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WebDAV Buffer Overflow Attack Compromises IIS 5.0
rf0 writes "Well CERT is reporting a new overflow attack for IIS 5.0. Microsoft has released a bulletin. Better download those patches and fix another security hole." According to this CNET story, Microsoft says that this is already being exploited, at the very least since last Wednesday.
If you listened to the Gartner Group, you stopped using IIS last year.
If you didn't, well, get with the program!
Eventually MSFT will have to deliver your "mission critical" ASP runtime for Apache, and the world will be a better place because of it.
Napster-to-go says "Fill and refill your compatible MP3 player", which is a lie. It's not MP3. It's WMA with DRM.
It says near the bottom that IIS systems with URL scan which is part of the lockdown utility are not affected by this.
/.'s don't like microsoft and thats sad because microsoft is the driving company behind many many jobs. The arrival of windows pushed the last boom. No questions about that. Unix had been around for 20 yrs and no boom. Windows and the net and look at how things accelerated..why..because ma/pa people use windows..not *nix. Just the facts.
Why would you run a IIS server without using the lockdown utility??
We (large corporation) have been using IIS servers and without a problem. With Lockdown/urlscan there are no problems at all. The logs show people trying to get in but being rejected.
I think this story is a bit overblown. It appears that most
cheers
John
Typically GUI config apps don't give you all the options either. They give you the most common ones. The rest are buried (in the case of Windows) in the registry. A pretty GUI just gives the _illusion_ that you're in control.
/etc/ssh/sshd_config). A bad config file will list only options that are different than the defaults or not included in the defaults.
A text file can hide options too, but not in the same way. Generally, applications have many defaults that don't need to be defined in the configuration explicitly. A good config file will list most of these anyway, even if commented out (example
That being said, there is no reason that someone putting a server on the internet should be afraid of editing a text file. Even in Windows! Notepad is just fine...
If you're playing on the public internet, you have to put up or shut up (know your shit, or accept the consequences)...
Obviously though, this issue has nothing to do with the WebDAV exploit. Even the best admin is at the mercy of the quality of his/her software (whether UNIX or Windows or $your_os).
-Ben
It is a concrete fact that that no MacOS based webserver has ever been hacked into in the history of the internet.
The MacOS running WebStar and other webservers as has never been exploited or defaced, and are are unbreakable based on historical evidence.
Okay, this is ludicrous. I ran Webster and other macintosh web servers in the 94-96 time range for a significant test prep company in NYC. They are just as insecure as any other web servers. The insecurity comes from the CGIs, not the static content. But who cares...programmer level or system level insecurity has the same result.
The claim is false - i've done this myself to prove a point.
Why is is hack proof? These reasons :
1> No command shell. No shell means no way to hook or intercept the flow of control with many various shell oriented tricks found in Unix or NT. Apple uses an object model for process to process communication that is heavily typed and "pipe-less"
Sure, Pre-OSX Macs have no CLI really, but does it make a difference if you can disable, DoS or take control of the system, even? Sure, they are configuration mistakes. You can make those with Apache/*nix or IIS/win32 too. I've seen Timbuktu installed with no firewalling and simple plaintext password protection of the most trivial kind. I've seen CGIs that allow system control of various sorts, put in place by the same type of people who love the ease of use of macintoshes. Security?
2> No Root user. All Mac developers know their code is always running at root. Nothing is higher (except undocumented microkernel stuff where you pass Gary Davidians birthday into certain registers and make a special call). By always being root there is no false sense of security, and programming is done carefully.
Sure, all Macintosh programming is done carefully as a result.
By your estimation, access controls are a complete waste. I'm sorry, this doesn't hold much water. I could use the same argument to state that Wintel boxes are better web servers. We all know how that pans out.
If all Macintosh programming was so excellent, those Type 1 errors where you have no choice but to restart would be a thing of the past, right? I still see them. Though I have to admit the car crash sound is better than a blue screen.
3> Pascal strings. ANSI C Strings are the number one way people exploit Linux and Wintel boxes. The Mac avoids C strings historically in most of all of its OS. In fact even its ROMs originally used Pascal strings. As you know Pascal strings (length prefixed) are faster than C (because they have the length delimiter in the front and do not have to endlessly hunt for NULL), but the side effect is less buffer exploits. Individual 3rd party products may use C stings and bind to ANSI libraries, but many do not. In case you are not aware of what a "pascal string" is, it usually has no null byte terminator.
Pascal strings have a single length byte and can't handle anything longer than 255 characters. Many http requests are going to be longer than that. Obviously, Webster and other Mac web servers aren't using those for everything, though admittedly the system calls require them in many cases. Your argument about this preventing buffer overflows is not very convincing as a result.
#4 must be a new feature because you could do just about anything cgi-wise with a macintosh in my days of futzing with them. Swiss cheese.
#5 - Applescript. Many CGIs used to use those as a control interface and obviously resource protections don't apply. They probably still do...
#6 - I fail to see how the Mac's zoned memory structure is any more protective than the hardware segmented memory protection of Intel (see Type 1 errors above), stack return addresses be damned. I'd be interested in any proof of this.
That is why the US Army gave up on MS IIS and got a Mac for a web server.
Not at this bas
HBI's Law: Frequency of calling others Nazis is directly correlated with the likelihood of the accuser being Communist.
Incompetent sysadmins still are the weakest link.
I don't agree with that. Microsoft itself can't keep up with the patch schedules; its servers regularly get hacked. Who has more resources than Microsoft? Nobody.
The fact is that if you are running a mission critical server you must test before deploying a patch. That takes time and money that the IT group has in short supply these days.
Then there is the issue of Microsoft's marketting - they sell IIS as the easy to use 'zero maintenance' lowest TCO choice. False advertising in this case.