OpenSSH 3.5 Released
Dan writes "Markus Friedl announces that OpenSSH 3.5 has just been released with notable updates since 3.4. It will be available from the mirrors listed at http://www.openssh.com/ shortly. Enhancements include bug fixes, improved support for Privilege Separation (Portability, Kerberos, PermitRootLogin handling), RSA blinding in order to avoid timing attacks against the RSA host key and much more. Congratulations are in order for the OpenSSH team's hard work and efforts."
so when will apple roll it into os x?
Remember to check the MD5s of those downloads this time around!
C - A language that combines the speed of assembly with the ease of use of assembly.
At least one major security vulnerability exists in many deployed OpenSSH versions (2.3.1 to 3.3). Please see the ISS advisory, or our own OpenSSH advisory on this topic where simple patches are provided for the pre-authentication problem.
The same people that make OpenBSD make OpenSSH?
Whenever some story about, say KDE, pops up everyone is like "this is the best thing for Linux since sliced bread". Reality check: not all people run KDE run it on Linux. I think the BSD people should be entitled to the same "This is what we do for everyone!" type of recognition as everyone else.
Buying a Dell computer is equivalent to dropping the soap in a prison shower.
>What does this have to do with BSD, as opposed to
>other Unixen?
OpenSSH was written by folks who also work on OpenBSD.
Of course, OpenSSH runs on many different *nix flavours.
You could either GPG sign the MD5 hash of the tarball, or GPG sign the tarball itself to guarantee that the tarball was signed off by the appropriate person.
Any sufficiently advanced technology is indistinguishable from a rigged demo
--Andy Finkel (J. Klass?)
There are numerous "fixes" which strengthen openssh in general, but there's no security hole mentioned. Looks like this is just something to do during the next weekend! That is, after everyone ELSE puts it on their production servers, heh heh.
You might want to check out scponly.
Be aware of the colour scheme on that site though, it's hard on the eyes.
If you are referring to Damien Miller's public key, you can get it off the keyservers. Or, you can get it right here:
f ga QvCvqK0bN0AF1ZG slfCqQn9ACTmsn42 +VCyW4hdwUGSBS6 Z2O7tFDnJNagF55v lnK0uMQwCg/8RUW PYJwAuhiQWAKxGRw p/ZyTaWCSERUBRV KbtVSZvRkgUfRNOk rcH2eiY8Iz6est1 6qDzLPdx6F3BAk2L G+TTwlKUPuGqOtb QnMm9Jat/yg9N6ni gSIiFyG8ixh1671 5AcPMST5v7v6O/ug 9aYWERZ0zjUhRHp PS5LeXHs28oVLlH7 QuRGFtaWVuIE1pG 1pbmRyb3Qub3JnPo hXBBMRAgAXBQI6o 7LA4b/nEiDMgCZAU zKq241h5GTJxC0I dasvS9uQINBDqa5t QQCADz/XnCcyleJ NOGp398Eh4Q9rkEp 5NH1qVecG953FuD 2VOY3h7SyfU25pcY iHEa1grfKPVoWm9 wgJR6H69lp4/cD2G yNaGarwY9HLvHFF FHrM0AzveIswgNpJ 0xNWXX8iXGsr3Y8 WdtmAylsio5+iZfW tdOb/Xpk2Yx5Ld+ bBZ0NjScNBo3kPSS CnQ6jRHokkz55rf Kke/TdT6wuCb4CdF S6tPgPrfYV+iwqj emEdIouShelikAAO 7QDKMr7vAjH8n0h pQGSaTukdPjKlG7s KwMu20ssK9DGVpu BVCsyf2D6GNW97Pf KQSkzFeZsbVB4Sj 4izawUiEYEGBECAA YFAjqa5tQACgkQA os+IiyAgAAn02wGO l1Wo/YJ+RY+c6K
-----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----
Version: PGP 8.0 (Build 288) Beta
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Vxxk9wlSXQp3+Qw5+qqsN5ovzsn39r9pq
5myh65ZJTK1ufWCZFssxQ0EiALagu4DlH
QYDmisEHjkarAapPaupxjhkD/j9riCVas
4Dg9QxpuwHKIT8BeDA3hJa/9Yxu5jec2N
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6u2EA/4+1CBYZ8mXq9GJnLRBPAoYwSJJz
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bGxlciAoUGVyc29uYWwgS2V5KSA8ZGptQ
muacBQsHCgMEAxUDAgMWAgECF4AACgkQz
guS6ht9i9ZsAoL/oXCmFsofARehZF6Aak
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edT9IAXqr8pjp5tdqMYCcaKy+aJ0Sw1zV
53IwWGVVtquF5dimAe75+D0aXyVCOv0Ez
vXONY2qm/GV5OjyOUO41gmQ4pyXQh+goc
Cvqm7JoIU9JKxDV+96bxDLfTdKpoLYKb6
ady9/+n3m6cvAAURCACrvoVSbd0MR0FWX
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2NB/BatePGg7Z6UALaULQ0m83DCEVLJNn
zwMpwRMXnvCM6zYlS9i1kOm8LVATk0Wyi
PgulTZ7rHqXl4juY8LQ2j4dPNaPoKWG8J
RQrVTchgBSYoxRVW3fLk/yc3TC5Abh6Gp
zo7LA4b/nEgftgCdHIZUDVAWDRa5siSi8
N58TmAPE
=rCFY
-----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----
I hereby place the above post in the public domain.
There's a fair amount of testing that takes place before the packages are updated. I wouldn't count on 3.5pX going into Sid for a while yet. The more critical fixes might be backported against 1:3.4p1-4, etc.
You again. Excellent troll, but you need to choose a different motif for your nicks.
For the uninitiated: that is not perl. It is line noise with some perl operators, bundled into a cleverly-masked troll. This guy is an old sport at this, previously using the name "PhysicsGenius". Check his (short) user history, and this guy's posting history. I simply cannot believe that moderators would be so idiotic as to mod this stuff up, so my conjecture is that he has two accounts: one to troll, and another serious account with mod points. It may be interesting to correlate average time between mod points to his posting history.
Relevant anecdote: the original OpenSSH sources had an "RSA in six lines of perl" in a comment of one of the source files. Theo removed that in some version. A little too much angst there, if you ask me - this stuff is supposed to be fun.
I agree. Look for djm@mindrot.org on your favorite keyserver. (I like the one below)
c h= 0x86FF9C48
http://pgp.mit.edu:11371/pks/lookup?op=get&sear
M
Basically what the script does is clean the environment. The requested command is stored in SSH_ORIGINAL_COMMAND environmental variable. Its checked to make sure it is in fact the command you intend. The options are then checked. Finally the script exec()'s the hardcoded path to the command with arguments supplied.
Although it comes written for scp i've used it for securing an account so they can't log in, and they can only execute one or two commands of my choosing.
from what i understand sftp just exec's /usr/libexec/sftp-server. i don't see why you couldn't alter the script to only allow that command.
also you'll want to make sure the client's ~/.bash_profile, ~/.profile, etc.--all its login scripts--are empty and owned by root so that they don't upload their own "special" login script and undo all your work.
scp-wrapper can be found here
Phibz
Firstly, do you patch all local privilege escalation vulnerabilities as quickly as you patch remote vulnerabilities? I know I don't.
Please RTFM: An attacker breaking privsep will find themselves in an empty chroot jail with a unique, non-priviliged UID & GID. Leveraging such an attack to even read local files would be very difficult.
Your points about a broken privsep being used to stage network-based attacks are valid.