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FSF FTP Site Cracked, Looking for MD5 Sums
landley writes "The Free Software Foundation's FTP site at ftp.gnu.org has been "compromised", and they don't seem to have full backups. They've yanked a bunch of recent packages (and their whole alpha.gnu.org ftp site), and when I asked about it they responded 'Our FTP server was compromised, yes. We are beginning to find good MD5sums for files which have not yet been restored, and they will be available again Real Soon Now. If you can provide MD5sums for any of the files listed in MISSING-FILES, it would be very much appreciated.' " Update the FSF has
a statement
on the FTP site explaining the matter.
Did you know that some files are just about impossible to get anywhere else?
Taking a brief glance over my FreeBSD server, all of the entries in the Ports tree have the MD5SUMs in the "files" file. The Ports tree includes many many FSF software package installs.
Fully licensed blockchain psychiatrist
Crackers exploited this vunerability, there was even a patch available!!
There is no god
Mirror, mirror on the wall, who is the fastest of them all?
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
.tar.gz, .tar.bz2, diff's, etc.) on ftp.gnu.org with a known good data. The file, .asc, contains a list of files
... REASON]
Hash: SHA1
To the Free Software Community:
Summary
* gnuftp, the FTP server for the GNU project was root compromised.
* After substantial investigation, we don't believe that any GNU
source has been compromised.
* To be extra-careful, we are verifying known, trusted secure
checksums of all files before putting them back on the FTP site.
Events Concerning Cracking of Gnuftp
A root compromise and a Trojan horse were discovered on gnuftp.gnu.org,
the FTP server of the GNU project. The machine appears to have been
cracked in March 2003, but we only very recently discovered the crack.
The modus operandi of the cracker shows that (s)he was interested
primarily in using gnuftp to collect passwords and as a launching point to
attack other machines. It appears that the machine was cracked using a
ptrace exploit immediately after the exploit was posted on bugtraq.
(For the ptrace bug, an root-shell exploit available on 17 March 2003, and
a working fix was not available on linux-kernel until the following week.
Evidence found on the machine indicates that were cracked during that
week.)
Given the nature of the compromise and the length of time the machine was
compromised, we have spent the last few weeks verifying the integrity of
the GNU source code stored on gnuftp. Most of this work is done, and the
remaining work is primarily for files that were uploaded since early 2003,
as our backups from that period could also theoretically be compromised.
Historical Integrity Checks
We have compared the md5sum of each source code file (such as
ftp://ftp.gnu.org/before-2003-08-01.md5sums
in the format:
MD5SUM FILE [REASON,
The REASONs are a list of reasons why we believe that md5sum is good for
that file. The file as a whole is GPG-signed.
Remaining Files
The files that have not been checked are listed in the root directory as
"MISSING-FILES". We are in the process of asking GNU maintainers for
trusted secure checksums of those files before we put them in place.
We have lots of evidence now to believe that no source has been
compromised -- including the MO of the cracker, the fact that every file
we've checked so far isn't compromised, and that searches for standard
source trojans turned up nothing.
However, we don't want to put files up until we've had a known good source
confirm that the checksums are correct.
Alpha FTP Site
The Alpha FTP site at ftp://alpha.gnu.org/ has been a lower priority for
us, but we plan to follow the same procedure there.
- --
Bradley M. Kuhn, Executive Director
Free Software Foundation | Phone: +1-617-542-5942
59 Temple Place, Suite 330 | Fax: +1-617-542-2652
Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA | Web: http://www.gnu.org
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Version: GnuPG v1.2.1 (GNU/Linux)
iD8DBQE/OnYb53XjJNtBs4cRAqplAJ95PHJhIwRiwjKBqSIx ZH SVlTOtxACgyouK
QAfYhiLJcwPHio6fsk+s2uY=
=DUMO
- ----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
This was modded as informative why? This is what it says on the FSF web site:
A root compromise and a Trojan horse were discovered on gnuftp.gnu.org,
the FTP server of the GNU project. The machine appears to have been
cracked in March 2003, but we only very recently discovered the crack.
The modus operandi of the cracker shows that (s)he was interested
primarily in using gnuftp to collect passwords and as a launching point to
attack other machines. It appears that the machine was cracked using a
ptrace exploit immediately after the exploit was posted on bugtraq.
(For the ptrace bug, an root-shell exploit available on 17 March 2003, and
a working fix was not available on linux-kernel until the following week.
Evidence found on the machine indicates that were cracked during that
week.)
Given the nature of the compromise and the length of time the machine was
compromised, we have spent the last few weeks verifying the integrity of
the GNU source code stored on gnuftp. Most of this work is done, and the
remaining work is primarily for files that were uploaded since early 2003,
as our backups from that period could also theoretically be compromised.
Call me old fashioned, but I like a dump to be as memorable as it is devastating - Bender
There are backups from before the crack.
If you want to give FSF $64,000, we could hire someone to implement a better plan. But we're not made of money.
Become a FSF associate member before the low #s are used
You mean, an accounting like this? Seems pretty detailed to me...
[snip]
(For the ptrace bug, an root-shell exploit available on 17 March 2003, and a working fix was not available on linux-kernel until the following week. Evidence found on the machine indicates that were cracked during that week.)
Given the nature of the compromise and the length of time the machine was compromised, we have spent the last few weeks verifying the integrity of the GNU source code stored on gnuftp. Most of this work is done, and the remaining work is primarily for files that were uploaded since early 2003, as our backups from that period could also theoretically be compromised.
(emphasis added). So in other words, they were cracked in the brief space between the exploit post and the patch, and didn't find it right away. Now, they are carefully vetting all their backups from that period to remove any possibility that a compromised backup could be redistributed.
So, to answer your poorly-researched questions:
Which part of this would you not consider a disaster recovery plan?
All the mirrors I've checked have placeholders.back-RSN.README, just like the ones at ftp.gnu.org.
Looks like they don't know how long ago the break-in was, so they pulled the mirrors to be safe.
Neither the OP _nor_ the moderator think it important to note in front-page post that the box was compromised in _March_ 2003? Jeez, is this /. or -.?
Must-not-watch TV!
As some other posters in other threads noticed, the FSF does not have full backups because all backups made after early 2003 can be compromised. The crack happened in March, and what they miss is all the stuff that was uploaded after the crack. Backups from before March are available. In this situation no backup strategy at all would leave you with total security after March. The fact that the site was cracked five months ago is a bit scary though.
Well, I must say that I've never met Mustafa at work... the people who run the UK Mirror Service are, however, there for all to see on the UKMS Crew Page
In all seriousness, you have until some time tonight (on BST, which is UTC+1) before we should be fully synced, including any files that have been pulled, with the source site. There are some exceptions, but I don't think they will apply in this case. And if any files were compromised, they are compromised on our servers as well.
WARNING: SHAMELESS PLUG: If you are a fan of the Mirror Service, or even just a user, please note the message on our homepage, as we are about to be able to serve even more users, at higher speeds.