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Linux Crypto Packages Demolished
SiliconEntity writes "Cryptographer and security expert Peter Gutmann has demolished several Linux security software packages in a recent posting to the cryptography mailing list. He says, 'It's possible to create insecure 'security' products just as readily with open-source as with closed-source software. CIPE and vtun must be the OSS community's answer to Microsoft's PPTP implementation. What's even worse is that some of the flaws were pointed out nearly two years ago, but despite the hype about open-source products being quicker with security fixes, some of the protocols still haven't been fixed.'"
he points to CIPE, a tool which hasent been updated since jun 02 and Vtun since aug. 2001. he says TINC was just as bad but was fixed when users complained. I think the obvious conclusion is that if people use the software and email the person who maintains it, it will get fixed. if the project goes stagnent because the author doesnt maintain it or people dont use it then of corse it will be vunerable after time as more flaws are discovered and not patched.
All these years after Phil Zimmerman released the original PGP code, we STILL don't have anything which satisfies the need for a securing email. It would have these properties:
1. Be under a BSD-ish license, so it could be linked in to commercial and non-commercial products.
2. Be a LIBRARY, not a stand-alone executable, so it can be linked into anything at all.
Let's see, the Xiph people want their protocols to be used all over the place, so they make it a BSD-license LIBRARY that anyone can link to. Hmmm, seems to be working. The PNG backers want their format to be used all over the place, so they make it a BSD-license LIBRARY that anyone can link to. Hmm, seems to be working. The PGP/GPG people want their stuff to be used by people to send mail everywhere, so they make it either a non-Open Source license (PGP) or a GPL license (GPG) and also never ever make it a library for non-existant "security" reasons. Guess what! No one uses it!
Oh, and while I'm ranting about the horribleness of Open Source security stuff, why is it that there is STILL no well-integrated filesystem crypto in any of the Open Source operating systems, including the security-oriented OpenBSD? No, loopback crypto kludges don't count at all.
One can browse a manual on the topic and write an implementation that technically works (when paired with a similarly shoddily-designed decoder), but be fully unaware that the pseudorandom generator is just that. Or that the ones-complement portion of the crypto engine fails when X=0, weakening the whole thing by sixteen bits while not producing garbage.
Unlike a crappily-designed game, it's a lot harder to spot when crypto goes wrong. And most of those thousands of eyes supposedly peering over the code aren't looking that hard.
I'd still contend that commercial crypto has had more and bigger flaws overall, but he's right that the open source process alone isn't going to give you good crypto.
Instead of making yourself look so great by "demolishing the security," why not offer the fixes? Yes, open source can be insecure, but at least it will be public knowledge what those insecurities are, and concerned individuals can make the mods themselves.
Oh lovely.... so now because these are OSS components, people can't be critical unless they actually code the changes? Informing those that are suppose to care isn't enough? The author made a good faith effort and freely shared his knowledge but instead of saying thank you we'll get someone right on it... it's code or shutup?! *sniff* *sniff* me thinks me smell an ungrateful, eleetist something in the wind.... *Blech*
The time it takes to fix software is inversely proportional to the popularity of that software. I know 0 people that use CIPE and vtun.
Back in the day, whenever I'd bitch about how window managers lacked basic functionality, how the default IP tools didn't do multiple hot-switchable configurations, about the lack of decent documentation in the distro, about some aspect of the application that didn't work, shouldn't work that way, or had TOO MANY OPTIONS.... the response was ALWAYS "dude. The source is THERE. FIX IT YOUR OWN DAMNED SELF." With "That's a FEATURE, not a BUG." being a close second. To which I'd usually reply "I'm an ARTIST, not a CODER," resulting in a flamewar about the quality of the Gimp, but that's a different story.
:D
Things like this will get fixed when the people maintaining the packages start doing the gruntwork that gets those little bits enterprise grade- in other words, doing the hard, annoying, pain in the ass shit that you pretty much have to get paid to do, because nobody wants to do it in their free time. Big bonus points to open source software companies for making a BIG effort to do exactly that.
I'm pretty sure there are some pretty pathetic, sad window managers out there too. Some of the text editors are rather less than impressive as well. There are all manner of dodgy MP3 managements systems. OSS creates all manner of bad software because ANYONE can code something up and release it.
The security and cryptography field just highlights the problem because there are so many opportunities to do something particularly stupid in those fields. Anyone can write a cryptosystem that they can't break themselves. Unfortunately a lot of people figure if they can't break it, then neither can anyone else...
Jedidiah
Craft Beer Programming T-shirts
Linux in general is more popular than this project. That popularity gives it more eyes to keep watch on it, and shorter turnarounds when problems are found.
As for this project (CIPE), I personally have never heard of it. Indeed, neither has the poster from that mailing list: A friend of mine recently pointed me at CIPE, a Linux VPN tool that he claimed was widely used but that no-one else I know seems to have heard of.
The One Rule Of Chess You'll Ever Need: Don't play someone who carries a kit in their bookbag.
This crap got modded up??? I felt sure when I first saw the comment that it would it -1 at mach 3. Especially in light of articles like this one.
Not only that, but if you think about it, blaster and slammer and all those thing... They were only single "attacks", writen presumably by one single person. The nature of the insecurities is what allowed these worms to be as disruptive as they were. You imply with your post that the security of a system is inversely proportional to the scale of the deployment of that system. I'd love to see some evidence of that.
noah
Vtun is still far from being useless.
Just turn off vtun encryption and use it via a ssh tunnel. That works very well (i use it for securing wifi) and uses a proven protocol.
I also believe this is good practice and should be a widely accepted policy - re-use of good and proven software is not lame - it is crucial for easy, fun and secure software development. There really is no need for re-inventing the wheel.
Now if only ssl were so integrated into the operating system that i could use select() on a ssl-socket created with socket(), and thus making writing of ssl-enabled apps as easy as non-ssl-enabled ones, that would be great!
-- Having problems sending big files over the net? Try out Efisto (http://efisto.org)
Of course it'll have a similar number of holes. After all, there's nothing about OSS that makes the software fundamentally more secure. BUT:
1) These holes are far less likely to be in the base operating system implementation, as the OSS mantra is generally to put as much logic in user-space as possible.
2) These holes won't be covered up and released only after the vendor has decided to let us know about them.
3) These holes will be fixed up very quickly (in general, anyway), in individual patches or point releases, without onerous licenses attached to them, and without fear that the release might break the rest of my operating system.
4) Because OSS products use open standards, if one particular package is simply too insecure, at least I can change to another product and have things interoperate (eg, switching from Sendmail to Qmail/Postfix/MTA-de-jour).
Open Source or Closed Source, its just as easy to write insecure software, either way.
The point is, that with open source you can see just how insecure or secure a particular product is by looking at the code.
Open source is inherently no more secure than closed source software. The difference is people like "Peter Gutmann" can see what is wrong and be at the ready with suggestions how to fix it.
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Peer Review != Open Source (Hint: 99% of the programming population don't count as peers for cryptography.)
#1 - He's right.
#2 - So are you, or better yet consider this:
If CIPE were closed source, would he have even been able to write this article? Unless I missed something, nobody ever claimed OS was flawless, just that the flaws were open to scrutiny.
"Lawyers are for sucks."
- Doug McKenzie
If the public can't review something, they can't know it's safe.
No, but they certainly can (and will!) assume. Look at Windows users, and look at the Linux zealots who'll gleefully tell you that Linux is invulnerable.
If there truly are zero vulnerabilities, security holes, bugs, etc., it's secure - whether the users trust it to be or not doesn't change that. It just changes whether they're likely to use it.
"Industrial strength" is an alternative way of saying "snake oil"
No, what do you think "security" is?
In this context I think "security" is a process of minimizing risks to acceptable levels for an arbitrary application.
If the public can't review something, they can't know it's safe.
So? 99.999% of the population can't determine good programming even if the source is open. I guess by your theory there is no secure software in use at the CIA or the NSA because "the public" hasn't seen the code.
The sanely paranoid won't take anyone's word on security, they need the ability to check it personally.
"The sanely paranoid" != "The public"
Only those using the software need to know it is secure. This can be accomplished whether the software is Open Source or not.
Si vis pacem, para bellum
The only thing more annoying than a Libertarian is an (un|mis)informed Libertarian
"Only those using the software need to know it is secure. This can be accomplished whether the software is Open Source or not."
i responded instead of modding you. Let me just point out that if the public is using it then it should be open source so that the neccasary non-corporate people (hackers) can take a look at the code and fix what is needed, in the case of microsoft they are saying "trust the people who we employ, and who depend on our products to make money" which is a very very bad thing to rely on.
The open source community might not be perfect, but its one hell of alot closer than any proprietary setup. (not to mention that the larger the OSS community gets the more people will be looking at the code, hence more security.)
the CIA and/or the NSA are bad examples of security in software. (as is anything in gov't) because politicians decide what gets done, and politiks do not mix well with software.
"Two things are infinite: the universe and human stupidity; and I'm not sure about the the universe." --Albert Einstein
In this context I think "security" is a process of minimizing risks to acceptable levels for an arbitrary application.
To minimize you must first know. To know you must see.
So? 99.999% of the population can't determine good programming even if the source is open.
They can, if they care to, hire an arbitrary number of reputable cryptologists and software engineers to give independent opinions on the safety. The original authors can't have inserted secret backdoors for fear of being found out by these 3rd party reviews (and then being revealed as either untrustworthy or incompetent)
If the source is closed, that review process is either much more expensive, or impossible (if the country has forbidden reverse engineering).
For example, Microsoft today can get the data from any of their users. They simply have to release a "security patch" which instead of removing a buffer-overflow, inserts one in a way they know how to exploit.
If there truly are zero vulnerabilities, security holes, bugs, etc., it's secure
I thought I just explained the definition of "security". It's different from "safety". Check your local dictionary for more info: security is an assurance of safety.
You might be safe, but if you don't know it, you're not secure.
Apparently your posting strategy went something like this:
Ironically, your post made for the better demonstration of the problems inherent in the Slashdot moderation system.
Do you have any idea at all what he was talking about? Lots of cryptographic algorithms depend on random numbers. A common mistake by newbie cryptographers is to use a pseudo-random number generater which gives predictable values, leading to encryption which is easily broken. Real cryptography software must work very hard to find sources of unpredictable randomness in a system (like, say, the timing of a sequence of keypresses, if the computer has a keyboard). He was making a good point.
Do you even know what ones-complement is? Again, he was making a point, but either you intentionally ignored it for the sake of your reply or if flew right over your head.
He made a good point: If a programmer produces a buggy game, it's not a big problem, even if millions of people play it. But if a programmer produces a buggy cryptography library, and millions of people use it, that IS a problem.
Wow - criticizes someone else's post without having a clue what it means! +5 Funny!
This is open source, figure out where to submit your patches or else you are nothing but an arm chair security expert.
Absolutely absurd. I can't believe you wrote this. People who are good at writing code donate code to free software projects. People who are good artists donate art to free software projects. Yet, somehow, when a noted cryptographer does a (somewhat acerbic) security analysis of *three* open source packages and lists fixes, somehow you feel that he hasn't contributed anything.
Incidently, I'm curious if you're aware exactly how much it would cost in consulting fees to get someone like him to sit down and review a given product. This guy contributed a lot more in terms of intellectual value to those three projects than the forty-five people that sat down and wrote five-line patches to remove gcc warnings (not that their work isn't appreciated, but still).
He deserves our thanks, not scorn.
May we never see th