Gates Says Windows Reliability Is Greater
mogrinz writes "According to an interview with the New York Times, Bill Gates is proud of the achievements Microsoft has made in increasing the security of Windows. As for the effects on people being attacked by SoBig.F, etc? Gates says this is "something we feel very bad about". Gates summarizes the Microsoft position very succinctly: "We're doing our very best, and that's all we can do"."
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"A door is what a dog is perpetually on the wrong side of" - Ogden Nash
A. No. "
He should.
Losers always whine about their best. Winners go home and fuck the prom queen.
Still, with a plan, you only get the best you can imagine. I'd always hoped for something better than that. -CP
I like the part about "are you afraid of product liability suits". He should have answered. "no, now that we understand how to buy politicians and use lobbyists, we no longer fear the law".
photoplankton
Dear Bill,
Far and away your #1 bug is the infamous "buffer overrun" flaw. These usually mostly manifest themselves in string libraries. I know that you have at least 3 library solutions in-house (Safestr for C, CString in MFC, and basic_string in STL) but your developers don't use them otherwise these problems wouldn't happen.
I'd like to point you out to another alternative:
http://bstring.sf.net/
Which your developers may prefer. But whatever you do, why don't you simply make it a requirement that <string.h> simply be outlawed (you could easily write a tool to enforce that couldn't you?), or take some other drastic action?
Buffer overruns are certainly the most common kind of bug that isn't caught by QA (the right answer is not to try to train QA to find them -- they would require the skill of a hacker.) If you concentrate on this one bug alone, you will probably easily remove 80% of these attacks.
I have never gotten a virus with xp. Never even even had one come up in a virus scan. But, I do all the right things like use a firewall and autoupdate. I also do things no one else does like use IE security settings and turn -everything- (java, activex) for all but say 40 sites on the net. This last step is just far too much work even for expert users (esp with that stupid site may not display properly dialog for ActiveX). Further it is just beyond the typical home XP user.
Now that's just mean.
If by reliability, you mean it's ability to function in a proper way without self-destruction, I'd say he is succeeding. Windows XP is indeed better than the previous offerings. Once upon a time, you didn't even have to touch your computer and it would spontaneously have problems. It has gotten much better. Now, it's resilience against the evils of the internet...
That's another story. Indeed, Gates should institue a moratorium on new projects until the old ones can become stable enough to actually properly handle the internet.
Sobig.F is a good example of how fundamental the problems with Microsoft software is. The changes required to secure (pick one: Windows,IE,Outlook,Exchange,IIS) need to happen at the API layer. Unfortunately, this would take industry-wide support, something not even Microsoft can make happen overnight. It would seem with all the money companies already have invested, there is a lot of corporate inertia to overcome.
You can't legislate goodness. Let each to his own destiny, by will of his freely made choices.
They'd figure out some way to make it possible to run your Windows XP Pro system with a Limited (i.e. non-root) account without rendering it totally useless.
The few programs I've actually managed to get running on a Limited account still don't seem to have the access they need to SAVE THEIR SETTINGS... So they need to be reconfigured every time they load up.
And the only way I've figured out for dealing with that is to temporarily add the Limited Account to the administrators group, pull the network cable, log in with it like that, make the changes, log back out, remove it from the administrators group, reconnect network cable and run Ad-Aware and pray nothing went horribly wrong.
Which is a bit of a hassle.
Please God, let me find my blue hat with the red trim. (Frances Farmer)
Before everyone starts chiming in on how real system admins would have been prepared. Remember a few things:
1) After being burned by a few bad patches, some corporations now have a policy that specifically states that patches must be tested first. With the huge amount of patches that is released by MS, this is a full time job.
2) Remote users (laptop users, VPN users, etc.) are like sailors coming back from overseas. Who knows what they were exposed to and what viruses they have. This is outside the control of most admins.
3) Microsoft itself was not prepared for Slammer. SQL servers that were being used in a development environment (read outside of normal sys admin networks) were not patched. With large organizations, sometimes there are unknown, rogue installations.
Well, there's spam egg sausage and spam, that's not got much spam in it.
> Every MS virus, worm, and what not does not cause BILLIONS in lost dollars. There are I am sure some cases of actual lost real money, but if they totalled billions I'd be surprised.
So be surprised.
Here are some virus costs from Wired:
Nimda -- $635 million
Code Red -- $2.62 billion
SirCam -- $1.15 billion
Love Bug -- $8.75 billion
While we're looking at statistics, here's another...
According to CERT, the number of reported security incidents grew, starting in 1988, until they hovered at just over two thousand incidents per year from 1994 to 1997.
But then in 1998, the number of incidents started to explode:
1998 -- 3,734
1999 -- 9,859
2000 -- 21,756
2001 -- 52,658
2002 -- 82,094
2003 -- 76,404 (so far)
So what happened in 1998?
Microsoft introduced embedded e-mail scripting in Outlook Express!
Even an idiot could have predicted the consequences.
But why would Microsoft do something that was so clearly incompetent and irresponsible?
The answer can be found in another event that occurred in 1998, namely, the leaked release of the Halloween document. That internal Microsoft document described a strategy for fighting Open Source, as follows:
> OSS projects have been able to gain a foothold in many server applications because of the wide utility of highly commoditized, simple protocols. By extending these protocols and developing new protocols, we can deny OSS projects entry into the market.
So there you have it. The embedded scripting in Outlook Express is just one part of a general Microsoft strategy to decommoditize (i.e. break) Internet protocols.
In other words, these viruses and worms, which are costing us $billions, are just a side effect of MICROSOFT'S EXTENDED DENIAL OF SERVICE ATTACK ON OPEN SOURCE USERS.
If Jeffrey Parson might be going to jail for his denial of service attack (modifying the DDOS Blaster worm), then why not the president of Microsoft?