Handling User Grown Machines on a Large Network?
matth asks: "Recently with the outbreak of the MSBLASTER worm and the startup of the college semester here in the US we've been hit by a big problem here where I work. Many students are bringing in machines from home, often times infected. The infections are so bad that they bring the whole network to a crawl. Yes, you can install ACLs on edge routers and put a router between the dorms and the rest of your network, but it still brings the dorm to a crawl. You can make sure people install the patches, but what if someone re-installs Windows, or brings in another machine, and what about NEXT year? From the Slashdot community, how have sysadmins out there dealt with this? How can you manage each machine in a network such as a college, where people are bringing their own machines in from the outside? ACLs on routers... but what about for the segmented network?"
just ban users from your network.
If you can track down where the traffic is coming from (which I believe you can with MSBLASTER, at least to the extent of IP address and from there, MAC address), block their port until they fix their machine. Once they've (a) patched up and (b) removed MSBLASTER, let them back on. Having an A4 sheet detailing where to get the patch and removal tool (possibly mirrored locally) would be a good idea too.
...tell students at registration that Windows machines are not allowed on the network, and that they must install Linux. This will not only clean up your network problems, but it will also give the students a sense of doing the right thing for their computers. Along with their free condoms, give 'em free Linux CDs.
Ensure that home machines (ones that you haven't configured) get IPs in a VLAN group which you've bandwidth throttled on the routers/switches along the say so the rest of the VLANs don't get choked by home-grown disasters.
Machines you have control over can get IPs in another VLAN which isn't throttled, or at least not as much as your "uncontrollable" VLAN. At the router where the VLANs can meet have strong ACLs and traffic flow control.
Just because you give them access with their own machines doesn't mean you have to give them unrestrained access.
Trolling is a art,
assuming your network is switched, and your switch are "manageables" (ie you can log in them remotely)
you could have an IDS (or similar) with a rule looking for specific attacks (ie blaster). when you detect such an attack, fire off a script that shuts down the user's port on the switch. they'll bitch and moan that they can't access the net but you'll know who they are now and charge them a cleanup fee (make sure to include it in the terms of use)
another solution is to require anyone bringing a computer from home to have it inspected by your techs, block access based on mac address and only give them access once they passed the test. it does require more ressources tho, and ideally you'd still need the first option (in case where someone reinstall windows)
I think this was one of the approaches Stanford was going to take. No DNS for your machine until you get it checked out by their IT department.
Chris
You'll need something more reliable than Windows if your plan is to mandate that sort of thing.
"Along with their free condoms, give 'em free Linux CDs."
"Here. You'll never use this first item if you choose to use the second item. Have fun, and welcome to college."
You are sooooo fired.
You ought to be able to tweak your DHCP so you can block machines that are broadcasting this badly by telling them their default gateway is localhost.
My problem? I was perfectly gruntled, until some numbnuts came by and dissed me.
Assuming you can identify the port from which the infected traffic is coming, post a list of all infected rooms on the front door of the dorms, with an explanation that "these computers are causing your network to suck."
The problem will be fixed.
Moderate drunk! It's more fun that way!
Students go to university to learn and give back some knowledge, not to constantly maintain their tools.
In our residence halls, we have about 7500 people. What we have done is make a series of VLANs, centrally administered by VMPS. We have the regular VLAN for a building's users, a quarantine VLAN, and a blackhole VLAN. As we detect users that are infected, we move them to the quarantine VLAN where we have colocated a quarantine webserver via an 802.1q trunk. This server provides them with all the patches, av software and latest DATs. Once installed, the resident "signs" with their campus ID to verify that they have installed the various fixes, and they are moved back. If someone languishes in the quarantine VLAN for too long, we move them to the blackhole VLAN (which is essentially a defined VLAN that isn't trunked anywhere so VMPS can still legally place them there).
This segmentation has helped dramatically. At one point, we were blocking nearly 800,000 icmp echo requests outbound/sec across all interfaces. Now? around 1k/sec. And that's over the last week.
Now if I could just get past the residents who:
1. Don't fix themselves because it was too much to read.
2. Don't know how to use a web browser
3. Don't know what a scroll bar is (!!!)
4. Don't contact us for help, but instead go to the President and Provost's offices.
Hang in there, segmentation helps dramatically.
I was with you until this part: "drop their connection via MAC address and refuse to give them another DHCP lease". Here's a better idea. CALL THEM! If they're running Windows, send them a Messenger Service Message before you cut their connection, telling them to call IT or something. Don't just shut them off, it's bad for your department's image and it's a bad policy when dealing with people.
- Sometimes you're the pidgeon, sometimes you're the statue.