OpenBSD 3.0 Honeypot Whitepaper
Tortured Potato writes "This white paper, by Michael Anuzis, details how he set up an OpenBSD 3.0 honeypot, watched it get cracked and then analyzed it -- all within 28 hours. Fascinating stuff...this is the first OpenBSD honeypot I've heard of."
A honeypot is a machine set up for the sole purpose of distracting hackers away from your main network by putting up an easy target.
Which is not very surprising for an OS that has had "One remote hole in the default install, in nearly 6 years!". An interesting read 'though.
By the way, there is a slashbox for OpenBSD Journal, which can be enabled here. It featured this story yesterday.
karma capped
You can learn a lot about honeypots and network security in general on the Honeynet site. Browse the challenges, and the results, and be amazed ;)
karma capped
If anyones interested, the website for the 'hacker' is omegapunx.org, his msn name is omegakidd@hotmail.com
E-Mail: omegakidd@tfz.net
E-Mail2: omegakidd@cheguevara.zzn.com
aim: eromlenosam
aim2: shoogy maple
aim3: satan the killer
msn: omegakidd@hotmail.com
yahoo: omegakidd
irc@efnet: omegakidd
Registrant:
OmegaPunx
5233 Welcome Ave N.
Crystal, Minnesota 55429
US
Registrar: Dotster (http://www.dotster.com)
Domain Name: OMEGAPUNX.ORG
Created on: 03-MAY-02
Expires on: 03-MAY-03
Last Updated on: 03-MAY-02
Administrative, Technical Contact:
Elmore, Mason omegakidd@tfz.net
OmegaPunx
5233 Welcome Ave N.
Crystal, Minnesota 55429
US
(763)531-0637
I tried calling the number, but no one answered (at 9:30AM EST) let me know if
So when redhat has a new securty flaw, it isn't so much as a redhat problem as it is to a open source community security flaw.
Sunny Dubey
OpenBSD uses random TCP sequence numbers, therefore it isn't very useful to nmap openbsd for finding initial sequence numbers when the firewall admin could simply apply "modulate state" for extra protection. For documentation man pf.conf(5) and search on down for "STATE MODULATION".
Stateful packet filters only check the first packet, and then only for the source, some flags, and then pass it through. Then it will make sure that following pieces of the conversation are limited to the same source, destination, and ports. What good does this do? Well, instead of just blindly passing ports through, you can say that inbound connections are only allowed if they are responses to outbound requests (net client), and vise versa (net servers). I'm afraid that's just not true. A stateful firewall is really only concered with the protocol, flags that are initally set, and source and dest ports. The contents could be pure random binary data sent to Apache or SSH, the firewall doesn't care.
So, if your firewall is set to allow connections to Apache and SSH, the worm or exploit will still get through. As far as more secure, you could configure your firewall to prevent outbound connections, stopping the spread of worms from your machine to others, preventing the use of your machine to attack others, and preventing outbound connections (e.g. Sub7, outgoing e-mails, et al.)... However, even in that restrictive configuration, you are just as susceptible to an attacker connecting with SSH, or an exploit sending a: rm -rf
So, properly configured, a stateful firewall still can NOT prevent you from being exploited. However, it can prevent your server from being of any use to an attacker (or a worm).
Slashdot gets worse every day... Pipedot: News for nerds, without the corporate slant
For those interested the site the whitepaper was on has been temporarily disabled by the web hosting company due to too much traffic.
Another copy of the whitepaper is available at:
http://www.anuzisnetworking.com/whitepapers/
And to verify, yes it was in fact me who posted the above apology. --Michael Anuzis