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Maryland Plans Code Review for Voting Software

Posted by ryuzaki0 on from the refactoring dept.

asmithmd1 writes "We already knew Diebold software is insecure, now the Baltimore Sun is reporting that the Governor of Maryland has asked SAIC to review the software in Diebold voting machines. Diebold has graciously allowed SAIC access to their proprietary code. Why isn't this code open source by law?" In a related story, a trade show for closed-source electronic voting systems is doing their best to keep critics out. Update: 08/07 15:23 GMT by M : Diebold's website security is less than outstanding.

72 of 307 comments (clear)

  1. the problem is... by borgdows · · Score: 5, Insightful

    even if the code is opensource, how can you be sure the voting machine executable has been compiled from the genuine source code ?

    1. Re:the problem is... by Trigun · · Score: 2

      I guess that certain procedures would have to be followed and an independant overseer would have to be appointed, albeit by one of the cantidates on the ballot.

      At some point we would have to collectively trust the bastards, the same way we trust automovite manufacturers and inkjet printer manufacturers to look out for our best interests.

      We're doomed!

    2. Re:the problem is... by UnknownQ · · Score: 3, Funny
      even if the code is opensource, how can you be sure the voting machine executable has been compiled from the genuine source code ?

      Compile it yourself! Every voter would compile the code Gentoo-style when they entered the booth.
      I knew Gentoo was the answer for everything!
      --
      Wherever you go, there you are!
    3. Re:the problem is... by cybermace5 · · Score: 4, Funny

      Heh, guess we could teach all voters to type "./configure; make; make clean"

      --
      ...
    4. Re:the problem is... by digitalunity · · Score: 4, Insightful

      I won't trust digital voting. A lot of people won't. I seriously hope someone hacks it in November next year to such an extreme amount that the politicians see the error in their stupidity. This won't work. I hope the results are wacked out like this one

      --
      You can't legislate goodness. Let each to his own destiny, by will of his freely made choices.
    5. Re:the problem is... by maxume · · Score: 5, Informative

      Of course, Ken Thompson has said some very interesting things about trusting code and compilers. The only way to really trust the code would be to hand code/compile/enter your own compiler in asm, and use this to bootstrap a more powerful compiler etc, until you were able to compile the code that you had reviewed and elected to trust. If you don't do it all yourself, you really can't be sure how trustworthy a binary is, your compiler might have done some dirty business behind your back.

      --
      Nerd rage is the funniest rage.
    6. Re:the problem is... by gmack · · Score: 2, Insightful

      People just aren't ready for it.. not when I read lines like this: "The hacker did not reveal how he subsequently breached the security of the Diebold staff site, which used SSL encryption."

      But we can't be hacked we have encryption?

    7. Re:the problem is... by TomV · · Score: 2, Interesting

      even if the code is opensource, how can you be sure the voting machine executable has been compiled from the genuine source code ?

      And herein lies a nice can of worms straight outta RISKS. Not only do we need to know that the binary in use has been compiled from the genuine source code, you also need to be confident that it was compiled with a trustworthy (preferably also Open-Sourced, GCC perhaps?) compiler in a trustworthy environment.

      And then there's the firmware on the machine itself.

      Geek that I am I can still see enormous strengths to our wonderfully archaic paper-ballot system here in the UK. You put a cross in a box on a piece of paper with a pen. If you mess up the cross you spoilt your ballot. At the count, for each person actually sorting and bundling ballot papers there are two people watching like a hawk (I tend to be one of these) to make sure they're counting and sorting OK. So long as the contituencies are reasonably sized, a result by the next morning seems OK when Right definitely outweighs Quick or Cheap. And therein lies the crux. So WHAT if it takes a week to get the correct result?

      TomV

    8. Re:the problem is... by ajs318 · · Score: 4, Insightful
      I agree with the original person. I can't state it loud enough that THE INTEGRITY OF ELECTION RESULTS IS A FAR GREATER CONCERN THAN ANY CORPORATION'S RIGHT TO SECRECY! The mechanism by which our leaders are chosen must be absolutely open to public scrutiny and any government that does not believe this so, deserves to be overthrown.
      even if the code is opensource, how can you be sure the voting machine executable has been compiled from the genuine source code ?
      I've looked at this one before and it is a problem, because the C compiler may be rigged so that when you try to compile it from source, then it modifies itself subtly so as to insert various backdoors; in other words, the code you get from the compiler does not match up against the source you compiled. Then, it does not matter how "clean" any of the source code is; because the compiler might modify the code during compilation. Even if you run the original, clean compiler source through it, chances are that the compiler could spot this and mung it, giving you a "dirty" compiler.

      Throughout the following, I'm assuming you - or someone you trust - can spot malicious C code just by looking at it, and can write assembler code you know is safe. You don't have to be able to look at someone else's C-generated assembler and know whether it's safe.

      You first need to write a simple C interpreter in assembler. Note, it only has to interpret; it doesn't have to compile. As long as the assembler instructions it generates do the same thing as the C source code you feed it - even if much more slowly than a compiled version - then it is good enough for the time being. It can even waste as much memory as you can spare. The most important thing is that you know the temporary interpreter is safe. Then you take the source code for the compiler you want to compile - you know this is safe, but the pre-compiled binary might not be safe - and run it through the interpreter. Now the output from the interpreted compiler is actually a compiled compiler, and it's safe. You haven't run the "dirty" compiler binary, which might have modified the compiler.

      Now you have a compiler which you know for certain isn't going to produce binaries which don't do what the source said. And that's the first step to trustworthy computing. Maybe get someone we all trust to sign the code by encrypting it with their secret key {so when you decrypt with their public key you recover the original; recall that P(S(x)) = S(P(x)) = x}. Problem is, you can't trust anyone with election results, because the stakes are so high.


      On the other hand, why bother with voting machines at all? In this country, we count votes by hand. It may not be high-tech, but it works and it's harder to subvert. Hand-counting of small batches of papers {which are kept, in case of dispute, until the next election is out of the way} is not significantly slower than machine counting. Anyway, what's a few hours here or there when a term of office can last for four or five years? To throw an election, you would need to bribe several people, not all of whom are politicians. The ballot paper {taken at random from a book of identical ones and by a different person than the one who sees your voter ID - the only communication between them is a slight nod} is the only record of the vote, and the voter has already had the opportunity to verify it before depositing it.

      For how often elections are held, it probably is less work to keep on doing all this stuff by hand than it is to put the safeguards in place that would make machine voting trustworthy.
      --
      Je fume. Tu fumes. Nous fûmes!
    9. Re:the problem is... by Jeremi · · Score: 4, Insightful

      Who cares about the code? If the machines generated a voter-verified paper trail, you could check the results for accuracy. Since they don't, you can never be sure that the results were correct, no matter how carefully the source was scrutinized.

      --


      I don't care if it's 90,000 hectares. That lake was not my doing.
    10. Re:the problem is... by jandrese · · Score: 2, Insightful

      Heck, how can you trust their closed proprietary hardware at that point? You never know if they took and modified their Pentium in there to recognise when you're bootstrapping a compiler and modifing your routines.

      The simple fact is that you have to trust someone (or some group of people) along this chain, which is very difficult because the incentive to cheat in elections is huge. You can reduce the danger with a solid system of checks and balances, but there's always the possiblity of the very determined/very rich individual buying off several key players.

      You can also buy off paper ballot counters.

      Because it is impossible to make a completely 100% fraudproof system, we need to instead focus on trying to keep the process as open and transparent as possible. We need to catch people cheating and insure that there is ample opportunity for detecting fraud.

      --

      I read the internet for the articles.
  2. because by bigpat · · Score: 3, Insightful

    "Why isn't this code open source by law?"

    because we haven't made it so yet. Remember Government by the people...

    1. Re:because by garcia · · Score: 4, Interesting

      but how many of "us" will realize the necessity of that? People are SO used to MS as being the only thing out there for computers and not knowing that there is such a thing as "open source" and that "trade secrets" aren't the most important thing when it comes to security.

      Who's to say that just because we see the source code that they actually use that code when they compile it?

      Who's to say that there isn't some hardware interface to mess with the votes?

      The list goes on.

      Basically what it comes down to is that the ignorance of the general public (and the fact that only a minority even care enough to vote as it is) is what is going to lead to the downfall of our voting systems.

    2. Re:because by EvilTwinSkippy · · Score: 2, Insightful
      but how many of "us" will realize the necessity of that? People are SO used to MS as being the only thing out there for computers and not knowing that there is such a thing as "open source" and that "trade secrets" aren't the most important thing when it comes to security.

      People once thought that women and minorities were inferior, slavery was ok, and only landholders should have a say in anything, and you can pay off your sins by giving to the Church. We have gotten past those issues, we can get past these as well.

      --
      "Learning is not compulsory... neither is survival."
      --Dr.W.Edwards Deming
    3. Re:because by Stubtify · · Score: 3, Interesting

      Well this past week on NPR's Talk of the Nation they had a Professor from MIT I believe who discussed the problems with these voting machines. He mentioned that they had "stumbled" upon the source for one of these machines and that they found many disturbing problems.

      What struck me as interesting was that there was a long discussion of why these should be open sourced, the callers, the moderator, and the professor all seemed to be on the same page. This is NPR, however that makes me feel a little better since I think its safe to say that more people who listen to NPR vote than those who listen to KROQ or some other Pop music station.

      http://www.vote.caltech.edu/

    4. Re:because by EvilTwinSkippy · · Score: 2, Interesting
      We need electronic voting NOW and we need open source NOW. We can't afford to wait 50 or 60 years.

      Hold the phone.

      Why NOW? We have managed to survive as a people for 250 years before the invention of the computer, and as a civilization for 10 millenia.

      Computers and Open Source are not a fix, an improvement, or a reform in unto themselves. They are a means. You can implement some pretty crappy things in Open Source, or some earth-shatteringly well engineered things. The Open Source, while it helps, does not mandate quality.

      Electronic Voting is a bad toy. It delivers one and only one improvement over our existing ballot system: instant returns. That's it. There are no improvements in reliability, security, or oppertunity inherent in electronic voting. I for one am sick of election night being covered like sporting events.

      Votes cast must still go through the rigorous checks and certifications that existing paper and mechanical ballots go through. Not so much to satisfy beaurocracy, as to satisfy the voter. The process of democracy wins regardless of which candidate is elected. Being able to go back and reconstruct an election bolsters winners, and reassures loosers. It occasionally will upset the original results, but only rarely and only in extreme cases.

      Crap processed electronically is still crap. Anyone who uses computers and has not gained a healthy skepticism about them is a danger to themselves and their profession.

      --
      "Learning is not compulsory... neither is survival."
      --Dr.W.Edwards Deming
  3. I know what I am doing next election by chrisgeleven · · Score: 5, Insightful

    Voting via absentee ballot. At least there is a greater chance of my vote not being screwed up or changed.

    Anyone who thinks these voting computers are going to be flawless and secure by Nov. 2004 is greatly mistaken.

    1. Re:I know what I am doing next election by WindBourne · · Score: 2, Insightful

      Sadly, even paper is easily manipulated. Chicago land area (historically) is a great example of this.

      --
      I prefer the "u" in honour as it seems to be missing these days.
    2. Re:I know what I am doing next election by smack_attack · · Score: 2, Informative

      Have you ever voted absentee? There are two envelopes, one goes in the other... the inside envelope face is blank and has no information about you and holds your vote.

      --

      Hammer of Truth
    3. Re:I know what I am doing next election by smack_attack · · Score: 2, Interesting

      Immigrants can't vote until they are citizens, so your analogy is flawed. Besides, if they become citizens they would be encouraged to turn someone like that in to INS by the process of becoming a citizen, not something a fraudster would want to risk.

      However, it would not be impossible to force someone to absentee vote in your favor, but there is less risk associated with just voting in the name of deceased voters or just outright poll fraud. Less witnesses, less risk.

      --

      Hammer of Truth
  4. Not open source because... by JohnGrahamCumming · · Score: 4, Insightful
    Why isn't this open source by law?

    Well because the US is a capitalist country and because currently most people seem to believe that the best way to make money in software is by keeping the code proprietary and because US government favors money-making corporations.

    I agree that if it were open source it would be far more likely the security problems would be discovered quickly.

    So how about creating an open source alternative... anyone ready to register an OpenVote system on SourceForge?

    John.

  5. It makes sense by Doesn't_Comment_Code · · Score: 4, Insightful

    It makes sense that they don't want their code to be open source, because then ALL the bugs will be found. When open source code is developed normally, people notice bugs/security holes a few at a time and fix them. But when software has been closed source for a long time, it's bound to have tons of bugs and holes. Opening the code up to public scrutiny would unveil A LOT of problems. And that's just not good for PR... especially in voting.

    My guess is they just want someone to look through the code, maybe suggest a couple quick fixes, and then give the OK, so they can reassure the public. They don't really want to get to EVERY hole in the code. They probably just want show that they get numbers close enough that we should keep using/buying their stuff.

    --

    Slashdot Syndrome: the sudden, extreme urge to correct someone in order to validate one's self.
  6. Open Source != Secure by daoine · · Score: 3, Insightful
    I'm a big fan of the open source movement, but I'm not sure that voting software *needs* to be open source, because there is value in securing the source code itself.

    Security through Obscurity is not Inherently Evil.

    Of course, if the only security a system has is based on the fact that nobody can see the code, I'd say that system is hosed. I highly doubt voting software would fall into this category. It's unfortunate that obscuring code has taken on the negative connotation of "hiding bugs." That's not always the case. Keeping the inner workings of a system secret is a valid security measure, and used in conjunction with other means it can create a well-secured system.

    I think the process they are taking is a step in the right direction. I believe that independent code reviews strengthen privately owned code. I think it's a mistake to deny access to those who have the ability to challenge the system. But I'm not sure open sourcing the code will make it any more secure.

    1. Re:Open Source != Secure by frodo+from+middle+ea · · Score: 2, Informative
      I believe that independent code reviews strengthen privately owned code

      In theory yes, in practice NO. I remember about 5 years ago, I was working for a company which was developing lot of C code on Tandem Mainframes for a stock exchange .

      Anyway the stock exchange asked an independent auditing company (the same one connected to enron ) to audit our code for Y2K and also security.

      To cut the long story short, the auditors were very smart in figuring out that the stock exchange's IT dept. was a joke and they had some insider contacts with another company doing Tandem mainfram developments.

      So instead of a fair audit, we almost lost our contract due to the manipulative tactics of the auditors and stupidity of the stock exchange IT dept, to the competing company which had some insider contacts with the auditing company.

      --
      for the last time people, I am "frodo from middle eaRTH", not "middle eaST".
    2. Re:Open Source != Secure by WindBourne · · Score: 5, Insightful

      Security through Obscurity is not Inherently Evil.
      In this case, it is.
      With normal elections, the abilty to tamper with the results are minimal. The reason is that the votes do not end up in one place. In addition, you have several different parties counting at all times (typically Dems and Republicans). With this approach, it offers a single point of entry. It is possible for the votes to be rigged here either directly or indirectly. Somebody could offer 10 to 100 million dollars to the coder or even CEO within the company (keep in mind that some elections are spending a great deal more money to win them these days; apparently it pays off). Or since it may have a unknown opening, only the bad guys would know. Only the problem is that the bad guys would be a party member.
      BTW, the orginal bribe may be to simply forget about an opening, rather than the introduction of one. Then the party would simply introduce something to manipulate it nationaly. At that point, they would manipulate close elections. Totally undectable.

      --
      I prefer the "u" in honour as it seems to be missing these days.
    3. Re:Open Source != Secure by gilroy · · Score: 3, Insightful
      Blockquoth the poster:

      Security through Obscurity is not Inherently Evil.

      When it comes to voting software, yes, it is. The people have the right to know that their software is as secure, bug-free, and outcome-neutral as possible. Like laws, the code to count ballots should be accessible to any interested citizen -- and there should be absolutely heinous penalties for anyone who uses a binary compiled from anything other than the open code.
      --
      The Mongrel Dogs Who Teach
    4. Re:Open Source != Secure by WNight · · Score: 2, Interesting

      If you've ever worked in an office, with a boss who is being pressured to release a product, you know why something needs outside audits if it's supposed to be secure.

      If this is a regular project, up for bid, it's going to be as absolutely horrid as they can get away with. You know, trillion bit encryption, rotating one-time pads, etc, etc. All the snake-oil you can shake a stick at.

      Open source doesn't guarantee security, but I wouldn't trust corporate-produced security unless it's open source.

      The voting mechanism in use in Canada is very open source. They give you a piece of cardboard and let you stand in a little room with a pencil. You mark the square directly corresponding to the person you want to vote for, fold the ballot in half, and walk out into the open, and drop your ballot, into the same cardboard-box-with-a-slit-in-the-top as everyone else. Representatives from every party are there, as well as any voters who want to simply watch the process.

      Later, the box is taken to a room with the same multi-party auditors and opened. In plain view of everyone, ballots are counted into different piles.

      I won't accept a voting machine until every stage of the process is as auditable as that cardboard box with paper ballots. You can have fancy ways of printing those ballots if you wish, but they need to be clear and human readable. You can electronically count my vote for up-to-the-minute poll results, but the authoritative answer has to the the paper, or something just as auditable to the average Joe.

    5. Re:Open Source != Secure by Falsch+Freiheit · · Score: 2, Insightful
      [...] I'm not sure that voting software *needs* to be open source, because there is value in securing the source code itself.
      You're missing the point. The point is democracy.

      The biggest reason for making the source open for voting software isn't security. The biggest reason is accountability. With a paper-based system, anybody (the losing candidate in a close race?) can audit the results by looking at the materials, seeing where the marks or punches or whatever are and counting. The components of the voting system are understandable and open.

      With closed-source voting software, the single largest, most complicated and most important component of the voting system is a "black box". There's no way to know for sure what it's doing, other than to test that when you do A the proper response B happens and not C. Because it is software, it'd be remarkably trivial to write code designed to pass the tests but still bias the vote in a real election.

      It's not just about hiding bugs, it's about hiding intentional flaws.

      An independent code review is mostly a sideways step only slightly in the right direction. It's still not accountable to the public, only to a larger secret-holding group. It decreases the odds of conspiracy by increasing the number of people who'd need to be "in on it". You can't totally eliminate the possibility of conspiracy until we're all in on it.

      And democracy is all about everybody being "in on it". Anything that reduces knowledge of decisions or accountability reduces democracy.
  7. I don't care about the code... by JayBlalock · · Score: 5, Insightful

    But for the love of god and all that is holy, WHY are they fighting so hard against paper records? It makes no sense. (unless you are conspiracy-minded) Seriously. I just can't come up with any decent reason that Diebold et al would be so strongly against hooking a printer up to the system to produce a physical record. Much less why our elected officials would buy into such an idea.

    --
    Bush: He's Liberal in all the wrong ways.
    1. Re:I don't care about the code... by Obsequious · · Score: 4, Informative

      It's quite simple: because it adds cost.

      Just list the components: a printer; ink cartridges; paper. Note that the last two are consumables, and ink cartridges are even perishable, in a way. (If you let them sit around too long, they get dried out -- or at least non-laser cartridges do.)

      Envision, then, what it would take to run an election, remembering that these happen maybe once a year at best. You have, say, 10 machines per polling station. On the days leading to the election, each machine must be installed, powered up, and tested. Then, you have to connect the printer, test the printer, and change any cartridges that might have dried out in the meantime.

      During the election, you have to keep the printers fed with paper. The ink might run out on a system halfway through. The printer might jam. Because of this you have to keep spares on hand, from the ink to the paper to the print mechanisms themselves. You only get one shot at election day, after all.

      Meanwhile, of course, the polling workers have to be trained and prepared to deal with all this.

      In other words, it's a rather significant amount of cost and effort to add printing support to such a system. Even if you don't use standard printers but some other technology, you still have similar problems: e.g. a cash-register-style printer (which is all you'd need) might still jam, and needs to have its paper changed, etc.

      So, that's why the manufacturers (and probably even municipalities) are opposed to paper. I don't agree with them -- I believe there SHOULD be paper verification.

      I see their position, but it would be nice if they were thinking of something other than the almighty buck.

    2. Re:I don't care about the code... by ChaosDiscord · · Score: 2, Interesting
      But for the love of god and all that is holy, WHY are they fighting so hard against paper records? It makes no sense.

      Unfortunately paper records are nearly worthless.

      Great, I've got a receipt that says I've voted for Bob Nifty. How do I know that the machine actually counted that? Or worse, what if a bug (or evilness) in the code caused 1 in 1,000 ballots to be handled wrong. I'll look at the receipt and it says "Bob Nifty", but I actually voted for "John Keen". With odds of 1 in 1,000, it's likely than some voters will never look at the receipt and notice the problem. So maybe 1 in 10 actually complains. At 1 in 10,000 complaints (basically, 1 per polling location), poll workers are likely to just chalk you up as an idiot who made a mistake. Even if they acknowledge the problem, can they really correct it? Even if they do, what about the people who never noticed because they assumed that the machine would do the right thing?

      Given all that, I'm being given a paper record that I need to review (if the voter doesn't review it, the computer can just record with erroneous result in its database and print it and no one will know). What's the advantage of the computerized voting machines over just writing my choices on paper in the first place? We've still got the paper, still got the occasional need for hand recounts. All we've done is add a complicated piece of machinery between me and my vote!

      Well, perhaps the paper record is completely anonymous, and I have to give it to election staff. Then, if there is a question about the validity of results, you can hand count the paper records and compare it to what the machine claims. Well, so long as a reasonably large number of people verify that the paper record that they get is correct, I guess. But what have we gained over using machine readable paper ballots? Nothing, really. Actually, we've gained additional complexity (and thus, potential problems).

      Take a well designed machine readable paper ballot. My locality uses some. It's a big sheet of paper and there is a large arrow pointing directly to each candidate's name. There is an inch or inch and a half gap in the arrow. I fill in the arrow of the candidate I like. I then feed my ballot into the counter machine (which is very simple). The most important benefit is that "my vote" is an actual piece of paper that I marked. There is no machine between me and the canonical representation of my vote. If there is a concern that the counting machine is misbehaving, you can simply pull out the ballots and easily hand count them. There is no risk of someone claiming that the machine wrote the wrong candidate on the ballot since you made the mark yourself. Power outage? System failure? Break out the candles and keep voting! Just pile them up and feed them through the counting machine when you get the chance.

      Computerized voting is a terrible idea. Getting paper records out of the computerized voting machines is a bandaid that destroys the meager benefits that the machines provide while failing to fundamentally fix the problem.

      --
      Search 2010 Gen Con events
  8. Not only open source code.. by Gefiltefish11 · · Score: 3, Insightful


    Not only should the code for voting machines be made open to any interested member of the public, the whole voting process should be opened to the public.

    Provided that it does not infringe on the privacy of individual voters, it seems reasonable and much more secure to allow any interested party to view the voting process in real time and at any level, provided, of course, that the process were set to read only ;)

  9. If you want it open... by TWX · · Score: 5, Insightful

    you need to build it. They're not interested in building it open source apparently. Remember, Diebold makes ATM machines and other commercial products, and they have stiff competition. By the design of their business plan their software won't be open.

    So, if you want to see an open source implementation of voting software, something that you can argue is perfect and be able to show the world such, you need to make it. Diebold and their competitors won't.

    If you can build the software to make a secure voting system, someone else can design the hardware once the software is ready. That seems to be what people are missing here. Design the system right and the hardware will be built to work. Design the hardware first, and the system will be dependent on whatever wacky design is chosen.

    --
    Do not look into laser with remaining eye.
  10. BSOD by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 5, Funny

    your vote has caused a fatal exception in kernel32.dll - try picking another option

  11. And in a surprise landslide... by packethead · · Score: 4, Funny

    Independant hopefull Kevin Mitnick was elected President of the 2004 elections.

    --
    .sig
  12. Insecure, closed source voting software? by ihummel · · Score: 3, Funny

    Before, it was whoever had the best campaign and the most money that won. Will elections in the 21st century be determined by whoever has the best crackers?

  13. Open Source doesn't solve this problem! by xphase · · Score: 5, Insightful

    "Why isn't this code open source by law?"

    This wouldn't fix the problem of faulty(by design) hardware, lack of audit trails, and no trust in the delivery method.

    Sure with open source we can see the code, but that doesn't help if it is compiled by a compiler that you can't see the code for, run on microchips that you can't see the code for, and administered by people you can't trust.

    The ``but it should be open source'' comment that gets thrown around in every single story about electronic voting does not take into account everything that happens to the code _AFTER_ we would be able to see it.

    Anyway,
    here is a link to a page on Electronic Voting:
    Dr. Mercuri's Page on Electronic Voting

    --xPhase

    --
    The following sentence is TRUE. The previous sentence is FALSE.
  14. Paper vs paperless by Ioldanach · · Score: 4, Insightful

    It is still possible to have a valid election, even with a closed source voting system. The key is to have the voting machine spit out a piece of paper where the voter can see the votes written down and then confirm them. It doesn't even have to be a paper the voter handles, it could be behind glass so the voter merely can see that what they voted for is on the paper. Then, in the case of a contested election, the checks can be made against paper as well as the bits. In a case where the ballots don't match, paper overrules the bits.

    Granted, I think an open source system is the only sensible way to go, and the people writing them should be protected by copyright and patents, not secrecy. After all, if they're all required to be open, its going to be awfully hard to hide the source code you stole.

    1. Re:Paper vs paperless by EvilTwinSkippy · · Score: 3, Interesting
      The actual registration of votes is not the problem.

      The problem is in counting the votes. You have to track the chain of custody from the voting booth to the final number. Every step of the way should require a certification from an election official. The certification states that the official saw the numbers, they made sense. If something is completely screwy the official is obiligated by law to declare shenanigans.

      As such, you could stage an election with paper and pencil, stones, or broken clay pots. The computers should only be used to make the counting faster. They cannot be trusted in any other regard.

      --
      "Learning is not compulsory... neither is survival."
      --Dr.W.Edwards Deming
  15. Re:Electronic Voting by TWX · · Score: 5, Funny

    "If electronic voting becomes the norm (likely), I just won't vote."

    The odds are already heavily against your voting currently anyway, so I don't see how this will matter much.

    At least we don't use the "Telelection" methodology a'la Max Headroom...

    --
    Do not look into laser with remaining eye.
  16. Diebold's own network isn't secure! by phillymjs · · Score: 4, Informative

    According to this story Wired is running today, Diebold got 0wn3d back in March. They were given a nearly 2GB archive of the stuff that was found by a person claiming to be the hacker who got in.

    If a company can't properly secure its own network, how can we possibly trust them to create a secure voting system?

    ~Philly

  17. Re:I thought that was what Palladium was for. by DAldredge · · Score: 2, Funny

    No. The point in having trusted binaries it to stop piracy so MSFT (and others) do not have to worry about people using their software with out a license. How else do you expect them to continue to grow their revenue each quarter?

  18. Why isn't this code open source by law? by stratjakt · · Score: 3, Insightful

    Why should it be?

    Why dont I get to follow my paper ballot, meet the person who counts it, give them a math test to make sure they can do the arithmetic required, and wont "carry the two" and fuck everything up?

    Open source software wont fix anything.

    --
    I don't need no instructions to know how to rock!!!!
    1. Re:Why isn't this code open source by law? by IWannaBeAnAC · · Score: 2, Insightful
      You do. In Australia at least, scrutineers are allowed at every step of the process. While I suspect the counters would be a bit pissed if you stopped them in the middle of the count to give them a maths test, there is nothing stopping the scrutineers from repeating the calculation and comparing answers.

      Mind you, I don't know how the scrutineers are selected. At minimum, each party can provide scrutineers, but I'm not sure whether the general public can. The system works well enough in Australia that there has never been any suggestions of systematic problems. (Well, Queensland might be an exception!)

  19. Fraud by Design by CaptainZapp · · Score: 2, Insightful
    it makes sense that an organization like IACREOT, that supports paperless computerized voting systems, which are secret by their very design, would not want computer experts who disagree with that position at their meetings." (emphasis mine)

    And that's exactly what's dead wrong about voting machines in general and Diebolds AccuVote in specific.

    It's about as plausible like those industry strength, propriatery, uncrackable encryption devices with a secret, secret algorithm (which is certified by the association of creative spooks).

    If we (as the voters) allow for such unaccountable, unauditable and error-rigged devices we can give the key to the town right away to he who maintains the devices (or even a few creative script kiddies for that matter)

    --
    ich bin der musikant

    mit taschenrechner in der hand

    kraftwerk

  20. Re:Electronic Voting by vudujava · · Score: 4, Funny
    It doesn't matter, the code will vote for you.

    --

    Word Axis

  21. Right of Inspection by 4of12 · · Score: 2, Insightful

    Why isn't this code open source by law?

    The source code doesn't strictly have to be under a free or open source license.

    However it is vital that every single voter should have the right to examine the software and the hardware of the election process.

    Without that right, there's nothing to prevent elections turning into the kinds of events that Robert Mugabe has been staging in Zimbabwe.

    --
    "Provided by the management for your protection."
  22. Use paper ballot with immediate scanning by Phoenix-kun · · Score: 3, Informative

    I really like the system we are now using in Florida with some caveats. You're given a paper ballot with fill-in bubbles to mark your choices. You insert the paper ballot into a safe-like container that immediately scans and tallies the ballot. I've not seen any cases where there were mistakes, but I assume it would function like one of those vending machines that take paper money and reject the ballot if there was a problem. However, my one concern is that the questions and choices are stated and marked in clear text (of course). In the process of feeding your ballot into the machine, your choices are clearly visible to whoever is standing nearby. If they can deal with that privacy issue, I think it is the perfect solution.

    --
    Phoenix
    1. Re:Use paper ballot with immediate scanning by sploxx · · Score: 2, Insightful

      Yes, but there is the whole transmission line from the scanner to the counter that can be observed. And then some secret service people asking you some not-so-nice questions afterwards, if you wrote "wrong"...

      I don't want to show my vote to a machine, either. That is as bad as showing it to a human.

      Until someone has an idea how one can safely suppress the personal information at the man-machine interface and only give the machine statistical information (Like if you throw the vote into a box with a hundred other votes!), electronic voting is a bad idea.

      Throw the paper votes into a box, let it scan them after the box is *full* and then recheck them by a human, that would be ok. But this has no advantages over the current system.

  23. Re:credibility by sploxx · · Score: 2

    The point is that media may have an opinion and they may express their opinion and print stories supporting their opinion. But they should make things clear. They should not try to hide that.

    BTW: As a liberal left-winger, I only see the (neo)conservative, and far right-wing deceiving people by manipulating media, voting machines etc. by the quiet method. Often, not really legal.
    Contrary, very leftish people get their attention more by exaggerating facts and then believing in them. Some kind of stupidity.

  24. Results for 2004 Marlyand elections by Lord_Slepnir · · Score: 4, Funny
    They're showing off the source code for a voting system, so you know that some people will find security holes in them (and not tell anyone). Here's what I predict the presidental election will yeild:

    GW Bush: -234,524 votes
    Troll4x0r: 538 votes
    Howard Dean: 864,234,234 votes
    Natalie Portman: 784,245 votes

  25. That's my job by Inexile2002 · · Score: 5, Informative

    Seriously. One of the things I do for Comp Sec is change management and version management. There are VERY strict auditing standards that companies like this need to meet. In the US there is a SAS 70 auditing standard that companies need to meet in order to do things like this. Up here in Canada, we call it a Section 5900 but its the same basic idea.

    The way it works is, a company says that there are controls in place to assure people that something is or is not happening. If someone wants to test those controls, they'll call in a team of qualified IT auditors and we'll do a Section 5900.

    For the 5900, the people hiring us to do the job (could be the company in question, a regulatory board, a judge, a client etc) will draft a list of risks or controls. These controls are things they want to see in place.

    So, for a voting machine, the people requesting the 5900 would list controls similar to the following:
    -All changes to code are authorized and approved.
    -All changes are adequately tested, approved and testing is not carried out by the original developer.
    -No changes are introduced to the code after testing.
    -Changes are promoted and versioned by someone other than the original programmer.
    -Code that is installed into the production system is the same code that was tested and approved.

    ... and so on.

    Then the auditors will go in and verify that these controls exist, that the risks these controls are designed to cover off are adequately covered and that the controls are effective. If a company fails a SAS 70 or a 5900, they usually HAVE to fix the problems.

    Also, it usually isn't that hard to get your hands on a Section 5900 or SAS 70 report. Most companies will happy give them out unless they failed them or there are other NDA issues. As a voter, you probably have rights to these reports, and even if you don't, your elected representatives definitely do.

  26. Re:credibility by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 2, Insightful

    You, like many others, misunderstand how bias in the media works. Look, you know who the author is, and you can take a pretty good guess at his political leaning. Therefore you have all the information you need to apply your own critical thinking filters to the article. If you know the author is left-wing then you are perfectly capable of filtering out the more obvious left-wing bias. If you're reading $ARTICLE in $NEWS_SOURCE by $AUTHOR you may not have this information available to you, and thus you have to take everything at face value, which in turn exposes you to more bias on the part of the author.

    So I'd rather read something like this from an obviously biased source than one from a source that claims to be "unbiased"!

  27. Open Source Voting Software by jcsehak · · Score: 2, Interesting

    Okay I just checked sourceforge, and I saw one open source voting project, with no activity. Why aren't we doing something to change this? Why aren't we writing our own voting software? We can test it out in small groups, eventually use it in communities, counties, states, and finally in national elections. The country is tending toward electronic voting; IT NEEDS TO BE OPEN SOURCE.

    A poster said earlier that the only reliable method of tallying votes is counting them by hand. That may be true, but look what happened last election. Wouldn't you feel safer if you could go through all the code line-by-line, and know for yourself it was secure, rather than have to trust some truck driver to not get lost with the ballots?

    One huge benefit of electronic voting: we could be a true democracy. Want to decide if we should go to war? Lets all vote for it. Lower taxes? Get your vote in, Sept. 19th. Everyone voted for no taxes, and things got fucked up? We'll schedule another vote Oct. 19th to vote again, and unfuck them. Think about it: technology today is about to allow us to do something that has never before been even attempted on a large scale - rule by the people. The president could be a figurehead! Congress could exist for the purpose of suggesting laws for the American people to decide, rather than making them!

    So who's the fucker who registered truedemocracy.org? Why don't you give it up so someone can put it to good use? I'm no programmer, but I'd be more than happy to give up some of my time to coordinate a project like this. Anyone who's interested, feel free to get in touch with me. Oh wait, I forgot - this is Slashdot - a lot of complaining about how things are, but no balls to fix them.

    --

    c-hack.com |
  28. SAIC = Military by arichar4 · · Score: 3, Interesting

    The state of Maryland just asked SAIC to issue a report on Diebold touch-screen voting machines.

    My prediction: They will issue a report that puts a seal of approval on these voting machines. It will be almost impossible to debunk their report.

    This is just to shut people up. SAIC = Military.

    So far, we have the Pentagon involved with Accenture/election.com
    General Dynamics,
    Diversified Dynamics,
    Northrop Grumman

    All getting involved in voting systems -- as are the Saudis and the Pentagon. Why?

    Take a gander at the companies run by SAIC and below this, their board of directors

    At SAIC we have over 35 companies, subsidiaries and equity partners. A partial listing is provided below.
    http://www.saic.com/about/companies/
    AMSE C LLC
    Specialists in full ship systems support: command and control systems, combat systems, communications, information warfare, main propulsion systems, hull & deck systems, auxiliary systems.

    Bechtel SAIC Company, LLC
    A joint venture between SAIC and Bechtel, Bechtel SAIC Company, LLC provides research, engineering and nuclear science capabilities to meet the unique challenge of science and engineering for the Yucca Mountain Project.

    Data Systems & Solutions
    A joint venture between Rolls-Royce and SAIC, DS&S incorporates Rolls-Royce engineering/controls expertise with SAIC's systems integration and information technology skills.

    Hicks & Associates (H&AI)
    Defense industry consulting.

    Saudi SAI
    Installation and maintenance of computer systems, telecommunications systems, and other data analysis systems in Saudi Arabia.

    Members of the board:

    D.P. Andrews
    Corporate Executive Vice President, Federal Business, SAIC

    W.A. Downing
    General, US Army (Ret.)

    B.R. Inman
    Admiral, USN (Ret.)

    H.M.J. Kraemer, Jr.
    Chairman and CEO,Baxter International, Inc.

    M.E. Trout
    Executive Vice President, Cytyc Corporation (?? someone want to look this up?)

    J.A. Welch
    General,USAF, (Ret.)

    A.T. Young
    Executive Vice President, Lockheed Martin Corp. (Ret.)

  29. open source by law? by tf23 · · Score: 2, Insightful

    It's not open source because a private company devoted it's resources to create it, and owns the copyright on it. (I'm assuming now)... It obviously needs to recoupe that investment, so it keeps it's code to it's own.

    Simple enough. I really don't know why you'd question why it's not open source.

    --
    http://slashdot.org/~tf23/journal
  30. Open Source in this case is important. by Art+Pollard · · Score: 3, Insightful

    I have to admit from the onset that I am no fan of open source. This is for a variety of reasons. (It is probably sacrilege to state that here.)

    Voting machine software is however a case where I firmly believe that open source is not only important but necessary. The ability to vote either among a certain group or among the populace as a whole goes to the heart of our democratic republic. If votes are not tallied properly, not only may mistakes be made but there is the very real possibility that the country through forged votes may be manipulated by those who have nefarious purposes in their heart.

    The cryptographic community a long time ago discovered the best way to ensure the security of a cryptographic algorithm is to provide the algorithm to their colleagues. The rest of the cryptographic community then responds by trying to break the algorithm or in the least trying to discover the weaknesses. Because of this review process, the algorithms are then adjusted until they are highly secure. On the other hand, when cryptographic algorithms are kept secret, the review process is skipped and it is not uncommon for unsecure algorithms to make it on the market. When this happens it can cost lives and money.

    The same can be said in the case of voting machines. If the source code is not released, security problems will likely go unnoticed until discovered by accident by someone who may or may not have the public's best interest at heart. In fact, the likely hood of it being discovered by someone who wants to manipulate the system will actually go up as they are more likely to be able to obtain the source through deception or to take the time to decompile the voting machine binaries. With the large number of voting machines that could be used around the country -- or in storage between use -- it would not be hard for someone to obtain at least the binaries for the voting machine software. And this goes to the heart of the matter which is this: Someone who wants to manipulate the system will be able to obtain the source either by bribery, theft or through decompiling the software's object code. Thus in a closed source environment, the only people who would not have the source and be able to easily discover the problems would be the good guys.

  31. Bad idea. by ShadeARG · · Score: 5, Interesting
    Why can't I buy people's votes? If I have a vote that I don't want, and someone wants a vote, they should be allowed to buy mine.
    Because that would make the system worse than it already is. The percentage of people that do not vote is astounding, and you can be sure those votes would be sold. It's bad enough that people vote just because they think a certain candidate is a good speaker or they are a member of their political party. If votes could be bought then the political giants with the most cash would win every time. This is exactly how government positions should never be filled.

    If you think about it, an election is like a high speed race. The only difference is that the voters are behind the wheel. With that in mind, I'm surprised the system allows uninformed voters to actually cast a vote without knowing about the issues and the politicians.

    Before you can drive, you take driver's ed. Every election before vote time, there voter's ed should be a requirement. The issues are constantly changing, as well as the politicians. If this was manditory like a driving test (written or hands on, doesn't matter), then the people would be far better informed. Imagine the difference that could make. Imagine the turnout.
  32. The ultimate goal... by KC7GR · · Score: 2, Interesting

    ...May be to throw up such discouraging obstacles that people will simply stop voting.

    Call me paranoid if you want, but it strikes me as odd that the US government is even allowing voting machine software to be closed-source. SAIC has been a virtual lap-dog for all kinds of well-shrouded government and DoD contracts for decades, most of which are heavily classified (I know this because a friend of mine used to work for them).

    And Diebold is now allowing SAIC to "review" its code? Given SAIC's heavy federal connections, does this not strike anyone else as a Fox-Guarding-the-Henhouse scenario?

    Don't even get me started on the possibility of back doors in voting software that would allow special interests who shelled out enough $$ to easily rig an election.

    Like I said, I hope this is just my paranoid side jumping at shadows. Unfortunately, I have little proof one way or the other.

    --

    Bruce Lane, KC7GR,

    Blue Feather Technologies

  33. Why isn't this code open source by law? by CognitiveFusion · · Score: 2, Insightful
    1. Lawmakers are people, elected by money and other people
    2. The majority of software is closed-source so a profit can be made
    3. The majority of people believe that secrecy is always equivalent to security. Trying to convince them exceptions exist is an uphill battle because this belief is often deeply ingrained.
    --
    Fools ignore complexity; pragmatists suffer it; experts avoid it; geniuses remove it. ~A. Perlis
  34. Re:I thought that was what Palladium was for. by WNight · · Score: 2, Insightful

    Palladium is mainly about preventing the user from tampering. The binary containts a signed hash from the author. If the OS can't verify the signed hash it prevents it from running, or at least prevents it from accessing protected media like the DVD drive, or your encrypted music, etc.

    Nothing in Palladium was designed to help users. It doesn't even help stop email viruses as they claim, because they're almost all exploits of "properly signed" software. Even if Palladium was did stop viruses, all it'd do is stop them from playing your DRMed MP3s while they wiped your drive and emailed your personal documents across the net.

    The big problem with DRM to protect a voting machine is that if the software and hardware are done by the same company, there's no extra safety. You could be somewhat sure their software wasn't tampered with, except by them, but the problem here is that we don't trust "them".

  35. UCITA and budget cuts by autechre · · Score: 2, Interesting

    Two interesting points, one which was brought up in the article and one which wasn't:

    I'm a resident of Maryland, and employed by a state university. The previous administration made a mess of our finances (which were excellent up until then), and now the state is suffering budget cuts, particularly in higher education. This has resulted in hiring freezes, elimination of positions, and layoffs.

    I've been voting in elections here for almost 8 years now, and I don't seem to recall us having problems like Florida's. Baltimore uses a system where you mark a paper with a special pen, and the paper is fed to a machine. It looks like a standard multiple-choice test, not confusing at all. Why is it absolutely necessary for us to be the first state to buy these shiny new toys when our financial situation is so dire? This will just bring more pressure to legalize gambling (although we already have a state lottery and Keno, so I don't see why people upset about real casinos aren't protesting those).

    Second, remember that Maryland is a UCITA state. Under UCITA, isn't software required to be fit for the purpose for which it is designed? There's also something in there WRT implied warranties concerning data. It will be interesting to see whether this plays a part.

    --
    WMBC freeform/independent online radio.
  36. John hopkins researcher to speak at NSF by Danathar · · Score: 2, Informative

    For those of you who are in Northern VA. The Researcher at John Hopkins who looked at the Diebold systems is doing a presentation on his findings at the National Science Foundation, room 110 Aug 12th at 4pm.

    If you can't make it, I've drafted an intern to tape and encode it for download. It will be archived a day later at http://www.ngi-supernet.org/conferences.html

    If any of you are interested please tell me so I can post it as a bittorrent instead of burning down the web server.

    Just respond to the thread...thanks!

  37. Re:blurring of language by gorgon · · Score: 2, Funny
    I'm going to start calling my bowel movements intellectual property, just to be safe.

    You should really call it intestinal property. You could still call it IP, though.

    --

    And I'd be a Libertarian, if they weren't all a bunch of tax-dodging professional whiners.
    Berke Breathed
  38. Re:And why? by bigpat · · Score: 2, Insightful

    "On the contrary, if the source were opened, one might not be able to trust that there would be more white hat hackers than black hats for such a high-profile application"

    Hacking is of little concern here. Since we aren't talking about Internet voting, so the only opportunity to hack would be while you are in the voting booth, with nothing but the interface that is given to you. So assume there is a touch screen or something with a limited number of options.

    Making this software open source so that we can all look at the code is really just to make sure that there isn't some algorithm that drops every 3rd vote for a particular party or adds it to the wrong tally. Paper ballots are retained for auditing by third parties after the fact if there are questions about how the human tally was conducted. But computer recorded voting does not have such directly auditable methods, so we must be certain that the systems are not flawed or biased.

    Voting by computer terminal might make it faster to count the votes, but it is more akin to walking up to a sheet and telling the person behind the sheet who you are voting for. You lose the physical evidence of the vote unless there is some direct physical recording made. Regardless of how you desing the system, it is essentially relaying the vote without any direct physical evidence of the vote. Any subsequent recording of the vote is at least once removed from the actual person casting the vote. Unlike with paper ballots or even those horrible punch cards where the ballots are direct physical evidence of the vote.

    So, that is the argument in a nutshell. If you are to be forced to trust a machine or person to record your vote accurately, then we have a right to know the procedures that they will use to record the vote.

    Otherwise and unless there are many layers of accountability, both before the election and after, then let's just stick with paper ballots and optical scanners.

  39. electronic machines MUST provide paper backup by ChristTrekker · · Score: 2, Insightful

    The only way I'll ever trust an electronic voting machine is if they provide a printout I can verify on the spot before dropping it in a box, so that it can be used for auditing purposes. Ideally, the source code should be open source. But even if it is not, providing a marked paper ballot that can be manually counted (if necessary) ought to be sufficient.

    --

    Constitutionally Correct

    1. Re:electronic machines MUST provide paper backup by Politburo · · Score: 2, Insightful

      The manual printout in the grandparent's case is to provide a paper trail in case of suspected tampering. Then, persons can go back and count the printouts for a verified count. The printout, imo, should not act as a "did the computer read my choices correctly" (as this is a trivial task and is currently not done on electronic voting systems already in place), but should act only as an alternative voting record. In 99.99% of the cases, the computer would still keep the original, electronic, vote tally, and no manual counts would be done.

  40. Coming soon, to an election near you: by YrWrstNtmr · · Score: 2, Interesting

    Absentee electronic voting.

    "H.R. 1377, the Military Overseas Voter Empowerment Act of 2001 introduced by Representatives Mac Thornberry, Duke Cunningham, Sam Johnson and Helen Tauscher would be a major step in improving the process. This legislative initiative provides for the Secretary of Defense to expand an electronic voting pilot program to test the system in the 2002 general election for the implementation of the ultimate solution - Electronic Voting."

  41. Re:And why? by ajs318 · · Score: 2, Insightful

    How dare you presume to tell me that I am not allowed to supervise the process by which my elected representative will speak in my name?

    Get your head out of your arsehole. It's because of idiots like you that your country's in the mess it's in.

    --
    Je fume. Tu fumes. Nous fûmes!
  42. The world would be a safer and better place by hey! · · Score: 2, Interesting
    if only everyone who thought about security reminded themselves of the basic and fundamental fact every time they looked at a system like this:

    Prevention alone can never be an adequate security measure.

    This is a very simple principle that any person should be able to understand, if they only have the moral courage to accept it. This would greatly clarify situations like this one, because people would be asking the right questions.

    I'm not saying that prevention is not useful, just that a wise assumption has to be that any preventive measures we take and and probably will be. These systems are not crackable because their preventive measures were bad although they may have been bad. They are crackable because any system is crackable. What I am afraid of is that an evaluation of these machines only will look at how robust the protective measures they provide are. While it is a good idea to get an independent review of these measures, it is a bad idea to put much credence in them. The fact is that even the brightest and most professional person in the world is not going to be able to anticipate all the ideas in the world.

    Security has to consist of a number of independent goals, including:
    • Prevention
    • Detection
    • Response
    • Damage mitigation

    We need to ask what any system provides in each of these areas in order to asses security.

    For example, if I put Grandma's diamond ring in a a safe deposit box in the bank, the thick vault walls and doors do provide prevention. However without alarms (detection) and police (response), those walls wouldn't stand much of a chance to a determined attacker. Detection and response capabilities are in themselves the single most powerful preventive measure -- much more so than the vault design itself.

    On top of that, if I am wise, I take out an insurance policy on the trinket (damage mitigation).

    Looked at this way, how would we evaluate a voting system?
    1. Is there any way to manipulate the results the system reports?
    2. Is there any ironclad way to detect such a manipulation?
    3. Is there any way to trace the manipulation back to the malefactor?
    4. Is it possible to mitigate or undo the damage of manipulation?

    Looked at this way, the manual paper ballot would be an almost miraculously robust system if it were a piece of software. It is capable of accurate counting the voter's intent, while completely anonymizing the voters choices. Prevention is accomplished by physical control of access to the ballot box, and by chain of custody of the ballots to the counting place. The greatest opportunity for manipulation comes up in tallying the results.

    However it is possible to detect and mitigate such manipulation by recounts. Of course we want to avoid situations where recounting is necessary, but the recounting process itself is not to blame. Electronic methods of vote recording eliminate recounting at the expense of making it impossible to establish independently whether fraud took place.
    --
    Post may contain irony: discontinue use if experiencing mood swings, nausea or elevated blood pressure.
  43. Even an ATM gives me a Reciept by NickFusion · · Score: 2, Insightful

    It doesn't automatically eliminate fraud, but at very least, I should be given a receipt of my transaction (vote), and a printer ought to be making an archival copy at the same time for recounts.

    Imagine if your bank instituted a no-paper-record policy.

    --
    What were you expecting?
  44. Re:payment? by Inexile2002 · · Score: 2, Informative

    Whoever wants assurance that the systems are working. An interest group of voters could hire the auditors if they wanted to. I've worked for government, banks, insurers, shareholders, the companies themselves... anyone with a stake in the process.

    That doesn't mean that the company making the software would let them come in and audit - but these are a fairly big deal and it would be VERY strange if someone with an interest was willing to pay for an audit and the company in question was unwilling to let the audit go forward.

    But auditors qualified to do 70/5900s are not something there are tonnes of. The big 4 Accounting firms maintain them, and some smaller shops. But this is all tied into accounting and business management standards.

    And as much as people point to Enron/Anderson and say you can't trust the big four - its just not true. One falsified SAS 70 or Section 5900 report and a whole multi-billion dollar company with 10s of thousands of employees can unravel. There is checking, double checking and very rigid standards of audit evidence that are required for these things.

    Every piece of work I do gets checked by at least three other people.