A Critical Look at Trusted Computing
mod12 writes "After just attending a two-week summer program on the theoretical foundations of security (one of the speakers was from Microsoft research), I have been interested in trying to find out if the "trusted computing" initiative was still alive. I got my answer today in the New York Times from an article that was fortunately rather critical of the concept."
As long as Microsoft is there, there is no trust.
I love the image at the top of the article showing the "sample of the code for a more secure version of Microsoft Windows" -- just some random binary file open in a hex editor.
Gotta love the NYT - their editors are on the ball!
Does anyone know of companies planning on building processors without DRM? In a competitive marketplace there would not be DRM because consumers don't demand it and surely would prefer computers that aren't controlled by the market after the sale. But with only two major PC processor manufacturers having a duopoly over the market it isn't very competitive.
for those of you who don't know, Markoff is the journalist who wrote several articles about kevin mitnick in which he "created the myth of kevin mitnick" (in kevin's words). many untrue allegations were presented as supposed facts.
but don't let that discourage you from reading the article.
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"A great democracy must be progressive or it will soon cease to be a great democracy." --Theodore Roosevelt
As PC makers prepare a new generation of desktop computers with built-in hardware controls to protect data and digital entertainment from illegal copying, the industry is also promising to keep information safe from tampering and help users avoid troublemakers in cyberspace.
Silicon Valley -- led by Microsoft and Intel -- calls the concept "trusted computing." The companies, joined by I.B.M., Hewlett-Packard, Advanced Micro Devices and others, argue that the new systems are necessary to protect entertainment content as well as safeguard corporate data and personal privacy against identity theft. Without such built-in controls, they say, Hollywood and the music business will refuse to make their products available online.
But by entwining PC software and data in an impenetrable layer of encryption, critics argue, the companies may be destroying the very openness that has been at the heart of computing in the three decades since the PC was introduced. There are simpler, less intrusive ways to prevent illicit file swapping over the Internet, they say, than girding software in so much armor that new types of programs from upstart companies may have trouble working with it.
"This will kill innovation," said Ross Anderson, a computer security expert at Cambridge University, who is organizing opposition to the industry plans. "They're doing this to increase customer lock-in. It will mean that fewer software businesses succeed and those who do succeed will be large companies."
Critics complain that the mainstream computer hardware and software designers, under pressure from Hollywood, are turning the PC into something that would resemble video game players, cable TV and cellphones, with manufacturers or service providers in control of which applications run on their systems.
In the new encrypted computing world, even the most mundane word-processing document or e-mail message would be accompanied by a software security guard controlling who can view it, where it can be sent and even when it will be erased. Also, the secure PC is specifically intended to protect digital movies and music from online piracy.
But while beneficial to the entertainment industry and corporate operations, the new systems will not necessarily be immune to computer viruses or unwanted spam e-mail messages, the two most severe irritants to PC users.
"Microsoft's use of the term `trusted computing' is a great piece of doublespeak," said Dan Sokol, a computer engineer based in San Jose, Calif., who was one of the original members of the Homebrew Computing Club, the pioneering PC group. "What they're really saying is, `We don't trust you, the user of this computer.' "
The advocates of trusted computing argue that the new technology is absolutely necessary to protect the privacy of users and to prevent the theft of valuable intellectual property, a reaction to the fact that making a perfect digital copy is almost as easy as clicking a mouse button.
"It's like having a little safe inside your computer," said Bob Meinschein, an Intel security architect. "On the corporate side the value is much clearer," he added, "but over time the consumer value of this technology will become clear as well" as more people shop and do other business transactions online.
Industry leaders also contend that none of this will stifle innovation. Instead, they say, it will help preserve and expand general-purpose computing in the Internet age.
"We think this is a huge innovation story," said Mario Juarez, Microsoft's group product manager for the company's security business unit. "This is just an extension of the way the current version of Windows has provided innovation for players up and down the broad landscape of computing."
The initiative is based on a new specification for personal computer hardware, first introduced in 2000 and backed by a group of companies called the Trusted Compu
COME ON! please, why do they make such claims?! or why do journalists make such claims? i think the establishment/private companies/whatever has been proved wrong on that issue over and over and OVER again. if there's someone who actually thinks their data is totally secure these days . . .
another point: this initiative could be very dangerous. buying OS's with this crap already on them, limiting what you can do . .. so, what, should we stock up on Win2000, XP, and Linux OS's along with our CD and DVD burners?
DRM may stop the morons, but soon enough, once a few "l33ts" circumvent it and it gets released into the wild, what's the point.
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we all deal with 'trusted computing' to some extent or other. in any computer system there is a person/persons/entity that is trusted. in the simplest form it is supervisor/admin/etc. as you design a network you describe who is trusted.
when you get a commercial digital certificate you are expressing trust.
in a well designed (large) system you would build in multiple trusts to act as a check and balance. sort of an auditing feature. novell is real big on this.
i find it interesting that the ms model of trust is pretty much putting all your eggs in what is mostly their basket. no auditing, no accountability, etc.
i suspect that we will see more distributed trust as companies and isps become more involved in this.
eric
The word "trust" is pretty much the central idea in formal security. And ultimately is comes down to deciding if one person trusts another person. Of course when you mix in technologies, then that expands into trusting the system components. Do you trust the website is the correct one? Do you trust the CA registrar. Do you trust that the web browser isn't lying to you. Do you trust that your keyboard isn't recording all your keystrokes? Its all about trust, and no secure system can avoid the subject. And no formal security method can avoid it either.
So yes, trusted security is very much alive, or it had better be, or we won't have any security. But the big question is whom or what is being trusted? And the big media companies are trying their best to confuse the issue. It's just like their "secure media". Their concept of trust is that they, the media distributors, want to be able to trust your hardware to not trust you the consumer. They also want to also insure that other consumers will not trust you, or you could otherwise become your own media producer and distributor and compete with them. If DVD players only play content that is digitally signed by the cartel, then you are barred from competing because you can no longer produce your own content that other's hardware will trust. But on the other side I want to trust that my computer is not infected with a virus; I want to trust that my legally copied media is not corrupted by the media police. Trust is the just the tool.
Trusted computed could be a very good thing, but you absolutely must define what you mean by trust before you can begin any discussion or evaluation, or to say whether it it "bad" or "good". From a purely technical and formal perspective trusted computing is the next step forward. From a society's perspective the answer is not so easy.
If the Wintel crowd were serious about security, they'd push for a hardware architecture that supports secure microkernels really well and put a very partitioned OS on top of it. But no; it's all about boot-time lock in.
I just wish people would remember all the _good_ parts of trusted computing. So far as the TCPA goes, DRM isn't even a part of it. It's just a standard hardware interface for encryption and key storage. Whether that's used to sign OS's, implement DRM, or simply secure Apache, is up to the OS. Yes, it _can_ be used for all that. But hell, a BIOS _now_ can be set to only boot an OS with a certain fingerprint - how the technology is used is independent from the technology itself. TCPA is a (possibly) good thing. Palladium/DRM, that's the real evil (from the consumer and OSS viewpoints, anyways).
Industry leaders also contend that none of this will stifle innovation.
What the Industry Leaders mean is that the Industry Leaders will not be stifled. The rest of the industry should just not worry their little heads. It will all be done for us by those who know best.
The biggest argument made against Lindows was that people who bought the system would be turned off once they got it home and realized it wouldn't let them do what they expected. In this case, running MS Office, games, etc. As a result, Lindows has since abandoned much of their early claims about MS-compatibility.
What happens when a someone gets one of these new Trusted systems home and realizes that they can't use it as expected? What happens when it doesn't let them them burn audio CD's or play previous burned songs on CD-R/W's? What happens when they have trouble just opening word processing or spreadsheet files, because they are not considered "trusted"? Even email could become a problem.
I see this whole "Trusted" initiative by Microsoft as a potential boon to open source software developers and even "white box" computer manufacturers.
Word will get out: "Don't buy any of the new Hewlett-Packards with that new Windows. They just don't work!" Microsoft has already turned many corporations against them with the new License 6.0 scheme. "Trusted" computing could turn many home users against Microsoft and all of the hardware manufacturers who have thrown their lot in with them.
I believe "Reliable and Secure" computing is what people want for home computers. The term "Trusted" computing is usually saved for military computers, etc, that are following the Rainbow books' criteria. Also for systems trying to get a Common Criteria rating. "Trusted" computing includes two-man controls, the kind that prevent one person from launching a bunch of nuclear missiles. The NYtimes version of trusted computing means computers that the RIAA and MPAA can trust not to let you download their stuff. It might even include letting the RIAA and MPAA destroy your computer if you do (based on what some senators want to pass as law)
--
Luck is just skill you didn't know you had.
Beyond changing the appearance and control of Windows, the system will also require a new generation of computer hardware, not only replacing the computer logic board but also peripherals like mice, keyboards and video cards
Like most new Windows features, I don't see anything in this that the consumer actually wants, I think it is just a way to force yet another upgrade on us.
-- the only thing we have to fear is really scary things
The National Security Agency's "security-enhanced" Linux is an attempt to make Linux into a "trusted" computing platform, but that has NOTHING to do with DRM and other MPAA- and RIAA-borne stupidity.
Security researchers are putting a lot of effort into defining trust relationships and developing guidelines for applying the term "trusted" to software. Has the software design been verified? How about the code? Who verified the design and audited the code? Have there been security problems in the past? Is the concept fundamentally compatible with security?
Then along come the MPAA and RIAA, and they convince Microsoft (among others) to start talking about a totally fucking DIFFERENT definition of "trusted". Whereas the OLD definition of "trusted" involved concepts like integrity, secrecy, reliability, and auditability, the NEW meaning of "trusted" is essentially "crippled".
As somebody who studies security for a living, it irritates me to see the two concepts confused. Microsoft's DRM-enabled operating systems will NOT include the features I've outlined above, and a highly "trusted" operating system could very well include software that allows you to "rip, mix, and burn" just as people are accustomed to doing today.
Really, just who is "trusting" the DRM operating systems? Not the users-- I imagine there will be just as many viruses and exploits and bugs as before. Not software developers-- Microsoft hasn't really announced any plans to do things like, say, encrypt the swap space or integrate stack protection into their linkers, loaders, and compilers.
In fact, the only people who are really trusting the DRM operating systems are the content industry associations. Which makes sense, as Microsoft and company are essentially doing the whole "trusted computing" thing at the behest of the MPAA's congressional whore.
Please, folks, let's call a spade a spade: the DRM-enabled operating systems are NOT "trusted". They're "content-industry-friendly". They're "crippled". They're a lot of things, but they're not "trusted".
Let's start asking for some precision of language, here.
The very things that computer users want to be protected from--viruses and the tons of spam messages--are not addressed with these "improvements".
As eloquently outlined in the Times article: the new encrypted computing world, even the most mundane word-processing document or e-mail message would be accompanied by a software security guard controlling who can view it, where it can be sent and even when it will be erased. Also, the secure PC is specifically intended to protect digital movies and music from online piracy. But while beneficial to the entertainment industry and corporate operations, the new systems will not necessarily be immune to computer viruses or unwanted spam e-mail messages, the two most severe irritants to PC users. "Microsoft's use of the term `trusted computing' is a great piece of doublespeak," said Dan Sokol, a computer engineer based in San Jose, Calif., who was one of the original members of the Homebrew Computing Club, the pioneering PC group. "What they're really saying is, `We don't trust you, the user of this computer.' "
In "trusted computing" the public gets no security; the FAT entertainment industry gets fatter; and the common man is unduly scrutinized.
Let's hope our everyday "Joe Consumer" rebels. If Intel comes out with a chip with this trusted-Big-Brother component, I hope the American consumer leaves it rotting on the shelves.
Money talks, b.s. walks. If the public refuses to buy this garbage which is hyped to protect them, perhaps the companies will look at this trusted computing issue again and drop it in the trash can it belongs.
Harpo Tunnel Syndrome--my wrist feels funny.
OTOH it looks like this stuff will only effect Intel and MS products. Personally, I have always used Apple products myself. It has protected me from MS viral licenses. It has protected me from Intel's occasional desire to track all users. It is now protecting me from silly DRM schemes that do nothing but protect antique business models. Apple has done more for security by allowing the user to turn off HTML in mail.app that MS could possibly hope to do in a decade.
The same could be said for GNU/Linux and other non-MS users. For these users there are only three concerns. First, laws could be passed to require certain attributes in entire classes of software. For example, as the article suggests, all email and music might have to be signed with a CPU generated hash. Of course all advanced users know that such technology could be circumvented, and, even with laws against circumvention, such actions will routinely occur.
Second, the makers of Intel clone chips might, and probably will, succumb to pressure and include security features. This would be bad because right now OSS is very tied to Intel class chips. The solution to this is to build open hardware platforms around non-Intel class chips, and create OSS projects that run on such platforms. Intel may be a slave to MS, but AMD and others might be more scared of lost sales due to OSS moving to Motorola and IBM chipsets. In five years if OSS is still tied to the Intel instruction set, and Intel is only making chips that spy on the user, there will be no one to blame.
The third issue comes from a quote in the article
the system will also require a new generation of computer hardware, not only replacing the computer logic board but also peripherals like mice, keyboards and video cards
from this we can infer that MS intends to push DRM to all hardware connected to the CPU, which, of course, is the logical course of action. The issue is as above. OSS runs mostly on what is essentially MS hardware. If all MS hardware requires software that is cryptographically signed and externally validated, probably by MS related service, one wonders if OSS will exist. If OSS does exist, one wonders if it would have any purpose the user was still ultimately tied to MS licenses and security schemes.
This has always been the danger of the single environment ecosystem. The OSS people seem to forget how inherently dependent on MS whims they are. One wonders if some diversification might be in order.
"She's a scientist and a lesbian. She's not going to let it slide." Orphan Black
AC comments get piped to
"The company is dealing with both technical and marketing challenges presented by the new software security system. For example, Mr. Juarez, the Microsoft executive, said that if the company created a more secure side to its operating system software, customers might draw the conclusion that its current software is not as safe to use. "
he went on to explain:
"What I mean is that we cannot have our customers using deductive reasoning to come to an obvious conclusion which might jeopardize our market share (control). Could you imagine the implications? We would rather them just trust us - and relax - big broth.. uhhh... I mean Microsoft has it all taken care of"