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Computers, Court, and Fingerprints
Degrees writes "Should Law Enforcement be allowed to Photoshop fingerprints? That is the question posed in this article in the South Florida Sun-Sentinel. The suspect is charged with murder, and the evidence was circumstantial before the fingerprint enhancment. At the end, the crime scene investigators say they want encrypted cameras. The implication is they want DRM-enabled digital cameras with software for full audit-trail capability. Would that make the Photoshoping more credible? Would DRM cameras be a good thing for Joe Citizen?"
They've tried this with audio before, notably in the Waco cases. The court rejected it then. Hopefully they will keep rejecting it. Such digital enhancement might be useful for getting leads, but the result isn't evidence; it's just a computer-assisted guess.
Wait... so they can crack the encryption?
Nothing is flawless, any form of encryption can be cracked.... all you need is time.
It would give the community a false sense of security. Just becasue id has DRm doesn't mean anything. Evidence should not be tampered with.... PERIOD
Hey, this is my sig, if you don't like it, STOP READING MY POSTS!
Considering what I have seen come out of halfway professional graphics people with Photoshop I wouldn't trust any digital photograph as absolute proof, especially if someone admits to having run it thru Photoshop|the Gimp|whatever.
No way.
Remeber, LAPD *may* have tried that with OJ, Time "enhanced" OJ's picture to the tune of a big dollar lawsuit.
Someone else mentioned Waco, yea, "enhanced" evidence is bullshit evidence.
Someone can "enhance" anything, even some yokel atop WTC with a 757 in the background.
Secure digital cameras, photoshoping fingerprints, no way.
Even with a "secure" digital camera, there will be wiggle-room to screw with pixels.
This kind of technology sounds kinda scarey ... just like in the (horrible) movie, Judge Dread. Yes, the technology could help police and law enforcement to solve crimes that would otherwise possibl be unsolvible, BUT is it worth it? I see the opportunity for a very hatefull person to set up someone for a crime they didn't commit ... and for the evidence to be used against them in court! Yes, this does exist today, but atleast there is a CHANCE that the person falsifying the evidence COULD get caught. How could this person get caught if he is permitted to MAKE evidence?
... which could also be used AGAINST the prosecution in what would have otherwise been a solid case ....
Its a good idea, but this DEFINATELY leaves a resonable doubt as to whether the evidence is real and legit
Bottom line: too much risk for too little benifit.
HallmarkOrnaments.Com
This not DRM at all, what they want is a system whereby they can say that a digital photograph has not been altered. So yes, this is very important. Imagine you're on trial for a crime you did not commit yet the prosecuting team has altered a similar fingerprint (but not similar enough for conclusive evidence) to make it more like yours.
DRM is an important fight, but keep the boundaries clear or you'll muddle your argument. These are separate technologies.
There exists the very real ability to tamper with evidence when it exists only as a series of bits. We need some means of ensuring that the data has not been seriously tampered with before we should allow these images to be admitted into evidence.
--The only way this can be seen as useful is if the person who is "cleaning up" the fingerprint has no idea who the print belongs to and where the print came from.--
Someone MOD that man up. That would be the only safeguard that would work.
The only thing the DRM or encryption would do is provide yet another means of tracking the files -- but it sounds like they are already using safeguards there. All versions, the user, and the duration of use are tracked. Those are the same, or in some cases better, than protections of physical evidence.
They don't need DRM cameras or higher cost encryption schemes. They need the same arguments that first allowed for fingerprints, DNA testing, and other new technologies in the courts.
frob.
//TODO: Think of witty sig statement
some thoughts..
* Anytime you use encryption or digital signatures, it's not "DRM". It's not like these folks want to restrict copying of the pictures, or track people who see the photos, they do that by keeping the pictures within their labs. The encryption is so they can show in court that the picture was not tampered with. When you check the signature in your linux package files, that's not DRM, that's something for your own benefit.
* I was recently looking at Canon's latest EOS-1Ds camera, which has a "Data Verification Kit" encryption module available. You put a smart card in a reader and every shot is digitally signed in the camera. So this stuff is available and hopefully the forensic photographers will begin using it. Of course a malicious photographer might change the software in the camera somehow but hopefully the module checks for that.
* Dodge & Burn tools should probably *not* be used.. they allow you to darken/lighten specific *areas* of the photo, which could be dangerous. When enhancing evidence they should only allow *global* changes like overall brightness or contrast, etc. Or at least they should send the evidence to three or more independent labs, who don't know anything about the case, and let each version be seen in court. That way there's less of a chance that someone will doctor the evidence for a specific outcome. And of course the whole workflow needs encryption and signatures.
* Evidence can always be tampered with. The digital signatures just make it harder, and hopefully at least as hard as it is now in the non-digital world.
Speaking as a member of the Law enforcement community, I see how increasingly difficult it is to get a good solid conviction.
This is just playing with fire. The encrypted cameras sound like a good idea, but I think that you need to have more solid evidence. Video cameras in squad cars is a great example. When you can get a drunk to admit how many beers he has had on video tape while conducting a field sobriety test it is pretty easy to refute his claims in court that he was just driving home from grandma's house and got a little tired.
The thing is, maintaining a trail of custody for the photos I think would be much harder, therefore easier to refute their validity in court. And any time you start messing with anything remotely related to being circumstantial evidence, you might as well just throw the case out the window, cause thats just what the judge is going to do.
It is going to be hard to convince people that this is a technology with feasible use in the courtrooom after they have seen pictures of OJ wearing ducky slippers.
Using something like Photoshop opens a wide door for abuse. If technology is going to be used to help uncover evidence (and it already is), then the power of that technology should be carefully circumscribed and open to public scrutiny.
Law enforcement should be using some special photoshop-like application, designed to allow only those "enhancements" that are deemed legal. (I'm sure that's on open question at this point.) A non-governmental, scientific organization should be responsible for coming up with standards: standards which would of course have to be voted into law.
Any application that implements this approved technology must be, without reservation, open source. People must be able to review what the application is actually capable of.
After that, the applicability and weight of such evidence will be accepted or rejected by a jury.
quiquid id est, timeo puellas et oscula dantes.
At first I thought this was a humor post ("AI that would prevent taking pictures of naked women"?!? I mean really.) but then it occoured to me that you might actually be serious. So, for just a moment, I'll step back from inflamatory language ("sick-men", "villany") and silly ideas (the aforementioned AI) and try to address your comment.
What you're proposing is that there should be a technological to what is, at it's heart, a moral problem. If you're looking at this from a moral/religous standpoint (and it sounds to me like you are) then you must recognize that you haven't solved anyting by taking away the option to engage in this sort of immoral behaviour (I'm assuming, for the sake of the discussion, that audit trails would, in fact, stop this sort of breach of trust from occouring - though in all honesty I think that's a deeply flawed assumption). Certainly the specific behaviour might have been prevented, but the underlying issues which allow someone to ignore or abuse their spouses trust, etc. still exist and have, in fact, been completely ignored. In the end all you'll end up doing is changing the specifics of the situation, but breaches of trust and sexual compulsion will continue. No amount of DRM can address the reasons that someone seeks out bad behaviour.
Of course, as I mentioned, DRM and/or audit trails won't do much to stop the unauthorized publication of such photos. It certaily won't stop one spouse from coercing/manipulating/etc. another to take the photos in the first place. In no way will it account for those who initially think the photos are a good idea but later change their minds. And finally, it's complete bunk to even begin to think that an audit trail will force anyone to "confront thheir odious addiction", and it certainly won't save any marriages.
The bottom line is that if a husband thinks so little of his wife and their relationship that he would violate her trust in sunch a way simply because he wouldn't get caught then the marriage is in serious trouble regardless. Technology is amazing stuff, but it's neither the cause of, nor the solution to each and every modern problem. I think people forget that too often.
Behold the Power of Cheese!
DRM is about taking options away from users.
Uh, no. This is an extremely popular misconception by some people, and an extremely popular knowing lie by other people.
DRM is about preserving the rights of content creators. Period.
Now, unfortunately, taking options away from users is a side-effect of most of the DRM schemes out there. But that is a side-effect, not a first effect. People advocating DRM are not evil boogeymen who derive pleasure from your pain like some music industry vampire. They care about preserving their rights in the face of rampant, out of control copyright violations.
Put it this way: if DRM existed that preserved your fair-use rights while taking away your non-right to mass distribute copyrighted material, they would fine with it.
Don't get me wrong. I don't particularly want my fair-use rights watered down, buy lying about these people's motivations just makes everyone looked like thieves in the eyes of lawmakers, and ultimately hurts the cause.
Sometimes it's best to just let stupid people be stupid.
Guys, encryption and DRM are not the same thing at all.
What's needed here is a "tamper-proof" digital image format, one that can't be modified or that can't be modified without leaving a record. Think checksums and digital signatures here, comprehensively applied. The same thing will be useful not only in criminology but also in medical imaging and lots of other areas as well.
DRM has nothing to do with "tamper-proof" data. DRM, which stands after all for "digital rights management," is simply a catch-all term for any technology that serves to capture rights as metadata, and possibly control access to media according to that metadata.
As I've written before, DRM is most important in the commercial TV broadcast space. A TV station buys a "rights package" for a syndicated program, and has to pay a very large fine if they violate the terms of that package. (Say, if they show the program at 10:00 AM when the contract says they can only show it between noon and midnight.) DRM in that arena will be a life-saver for those kinds of folks.
I know this is Slashdot and ungroupthink is doubleplusungood, but DRM is not a dirty word, and DRM and "tamper-proof" media are not the same thing at all.
I write in my journal
Law enforcement agencies need secure cameras because criminals are slimy and judges often side with criminals. If a criminal can claim that evidence should be thrown out because it wasn't secure, you bet the judge will side with him.
We also need the right to "photoshop." Enhancing a photograph is no different then using a microscope to make the image more clear.
Although I could compromise on the first one if the law would be strong enough to prevent evidence from being thrown out, we need a strong law to be passed allowing digital enhancing.
-Brent
It doesn't (as far as I could see) mention DRM. It only talks about being able to follow who did what with the information.
However, even the system of encryption, et al which is being proposed doesn't really do much. First, is the machine picking the randomly generated password or the person picking an easily recognizable password as in this problem.
Second, the machine (whether it be a camera, computer, or nightstick) doesn't have intelligence built into it. Thus, it would allow anyone who knew how to work the machine (and could guess the passwords) to alter the information. Even the fact that the computer is smart enough to make a copy of the original doesn't mean anything. If someone knew how the program worked - they could (and would) alter the original as well as the copy.
Until machines become self-aware or at least are aware of what someone is trying to do to them - we will not have a "good" way to stop fraud. (I say "good" because even then we will probably have some way to circumvent/unplug the smarts from a machine which puts us back where we are currently.)
Thoughts:
If the police want a more fullproof method of maintaining equilibrium in the establishment of, and verification of proof. Then they will need to greatly improve how that information is handled. A network (probably made up of Linux boxes) which are attached to a central repository and to which they can send information but not retrieve information (ie: a blind send) would be a step in the right direction. Information would only be retrievable from the main console connected directly to the centralized hardware. Also, files can not be deleted from the main system until the files have been backed up to a reliable medium (such as CDs/DVDs/tape). Otherwise, the system simply allows a user to register updates and nothing else.
Someone put a black hole in my pocket and now I'm broke.
Let's not get our collective panties into a bunch, people. 'Framing people' existed long before Vic Mackey picked up the local Yellow Pages to interrogate a suspect and Jack Bauer found another use for a bowling bag.
This is case of a another facet of technology that can be used by a Corrupt Offical For Nefarious Gains[TM]. If it exists, it will be used. And it will be allowed only when those in judgement allow it to be used.
Mod Karma -1: I sed bad wurds. If I cep my mouf shut, I wud be at riyses.
Why not just create a version of Photoshop that can only do things like contrast, burn, etc? Remove the tools that allow image modification entirely, and sell it to police forces as a way to get around this problem.
I see a software niche....
First off, IANAL, and IANAForensic expert of any sort. I have used photoshop for years. And I've worked on software projects requiring government certification. These are my opinions.
;)
That said, DRM does not apply (you are certifying the source here, not caring about end user rights). Photoshop is way too broad a tool, with too many abilities to create your own content. As for a digital file, don't put that in your mouth unless you know where all it has been.
What you would need would be image processing (not editing) tool, preferably specific to enhancing fingerprints. The best thing would be a self contained fingerprint enhancing appliance, with scanner, printer, and built in algorithms. The fingerprint would be scanned in, enhanced, and then go back to the real world as a watermarked print that could be taken to court with the device's serial number and the original fingerprint.
The device would of course be fully certified to do exactly what the court would admit. And that is the ticket: you need a fully controlled process that can be examined at every step with a fine tooth comb by some agency of the court to prevent forgery of evidence. You also need to link the evidence to the specific machine, so it can be hauled into court and publicly verified that it hasn't been tampered with.
Of course, to make Slashdotters happy, the device could run embedded Linux, and use Gimp routines, as long as you could find somebody to fill out enought paperwork to keep a certifying agency happy. A few boxcars would do.
This device would not be a consumer or pro graphics device. So there is no need (or even desire) to burden the public and the pro graphics community with the requirements of forensic evidence.
"The thousand year dragon king: King Ghidora."
Yuri, "Godzilla, Mothra, King Ghidora: Giant Monsters All-Out Attack"
Don't forget King Ghidora's birthday is tomorrow.
Of course, you don't need Photoshop to fabricate evidence. It's just another tool that can be used.
A lot of people have complained that who knows what the authorities might do with Photoshop -- enhancing evidence and such. That's a valid point but you should take a step back and realize how scientifically flawed fingerprinting is in the first place. (In my opinion, of course.)
Fingerprinting came about around the turn of the twentieth century as a replacement for a failed biometrics system, in which certain mesaurements of a person (size of head, length of arm, stuff like that) were being tabulated, and recorded to make a database of known criminals. Problem is, two people could have the same measurements.
Likewise, there is no "guarantee" that two individuals have the same fingerprints. Observation has shown that two people probably don't have the same prints, but that's no guarantee. I don't believe the medical community even really understands what makes fingerprints "grow" in the first place.
Fingerprinting is not a "science" in the way physics, chemistry, etc. are. (Legally, this is called the Daubert Test.) Where is the peer review? If fingerprinting were truly a science, as American courts have determined science to be, the national fingerprint database should be publicly accessible. It is not. The formula/algorithm by which fingerprint examinters determine a "match" would be public. The method that the computer uses to match fingerprints would be public knowledge, but it is not.
I'm not trying to say that fingerprinting doesn't provide valuable evidence, and I certainly do believe that fingerprint evidence is a good indicator that somebody touched something. But is it iron-clad proof? No. And worse than that, is is a closed-source, proprietary system.
Were fingerprinting evidence to be invented today, the courts would probably not allow it. It has not withstood (likely it cannot withstand) the same sort of scientific scrutiny that DNA identification has. However, they have significant enough momentum behind them that even though they may not be an "exact science" they are good enough for the purposes of the criminal justice system.
Here are some good links:
Federal Judge Slams Fingerprint "Science"
Cornell News: Fingerprint Study
Latent Print Examination disagrees with most of what I say...Click the Ressam link...if you don't support fingerprint evidence, then you support terrorism!
So it should, as an investigative technique. But to be admissable in court it needs to be shown that no other changes were made. To do this would require an in court demonstration. Something like:
"Here's the original fingerprint. We will now scan the fingerprint."
"As you can see (shows jury), the scan matches the original."
"I will now open and install this original copy of Photoshop. (Installs). I have a representative from Adobe here to verify that this is, in fact, an unaltered copy of Photoshop. (Adobe rep verifies installation.)"
"Now you may observe as I use the following standard technique to clarify the scanned image. (Uses big screen so entire jury can observe.) As you can see, the enhanced image matches the accused's fingerprint."
Using this method, the fingerprint can be entered into evidence, and the jury can be reasonably certain that no underhanded alterations were made during the process. However, the defense can also attack the evidence in a number of ways: arranging expert witnesses to attack the reliability of the method, demonstrating an alternative clarification technique that provides a different but equally convincing result, and so on. In this way, the prosecution can present their real evidence, but the jury is given proper opportunity to weigh its reliability and relevance.
IceDiver.
Politically Incorrect - and Proud!
Let me try:
In this case, DRM means "this file is evidence, and thou shalt not tamper with it, nor allow others to tamper with it". There is no issue of rights (or lack thereof), but rather of data integrity and provenance. This, IMO, is a rightful use of DRM.
Would YOU want to be on trial based on an image that had received an uncertain amount of twiddling by persons unknown? Of course not. You'd want to know that the image was correct, untampered, and that no one with an agenda (for OR against the defendant) had ever had access to it.
This is really no different than maintaining the integrity and provenance of physical evidence. Say you're arrested for drug trafficking, but in fact you only had a bag of sugar. Naturally, you'd want to be completely certain this very same bag of sugar is the one brought into evidence and presented in court, and you'd want to be equally sure that no naughty persons had dropped a spoonful of coke into the bag while no one was watching.
Think of the image file as the bag of sugar, and all should become clear.
~REZ~ #43301. Who'd fake being me anyway?