are secluded from anything that would have outside access.
what i'm guessing he wants to know is something more along the lines of this.Windows NT cripples US Navy Cruiser
in which case, he's really asking which software/OS is the least likely to puke and leave you up a creek without a paddle.
Later the EU produced their Green book which looked at availability as well, this is kind of good for information systems but it doesn't really cover real-time control systems.
A long time ago, I worked on real-time control systems. We divided our systems into control/measurement, supervisory and at the top, information systems. At the lowest level, we are talking hard real-time and simple enough to be very reliable. They had to be as they were typically sitting by a man-sized chemistry set. The supervisory systems gave the pretty interfaces, they could crash, but generally they didn't. These were for control rooms, and whilst bypassing them was possible, it wasn't easy. The top level system ran all kinds of complicated software applictions that could and would occassionally crash. Apart from the crudest electrical standards for the stuff in the plant and the control room, there were no evaluation criteria.
I worked for a famous defense contractor located in Fort Worth, TX. My department was responsible for writing requirements for software that was installed on fighter aircraft.
When using a requirements-based system (where you write requirements for software and then the software is written from the requirements), there are multiple checkpoints. First, the requirements document for the software must meet or pass certain criteria. Second, the software must meet or pass the criteria put forth by the requirements document. Third, the software is rigorously tested.
Now, in fighter planes, the software must be incredibly robust - you don't want planes falling out of the sky - and in defense projects, bureaucracy tends to inflate the whole process.
That being said, requirements are an excellent way to control the quality of software, or an installed computer system.
And this is important! We all remember the movie Hackers, in which the Davinci virus was going to cause a bunch of oil tankers to tip over into the ocean. And we all know how closely that movie parallels reality.
--
Disclaimer: The above statement probably includes half-truths, because real truth is too complicated.
Computer security in no way affects human life directly.
"Reboot the air traffic control system."
"How long has the reactor control system been down?"
"Try to get the GPS working again before we enter the harbor in this fog."
Any of these sound like non-life threatening situations? And you did notice the questioner is specifically concerned with the third type of situation I mentioned, didn't you?
Nope, no sig
The FAA has well-known procedures in place for certifying HW and SW for safety. Look up DO-178B, for instance.
It'd be almost trivial for the shipbuilding industry to adapt them to their somewhat lower-risk environment.
--Blair
Yes, google knows about:
CCITA
ISO/IEC 15408
NSA Rainbow
Which might be of note.
Sure Windoze apps have buffer overflow holes like [insert good analogy here], but when was the last time your WinVERSION came installed with a plaintext remote login server? Or have you seen Windoze setup with directory services exporting crackable password hashes? .. Unix is safer in many respects (especially to the scheduled-to-be-obsolete Win95/98/ME series), but I don't know that it's a cold statement of fact to say everyone knows that UNIX is safer than Windows. Depends on the attack vector.
If you need text styles to communicate then you don't have a message.
Yes! Exactly. There are several standards for the evaluation of computer security. The more accepted today is the Common Criteria of Information Security Evaluation (Common Criteria for short) and the good old Rainbow series from the US Gov't. Particularly the RED book for the evaluation of trusted computer systems and the orange book for the evaluation of trusted networks. There are many more, but the problem is not so much that we need these standards, but that many companies are not willing to go to the expense of implementing them. This leads to shotty software because no organization or company is paying to check out all of the possible flaws in their systems.
Wherever you go, there I am...
Design bases means that information which identifies the specific functions to be performed by a structure, system, or component of a facility, and the specific values or ranges of values chosen for controlling parameters as reference bounds for design. These values may be (1) restraints derived from generally accepted "state of the art" practices for achieving functional goals, or (2) requirements derived from analysis (based on calculation and/or experiments) of the effects of a postulated accident for which a structure, system, or component must meet its functional goals.
The same logic underlies all design. At some point you have to have engineers you trust and they should be versed in the "state of the art" and all applicable studies.
In the nuclear industry we can and do rely on vendor studies. Who else but GE is going to know the maximum power levels that are safe with their reactors? They built a full scale model and proved it.
In the software industry, as you have noticed, things are a little less clear. First, Microsoft is an unethical company. (gotta go before finishing!) You and me both know that Windows is an unstable system. It changes all the time and those changes break programs. Some would even say that Windows is unstable without any changes, and indeed sites that use it typically see 30 day uptimes and no better. Anyone who would relly on such a thing for something that in is in any way needed to protect the public safety is incompetent. How that might be worked into a ship is a matter of judgement. I would not use it except as a game platform in the rec room or to look after some system that is superfuous.
Friends don't help friends install M$ junk.
The answer is obvious if you're looking for the best way to secure an onboard system: hide the ship.
-mm
obscurity mon ami
First, let me point out I work with both *nix systems and Windows. Both have problems. I'm not going to address these problems.
My thoughts on this are, what levels of security are required? I've never heard of someone hacking an oil tanker, but just because I've never heard of it doesn't mean it hasn't happened, or is impossible.
My opinion is that the most important thing you would need software for is navigation software, in order to determine location, and software for weather reports, so you can plan ahead for adverse weather conditions. Can you get both for either OS? Sure (but I don't know names). Do they work? Well, if they didn't we'd have a few more ships crashing into reefs.
It gets away from secure systems, in my opinion, and more towards robust systems. Maybe it's just words, but I view secure and robust being different.
EFGearman
--
Atomic batteries to power! Turbines to speed!
You wanna get everyone looking over our shoulders all day long!
M@
Krispy Cream is people
The real problem has very little to do with software and very much to do with the people running the software.
I don't care how secure your unix system is, if your root password is "password" or you let root telnet into it, you're system is insecure. Selecting "unix" over "NT" should not save you money on insurance if it's the same moron running either machine.
Not to mention that there is some inherent risk in change. If you declare that "Unix is secure" and give a break to anyone using it, you're going to end up with a former NT administrator forced to admin a system he knows nothing about. (The same would be true in reverse.)
-- Don't Tase me, bro!
I recall that a while ago some navy ships were stopped dead in the water due to computer failure, so there are legitimate concerns. Most ships have a large number of fallback systems - notably crew - that can recover from most problems.
Large ships also benefit from a reasonable physical security structure - limited bridge and engine room access for crew - that help computer security
In light of a natural physical isolation, limiting the net access of the navigation computers is a natural and effective security boost.
Most of the 'essential' computer systems that are currently used are not OS based, but embedded. It would be silly to worry about the electronic fuel pump in your car getting a worm. These embedded systems are often virus proof because they use ROM program space. Any bugs are the result of programmer error and insuficient testing
So, I suspect that only high-level systems like navigation are vulerable to worms. Now, let's take a look at possible damage
Massive failures can be caused by hardware, so there must be a backup system regardless of the software that you choose
The same redundant systems can also be used to keep the master system honest
In general good policy and management is more important that what software is used.
Maybe now that companies are offering hacker insurance some standards and guidelines will develop?
On the other hand...when has the computer industry ever mirror any real world industry? We still don't have the equivalent of the Consumer Product Safety Commission nor is there product liability, recalls, or defect-related lawsuits.
If there were, Microsoft would make the Ford/Firestone fiasco look like nothing.
- JoeShmoe
.
-- I wonder which will go down in history as the bigger failure: the War on Drugs or the War on Filesharing
There is one answer... the US government has published a civilian version of a process that the DoD has been using for a while. It's called the NIACAP (NSTISSC 1000), here.
Simply put: It defines a complete, scaleable, tailorable and relevant process to design, test, certify and maintain a system for use.
IF: 1. Good, well informed individuals identify vulnerabilities during system design and testing,
2. The upper management commits to following the maintenance plan, and
3. The priciples of good system design are followed (i.e. KISS, enforcement of least privilege), then many security issues are non-issues.
IMHO, one of the most important things in certifying a system for a critical app is to get the underlying SW from a reputable vendor, one who identifies "Day 0" exploits immediately, preferrably one on the Common Criteria List, and offers a modularized package to limit the amount of unused but potentially vulnerable code in the system. No system is going to be immediately perfect now and for its entire lifespan, but follow a good maintenance plan and you may even be able to make a M$ system secure!
"If you know yourself but not the enemy, for every victory gained you will also suffer a defeat." -Sun Tzu
It all depends on the industry in question. Take as an example, light bulbs. When you buy a lightbulb for you bathroom light, no one really cares. But when you buy a light bulb for your car headlight, you start running into safety regulations. And when you buy a light bulb for your left airplane wing, the FAA is going to be breathing down your neck.
I help build software for invasive diagnostic medical devices. The FDA (and similar organizations for other nations) is very concerned about the software we use. They don't have a checklist of brands, makes and models of software, since that's not the nature of software. But they do audit our development process. ISO compliance is easy. FDA compliance is hard.
For our next project, some boneheads decided on Win2K and "embedded" Win2K. I personally think the decision is stupid. But it probably won't affect the final quality of the device. Why? Because it won't be a stock Win2K, it will be the embedded version, stripped of everything we don't need. We will be in charge of the hardware it runs on. It will be tested under rigorous protocols. Etc.
The FDA doesn't care that it will have Windows on it. But they will care that it operates safely. That means it can't crash while diagnosing a live patient.
A Government Is a Body of People, Usually Notably Ungoverned
I would venture to guess myself that software is very hard to regulate in a normal sense. On complex pieces of code (KISS standard aside) it is nigh impossible to completely prevent bugs 100%of the time. That's the ideal, but that's why we call it ideal.
If a bug occurred in a very unique situation, and it took 20 years for that situation to come about and it caused just one death, people would still ask, "Why wasn't anything done to prevent this?" Something was done (hopefully), and standards and regulations help, but in the end that's pretty much all you can do.
I don't think he's asking as much about viruses or hackers in this case, but those are also valid questions. I tend to believe what is stated downstairs in this argument -- I've seen Unix systems that were wide open and Windows Boxes sealed tighter than a drum, and it's up to the admin. I'm not really sure if there's a test or anything that sysadmins must pass to become licensed sysadmins, but if there isn't (and I'm not talking about certification) there should be one, at least as far as sensitive data like this is concerned.
Also, a real life situation when computer software caused multiple deaths was in the case of the London Ambulance Service, which used a very poorly constructed computer system and was directly linked to 20 or 30 deaths (due to late ambulances) in the few days it was active.
Here is another clue I got today from my uni lecturer. If you wanted to run a secure web server, would you run it on NT, Linux, Solaris or the Mac?
*Up go hands of Linux advocates*
Answer: Mac because it is the least available operating system and as such fewer attacks have been created for it, even if there are hypothetically more bugs. As such, you would be less likely to suffer a problem, all else being equal
Back to the article, would a measurement take into account this type of situation? Does Mac get a high rating for low rate of incidents or a low rating because it (probably) has more bugs than Linux. Open question
To be perfectly honest, is the computer on a ship going to be networked externally? Maybe the control systems on board are linked by a network, but surely there is no need for vital systems to be connected to the outside world?
If the ship needs a internal network connected to an open network, then it should be entirelly physically separate to the control systems. No firewalls, no fancy security measures. Just no route between the two.
More of an issue is software reliability and stability. I won't get into the linux/windows argument, but generally, a more stable, stripped down system can be easily achieved with linux. In windows, you run the whole OS, no two ways about it, even if it just adds to instability and problems.
Generally, on essential computer systems, such as those on planes, radar, life support systems, and sattelites, are as simple as possible, and undergo rigerous testing. The development is often frozen early on because of this, resulting in reduced features, but better overall performance. It can take several years for changes to propagate throught the system... this can be annoying if it is as simple as a GUI change (say, one display needs to be frequently accessed, but requires several button presses, where another, rarely used display has instant access off the yoke).
Hardware reliability could be a problem as well - though I should imagine these systems are ready built by people who know what they are doing. I wouldn't trust off the shelf boxes and bog standard cat 5 linking them.
Redundant systems are probably a very good idea - as is some form of power conditioning and UPS system, as ships power may not be the best.
There is a lot to consider, but I think you may just as well turn to someone who has experience with aviation computers as well as someone who knows a lot about closed network security.
And imagine.... maybe the dodgy oil tanker plot in hackers could come true...
your lecturer is advocating security through obscurity. by that measure, the most secure possible web server is one you've written yourself, regardless of your competence level, because it's one of a kind.
I would like to see that point of view competently defended in the public court of security experts.
Click on 'classifications', then try to use any of the links on the left, register of vessels and such. The link for that is file:///registerofvessels. Needless to say, that link doesn't work too well on a public internet.
it can only be safe if it is not connected to the outside, off, and unplugged from the wall.
Implementing a system with an air gap is definitally a good security measure. However, it is really only practical for certain systems. On a ship, an air gap might be applicable for systems that run the ships controls (i.e. engines, environmental controls, etc). These systems may be very important for ship safety and have no need to be in contact with the outside world.
Then there is the navigation and communication systems. These are very important for a ship but may require limited access to the outside (GPS, etc). This should be completely seperate from the air gapped systems above and of course implement all other possible security measures (firewall, etc).
On a modern ship there will likely be a third level of systems used for personal communication. Web browsing, Email and the like are not vital to the safety of human beings onboard the ship an thus do not require as stringent security.
Using a multiple-system and multi-tiered security model like this may affer the best combination of security, price, and convenience due to not having to secure everything to the highest order.
-- Find the Truth...
"Captain -- the minesweeper program's crashed again!"
Yes, [everyone knows] UNIX is safer that Windows. BUT, that is in general, not specific.
I can write my own Unix, make it fully posix, even pay for legal use of the unix name. (I don't have the money, but I could in theory) I'm a fairly good programers, and I've done some OS level work. However I know next to nothing about writting a secure system, and apart from the backdoors that I intentionally put in my code, there will be many accidental security holes. However it would still meet the standards to be called unix by all measures.
The point is your standards need to mandate a solution that works. Require code audits by qualified external parties if it is net connected. Make sure your external parties are well chosen (example Bruce S. or applied cryptology fame, or his company), but make sure you have several different experts represented. Make sure the requiremetns are reviewed. Accually, you probably have processes for reviewing the machanical areas of the ship, extend those processes to the software. Remember, anything you can do in software I can do with gears (though in some cases I don't know if there is enough metal on earth to accually make all those gears, not to mention the relability) so your mechanical review process should extend to software.
Do you let your suppliers buy an engine (eg from Cummins) off the shelf and put it in, or do you require that your mechanicial engineers examine the engine design first. If they can buy any engine, then they can put in any software. If you need to see all the engine design, then you need all the software design.
Simply do any Google search on "FDA 21 CFR" and you'll find hordes of information that you can use.
Ah yes, good old security-through-obscurity. Shouldn't you say, "there are fewer publicized attacks created for it"?
I don't care if it's 90,000 hectares. That lake was not my doing.
Do you not realize that the vast majority of network server software is not even developed by the 'bundler' (e.g., OpenBSD, RedHat, etc), so the 'remote exploit' issue is quite irrevalent. As to the question of how many are enabled by default, there is practically no services enabled by default on RedHat (I'm not sure how many; I use custom installs). Even inetd isn't running on many RedHat systems.
Let us supose that someone discovers a bug in the MAC O/S that is only relevant to online control. almost no MACs are used for online control, what is the probability your bug will ever get fixed?
The original story in this case is posted with the intention of obtaining a particular answer. The poster is not really interested in what system would be secure, he wants to have his original prejudice reinforced.
Design of ship control systems is a real time control problem. As such it is not an application for which 'Linux' is a solution, you have to be much more precise and specify exactly which real-time enhanced Linux you are considering. It would also kinda help to actually specify the problems to be addressed
As for 'security', one would hope that you would not be hooking your control systems up to the Internet or running any sort of user application other than controls for the ship. The references to worms viruses etc suggest to me that the poster does not understand the problem or is trolling for anti-Microsoft stories to tell his manager.
Looking for an Information Security student project suggestion?
Try http://dotcrimeManifesto.com/
Many medical diagnostic machines must be validated by the FDA for use. A friend of mine works for a medical instrument company, and the hardware/software check are quite involved. You might see how the FDA and the various hardware manufacturers handle this issue.
Don't you understand the importance of gratifying your own ego? Instead, you remind us of a useful link, and go away! How lazy can you get?
The actual department of the U.S. National Institute of Standards and Time is CSRC I would point you to the Computer Security Expert Assit Team and their guidlines
Their audit and risk checklists are quite extensive.
Ahh..
Another day, another "Tell Me Exactly How To Do My Job post masquerading as an Ask Slashdot question.
:)
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Today's Top Deals
In Microsoft's anti-monopoly case, Microsoft's lawyers had to use WordPerfect to prepare their case because MS Word didn't meet the relevant bar association standards. If I remember correctly Word didn't count words reliably, so both sides couldn't be certain that they were looking at complete documents.
Also I believe there is a similar set of standards for accountants using spreadsheets.
Most of us just assume that our software is going to work and tell horror stories when it doesn't, but for those whose very careers depend on the accuracy of their programs, software is indeed very closely monitored.
- The machine could not malfunction in a way which would harm the patient, and
- The machine would not report erroneous data which could lead to harm from subsequent mis-treatment of the patient.
How you'd demonstrate such things given the legendary instability of Windows, I have no idea.Scientists restrict study to entire physical universe; creationist
so Internet security isn't an issue. For a shipboard computer, you only need two things:
* No network connections to non-trusted systems (i.e., onboard crew and passenger personal systems)
* Solid stability and reliability in operation.
Given those, your ship computers should be secure.
If you wanted to run a secure web server, would you run it on NT, Linux, Solaris or the Mac?
*Up go hands of Linux advocates*
Answer: Mac because it is the least available operating system and as such fewer attacks have been created for it, even if there are hypothetically more bugs. As such, you would be less likely to suffer a problem, all else being equal.
This is short sighted, becuase it does not take into account what you are securing AGAINST. If you are securing against random, non targeted attacks from script kiddies, you might be right, becuase said script kiddies aren't going to spend the time to figure the system out... but if you are trying to secure against a real, concerted attack by agents of a competitor trying to steal your ideas or ruin your business, then you have made a very grave mistake.
When you say "all things being equal", then you are saying that 1 defaced web page is exactly equal to 1 stolen top secret formula, which is preposterous. A hypothetical question can not consider all types of attacks to be equal and still produce a valid and meaningful result.
If you use that logic, then using a completely open and unsecured network would be ok if you sealed the computer in a locked metal box, since it would deter physical attacks by baseball bats (ALL attacks are of equal value, right?). Or you could say that adding the line "WWJD" to the telnet login prompt would be a valid defense since it would lower the instance of attacks by Christians by 80%.
Go set him straight.
"Your superior intellect is no match for our puny weapons!"
The Common Criteria:
here and here.
Which supersedes the Orange Book:
here and here.
"This message is composed of 100% recycled electrons."
You might find my Secure Programming for Linux and Unix HOWTO useful. It's a set of guidelines for writing secure programs, including writing web applications, clients, viewers (including word processors), setuid/setgid programs, and so on. It's focused on Linux and Unix, but most of the general principles apply to all systems.
- David A. Wheeler (see my Secure Programming HOWTO)
OK, first off if your looking primarily from an insurance standpoint any number of criteria can be used.
Since the computers are in a marine environment are they resistant to (salt)water?
Is there a knowledgable(sp) computer tech on board, and what are his additional duties. Is he/she there to make sure the computer system stays online or is he/she also cleaning out shitters?
One computer system is much like the other much as one OS is much like the other. Both Linux and Windows (pick your version) have it's bugs, and will the particular bugs have an effect on the operation.
In any operation there ideally should be enough spare parts around that you could build another complete unit if needed, but there's never an ideal situation.
The list could go on and on and on, but there are a few major points...
1) environment
2) support personell
3) inventory
4) access
Most here will be talking from an electronic security aspect, but on a ship the major focus should be physical security.
Steve's Computer Service, Hobbs, NM
It's been pointed out that ships whose absolute-position navigation systems (GPS, LORAN, radar, etc.) conk out depend on dead reckoning: determining position based on speed and initial course.
It occured to me that this is the way software purchased are too often made: rather than determining exactly what is needed, purchases are based on what's already there and how fast development has proceeded. It seems like people buy the newest version not because they need it, but because it's available. Most users I know would be doing just fine with Word 97, (heck, most of them would do great with WordPerfect 6 for DOS) but they have upgraded to Word 2000 then Word XP because it's there. (I used to use WP6/DOS extensively, and it NEVER crashed on me.)
If Microsoft spent more effort making Word 2000 and Windows 98 more stable than succumbing to feature creep, the world would be a better place.
If people wouldn't upgrade for the sake of upgrading, they could demand that future software versions be compatible with older versions: a document in Word XP should be openable in Word 1.0.
Give me my freedom, and I'll take care of my own security, thank you.
Go back, reread the articles, put on your critical thinking cap and try to explain to yourself what must have happened.
The article talks about a software problem, not an OS problem.
Many people have brought up the SECURITY question here, myself included. But the issue is SAFETY.
SECURITY asks, will the lock keep out intruders?
SAFETY asks, will the lock allow personnel to pass quickly in the event of an emergency?
SECURITY asks, will the window resist breaking in an intrusion attempt?
SAFETY asks, will the window resist breaking if accidently impacted? Can the window be used as an egress in an emergency? If the window breaks, will the fractured glass cause injury?
SECURITY asks, can intruders compromise the ships navigation or control systems?
SAFETY asks, will failure or compromise of the navigation or control systems have a negative impact on life or property?
SECURITY asks, does the system have permission to perform task A while being restricted from performing task B?
SAFETY asks, are the navigation or control systems able to the specified job in the specified manner?
SECURITY asks, how will access be controlled in the event of a system failure or compromise?
SAFETY asks, how will catastrophic failure be prevented in the event of a single system failure or compromise?
Hopefully, these questions will give you an idea of the kinds of questions a computer systems safety panel would be responsible for answering. Security is concerned with authority, which is NOT the question here. Safety is concerned with protecting the life and health of personnel and the physical integrity of assets.
That being said, Michael should go back and revise the headline to read "Computer SAFETY Criteria."
Give me my freedom, and I'll take care of my own security, thank you.
There has been a lot of work on establishing standards for safety critical systems. search google or try http://www.afm.sbu.ac.uk/safety/ as a start
Everyone's saying "it should be designed like such and so" and "keep it out of the water" (duh) and so on. That's all well and good, but the question here is about measurement. You've got your theories, you've implemented them, now how do you decide whether they hold up?
The only way I can think of is to do some good old fashioned actuarial analysis. It's a lot of work and a lot of time, but basically answering this question involves (1) collecting gobs of data and (2) analysing it. As well intentioned, well-researched, and sensible as the rest of the front end design advice might be, it's basically a lot of handwaving. It's about where the rubber hits the road, not a theoretical discussion about what chemicals should be used to make tires.
--Lawrence Lessig for Congress!
1. The fact, if it is a fact, that reliability is in fact an issue that should be reckoned with
2. Criteria that clearly show the strengths and weaknesses of the alternatives that exist
3. The fact, if it is a fact, that it is possible to create a body that, based on objective criteria, can act as an authority that sets the standard for safety of ship's computer systems.
In reply:
1. For reliability, on cursory examination, I would suggest looking at the methods that new technology has replaced. Was it important for the previous method to be reliable? To what degree? Then presumably the new method needs to be as reliable.
2. Now we're back to how to set up a criteria creation body, which I think has been less addressed in the responses. I mentioned SANS in my early posting, why not contact these people, and people in similar industries (the person who mentioned they were in the railroad industry for example) and find how they did it, who the major players were, and talk to them.
3. I'll take a pass on this one.
Software is different in three regards.
I think this will change drastically as soon as software makers start to have real liability for the products they sold (free software is a seperate issue), like other engineers do. Then it might just happen that you will not find anybody willing to do software where their feeling tells them the art is not advanced far enough. And software production will be slower and more careful. And even more important those that fail repeatedly will have to leave the business!
Most ACs are not even worth the keystrokes to insult them. Be generically insulted and ignored otherwise.
Wrong. Use Linux with Solaris as fallback or the other way round. These systems are compatible with each other and you can use one as a backup for the other.
Maybe use both with a hard-coded failover or a combined system where both OSes have to be successfully hacked in order to compromise the system. Depends on what kind of security you need.
Most ACs are not even worth the keystrokes to insult them. Be generically insulted and ignored otherwise.
I never said that OpenBSD has no exploits. What I'm saying, is that they have the least amount of them. You can install it out of the box, and as long as you pick a decent root password, you can leave it plugged in, and stay safe for quite a while.
I am quite willing to spend the extra time to secure my linux system in order to get better driver support. Not everybody is able to do this though. These people should carefully consider whether to use OpenBSD or pay a Linux-expert to secure their installation. Or whether to use another Unix(-like) system. If you don't need the better drivers, OpenBDS should be a very good choice.
Most ACs are not even worth the keystrokes to insult them. Be generically insulted and ignored otherwise.
Yes, you can. Your Windows box can randomly throw 'sploits at a box you don't know exists until it finds one the admin didn't patch or didn't know about. Often, you don't know your Windows box is doing this, because you don't know that it's been thoroughly zombied.
One-of-a-kinds generally don't help as much as you might think because what you gain in obscurity you lose in maturity (ie, some script kiddie stuff will still work becuase the author made the same mistakes that were found and removed from Apache years ago).
Got time? Spend some of it coding or testing
There are at least two huge flaws in this; firstly, a generic attack (or a manual followup to a generic probe) is more likely to work, and secondly the hack-attack numbers reflect a smaller population, not necessarily a smaller proportion of a population. It's a great comfort to know that you're unique as you sit there looking at your Mac server full of zeroes.
If I wanted to take advantage of the features advocated by the lecturer, I'd use something like Roxen on Linux on a MIPS box, chrooted and as far as possible readonly (chown/chmod then chattr +i then remove the chattr binary, and if possible also mount -o ro).
Got time? Spend some of it coding or testing
IEC 61508: "Functional safety of electrical/electronic/programmable electronic safety-related systems".
This standard, which also applies to software (see 61508-3: Software requirements), defines some very stringent requirements for systems that have anything to do with safety, i.e. where a failure of the system could endanger life.
See the IEC's website for more...
Yeesh... not sure what the mods are doing me modding me up. It wasn't meant to be a serious post, nor was it a serious gesture by my lecturer.
The point I was trying to make (and my lecturer too I imagine - I slept thru much of it) is that the incidence of problems is not purely a function of "security" but also a function of "attack likelyhood". Of course these are dynamic variables and aren't even completetly independent variables but they do illustrate a point.
If you are going to measure security, do you measure it by "measuring" empirical results to form your conclusion or do you go into the black art of measuring security by non-empircal means like how many holes you "think" there are.
That's the serious point that *I* wanted to make. And if my parent miraculously got an overrated moderation count, this deserves a (+1) insightful =P
Given the cost and reliability of paper charts, it would seem highly imprudent not to take at least a set of the most crucial ones.
Of course, forintercontinental shipping charts aren't terribly useful for most of the trip, though.
Any sufficiently advanced technology is indistinguishable from a rigged demo
--Andy Finkel (J. Klass?)
That would be bad design. Systems controlling critical functions should be physically secured and certainly not anywhere near *any* kind of wider network access, least of all Outlook.
It boils down to criteria listed in several posts here already. There's no point in having the best, most secure OS if you leave it with a floppy drive, unattended root logins, Outlook, NFS exports. Since PCs are so cheap, why risk so much to save maybe $2,000 per PC?
Xix.
"Everything is adjustable, provided you have the right tools"
Have you tried British Standard BS7799? I think it has been turned into an ISO standard (or is underway). It defines how to turn your organisation into a secure/reliable environment - and more importantly how to prove that it is. It takes into account the fact that systems change, and that they are not reliable - and helps you work around/knock down the risks to a level you are comfortable with. It is used mainly for companies - but I don't see why it couldn't be used for any organisation (read: ship-board network/control system). In fact, get in touch with them on http://www.bsi-global.com and see if they would be interested in defining a sea-borne computing standard (they do that kind of thing with private firms as long as the standard becomes public domain...).
Alternatively, call a manufacturing network supplier. Think about the kind of reliability that Ford or GM requires on the assembly line - they don't allow any crashes! (har har har) There are (as usual) several competing standards which could be converted to nautical use.
Pimping my Karma Whore since 1847.
Computers for main functions (propulsion, steering, cargo) in a ship have been in use since the mid seventies, and although lagging somewhat behind in the beginning when it came to Rule coverage, all major Shipping Classification Societies today have Rules which cover above use of computers onboard ships. This relates both to hardware and software. E.g.:For DNV (Det Norske Veritas) see Rules Pt.4 Ch.9 (Instrumentation and Automation) Sec.4. This is 2,5 pages of what experience have taught us are the most important aspect concerning computers onboard. However, everything else in Pt.4 Ch.9 concerns computers as well as other technology platforms, the Rules are written to be as technology independent as possible. The gradual increase due to expense Considerations in the use of PC's as workstations, , are something we haven't taken lightly. The hardware needs to prove itself by going through environmental/EMC testing (See Rules Pt.4. Ch.9 Sec.5 and Standards for Certification 2.4), and the software is tested by Approval Test of Application Software, where normal operation as well as reaction to most probable system failures are tested. Admittedly the first Windows versions were not secure, but today's versions are mostly acceptable, that is if you know which precautions to take. Of great concern is young eager software designers who haven`t learned their lessons and read necessary safety documentation before diving into the design phase. It seems DNV as a Classification Society have a similar problem. We would not object if you do some more homework and then revert with your findings! By the way, DNV does have a group working with software analysis as well, as far as I know they are mostly used in the consulting role, for manufacturers developing extremely safety critical systems. One last information: DNV consists of 5400 individual spread all around the world, all trying their best to fulfil our intentions of keeping our customers on the right track with regard to safety matters.
Design of ship control systems is a real time control problem. As such it is not an application for which 'Linux' is a solution, you have to be much more precise and specify exactly which real-time enhanced Linux you are considering. It would also kinda help to actually specify the problems to be addressed.
Also it may well matter quite a bit if the ship in question is a supertanker, aircraft carrier, bulk carrier, destroyer, liner, ferry, etc.
Bruce Schneier's Secrets and Lies : Digital Security in a Networked World. Many of your questions will be answered, and you will walk away from the reading with much better questions.
Guns don't kill people; Physics kills people! - John Lithgow as Dick Solomon on Third Rock From The Sun
Try 'loses'.
-josh
No, I did not know that. I thoght they still ran on BSD, that all efforts to port had failed and that they put a few win2k machines up front. Eh, what do I know?
Hotmil Hacked Go team!
Hotmail still using non-microshit software last summer Oh yeah, at leas one of the posters there notes that NT code has lots of BSD in it too. Fanboys like you know that, don't you?
the start of their effor, summer of 2000 Don't look like it happened does it?
Oh well, it's silly to talk to trolls. I like the graph of Hotmail's uptime. It looks like they figured out how to load balance hide their individual machine's poor performance last summer. Since their switch from BSD and solaris (which billgates still uses for his own site) their best uptime was 66 days or so, ptttthfit. You might have a look at Netcraft's good uptime page to see where your mighty 115 day spree really sits. Hint, multiply times ten to get real uptimes that free code provides!
Friends don't help friends install M$ junk.