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Biometrics: Prepare to be Scanned
npistentis writes "From an
article in the Economist: It has been a long time coming. But after years of false starts, security systems based on biometrics--human characteristics such as faces, hand shapes and fingerprints--are finally taking off. Proponents have long argued that because biometrics cannot be forgotten, like a password, or lost or stolen, like a key or an identity card, they are an ideal way to control access to computer networks, airport service-areas and bank vaults. But biometrics have not yet spread beyond such niche markets, for two main reasons. The first is the unease they can inspire among users. Many people would prefer not to have to submit their eyes for scanning in order to withdraw money from a cash dispenser. The second reason is cost: biometric systems are expensive compared with other security measures, such as passwords and personal identification numbers. So while biometrics may provide extra security, the costs currently outweigh the benefits in most cases."
I think they may be able to steal my finger with a big knife!
Here you'll be treated with dignity. Now strip naked and get on the probulator!
You can't take the sky from me...
The main problem in my eyes is the fact that a biometric system turns a fingerprint or retina scan into a string of ones and zeros. If the software is cracked to reveal this string, then the person who belongs to the fingerprint is *permanently* compromised. You can't change fingerprints like you can passwords.
I find it hard to justify the cost of using biometrics, at least in this airport example. The airlines in are in decline, the government has just bailed them out with a couple billion, and revenues are still falling. Does the TSA really need to scan my finger before I step onto a plane? Like the quote says, biometrics wouldn't have made a difference on 9/11.
The two main reasons being unease and cost?! That is wrong. The simple truth is poor performance. So far, no system has been able to match faces better than 60-80% in real life tests. That is still far too poor to be really useful for police work and other, similar purpose.
Whether you consider this a good thing or not, if and when it is implemented we need to remember that just like anyother form of security, the weak link will still be the human factor.
Even if you have the best biometric system, but it is not monitored for tampering (and its database) regularly, who is to say a malicious person didn't add or change a users information. And because biometrics are supposed to be so good, who will the people in charge believe, someone saying they are john smith the computer tech, or the computer that reported them being as being some criminal?
So what happens when someone who has lost one or both eyes tries to withdraw money from their bank account? Or when a burn victim passes through a face recognition checkpoint?
With passwords, all they had to do is torture me, but with biometrics they just cut off my hand...
|>>?
Becuase you can change your password a whole lot easier than you can change your DNA.
The flip side of not being able to lose or forget your biometrics is that you can't change it when it gets stolen. And, yes, people will find ways to spoof biometric authentication schemes into believing that they have your data. Whether it's fake fingerprints, or (more likely) some sort of data hack that sendst the computer the right bitstream for a given person's biometric data, once yours is gone, you're just hosed forever.
If your password or PIN gets stolen, you can make a new password, or get a new ATM card and a new PIN, and cancel the old ones. Once your biometric info is stolen or spoofed, you have the choice of cancelling it and not being able to authenticate anywhere, or just accpeting that your identity is stolen and will stay stolen.
Biometrics are great if *combined* with a password. But by themselves, they're foolish for strong authentication. Just because your fingerprints are on your hand doesn't mean that there isn't a pattern there that could be stolen and stored somewhere by bad actors.
-Rob
but realistically, the government would never spend the insane amount of money to install cameras all over the public area of America, especially not high-tech eye-scanning ones.
Agreed. But don't estimate the money-spending abilities of corporate marketing departments as they attempt to identify and target consumers. (Which, by and large, was what was scanning whatshisname in Minority Report.)
If you're not happy being paranoid about marketing departments, consider that once the cameras are there, it's real easy for whatever random government organization to use PATRIOT IX to get that data without a warrant, but with a gag order that prevents your being told they got the data.
-Rob
That article was more or less product placement. Biometric passwords, while looking very cool in sci-fi flicks, have the following misfeatures:
I would say these are the real reasons no one else than gadgeteer type bosses would ever consider using biometric passphrases.
How long until someone sets up a phony ATM to capture retinal patterns? And unlike passwords, your retinal pattern is not something you can change as needed.
Don't get me wrong, biometrics has its place but that place is part of a multi-factor security system. I predict that we will eventually see ATMs that require a card, password and biometrics. Three factors: something you have, something you know and something you are.
Biometrics by itself is useless for security.
In 50 years time we will have to give all kinds of bio information for everything, so we will carry a handy machine readable card with every bit of data on it to make it more convenient...
Thus defeating the entire purpose, and a stunning testament to human nature.
Beep beep.
The problem with using body parts like fingers, retinas, or faces for access control security is that one's physical body can be coerced. No one can force me to reveal my secure password. I can choose to die rather than reveal it, and if I die, the protected data will die with me.
A few scenarios come to mind. I'm walking in a city late at night near an ATM. A thief puts a gun to my head and tells me to go to my ATM and withdraw funds for him. I can refuse, but if he kills me he will get no money. With a fingerprint, retina, or facial scan, he can shoot me first and just drag my body to the ATM.
Another scenario is private data on my computer that I want to be kept safe from everyone including governments. A government can physically coerce a citizen into using his fingerprint scanner to retrieve the data that they want. They can do nothing about a strong password, and, again, if they kill you they lose any chance of getting the data.
Of course, this is where torture comes in, but I'd rather have the choice of being tortured or even dying to protect sensitive data. Biometrics take away that choice.
Having said all this, voice print ID avoids many of these pitfalls. It seems the most promising since no one can physically force you to speak your password, and if you die the data remains protected.
Quite an experience to live in fear, isn't it? That's what it is to be a slave.
The economist article fails to mention the other major reason these systems have not taken off - comparability.
Or, I should say, the Lack of it.
Each fingerprint device on the market uses its own format for storing it's data - making each device incompatible. At first, this would seem to be an easily surmountable problem - but then you must realize that until recently, Every device on the market had its own API for development.
Let me give you an example to illustrate this issue: company X has 2000 employees, and it goes to look at biometric systems - they are either faced with the choice of paying for very expensive equipment from 'long time players' in the industry - who would be around in 2-5 years when the devices start failing due to wear and tear - or choose from some of the 'upstarts', and risk being out in the cold if the company they choose isn't around in several years. a hardware switch down the line not only would incur the cost of re scanning everyone, but the application itself would need to be modified to work with the API for the new device.
Enter the BioAPI (www.bioapi.org) - which proposed a standard api - now widely adopted. You may notice that the Bioapi page mentions it was founded in 1998. It has taken several years for this standard to come to the foreground and there are still roadblocks - not all manufacturers participate freely.
As an example: one rather large manufacturer, Identix (www.identix.com) seems to have been stonewalling for years. Why would a manufacturer do such a thing against what is good for the industry? Because they were leading the industry. When you have all of the high end government contracts coming your way, a standard the opens the doors for the little guy is a Bad Thing for your business - or so they thought.
Take a look at the members list on the bioapi site - identix is listed - then take a look at the supported devices list... not a single identix product.
In 1999 I witnessed this stonewalling firsthand at a meeting in washinton DC. This meeting had manufacturers and interested parties from all over the globe in attendance, including representatives from the US military. The whole agenda for the meeting was how to promote/define standards so that the industry could grow.
I had the unfortunate luck to be seated next to the Identix representative. He had apparently flown in just so he could stonewall - every opportunity he got, he grabbed the microphone and ranted about how we should let the free market dictate standards - that they would come about naturally in the free market (he loved the term free market).
Meanwhile the rest of the group was discussing issues about how to resolve device inter operability - even so far as to discuss how data could be shared between devices. No concrete decisions were made at the meeting, but it did get people talking.
Anyway, my whole point is, one of the major reasons the biometric security industry hasn't grown (as fast as has been predicted for the past 8 years) is because without standards no one wanted to invest in writing applications. It was just too risky.
Note: I am flipping a coin as to wether to post this anonymously or not, since Identix could decide to try and silence this sort of talk...
man is machine
is a big problem, partially real and partially imagined. The real issue is transmission of viruses and bacteria through body fluids - what if I have an eye infection when I peer into the retina scanner? What if I pick my nose, then scan my fingerprint? The imagined issue is the 'cootie factor', where you wont want to touch something that 1,000,000 other people touched (think toilet seat).
Lastly, our new biometric overlords (The US Govt) will undoubtedly put 1,000,001 policies and procedures in place creating a huge barrier to market entry, unless of course you're the gov't approved contractor. None of which will be followed by the unscrupulous, thus continuing the tradition of fucking the honest and awarding (by default) the sketchy.
I want to delete my account but Slashdot doesn't allow it.
That is effectively what biometric security is. Consider then that the entire network must be physically secure or my (eye/finger/etc.) "password" will quickly be known and re-used. The "password" I used decades ago is still valid!
Also, I'd rather give a mugger my wallet & pin, than my wallet & thumb...
Repeat after me....
Biometrics are unique but not secret.
The time it takes to make a perfect duplicate is about 15 minutes (with special material it can be reduced to less than 10 minutes). To make a duplicate of a lifted fingerprint took me several days in 1992 and I had to do a lot of experiments to find the right process/technique. Now it takes me half an hour and the material costs are $20 (also sufficient for about 20 duplicates), the only equipment you need is a digital camera and an UV lamp. Not only do I now make the duplicates in a fraction of the time, but also the quality is better.
No electrons were harmed creating this post, though some may have been subjected to electrical and/or magnetic fields.
Your idea has problems for several reasons:
- biometric data is not stored as a simple image. It's not stored as a compressed image, or a md5 of the image. It is most often stored as a series one-way-hash values, each of which is derived from some characteristic inherint in the scan. Someone could steal this data, but creating the original image is near impossible, like breaking a 100 kilobyte rsa key.
- biometric data is stored in a different format by every manufacturer. There is no standard - heck, they can barely get a standard API for how to interface with the hardware and drivers (www.bioapi.org), let alone agree on a standard format. Thus, if visa were to start using scanners, and your fingerprint scan were stolen, only visa systems would be affected.
- most authentication systems (other than the implied example of logging onto a computer) use multiple pieces of information, usualy two or more of the following type:
- something remembered ( a password or pin)
- something kept (a security card, a credit card)
- somethign intrinsic (a biometric)
Now, how useful is that fingerprint scan if the visa card it's associated with is not in the theif's hands? How useful is it if you cancel your card and get a new one?
- if someone did manage to steal an image of your fingerprint or retina, it won't do much good: systems these days are able to tell the difference between a dead/living finger, a photo, and even a plastic mold (many systems look for temperature of what is scanned, and can even look for capilary blood flow).
- if someone gets access to a computer system where they can use the information stolen and bypass the scanning device, well, you have much bigger problems: such a breakin would probably compromise things to the point where they can simulate a positive authentication from the driver/hardware, for any user.
- (this one only applies to fingerprints): you have ten fingers, use a different one. For eyes, switch eyes.
Having said all of that, please realize that biometrics are intended to enhance security by adding another layer to the authentication systems in place, not to replace them. A bankcard+pin+fingerprint is more secure than a bankcard+pin.
Anytime you hear/read the mass media promoting the death fo passwords via biometrics, realize that either A) the reporter doesn't get it or B) they have talked to a marketing person at one of the manufacturers who is (most likely in my experience) pandering to the media in an attempt to grow the market and get sales, despite the falsehoods involved.
By the same token, anyone who tells you a password by itself is secure, is also wrong.
man is machine