Cyber Insurance Between the Lines
Shackleford writes "Security Focus has an article that discusses insurance policies regarding 'computer attacks and cyber sabotage.' It discusses a case in which an administrator who set up back doors in the system with which he was trusted deleted files to which he could access after he was fired. His company had insurance against dishonest acts by employees, but not against 'acts of destruction.' Eventaully, the company won, but the case went to litigation. So the lesson to be learned here is that your company may have 'cyber insurance' without knowing it, but you need to be sure about it."
If you're the system god, would this violate the insurance policy?
It discusses a case in which an administrator who set up back doors in the system with which he was trusted deleted files to which he could access after he was fired.
What is that sentence supposed to mean? Use a freaking comma!
Yeesh.
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Where are the slash-groupies? I distinctly remember being promised slash-groupies!
Always wanted to know this. I am a sysadmin for a College (i'm a student there), and I always leave a backdoor or two in case of emergencies. like someome else chaniging the root passwords etc. Does anyone else do this, or is it just me?
Fantastic. And with litigation costs to boot.
Try not. Do or do not, there is no try.
-- Dr. Spock, stardate 2822-3.
Obligatory link to The Bastard Operator from Hell page.
Don't leave backdoors in the system, burn the place down. It's harder to trace back..
Trolling is a art,
I'm sure this is an over simplification, but if the insurance was for dishonest acts by employees, how could the company win? This act was comitted by someone who was no longer an employee...
true true. But the question is, do sysadmins suvccumb to the tempatation of leaving these backdoors? Hell, i know that if someone else stumbles upon the backdoor, i'm screwed, so i change the backdoors every two weeks. but i still leave them. They've saved the systems ass a few times too, when the other sysadmin, whos more of a NT/2k guy, screwed around. So does anyone else do this, then?
Insurance is one of the biggest vains the U.S. is facing today. You name it, car insurance, workman's comp, homeowners, cyber, etc.
Beside's it being legalized gambling, whenever something does happen, these companies try to get out of paying and point fingers at fraud.
There has to be a better way.
P.S. Is it this bad in other parts of the world, or are there "better systems" in place?
It's simple, if any of the above events have occurred, plan to move on and if your company has purchased anti-employee insurance, it's time to het the hell out anyway.
--CTH
--Got Lists? | Top 95 Star Wars Line
Hey.. you behind da keyboard. You need protection.. Things happen. Hard disks crash, software breaks, monitors get shot.. err.. dey break too.
Trolling is a art,
I guess the lesson here is to read the fine print. The important thing to look for here is when the "dishonest employee" commits their dishonesty. From a logical standpoint, any malicious acts committed through the back-door should be covered by the insurance, merely because the back-door only existed because of dishonesty. But I'm sure the insurance company tried to argue, and support with the fine print, that the actual exploitation was the dishonest act, and occurred only after the employee was fired.
Here's something to make you think: what would happen if the dishonest employee created the backdoor, quit, and someone else from outside the company exploited the back door? Then who would have won? I'd love to examine the actual insurance policy to find out.
I wouldn't be surprised if this kind of thing happens a lot over the next little while, until insurance companies (and in particular, the actuaries) can get their heads around the liability associated with network security.
As a developer in the security industry, I look on this as great news. I've been saying for a long time that what data security companies really need is for the insurance companies to start tying premiums to security infrastructure. When that happens there will be a clear ROI on security investment, and companies will learn quickly how to cover their asses better from these kinds of vulnerabilities.
Situations like this motivate the insurance companies to start assessing risk, and when they start assessing risk they start charging their customers for it, and when the customers are getting charged for it they start mitigating that risk. Right now, that just isn't happening.