Graphing Randomness in TCP Initial Sequence Numbers
Saint Aardvark writes "This is neat: Graphic visualization of how random TCP Initial Sequence Numbers really are for different OSs. It's a great way of seeing how secure a TCP stack really is. Cisco IOS is great; OS9, OpenVMS and IRIX aren't. Posted to the ever-lovin' BugTraq mailing list." This is a follow-up to the previous report.
He must be running a server with no tcp stack. heh.
I propose a new flag in the standard TCP/IP packet. We shall call this the Slashdot Flag. The general purpose of this flag is to state whether or not the bandwidth limits of the server can handle the requirements a Slashdot posting can impose. If the flag is set false, Slashcode will automatically generate numerous, random, 'this page has been slashdotted' posts requesting a link to a mirror.
That being said, the page *is* finally loading up so I'm going to go look at some pictures now.
tinfoilmedia
Original report here:
t ml
http://razor.bindview.com/publish/papers/tcpseq.h
>certainly more common than many of the other
>selections.
>
>Should we assume Linux matches *BSD or some other
>flavor? or do I need to read more carefully
You need to read more carefully.
Lets face it: current computers and humans are both as bad as each other at randomness. The fact that computers have to "calculate" randomness is a bad sign in itself, and the humans that program these computers are almost utterly incapable of perceiving true randomness anyway. I'm waiting for the day when the national lottery comes up 1,2,3,4,5 with a bonus ball of 6. Society will crumble, public enquiries will be called for and conspiracy theorists will have something to bang on about for years. I think that barring the sudden development of Quantum x86 chips (at which point randomness becomes "real" and encryption becomes pretty much unbreakable), the only real solution for decent randomness must surely be TCP/IP seeding based on Lava Lamps
It's too late for me to die young