Opportunistic Encryption of IP traffic: FreeS/WAN 2.0
Russ Nelson writes "Since 1996, John Gilmore has
dreamed of an Internet where all traffic between cooperating sites is
encrypted. He has supported the FreeS/WAN project which uses IPSEC to encrypt IP traffic on
an opportunistic encrypting basis. The team has released Linux
FreeS/WAN 2.00, their first release optimized for Opportunistic
Encryption (OE). After installation, ZERO host configuration is
required for OE! A Linux box running 2.00 will encrypt all IP packets
to other OE capable boxes whenever possible, provided you publish a
key and IPsec gateway information in DNS." Nice.
This is a very useful application of IPsec. The wavesec project is an example of using IPsec to secure the link between a client and the wireless access point.
This was in-practice last year at OLS where the FreeS/WAN folks set up a wavesec encrypted link, while the folks that were not using wavesec had their traffic snooped and displayed on a monitor.
The problem with using IPsec as a replacement for WEP, however, is that IPsec is higher up on the OSI layer diagram, so more information is left unencrypted than when using WEP (yes, I'm aware that WEP is weak and in this case, won't make a difference, I'm just illustrating a point.)
(I realize the articles listed are 8-9 months old, but clearly the issue is still relevant.)
I'm unfortunately not running OE, as my DNS provider (UltraDNS) did not provide the capability to add KEY records to a zone at the time I went through the installation process. Not sure if they do so now; perhaps time to check! I'd be interested in discovering which DNS providers do or do not provide the ability to insert KEY records into zones.
Yes, DNS is currently the weakest link.
.nl will sign records all the way to the root zone. We need more TLD/gTLD buy-in for DNSSec to become commonplace.
DNSSec will fix most of this, however that requires all of the TLD and gTLD's support it. Currently, only
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ken@freeswan.ca