Remote RSA Timing Attacks Practical
David Brumley and Dan Boneh writes "Timing attacks are usually used to attack weak computing devices such as smartcards. We show that timing attacks apply to general software systems. Specifically, we devise a timing attack against OpenSSL. Our experiments show that we can extract private keys from a OpenSSL-based server such as Apache with mod_SSL and stunnel running on a machine in the local network. Our results demonstrate that timing attacks against widely deployed network servers are practical. Subsequently, software should implement defenses against timing attacks. Our paper can be found at Stanford's
Applied Crypto Group."
Great, and this after I've been bragging about my 'not-breakable for a billion years' 2048-bit key.
$mouth . $foot
--Bennett Prescott
Former Lord Of Packets
Is one smart cookie. He's also the only prof I wouldn't take a class from because it wasn't webcast. In other words you can't pause and rewind his live lectures. He talks real fast. And tilts his head at a 30 degree angle to his left.
That summary is so buzzword-rich I feel compelled to purchase a product, if one were offered.
Only if you type really, really fast.
Why don't all the OpenSSL folks sue these guys under the DMCA? It's good enough for Adobe, it should be good enough for Open Source folks, right?
A SQL varient of this is far more effective:
insert into mouth values ('foot')
Maw! Fire up the karma burner!
Is there even a reason to be concerned with this when ROT-13+ is perfectly secure? It was recently expanded from regular ROT-13 so it doesn't only encrypt letters, so it should be good enough for any application.
In the long run, we're all dead.