Linux Security: Reflections on 2002, Eye on 2003
Mirko Zorz writes "Here are the reflections on Linux security in 2002 and predictions for 2003 by Bob Toxen, one of the 162 recognized developers of Berkeley UNIX and author of the acclaimed book "Real World Linux Security" already in its 2nd edition. Read more at Help Net Security."
That was a rather disappointing article. He only made one Linux-related prediction: that there will be a major Linux virus. Besides that, everything else was generic and not Linux specific.
He says that he predicts (and hopes) that the practice of using honeypots, etc. will decrease; that it only serves to illustrate to managers that security will be breached. Thus, we can assume that all sufficiently weak security will be breached eventually, ergo this practice is useless.
He forgets the other valuable feature of honeypots. You can deploy prototype installations and observe the kinds of attacks in the wild, to get a feel for the capabilities of the advisary. These techniques change over time, and that information is invaluable when determining where effort needs to be focused in a security plan for your product.
This short-sightedness casts doubt on some of the other parts of his essay, other than on the obvious points (to us at least, those involving Microsoft, Hollywood, the man keepin us down, blah blah blah)
Fuck Beta. Fuck Dice
Yeah, and I'll bet he gives his credit card to waiters in restaurants all the time. The only time I've ever had someone try to use a credit card number stolen from me, it was a busboy at a local Cambodian restaurant (they caught the guy too).
Yeah, people act like only MS can get infected with a virus but there will be a major linux virus soon. It is going to happen. As linux gets more exposure more schmucks will write malicious code designed for busting up linux boxes. It is not like the Unix world is some foolproof world of rock hard servers.
After all, why did linux inherit the Unix concern for security?
Enough old-school unix guys have been bitten by the bad security in telnet and NIS and a half dozen old world Unix services with big nasty security issues.
Sure Bastille linux or RedHat secure server makes decent choice and OpenBSD is locked pretty tight right out of the box. That does not mean that it is impossible to break into those boxes. Just that it is more difficult. All you need is a one-day lag between a security issue posting on Cert and the patch to whatever software you are using coming up for your distro or OS. It can happen to any of us. It will happen to many of us.
The over-confident are always the funniest to watch when their shit hits the fan.
The honeypot thing is interesting. I have always wondered if you really get enough useful information from the attacks to warrant the time put into the systems. Somehow it just smacks of a geeky wanking waste of time. On the other hand, maybe the information from such implementations really make this worth it.
Any comments on this?
ACK
There is a rationalization going on in business IT. This is not a recession at all.