ICANN Gives VeriSign 36 Hours to Pull Sitefinder
Froomkin writes "ICANN this morning announced that it sent VeriSign an ultimatum: pull sitefinder by tomorrow evening or we'll sue. Details and links to discussion of the contractual and legal issues in ICANN Throws Down the Gauntlet to VeriSign on Sitefinder at ICANNWatch." Update: 10/03 19:29 GMT by M : Verisign blinked.
3 October 2003
.com and .net Top Level Domains announced by VeriSign on 15 September 2003, and in response to your letter of 21 September 2003. These changes involved the introduction (for the first time in the .com and .net domains) of a so-called "wildcard" mechanism that changes the expected error response for Internet traffic that would otherwise have resulted in a "no domain" response, and redirects that traffic to a VeriSign-operated webpage with links to alternative choices and to a search engine.
.com and .net, until more information could be gathered on the impact of these changes. On 21 September 2003, VeriSign refused to honor that request. In the time since then, ICANN has had further opportunity to consider the technical and practical consequences of these changes, and to evaluate whether these unilateral actions by VeriSign were consistent with its contractual obligations to ICANN.
.com and .net domains. Under these circumstances, the only prudent course of action consistent with ICANN's coordination mission is to insist that VeriSign suspend these changes pending further evaluation and study, including (but certainly not limited to) the public meeting already scheduled by ICANN's Security and Stability Advisory Committee on 7 October in Washington, D.C.
.com and .net registry agreements between ICANN and VeriSign leads us to the conclusion that VeriSign's unilateral and unannounced changes to the operation of the .com and .net Top Level Domains are not consistent with material provisions of both agreements. These inconsistencies include violation of the Code of Conduct and equal access provisions, failure to comply with the obligation to act as a neutral registry service provider, failure to comply with the Registry Registrar Protocol, failure to comply with domain registration provisions, and provision of an unauthorized Registry Service. These inconsistencies with VeriSign's obligations under the .com and .net registry agreements are additional reasons why the changes in question must be suspended pending further evaluation and discussion between ICANN and VeriSign.
.com and .net domains to their state before the 15 September changes, pending further technical, operational and legal evaluation. A failure to comply with this demand will require ICANN
Via E-mail and U.S. Mail
Russell Lewis
Executive Vice President, General Manager
VeriSign Naming and Directory Services
21345 Ridgetop Circle LS2-3-2
Dulles, VA 20166-6503
Re: Deployment of SiteFinder Service
Dear Rusty:
This letter is further to the advisory posted by ICANN on 19 September 2003 regarding the changes to the operation of the
Because of numerous indications that these unannounced changes have had very significant impacts on a wide range of Internet users and applications, ICANN on 19 September 2003 asked VeriSign to voluntarily suspend these changes, and return to the previous behavior of
Based on the information currently available to us, it appears that these changes have had a substantial adverse effect on the core operation of the DNS, on the stability of the Internet, and on the relevant domains, and may have additional adverse effects in the future. These effects appear to be significant, including effects on web browsing, certain email services and applications, sequenced lookup services and a pervasive problem of incompatibility with other established protocols. In addition, the responses of various persons and entities to the changes made by VeriSign may themselves adversely affect the continued effective functioning of the Internet, the DNS and the
In addition, our review of the
Given these conclusions, please consider this a formal demand to return the operation of the
Bel, the mostly sane.. "Of course I can't see anything! I'm standing on the shoulders of idiots." -- Me
> What if Verisign ignores this just like they ignored everything else? They are
> in a position to seariously mess up the DNS system.
ICANN can always instruct the root DNS servers to point elsewhere for com. and net. instead of verisigns gTLD servers. That would effectivly remove verisign from the game totally.
At this point verisign is legally bound to hand over their database of customer info so that the new registrar can pickup where they left off, and verisign would be held accountable for all damages caused if they dont (Which would easily be in the tens of millions a day)
ICANN being the primary board, if anyone at verisign said 'no' they most likely would be held personally accountable.
Its like if the admin of a company gets put on another project and refuses to give his boss the root passwords. He will be personally held responsible. And one way or another, the problem will get fixed.
ICANN is saying that if VeriSign can prove Sitefinder doesn't have any negative impacts then it can be reinstated and they'll be glad to help. However, paragraphs 3 and 4 in the linked letter make it clear it would be an extremely unlikely event.
Stay tuned folks, some interesting viewing coming up regarding this.
Verisign should have its right to manage the .com, .net and .org TLDs revoked permanently. No ands, ifs or buts. They have stepped over the line. They have had the opportunity to down sitefinder weeks ago and they thumbed their nose at all of us.
Strange women lying in ponds distributing swords is no basis for a system of government.
Read the entire letter, not just the last sentence:
-- Don't Tase me, bro!
they did lose the .org management already. It's just .com and .net now.
...and that's the way the cookie crumbles.
b/c verisign has changed its approach and implemented a mail server which bounces mail. also note that you are dependant on them for this behaviour now. currently if they wanted they could change this behaviour, and that's one of the reasons their action has undermined the stability of the net.
--
Simon
220 sitefinder.verisign.com VeriSign mail rejector (Postfix)
HELO dsnjkas
250 OK
MAIL FROM: <sdnjkas@com.com>
250 Ok
RCPT TO: <sdnjkasd@sdnfjkasd.com>
550 <unknown[xxx.xxx.xxx.xxx]>: Client host rejected: The domain you are trying to send mail to does not exist.
I used up all my sick days, so I'm calling in dead.
And anyway, why did they need root servers for that stunt? They didn't wildcard ".", after all.
Programming can be fun again. Film at 11.
You are SUPPOSED to be able to count on getting "DOMAIN NOT FOUND" errors.... DNS isn't google.. it's a precise, distributed database, that has served us well so far.
I have been hit by this problem already, where typos went unnoticed in scripts because a connection was made, and html returned.
I've had mail problems as well, where secondary MX was never tried, because of verisign's new trick.
It's handy for when you mistype.. unfortuntaely, looking up web pages is just one of many uses for the DNS.... and not at all what it was intended for.
Everyone should transfer their registrations NOW. It's easy and you are making a stand that might actually be noticed. At least you won't be sending any more dollars to a corrupt company that doesn't give a rip about Internet standards.
Probably should have RTFA then, huh? Both the .COM and .NET contracts were linked from Dr. Twomey's letter. Verisign's lawyers are probably pouring over section "Y" as you read this. ;)
UNIX? They're not even circumcised! Savages!
VeriSign Will Temporarily Suspend Web Navigation Service in Order to Continue To Work With Internet Community Towards a Long-Term Implementation
Good for them. Even better for us.
It's a press release from VRSN, so naturally it is full of half-truths and lies, but the bottom line is that they are getting in line. I doubt SiteFinder or wildcards will be resurrected after this debacle.
Edith Keeler Must Die
It's neither. It's a DNS issue. Full stop.
Here, have a loot at the IAB's point of view. They make a powerful case against the use of wildcarding in top level zones. The big thing is that it breaks a whole lot of protocols. HTTP isn't really that big a deal. ISPs could easily handle that in their DNS systems. Currently there are so many public and private protocols being used that nobody, not even Verisign, can properly provide for them using a wildcarding sytem, yet that is what Verisign is actually doing. And they are doing it very badly.
It increases network traffic, incurring more cost to ISPs and consumers. It makes it very difficult to present proper error codes for protocols that Verisign did not anticipate such as IRC. It breaks old protocols for which clients are not being developed but still provide a valuable function. For protocols that are still supported, it incurs higher costs for those users since the developers will need to update their software. There are so many problems with wildcarding that even the IAB gave up listing them after a dozen or so.
(Score: -1, Stupid)
Oh, boy. Here come the mis-informed paranoids again.
Web browsers use A and CNAME records:
$ host nosuchtypoaddrdom.com
nosuchtypoaddrdom.com has address 64.94.110.11
$ nslookup 64.94.110.11
Server: localhost
Address: 127.0.0.1
Name: sitefinder-idn.verisign.com
Address: 64.94.110.11
$
But mail apps only send messages to MX hosts
$ dig verisign.com mx | grep -v '^;' | grep MX
verisign.com. 5m44s IN MX 400 verisign.com.mail8.psmtp.com.
verisign.com. 5m44s IN MX 500 pigeon.verisign.com.
verisign.com. 5m44s IN MX 500 peacock.verisign.com.
verisign.com. 5m44s IN MX 100 verisign.com.mail5.psmtp.com.
verisign.com. 5m44s IN MX 200 verisign.com.mail6.psmtp.com.
verisign.com. 5m44s IN MX 300 verisign.com.mail7.psmtp.com.
$ dig nosuchtypoaddrdom.com mx | grep -v '^;' | grep MX
$
Mail sent to a mis-typed domain will not be sent to a sitefinder mail server. That's not how their DNS typo hijacking works.
Sitefinder has caused trouble with email delivery, but not at all what you're claiming.