Honeytokens: The Other Honeypot
martyros writes "I just read a fascinating article
by Lance Spitzner securityfocus.com about a concept he calls
honeytokens. The idea is similar to that of a
honeypot, which he defines as "an information system resource whose value lies in unauthorized or illicit use of that resource". Rather than having a computer that's designed to be broken into, however, you have say, a record in a database or a file has no legitimate use; ergo, if anyone uses it, it must be illegitimate. An example he gives: adding a record to the hospital database for a guy named "John F. Kennedy". It doesn't correspond to a real person, so no one has any business looking at the file. If someone does access it, you know that they're abusing their privileges somehow.
The article has several other clever examples, which I found very thought-provoking."
Or there's a flaw in your software.
Or they were poking around bored.
Or you've been hacked in which case you won't have an access record anyway if the hacker did their job right.
Yes, quite superior to a honeypot, in every way.
The key to the enjoyment of pop music is to replace any instance of "love" with "C.H.U.D."
The problem with this (and with a lesser degree, with honeypots) is that these tokens will get accessed in legitimate ways -- for example, what if your secretarial staff is creating a mailing list, and "JFK" gets sent something? Or you have a browse function in an application that uses the database?
It's a good idea, but not a panacea.
When the Boss steals, it's big-time, way more than any of you make in a year at your salaried job.
The big guys don't need to steal to drain the company. The laws (and corporate policies) allow them to do things the rest of us would spend hard time in the federal pen for.
As a trivial (though not unusual) example, at my previous job, the CEO made a bad call about handling a bug in a customer's software. Relatively minor bug, but due to the nature of the software, he and the company might actually have had to endure criminal proceedings if they handled his bad call poorly.
So the solution? He left the company with nearly a ten MILLION dollar parting bonus, sort of vaguely admitted responsibility, regulators considered the matter suitably dealt with, and the problem went away.
Think about that... This guy broke the law, so they gave him millions of dollars.
And some folks wonder why so many of us outright despise corporate America.
As Eric Idle once said, after killing a dozen or so tribesmen in Monty Python's "The Meaning of Life", "Back home they'd hang me, but here they gimme a fuckin medal!".
Some people have pointed out that maybe someone just looking through a database on legitimate business sees an interesting patient file, and opens it up, just to look.
One reason this idea would be especially good for hospitals is because such actions have gotten hospitals sued in the past. Simply put, no hospital employee is supposed to view a patient's information unless required. So, if Nurse Betty is looking up "John F. Kennedan's" file, and also sneaks a peek at "John F. Kennedy's", she just broke federal law, and the hospital is going to want to know about that.
As for false positives in other instances, people seem to be just trolling. For example, every single day at a former employer of mine, a cell phone provider, we'd get false positives on customer who may or may not have been using fraudulent information to sign up for service. As such, we would stop and call the verification services we used, and verify that customer. So sure, out of thirty customers a day, it would generate five warnings, four of which were false. But one of them wasn't, and that makes all the difference.
Not exactly revolutionary... This is just list seeding.
You shove in one-time known fake name into a mailing list (postal or e-mail) that you sell and then if any mail arrives at that address sent by someone you didn't sell the list to, then you know that they've been abusing their terms for use of the list. I do the same thing with websites... I register for websites I write with sitename_seed@mydomain.com and if any of the 'seed' addresses get mail, then I know that someone's been harvesting addresses from that site. Thankfully this has never happened (yet!).
Our company uses this trick. There are 'honey-addresses' in our database. (a correct address belonging to an employee, with a completely wrong name) As soon as anything arrives at one of those adresses we know someone has made illegal use of an address from our database. Whatever gets send tells us who. Legal action follows ....
If you go making up honeytoken credit card numbers and social security numbers, you'd better be sure they *are* bogus, not real numbers that belong to someone you don't know. Otherwise, your honeytoken might be someone's real data....
Oops wouldn't cover it in that case. <wry grin>
Catherine
get credit for this. She was the one who said something to the effect of "if the hacker wants data, then give it to them." They did, and the hacker was connected long enough for them to track him down. Greed is the downfall of most criminals, preceded only by stupidity.
So the JFK record would have to be corrupted, because if it emulated a correct record, then when the senior ward supervisor (nurse) was rostering staff to look after patients, JFK would be selected and allocated automatically. You'd have to fake all the way up to the top, ie ward, doctor, everything. And then the staff would recognise it as fake. Hospital patient databases are mostly for making sure patients get the right treatment, and a legal record of that treatement, and a financial record of the cost of that treatment, so a fake record would still have to be accessible to people responsible for these.
It doesn't make sense to say that nobody should be looking at the JFK record. It would make more sense to see the ward staff go nuts trying to find where he nicked off to (like an altzheimer's patient). He's in the computer so he should be in the hospital. If it is merely a historical record, the same problem would apply to the accounting staff (why hasn't he paid his bill?).
And mostly when you go into a hospital or medical facility they get you to sign something that says vaguely that you consent to have your details available to anyone they deem appropriate. They're not going to come back and try to get your permission separately to give details to the cardiac doctor if you happen to have a heart attack while staying with them!
I understand the concept, but I think the example is fairly poor. Perhaps it would be more accurate to say something like "access to this record should be limited". And I think the concept may be fairly old, eg in WWII examples of feeding the enemy false data, rather than actually imprisoning the detected spy.
-- it must be true, it's on the internet.
Yes, but don't forget according to the USPTO anything obvious, well known for decades etc, when augmented with the text "with a computer" makes an entirely new invention that is worthy of a patent and not at all obvious to anybody. I'm surprised they haven't already got a patent on it.