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Electronic Voting Machine Cracker Challenge
An anonymous reader writes "In the ongoing debate on the security of electronic voting, an Atlanta area programmer has confronted Georgia election officials on the potential for fraud in its statewide electronic voting system. She claims that she can be prepared to crack the system within a week, and officials have accepted the challenge." What makes this even more interesting is that the election officials are encouraging the woman, so that any possible exploit can be found and remedied.
The Diebold system does have major flaws. I was just at the Crypto2003 conference where one of the talks was on the faults in this system. Amongst other things, when they pointed out the major errors in code, the company replied back calling DES (or DSA, I forget) a compression scheme, and they implemented an algorithm from Handbook of Applied Crypto for purposes of encryption with a value listed in the book that says explicitly "Do not use this for cryptographic purposes"
This is a change from the Kevin Mitnick days when ppl would be incarcerated for even *thinking* about cracking a gov system.
Mad props to Georgia for being cool about this.
1. Accept the challenge.
2. Make her win.
3. Fix holes.
4. Put her to jail on DMCA basis, or Patriot Act, or for desire to live and love for the country, or whatever.
5. ???
6. PROFIT!!!
(Hope #4 won't happen.)
Moreover, they said, paper ballots can be tampered with more easily than electronic ones, and they're harder to tabulate.
Sorry, don't believe that. A few locations in memory are easier to change than thousands of paper ballots. Hanging chads notwithstanding...
Nice comeback at the end -
Asked Williams, the computer security expert: "Are you saying there's no such thing as a secure and accurate computer? Do you fly on airplanes?"
I think I'd counter that by asking if he knew of any airplane where all members of the general public were allowed access to the terminals used by the pilots? And if so - does he fly with them?
I don't think I'm very happy. I always fall asleep to the sound of my own screams.
And unlike the US there was never a Florida voting scam.
And paper is much more immune to fraud: the election sheets are stored for a certain time, so any questions and be sorted out by a recount without any paper pebbles dropping from the holes. And if a fraudelent government wants to pull off a voting scam they have either to forge election sheets, which would be noted afterwards, or they have to destroy sheets, which would be noted, too.
So why use a high-tech solution which isn't immune to fraud and other problems instead of a low-tech solution which hasn't these problems ?
Owner of a Mensa membership card.
God, this is stupid....
Instead of doing such a media hype just open the source code for the public and let about 10'000 people have a look at it.
Idiots.
Please will at least everyone keep in mind that when she wont succeed in cracking the machine that doesn't prove it's security.
You can't prove a product is secure, only showing that it's insecure...
Alan Perlis once said: "A language that doesn't affect the way you think about programming, is not worth knowing"
He put the odds of corrupting the software undetected at 1 billion to one.
If you make a statement like that you are asking for trouble. It's like walking into a bar and saying 'No one here could win in a fight with me.'
Of course, this is assuming Ms Jekot fails to find weaknesses in the voting system.
Even if she does find exploitable flaws, will she find all of them? Probably not, in my opinion.
Am I being cynical and paranoid? Hell yes.
Although it's good to have an independant security audit of the hardware/software, it's still a far cry from what I would call development of a secure system.
...? What are the logging/auding possibilities? How secure is the data transmitted? How secure is that data stored?
...
Did an independant auditor (or security specialist) audit the design - both hardware and software - from a security point of view? Where there independant audits/reviews of the coding or assembly of the hardware? Can you trust the developers or factory workers? Who is monitoring the deployment, development, good working,
Who will monitor the people who are in charge of the system?
Ultimately, you have to trust someone. And putting trust in the wrong kind of people is the biggest security risk there is
http://blog.astyran.sg
This is obviously a hoax. Everyone knows that there are no women in computer science. :)
I've been in college for a few years and I haven't seen a women since I stopped taking Gen. Ed. classes.
that the companies that manufacture voting machines are not mandated to publish full specifications including technical drawings and listings of firmware, for anyone to look at, any time, for free. It's like they are trying to say mere mortals are not supposed to know the processes by which their representatives are elected.
And don't give me the hand-wringing "important proprietary secrets" crap. Firstly, all companies would be required to show their "secrets", so nobody would be gaining any unfair advantage. Secondly, what the hell is so secret about adding up a bunch of numbers anyway? And thirdly, what corporate secret is more important than the due processes of democracy?
If these companies are not prepared to let the general public - who are, after all, the rightful owners of "Government" property - scrutinise their products, thenthat alone is a good enough reason why the public should reject their products.
Je fume. Tu fumes. Nous fûmes!
have destroyed the record of the 2002 election, in defiance of federal law. they have stated that the election went smoothly.
Right before the election, an uncertified patch was installed to all the voting machines in Georgia. There were some stunning upsets in the race. Saxby Chambliss and Sonny Perdue won in dramatic, come from behind fashion.
the Libertarian party candidate has issued a formal request for the voting records, the ones that have been destroyed.
photosMy Photostream
This only PROVES their ignorance. If one person fails in one week, that's far from showing that the system is secure.
Open Sourcing it won't make it secure either, but it would probably be the fastest way to fix a ton of the most obvious holes.
Better yet, if they want good PR, they should hire Mitnick to have a go at it. Lord knows he's probably rusty, but his name alone would end the debate one way or the other.
[100% ISO 646 Compliant]
SVM, ERGO MONSTRO.
Sorry to burst your bubble, but paper voting is rife with fraud, that is one of the major reasons it took so long to rid many of it.
Going to digital introduced a whole new system, whereby the exploiters of the previous lost their investment and are forced to start again.
Voter authentication needs to be taken further with the requirement of a picture ID, as it stands now, many dead vote on paper ballots, and many votes that are for one party or another are either lost or damaged so as to become invalid.
If Florida proved anything, it proved just how dangerous paper ballots were, and even how more dangerous subsequent handling of them was. Seems to me many stories of how the same box of ballots yieleded different results depending on who looked at them!!! How is that not an easier source of fraud? Especially when people start introducting "interpetation of intent" into the mix!
Sorry, digital voting will one day be the only true way to avoid fraudelent voting, however for that to come about we will had to shed some of our mickey mouse vanities. Something must be done to not only protect our vote from a fraud at the machine but to protect our vote from fraudelent voters (ie, the dead, the multi-voters, etc)
* Winners compare their achievements to their goals, losers compare theirs to that of others.
She's a webmaster with an interest in carnivorpus plants. She did this site.
N ote the fucked up links on the bottom of the page. They point to c:.
http://www.cumbus2002.org/eco_rescue.htm
She does not even have a web site for her web design business! AWEBPLACE.COM is registered to her company Southern Belle Software. Search for some of her posts to newsgroups for more dismaying info.
How about posting the code here, Roxanne? A 'few of your expert friends' will be happy to help you out.
The latest Slashdot meme.
At least in a paper voting world, there needs to be some semblance of a paper trail record to be available for recounting.
While such systems can be manipulated, it takes quite a lot of people in the loop to do so. Voter early, vote often; run a steel rod through any Republican ballots in Democratic areas...
The move to scannable ballots using sharpie markers is a bit better but physical security of those are questionable as they allow thermal printouts and often have the covers open at the polling places.
Right now, if I want to steal an election, I probably have to bury my opponent in the places that I control the entire polling apparatus with my political party hacks. It looks crude and messy to anyone who watches.
Now if we have all the local precincts reporting frequently into a central computer system with two way back door communications; we can easily determine the number of manufactured ballots needed and allocate them over a greater number of precincts without drawing any attention at all.
An example of this is a weighted average cost bid, I have personal experience with this. If we know that there are two items on the list; one says it will buy a million of an item and the other says it will buy 3 of the item but the quantities are reversed. I can make my evaluated bid much lower and rape the buyer by biddin no cost for the first item and $10,000 for the second item (assuming both are worth $1000); however the bid will look really, really abnormal compared to the other bidders and they are going to smell a rat even if they don't know the real quantities to be bought.
However, were I to just shade the bid a bit by lowering the cost on one and raising on the other I could win the bid, have higher margins and no one be any the wiser. OK, the example of a million vs 3 is too extreme but so is the ballot count for Democrats in these key urban areas coming in higher than the total number of living and dead there.
If the election comes in as the controlling power wishes, there is no need to do anything. If it is off track, they can certainly round up people on buses to vote but they can also create some new ballots that will be totally untraceable.
All electronic balloting is not to be trusted.
Computers do many wonderful things, counting elections is not one of them.
D
The potential for fraud is only part of the problem with electronic voting. The biggest problem is the lack of a hard paper trial to use in the event of a recount or if the machine crashes. Suppose you have a group of booths in a busy voting district that suddenly decide to blue-screen. Potentially, thousands of votes could be lost. The lack of a paper trial has been brought up many times, but proponents of the system have so far dismissed it as unneccessary. This is just asking for trouble.
Even worse is cases like those in Florida where the state purchased new electronic voting machines with the provision that their warranty would be immediately canceled if the state ran tests to verify their performance. Egads! This has fraud and disaster written all over it.
Our system of democracy is very important our liberties. As voters, we should insist that our voting system be beyond question. That means it should be secure, verifiable, and robust. The best way to accomplish this is through open-source peer review of the code and hard-copy backup of voting results for auditing purposes.
When all else fails, run.
The difference is that she didn't try to hack it first. She made a challenge and they accepted. This is how normal society acts. Hackers have made a bad name for themselves by doing things without other people's knowledge or permission---often to show off their "superior skills". Hackers may feel this is no big deal or some sort of "good work", but normal people feel very threatened and violated. Hence people like Mitnick go to jail.
If Mitnick had asked and recieved permission like this woman, there would have been no problems.
Brian Ellenberger
No one is saying get rid of touch screens, we are saying PUT PAPER IN THE PRINTER which is already built into Diebold and every other touch screen machine. Print ballot, voter verified, it goes in a ballot box, you've got evidence of the vote. Explain why: 1) A person in a wheelchair, or a muscular or neurological difficulty, who can vote on a touch screen suddenly cannot vote on a touch screen if you have paper in the printer. 2) A person who is blind, and uses the headphones to vote, suddenly cannot vote on a touch screen using headphones if you have paper in the printer. This is a prepared talking point sent out by the voting machine industry. Bev Harris Black Box Voting