Opportunistic Encryption of IP traffic: FreeS/WAN 2.0
Russ Nelson writes "Since 1996, John Gilmore has
dreamed of an Internet where all traffic between cooperating sites is
encrypted. He has supported the FreeS/WAN project which uses IPSEC to encrypt IP traffic on
an opportunistic encrypting basis. The team has released Linux
FreeS/WAN 2.00, their first release optimized for Opportunistic
Encryption (OE). After installation, ZERO host configuration is
required for OE! A Linux box running 2.00 will encrypt all IP packets
to other OE capable boxes whenever possible, provided you publish a
key and IPsec gateway information in DNS." Nice.
A chain is as strong as its weakest link.
This applies to cryptography as well.
In the Oppertunistic Encryption scenario, DNS is probably the weakest link. Spoof KEY records and you can launch a man-in-the-middle attack.
If this sort of technology were to be rolled into the main distributions as well as Microsoft/Apple packages, the internet would then have a decent level of privacy.
I think this idea of a "meta-SSL" is a really good one--not only can we encrypt the data stream, but also the headers. Of course, we'd still need to deal with session keys and the problem of "known response" attacks, but assuming we can fix that, this looks really promising.
(And of course, it would be best if we could implment this on the hardware of the routers themselves, rather than rely on the OS...*cough* M$ *cough*).
Q: "Why do sound techs say 'check 1, 2'?"
A: "Cause if they could count any higher they'd be lighting techs."
This is a very useful application of IPsec. The wavesec project is an example of using IPsec to secure the link between a client and the wireless access point.
This was in-practice last year at OLS where the FreeS/WAN folks set up a wavesec encrypted link, while the folks that were not using wavesec had their traffic snooped and displayed on a monitor.
The problem with using IPsec as a replacement for WEP, however, is that IPsec is higher up on the OSI layer diagram, so more information is left unencrypted than when using WEP (yes, I'm aware that WEP is weak and in this case, won't make a difference, I'm just illustrating a point.)
(I realize the articles listed are 8-9 months old, but clearly the issue is still relevant.)
I'm unfortunately not running OE, as my DNS provider (UltraDNS) did not provide the capability to add KEY records to a zone at the time I went through the installation process. Not sure if they do so now; perhaps time to check! I'd be interested in discovering which DNS providers do or do not provide the ability to insert KEY records into zones.
Has anybody thought about the fact that this removes the option of network level filtering? Think about the scenario in which a virus is created that spreads quickly via web servers (e.g. IIS). Currently, it is possible to filter out viral traffic because the routers can inspect the messages. This prevents the spread of the virus even though the hosts/severs remain vulnerable.
Once all traffic is encrypted using OE, the routers/firewalls cannot recognise the type of traffic anymore, and virii will be able to spread to all vulnerable hosts.