Yahoo! Settles Patent Dispute
theodp writes "NCR has settled the lawsuit it brought against Yahoo! last December for infringing on 10 patents related to e-commerce technology. The case, discussed earlier on Slashdot, was especially significant because it involved broad patents covering basic Internet functions. As part of the settlement, Yahoo! is now licensing the technology. Terms of the settlement and licensing agreement were not disclosed."
No. But if you like, you can always exclude the patent articles from the homepage in you /. preferences.
zWhat would an EWOULDBLOCK block, if an EWOULDBLOCK could block would? -- me
I am not sure but if the EU starts to accept software patents will the US patents be enforceable through WIPO or similar. If so then the EU will already be at a loss as all the US patents will come into force and by typing this I am probably breaking a few of them
Titles are usually overly borad, but have no legal imlications, in a patent, only the valid claims have legal imlications and they are usually much narrower.
P.S. IANAL...
http://www.gnu.org/philosophy/words-to-avoid.html
> But 3 million outsourced jobs? FUCK YOU IBM.
IBM doesn't even employ 3M people - you're not even in the same order of magnitude. If they outsource 3M jobs, they are *employing* an extra 2.75M people. Sounds like it'd be good for the world as a whole.
Oolite: Elite-like game. For Mac, Linux and Windows
heres a link to the patent for yr interest. Read the patent
while(karma less_than enough_karma){karma++}
There are some significant antitrust issues related to the non diclosure of patent settlements (although probably not in this particular case).
Settlements between competitors in patent cases raise important and sensitive antitrust issues. The issues are important because patent settlements may create or maintain monopoly in technology and innovation markets and may also effectuate a monopoly or cartel in a related goods markets. Antitrust risks are highlighted by the fact that, absent the patent rights, patent settlement agreements may be per se antitrust violations. Further, anticompetitive patent settlements unlike most antitrust conspiracies are enforceable in court,and by that means can prevent the cartel cheating that is the bane of cartels. Thus, the antitrust risk that a settlement agreement may operate as a disguised cartel has long been recognized.
The antitrust enforcement issues are sensitive because patent settlements can also promote efficiencies, resolving patent disputes that might otherwise block or delay valuable invention. Settlements can reduce the expense and delay that patent litigation often entails. They enable risk averse business firms to avoid litigation uncertainty and variance of outcome. These risks include the unjustified loss of patent rights if a court erroneously holds the patents invalid. Finally, patent settlements can promote productive technology interchange within industries (at least for non-core technologies).
Thus, antitrust screening of patent settlements has an important role to play, identifying antitrust risks and balancing efficiency benefits. However, effective antitrust scrutiny is constrained by several factors. First, since the anticompetitive risk is most acute when patents are weak, invalid or not infringed, any precise identification of the antitrust risk would requires assessment of patent validity and scope. But these issues can only be fully resolved through litigation, and settlement precludes litigation. The alternative of assessing probable validity and infringement in an antitrust proceeding fails to provide a tractable or predictive legal standard.
Antitrust scrutiny of patent settlements is further constrained by the fact that patent settlements are not disclosed to enforcement agencies. To be sure, the Patent Act requires filing of interference settlements and collateral agreements with the PTO. But it appears doubtful that the PTO can police disclosure of collateral agreements and the Department of Justice lacks standing to enforce compliance.The absence of effective disclosure requirements for patent settlements stands in sharp contrast to disclosure provisions for mergers, R&D joint ventures and innovation-related production joint ventures all of which require notification of the transactions to the antitrust agencies. Finally, defendants in settlement cases benefit from two legal presumptions that while legitimate in themselves, impede antitrust challenge: a patent is presumed to be valid and courts have frequently declared that patent settlements are to be encouraged.