Handling User Grown Machines on a Large Network?
matth asks: "Recently with the outbreak of the MSBLASTER worm and the startup of the college semester here in the US we've been hit by a big problem here where I work. Many students are bringing in machines from home, often times infected. The infections are so bad that they bring the whole network to a crawl. Yes, you can install ACLs on edge routers and put a router between the dorms and the rest of your network, but it still brings the dorm to a crawl. You can make sure people install the patches, but what if someone re-installs Windows, or brings in another machine, and what about NEXT year? From the Slashdot community, how have sysadmins out there dealt with this? How can you manage each machine in a network such as a college, where people are bringing their own machines in from the outside? ACLs on routers... but what about for the segmented network?"
You can only separate networks so much.
If you make them bear some financial responsibility for not checking their machines first this might help.
just ban users from your network.
At my university, at least for the public machines, when you logon to the domain, a script executes that automatically patches your machine and runs fixblast and fixwelch. you might want to investigate into something like that
If you can track down where the traffic is coming from (which I believe you can with MSBLASTER, at least to the extent of IP address and from there, MAC address), block their port until they fix their machine. Once they've (a) patched up and (b) removed MSBLASTER, let them back on. Having an A4 sheet detailing where to get the patch and removal tool (possibly mirrored locally) would be a good idea too.
Do some intrusion detection on the network--possibly through Snort. If any machine is spamming out MSBlast messages or Sobig emails, drop their connection via MAC address and refuse to give them another DHCP lease. Then, when the person comes in to complain, let them know their computer was infected and flooding the network, and give them a floppy with the proper security patch on it.
It might be a bit annoying to automate the process (except for handing out floppies) at first, but it seems like it could significantly help, while at the same time educating users to update their patches.
No comment.
...tell students at registration that Windows machines are not allowed on the network, and that they must install Linux. This will not only clean up your network problems, but it will also give the students a sense of doing the right thing for their computers. Along with their free condoms, give 'em free Linux CDs.
Ensure that home machines (ones that you haven't configured) get IPs in a VLAN group which you've bandwidth throttled on the routers/switches along the say so the rest of the VLANs don't get choked by home-grown disasters.
Machines you have control over can get IPs in another VLAN which isn't throttled, or at least not as much as your "uncontrollable" VLAN. At the router where the VLANs can meet have strong ACLs and traffic flow control.
Just because you give them access with their own machines doesn't mean you have to give them unrestrained access.
Trolling is a art,
assuming your network is switched, and your switch are "manageables" (ie you can log in them remotely)
you could have an IDS (or similar) with a rule looking for specific attacks (ie blaster). when you detect such an attack, fire off a script that shuts down the user's port on the switch. they'll bitch and moan that they can't access the net but you'll know who they are now and charge them a cleanup fee (make sure to include it in the terms of use)
another solution is to require anyone bringing a computer from home to have it inspected by your techs, block access based on mac address and only give them access once they passed the test. it does require more ressources tho, and ideally you'd still need the first option (in case where someone reinstall windows)
I think this was one of the approaches Stanford was going to take. No DNS for your machine until you get it checked out by their IT department.
Chris
You'll need something more reliable than Windows if your plan is to mandate that sort of thing.
... from another point of view.
I'm a student at a university whose dorm network got nailed by blaster something fierce. Almost as bad as it was Klezed a couple years before. Anyways, because of all of this, the sys admins decided to completely eliminate the dorm network from the upper campus one - also cutting off 'net access - during school hours. This is a real big pain in the butt, and I'm actually hoping there are some great answers in this topic so I can give them to my sys admin.
Of course, compounding the situation are seemingly (dunno if they actually are or not considering I've never even SEEN one before) incompetant dorm techs taking an entire day to clear out just one dorm building of ~50 rooms (2 people per room, but often less than 2 PCs per room...). Considering Blaster only affects 2000/XP/2003 machines, that means that the roughly 50 computers running those took 8 hours to clean? Something seems wrong here.
I'm just annoyed because my room (along with my entire hall since I'm the resident 'hey, call him!' computer geek and have patched everyone) is completely free of blaster and its ilk, yet I have to deal with the people who either don't know to patch Windows often, or don't care.
How about this one: What can a STUDENT at one of these schools do to help? I've tried teaching as many people as possible about computer safety (take a health classes' STD safety course, apply to computers basically), and I'm ineligable to become a dorm tech right now... anyone?
--- Ãther SPOON!
"Along with their free condoms, give 'em free Linux CDs."
"Here. You'll never use this first item if you choose to use the second item. Have fun, and welcome to college."
You are sooooo fired.
You ought to be able to tweak your DHCP so you can block machines that are broadcasting this badly by telling them their default gateway is localhost.
My problem? I was perfectly gruntled, until some numbnuts came by and dissed me.
Assuming you can identify the port from which the infected traffic is coming, post a list of all infected rooms on the front door of the dorms, with an explanation that "these computers are causing your network to suck."
The problem will be fixed.
Moderate drunk! It's more fun that way!
... when you go to a university where you do not log on to a domain in dorms.
I've found that to be very common (including the Uni that I'm typing this at) since it is MUCH easier to set freshman up on movein day.
Also, certain things do not work when you start logging onto domains. Example: XP's fast user switching. You'd have students complaining about the administration restricting their rights to their own computer, blah blah blah... then on top of it, automatically patching something. Legal nightmare. Works great for lab PCs, horrid for dorm PCs.
--- Ãther SPOON!
When the blaster worm hit, we had to work for a few days to clear the thing from the staff network.
Now that we well and truly cleared it after much scanning to make sure, we've moved on to the on-campus student's network.
We have to physically go to each room, patch and scan to remove both blaster and welchier.
It's both an annoyance for us and the students who pretty much treat us like unwanted guests on their pcs.
Be you Admins? nay, we are but lusers!
what about the seniors who are still running 98. then you also end up slowing down student machines and you get a bunch of unhappy students. micromanaging a few thousand computers who's specs are all over the board will cause more headaches than it solves
I never said I was smart, I just said I was smarter than you
For years, the last thing the admins at my university wanted to do was inspect each computer before it was permitted to be on the network. This year they have broken down and are doing so, to be connected (wired or wirelessly) one of their employees must inspect the computer and make sure that they are not only completely patched, but also that they are running antiviral software (Norton ONLY).
This is of course great in theory, until a week later when someone formats, 'forgets' to patch, brings their computer home, gets re-infected and comes back to school.
Until patches become mandatory for many of these users, there is no way to prevent such a thing... short of finding the virus writers and skinning them alive during prime time, that might make some of these script kiddies think twice before doing what they do.
Help Brendan pay off his student loans
In our residence halls, we have about 7500 people. What we have done is make a series of VLANs, centrally administered by VMPS. We have the regular VLAN for a building's users, a quarantine VLAN, and a blackhole VLAN. As we detect users that are infected, we move them to the quarantine VLAN where we have colocated a quarantine webserver via an 802.1q trunk. This server provides them with all the patches, av software and latest DATs. Once installed, the resident "signs" with their campus ID to verify that they have installed the various fixes, and they are moved back. If someone languishes in the quarantine VLAN for too long, we move them to the blackhole VLAN (which is essentially a defined VLAN that isn't trunked anywhere so VMPS can still legally place them there).
This segmentation has helped dramatically. At one point, we were blocking nearly 800,000 icmp echo requests outbound/sec across all interfaces. Now? around 1k/sec. And that's over the last week.
Now if I could just get past the residents who:
1. Don't fix themselves because it was too much to read.
2. Don't know how to use a web browser
3. Don't know what a scroll bar is (!!!)
4. Don't contact us for help, but instead go to the President and Provost's offices.
Hang in there, segmentation helps dramatically.
Naturally, if you're the BOFH type of network admin you can skip the first part
You never played the lottery? Let me ask you another question.
Do you have any kind of insurance?
But surely you know that, like a lottery, insurance works because on average people pay more money into it than they receive from it. Lotteries and insurance are both gambles... except that in a lottery, you bet on good fortune. With insurance, you bet against bad fortune. In both cases, the expectancy value is less than 1, but in both cases you'll be damn glad you subscribed when your number's up.
I know I know, it's just a joke. Well, I just had to get this off my chest.
If construction was anything like programming, an incorrectly fitted lock would bring down the entire building...
This happened to a friend of mine recently, only it was a hardware fault. The fact is that after fans, hard disks are the most failure-prone pice of equipment in the computer.
There is only one thing you can really do about this: Back it up.
If you are likely to be on the receiving end of the complaints, you may find it helpful to provide a backup service. It should consist of the following components:
Remember, the more the student body is involved and empowered (euphemism for being told it is their own responsibility), the less you will have to do about it.
If you really want to over-egg the pudding you might even make versioned backups available, so they can find what they had six weeks ago -- might be useful for some.
Good luck.
NO ID: BEING FREE MEANS NOT HAVING TO PROVE IT
Not really an option. And an incorrectly managed linux machine on an academic network can be almost as big threat to the outer world as windows. I am speaking out of experience as I have dealt with OC3+ floods coming from zombies in student dorms long before people started to apply "voodoo" to windows machines. It was linux, bsd, solaris and other unix systems in those (pre BO) times. Quite oftent it still is.
Still, you can very easily deal with it.
1. Move dorms to private addresses so that you do not have an address space constraint as the next step will eat addresses like there is no tomorrow.
2. Subnet the network into a small salad and put each slice of the salad into a separate VLAN.
3. 802.1q the vlans up to a linux box, bsd box or a cisco that has enough grunt to filter (72xx VXR or similar comes to mind, bigger ones have a hard time filtering, smaller ones cannot handle the bandwidth).
4. Filter on all 802.1q interfaces on the linux/bsd/cisco.
As a result you contain any clap to a small subnet.
Note that everybody will hate you initially. People definitely did hate me 8+ years ago as this was one of the things I did to deal with a similar problem (one dept in the building I managed was being hacked left right and center).
Baker's Law: Misery no longer loves company. Nowadays it insists on it
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