Collapsing P2P Networks

Andrew writes "I'm a undergraduate at the University of Washington, and after seeing this article on Salon, I dusted off a paper I had written last year. I examined P2P networks under a model usually used in describing animal populations, and found that it may be possible to cause a collapse in the network based on the intrinsic nature of the technology. Just as in animal populations, P2P networks require a sizable "critical mass" of users, and overharvesting can cause a systemic collapse - what if this were done on purpose? Quite ominously, my second recommendation on disruption was carrying damaged or incorrectly named files. You can read theabstract and the actual paper"

Comments

Re:Well, atleast we know who skipped maths lessons

[Saeger]

1. Randomly selecting and litigating against users engaging in piracy

countermeasure: encryption + the bad press that randomly sueing upstanding citizens would bring.

2. Creating fake users that carry (incorrectly named or damaged files)

countermeasure: webs of trust & md5 hashes.

3. Broadcasting fake queries in order to degrade network performance

countermeasure: evolve to shun the DoS nodes (again, webs of trust & a 'witness system' needed).

4. Selectively targeting litigation against the small percentage of users that carry the majority of the files

countermeasure: This being the most effective [scare] tactic of the four, the best way to deflect it would be hiding your identity, or somehow spreading everything available very thin (freenet style) for plausible deniability, or serving from offshore, or rotating selections...

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