Secure PDAs

An anonymous reader writes "This article at LinuxDevices.com introduces a unique Linux-based 'secure PDA' co-developed by IBM and Consumer Direct Link, Inc. (CDL). The Paron MPC combines the functions of a PDA, Bluetooth wireless access, cellular telephone, and biometric fingerprint recognition, along with a security-oriented hardware/software architecture. The device is claimed to be the world's first handheld wireless device with built-in biometric user authentication. The Paron is based on an Intel StrongARM SA-1110 processor and uses a Linux 2.4.x kernel and provides a GUI environment and PDA app suite based on Trolltech's Qtopia and Opera's browser much like the Sharp Zaurus."

Comments

BioMetric User Identification

[mumblestheclown]

If microsoft did "biometric user identification", we'd be screaming bloody 1984.

Instead, it's linux-based. Neat-o.

The true hypocrite is the one who ceases to perceive his deception, the one who lies with sincerity. ~André Gide

never work

[TerryAtWork]

Bruce Schneier has handled this in his book
Secrets and Lies.

http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/tg/detail/-/04 71 253111/qid=1036775441/sr=8-1/ref=sr_8_1/102-248505 7-0576118?v=glance&s=books&n=507846

Biometrics is not ready for prime time. When they hack it, are you going to be isssued a new thumb?

Re:never work

[fermion]

It has been a while since I have read that book, and I don't have it in front of me, but if i recall he realized that in Applied Cryptography he implied that properly vetted and implemented algorithms would imply security. In the fullness of time he realized that the view was naive. As such, S&L was written to convey the message that algorithms alone are insufficient. A secure system must consider users, application, the nature of the security threat, and the cost of breached security, As such, in general, all security methods fall short.

In this case, IBM tends to market to sophisticated markets. They tend to, and are increasingly, trying to serve the sophisticated market in new ways so as not to lose to MS, Dell, and others. Hopefully we will not see these devices everywhere, because, as you say, once a thumbprint is compromised it is always compromised. I honestly do not know if this is a useful tool, but i can imagine some applications where it could be.

On the other hand if MS did this, your point might be valid because then the technology would be shoe-horned into general use. For instance, if the validation was in the OS and IE, and the reader were on the keyboard, thousands of merchants might use the fingerprint for sole verification. This would create a large incentive to hack the system, which, a you point out, would only require the capture of the digital signature of the fingerprint, which is not a replaceable token.

As any security conscious agency can tell you...

[saskboy]

No PDA is really secure. The encryption and such will always be hackable.
The only true method of keeping confidential information safe is to keep it under lock and key, or in the possesion of a concerned person all the time.

Secure PDA is an oxymoron.

you must admit

[Faggot]

If microsoft did "biometric user identification", we'd be screaming bloody 1984. Instead, it's linux-based. Neat-o.

There's plenty of automatic-MS-bashing that goes on here, and plenty of automatic-MS-bashing-bashing. But if you look at the facts and stick to the numbers, it's not very farfetched to assume Microsoft is always trying to screw us somehow.

Look at Palladium, with which they will entrench DRM on every desktop. Look at Word's closed and obfuscated binary file format. Look at all their OEM tricks, and EULA abuse, their fake Switch ads and their systematic abuse of power.

Their strategy (whose final step is most assuredly "PROFIT !!") has been to fuck consumers and users as much as they can get away with and rob their pockets of change. Next to a Finnish hobbyist's OS, they look pretty bad.

Two simple words:

[burgburgburg]

Passport
.Net

True, but PDA will exist (Utimaco SafeGuard PDA)

[Erik_]

The only true method of keeping confidential information safe is to keep it under lock and key, or in the possesion of a concerned person all the time.
Very true, but it's not going to stop the problem that PDA are potentially the largest outgoing 'leak' of information for companies and organisations. They contain so much valuable data...

One interesting product that is well worth a close look is Utimaco's SafeGuard PDA solution.

For one thing the pinpad screen, swaps the numbers around when you want to unlock the device. So even if you watch your neighboor use his fingers pattern when he unlocks his PocketPC, it won't help you. The product also has a lot of other interesting features...

Re:As any security conscious agency can tell you..

[Planesdragon]

The only true method of keeping confidential information safe is to keep it under lock and key, or in the possesion of a concerned person all the time.

Secure PDA is an oxymoron.

No person is truly secure. Those in power are always corruptable.

Security, when it comes down to it, is simply the challenge making the price of breaking in greater than the beneift of breaking in.

If a crook has a 1% chance of being caught and sentenced for one year for breaking into my home, and we value his year of freedom at $50,000, he had had better get more than $500 from breaking in or the risk isn't worth the gain.

Most criminals (and hackers) don't think in these terms directly, but there is, AFAIK, an pseudo-concious awareness of it. ('course, the whole bit is thrown when non-cash values, like Thrill or Political Activism are factored in...)

Re:Not-so-secure PDA

[virtigex]

The concern about Bluetooth is mainly focussed on devices that are shipped with security disabled. In addition, the device would have to provide a service (such as the ability to make a phone call) for that service to be abused. Most major manufacturers ship with security enabled and I doubt whether the PDA exports any services either.

Re:Secure?? how?

[cheezedawg]

Funny- the "risk assessment" of fingerprints includes using a severed fingertip or a genetic clone of the registered finger. I'd say that if somebody cuts your finger off you have more to worry about than the security of your PDA.

err and which

[Archfeld]

biometric system, or fingerprint system has not been broken already ? Kind of funny calling somthing the size of a double deck of cards secure. You think laptops walk off easily. The bottom line is physical access always compromises logical security. Maybe we could add a MissionImpossible self destruct option :)

I sure hope this description is a bad one

[BeBoxer]

Ugh. This article describes exactly how you shouldn't use biometric authentication.


Instead of swiping a badge through a reader, the employee would place his/her thumb on the Paron's small fingerprint recognition screen, and a wirelessly connected server would read the fingerprint, identify the person, and grant access if a match is found between the person making the request and the data in the server.


Uh, this is just using the fingerprint as a password to authenticate the user. Dumb dumb dumb. If they really are doing this, then anybody who can get the user's fingerprint can get access. What they should be doing:


Instead of swiping a badge through a reader, the employee would place his/her thumb on the Paron's small fingerprint recogniction screen to activate the embedded crypto processor. The processor would then use the employee's private key to authenticate to a wirelessly connected server.


Why is this different? For one, the actual authentication to the building is being done with a private key. Private keys are much easier to replace if compromised. Most people also don't routinely leave copies of their private keys on everything they touch.

Second, the fingerprint is only being used to activate the crypto processor. It only needs to be valid from the fingerprint sensor into the bowels of the PDA. But more importantly, it's not good for much. All it does is allow the crypto processor to be activated. An adversary still needs to first steal the PDA itself and then defeat the fingerprint sensor. And then they can only use the public key until it's revoked.

But trusting a wireless device to send the server the fingerprint is just plain silly. That's worse than a cleartext password. It's like authenticating on the username alone. Hopefully, this device doesn't actually work this way and the article is just simplifying for the reader.