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MS SQL Server Worm Wreaking Havoc
defile writes "Since about midnight EST almost every host on the internet has been receiving a 376 byte UDP payload on port ms-sql-m (1434) from a random infected server. Reports of some hosts receiving 10 per minute or more. internetpulse.net is reporting UUNet and Internap are being hit very hard. This is the cause of major connectivity problems being experienced worldwide. It is believed this worm leverages a vulnerability published
in June 2002. Several core routers have taken to blocking port 1434 outright.
If you run Microsoft SQL Server, make sure the public internet can't access it. If you manage a gateway, consider dropping UDP packets sent to port 1434." bani adds "This has effectively disabled 5 of the 13 root nameservers."
Where I work we ended up with quiet the excitement. Around 1am I lost connectivity on my DSL modem at my house.. and I just figured something was up with the DSL so I fooled around with that for a while.... but then I realized the data light on the hub for the DSL modem was blinking a WHOLE lot and nothing else on the hub was (ie broadcasts were coming through)... I couldn't ping our core router, nothing... YIKES! So I hiked into work... only to find that 3 machines had been compromised. A co-lo we have, and some other ones. Nothing bad mind you.. easy to fix.. install Service Pack, and then firewall the ports out.. but still.... it was interesting.. I walked into the server room and was greated with a ton of orange lights (that are normally just blinking!) That thing can really cook out the damage!
Someone really has carefully crafted this worm to try to bring down the net.. and what better time then on a Saturday morning when all admins are away and not planing to work the next day!
Outside a firewall for no apparent reason is a tool. That being said, we live in a world of idiots. Why?
NGSSoftware alerted Microsoft to this problem on the 17th of May 2002 and
they have produced a patch that resolves these issues.
This is January 25 2003 if I'm not mistaken. Are these the same people that leave their cars unlocked with the keys in the ignition?
Terrorism? Bill Gates better be detained indefinitely as an enemy combatent then. Finally, some good may come out of this terrorism paranoia!
It's only the fact the traffic is all destined for a certain destination port that makes it easy to filter. /sbin/iptables -I FORWARD -p udp --dport 1434 -j DROP
You are filtering it out on your firewalls, aren't you?
Exactly. From the MS Security bulletin:
The risk posed by the vulnerability could be mitigated by, if feasible, blocking port 1434 at the firewall.
What the heck was it doing open in the first place?
You are filtering it out on your firewalls, aren't you? /sbin/iptables -I FORWARD -p udp --dport 1434 -j DROP
I bloody hope no-one is specifically blocking this port. That's not how firewalls are supposed to be used. First you block everything then only open the specific ports you need. In most cases, these are 80 and 22 and maybe 25. There's no reason a database server's protocol port should ever be exposed to the public Internet!
Whoever puts a database outside a firewall? and then leave its external port open???
Sysadmins like that should be dragged into the street and shot.
Wouldn't it be nicer if the owners of these machines bother patching the fucking things though?
As far as I'm concerned, boxes SHOULD be able to stand on their own without firewalls. A firewall just adds another layer.
Sounds like you're advocating armadillo security to me - hard on the outside, soft on the inside.
Get your own free personal location tracker
http://average.matrixnetsystems.com/Daily/markR.h
http://mrtg.nac.net/switch9.oct.nac.net/3865/swit
The advisory announcing the flaws:m /
http://www.boredom.org/~cstone/worm-annotated.txt
http://www.nextgenss.com/advisories/mssql-udp.txt Various disassemblies and discussions: http://www.snafu.freedom.org/tmp/1434-probe.txt http://www.digitaloffense.net/worms/mssql_udp_wor
Writeups:n et.attack.ap/index.html / 20030125/ap_wo_en_po/na_gen_internet_attack_2 r tdetail.jsp?oid=21824
http://www.cnn.com/2003/TECH/internet/01/25/inter
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/technology/2693925.stm
http://story.news.yahoo.com/news?tmpl=story&u=/ap
http://bvlive01.iss.net/issEn/delivery/xforce/ale
Depends. If you're protecting your network, you are right: "allow required traffic, block everything else". If you're providing network services to others, they probably don't want to beg you everytime they need to open a port. In that case it's "filter bad traffic, allow everything else".
Some snippets from there:
When the SQL Server 2000 client Net-Libraries connect to an instance of SQL Server
2000, only the network name of the computer running the instance and the instance
name are required. When an application requests a connection to a remote computer,
Dbnetlib.dll opens a connection to UDP port 1434 on the computer network name
specified in the connection. All computers running an instance of SQL Server 2000
listen on this port. When a client Dbnetlib.dll connects to this port, the server
returns a packet listing all the instances running on the server. For each instance,
the packet reports the server Net-Libraries and network addresses the instance is
listening on. After the Dbnetlib.dll on the application computer receives this
packet, it chooses a Net-Library that is enabled on both the application computer and
on the instance of SQL Server, and makes a connection to the address listed for that
Net-Library in the packet.
So the UDP 1434 port is open when the SQL Server is started to listen all the clients
with any IP address on this port. SQL Server only receives the packet from the client
on this port to determine which instance the client attempts to access and return the
related information of the SQL Server to the clients. Then, the clients can create
the connection to the SQL Server with the protocol enabled on the server side.
Consider a VPN dude.
It was not Mitnick.
I investigated into this matter, and came up with the following theory.
Port 1434 = 1+4+3+4 = 12
12 is the number of the month when Steve Gibson got hired as a consultant. Coincidence? I think not!
SQL (alphabet numbered) = S(19) + Q(17) + L(12) = 48
48 is the number of states which are connected together on US map. That means that attack came either from Hawaii or Alaska.
Using the search on a popular site called Google, I was able to track down the perpetrator.
So at the end we are left with one answer: Steve Gibson is just hax0ring back, in an elaborate revenge plan to outlaw port 1434 and raw sockets.
Firewalls promote softer security.
"Oh, it's OK because it's behind the firewall..."
I think firewalls make people lazy. Imagine if we didn't have firewalls. We'd have to keep our passwords good, our services minimal, and make sure we were running the latest, most secure daemons.
Get your own free personal location tracker
I groggily stumble up to my computer, it being a normal enough sort of Saturday AM, and as I sit down I cast a lazy eye at my firewall counter.
/. -- a lengthy process due to my dumbass ISP not having reverse DNS entries -- so I sniff around my logs.
.edu's with cute names like 'staging3', 'testing1', and, no joke, 'snoogans'.
Woah! What's.. uh.. 150 inbound requests.. doing.. today.. worm?
I start to fire up
*clickity click*
1434? The hell is 1434. Worm?
*slashdot shows*
Ah ha! Ve haf comprehension.
*groggily shuffle off to get coffee, oooo black gold*
For what it's worth, a majority of the packets so far have been mostly US servers --
Heh...on the Fox News Channel's ticker, they had the following tidbit of information:
"The virus spreads using a Microsoft vulnerability known as "SQL Server""
This space intentionally left blank.
This one has surprised me most so far:
tybclbsqla02.listbuilder.com
Hmm. Lists equal large databases.
Large databases usually mean a DBA.
DBAs should know better.
whois listbuilder.com
Technical Contact:
Microsoft (EJSEHEQUAO)
msnhst@MICROSOFT.COM
Microsoft
One Microsoft Way
Redmond, WA 98052
US
425-882-8080
Get your own free personal location tracker
billg cannot be an enemy combatant because he
does not wear a military uniform.
So he must be an _illegal_ combatant.
Therefore, if guilty, he will have to go to
Guantanamo Bay for a few years to "help with
investigations".
Of course, proof cannot be given for his guilt
because that might jeopardize national security.
Therefore no trial until terrorism is defeated.
Can't afford to take chances with them terrorists!
Gates acknowledged that the technology industry must make significant improvements, adding that, "Microsoft has a responsibility to help its customers address these concerns, so they no longer have to choose between security and usability."
How about easier ways to apply hotfixes remotely to desktop computers? (There are ways apparently, but requires installing IIS and SQL ironically, to run something called SUS.) I'd prefer the hotfix to simply have an option like '-m\\machine' to apply to domain machines in a domain admin context so I can script the installs to my tastes and needs. No need to get overly complex. Besides, I'd rather not have an IIS server at my site if I can help it. Apache runs everything. Just another damn thing to learn for something that should be simple.
Also, the hotfixes themselves only have about 10 different ways of applying at the command line unattended. How about standardizing the hotfix installers too...
Example, this is what is run after an XP desktop install with SP1 at our location...
It doesn't include latest javavm fix, which for some reason won't install right during the guirunonce part of an install, so I have to script to reboot the machine TWICE before running... Think that's bad? Here's some pre sp1 hotfix command lines from an earlier script.. And the syntax to install unattended is never easy to find on their site. I usually have to use google to search microsoft.com to find what I need, their search engine really sucks. Others must feel the same way since there is a dedicated google page for this at http://www.google.com/microsoftI found it amusing that the two current headlines on the front page under the technology section at CNN are:
Gates pledges better software security
Electronic attack slows Net
Now if they would only address security before they released their products we might not see these issues.
I have argued for many years that people tend to get the idea that a firewall is some kind of +8 amulet of protection they just strap on which will protect them from pretty much anything.
However there are real benefits to using firewalls and NAT boxes. Unfortunately there are some members of the IESG who are confused on this point but thats because they are blinkered by the end-to-end dogma. I'll note here that Steve Bellovin, the new security AD knows a thing or two about firewalls.
There are actually two end-to-end principles. Applied to networking it meant put the intelligence at the ends, not in the middle of a communication. This was applied to security to mean the same thing.
End-to-end is appropriate to the design of network protocols, it is inappropriate as a guide to operational security. Many protocols are not designed securely, most protocol implementations have flaws.
Another dogma that is inappropriate to operational security is the 'security through obscurity' trope. A design that relies on security through obscurity is broken. This does not mean that operators should divulge all the details of their operations to attackers in the hope this will improve security, it will not. Argument of this type was used to block the introduction of shadow passwords on UNIX for years after the vulnerability to dictionary attacks was widely known and being exploited by attackers.
A firewall and NAT box provides a significant degree of security at low cost. NAT provides a means of concealing the internal structure of the network. This does not eliminate the possibility of attack but raises the bar significantly. If you are running a site that is considered attractive to hackers a technology that weeds out the knob turners and dimmer script kiddies has value.
What we need to move to is security in depth, recognizing that design security and operational security are different and that both are important.
Looking for an Information Security student project suggestion?
Try http://dotcrimeManifesto.com/
I wouldn't say firewalls make people lazy; it's more a problem of people not understanding security.
These people are just as likely to say things like "I'm 3DES encrypting my data, so there's no way anybody can read it", because they fail to understand the meaning of statements like "cracking 3DES is computationally infeasible". When you try to explain to them that their webserver and applications are much more likely to be their weakness than their encryption algorithm, they give you blank looks and mutter about the Computerworld article that said 3DES is "unbreakable encryption". It's not a problem with 3DES (or any strong algorithm); it's a problem with people not understanding that any security measure can be negated by poor design in other parts of their architecture.
It's the same thing with firewalls. Only the unknowledgable would drop in a firewall and then go off to the bar to celebrate their newly "secure" network. That doesn't mean that the firewall is useless; it is still a crucial tool for securing one's network. The problem is the people who have no idea how to use the tool properly, and no concept of what a real-world attack actually looks like.
Imagine if we didn't have firewalls. We'd have to keep our passwords good, our services minimal, and make sure we were running the latest, most secure daemons.
Locks promote softer security.
"Oh, I'm OK because I have locked doors and windows..."
I think door locks make people lazy. Imagine if we didn't have deadbolts, or doors for that matter. We'd have to sit in front of the front door, with a shotgun, never sleeping for more than a few moments.
This adds a third layer of security, in addition to the 'secure firewall' and the 'secure desktop'. If, god forbid, someone gets through your firewall, you'll at least know it.
And I'm talking about logging outgoing traffic, also. After all, if your firewall is set up correctly you can't have any random incoming traffic...but you'll have lots of outgoing. They have NIDS to detect suspicious traffic, or you can just get a huge dump and start filtering out things you know are okay.
And it's about the only way you'll ever catch that some idiot is running an ICQ from three years ago with a known buffer overflow or something stupid. Neither firewalls nor updated desktop machines can protect you from your own users, only log files of network traffic can do that.
If corporations are people, aren't stockholders guilty of slavery?
You put your webserver on a DMZ, and let it (and only it) talk to the database server through the firewall. Any 2-tier client-server app should be going through a VPN or other secure tunnel.
The only way to do security is to have multiple layers, and to ruthlessly apply the priciple of least privilidge (you get only those permissions you ABSOLOUTELY need and nothing more).
Why is it that the proponents of "one nation under God" are so eager to get rid of "liberty and justice for all"?
--I thought this too, but I mean semi seriously. I stayed up real late watching it to make sure it wasn't a 'war' prelude. All the second world potential badguys have a cyber attack part of their assymetrical warfare plans, that's just freely available data you can read about.
My "oh crap,no internet" communications plans are a heap-o shortwaves and scanners. Better than nuthin. I know all the commercial am and fm and tv stations will all get taken over by the fema boxes, and start spewing dotgov propaganda (moreso than normal), so I'd be more monitoring some more "unregulated" sources.
Not to mention every starcraft and diablo player :P
N.
"Nothing strengthens authority so much as silence." - Charles de Gaulle
My intial thought on this was that this isn't MS's fault and we shouldn't be bashing them for this worm; almost every os and daemon out there has had it's holes and exploits and MS has already put out the fix so it's in the admins hands now.
But on second thought, when I look at the serious impact of the worms that have been created for MS products and their vulnerabilities the last few years, the obvious becomes apparent: admins of MS OS's and processes on them are a LOT slower to patch than any of their counterparts (read: stupider). And the thing is, MS knows this, they specifically market to the stupid/lazy admins. They're the "easy" OS, they sell their products by telling people that you just install them and never worry about them again. I've taken too many MS courses (I am an MSCE and MSCDBA if they haven't expired on me, but I couldn't care less) and not once was patching the operating systems or server processes ever mentioned during all those courses, which is amazing to me.
And hey, to each their own I guess... apparently there aren't enough intelligent or well read admins around so there is a demand for these products and this approach. But if that's the case, then I think it has to be said that MS has a greater responsibility to create products free from exploits than anyone else, if they're marketing and teaching the idea that you don't need to patch.
It's by creating that laissez faire attitude towards administration that MS is directly responsible for the proliferation of these worms.
----- sXe