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Biometrics: Prepare to be Scanned
npistentis writes "From an
article in the Economist: It has been a long time coming. But after years of false starts, security systems based on biometrics--human characteristics such as faces, hand shapes and fingerprints--are finally taking off. Proponents have long argued that because biometrics cannot be forgotten, like a password, or lost or stolen, like a key or an identity card, they are an ideal way to control access to computer networks, airport service-areas and bank vaults. But biometrics have not yet spread beyond such niche markets, for two main reasons. The first is the unease they can inspire among users. Many people would prefer not to have to submit their eyes for scanning in order to withdraw money from a cash dispenser. The second reason is cost: biometric systems are expensive compared with other security measures, such as passwords and personal identification numbers. So while biometrics may provide extra security, the costs currently outweigh the benefits in most cases."
I think they may be able to steal my finger with a big knife!
i'm all in favor of it, but it still does bring my mind back to minority report. Some people have a right to be uneasy.
Here you'll be treated with dignity. Now strip naked and get on the probulator!
You can't take the sky from me...
The main problem in my eyes is the fact that a biometric system turns a fingerprint or retina scan into a string of ones and zeros. If the software is cracked to reveal this string, then the person who belongs to the fingerprint is *permanently* compromised. You can't change fingerprints like you can passwords.
I find it hard to justify the cost of using biometrics, at least in this airport example. The airlines in are in decline, the government has just bailed them out with a couple billion, and revenues are still falling. Does the TSA really need to scan my finger before I step onto a plane? Like the quote says, biometrics wouldn't have made a difference on 9/11.
The two main reasons being unease and cost?! That is wrong. The simple truth is poor performance. So far, no system has been able to match faces better than 60-80% in real life tests. That is still far too poor to be really useful for police work and other, similar purpose.
Whether you consider this a good thing or not, if and when it is implemented we need to remember that just like anyother form of security, the weak link will still be the human factor.
Even if you have the best biometric system, but it is not monitored for tampering (and its database) regularly, who is to say a malicious person didn't add or change a users information. And because biometrics are supposed to be so good, who will the people in charge believe, someone saying they are john smith the computer tech, or the computer that reported them being as being some criminal?
So what happens when someone who has lost one or both eyes tries to withdraw money from their bank account? Or when a burn victim passes through a face recognition checkpoint?
That means, once your identity is compromised, it stays compromised... and there is little to nothing that you can do about it.
That is why I don't like biometrics...
With passwords, all they had to do is torture me, but with biometrics they just cut off my hand...
|>>?
This of course, next to waisting huge amounts of money, can create a false sense of security or even lower security as in the example they cite: on an airport, if every 10000th passenger is screened for second testing, the odds are high that guards will not be very optimistic about the system and make mistakes, diss the system, etc.
in the mean time, terrorists travel by sea, land, etc. Even most of 9/11 went by their real names....
Becuase you can change your password a whole lot easier than you can change your DNA.
The flip side of not being able to lose or forget your biometrics is that you can't change it when it gets stolen. And, yes, people will find ways to spoof biometric authentication schemes into believing that they have your data. Whether it's fake fingerprints, or (more likely) some sort of data hack that sendst the computer the right bitstream for a given person's biometric data, once yours is gone, you're just hosed forever.
If your password or PIN gets stolen, you can make a new password, or get a new ATM card and a new PIN, and cancel the old ones. Once your biometric info is stolen or spoofed, you have the choice of cancelling it and not being able to authenticate anywhere, or just accpeting that your identity is stolen and will stay stolen.
Biometrics are great if *combined* with a password. But by themselves, they're foolish for strong authentication. Just because your fingerprints are on your hand doesn't mean that there isn't a pattern there that could be stolen and stored somewhere by bad actors.
-Rob
Digital Biometrics Inc. provides live-scan systems from the Los angeles County Sheriff's Department. These systems are installed in Los Angeles County Courthouses to verify the identity of persons being released from custody. These systems are also installed in Los Angeles Sheriff's Department booking stations.
Miros Inc. ,developers of the world's easiest ad most reliable personal
identification systems, have announced that they will demonstrate the first
biometric technology to secure Internet access employing face-recognition:
TrueFace Web. This technology employs a live video image previously recorded.
XL Vision Inc. a leading provider of fingerprint have announced the Human Authentication Application Program Interface (HA-API) for companies and electronic commerce applications.
Eltron and 3M have announced their collaboration for secure identification-printing systems. Eltron International Inc. leading global designer and manufactor of thermal-label and plastic-card printers.
PenOp Inc. is a privately-held international software company specializing in electronic signature capture and verification for on-line business transactions. While some vendors, including IBM Corp., have been quietly researching the viability of this type of software, PenOp Inc. is one company that has taken an agressive role in promoting it to the financial services market. The company's software allows signatures to be written onto a penabled computer screen or a digitizer (a computer pen and pad), then encrypted and tran
but realistically, the government would never spend the insane amount of money to install cameras all over the public area of America, especially not high-tech eye-scanning ones.
Agreed. But don't estimate the money-spending abilities of corporate marketing departments as they attempt to identify and target consumers. (Which, by and large, was what was scanning whatshisname in Minority Report.)
If you're not happy being paranoid about marketing departments, consider that once the cameras are there, it's real easy for whatever random government organization to use PATRIOT IX to get that data without a warrant, but with a gag order that prevents your being told they got the data.
-Rob
As it was said time over and over here,
The Problem is that if somebody menace at pinpoint you can give a password or a pin and they will go on statisfied. You loose money but after you can change the in or apssword and that's it.
With biometric you CANNOT change those data. Meaning once you are compromised this is over. For ever.
Furthermore criminal aren't exactly known to be Sissy which would repugn or be afraid of , let us say, chopping a handor an arm. Or getting an eye out of that socket. Even worst it was proved that for many system with caoutchouc , rubber or high res photo scan , you can foolsome of those system. And I bet that you could hack you way thru if you have physical access like any password system.
The only way to go would be a DOUBLE system. password *and* biometric. Biometric cannot replace the password system with more security. On the contrary it has too many disadvantage.
So what is my point ? Seeing biometric as more than an extension of the password system will bring a lot of problem as well as a false sense of security. And a false sense of security is far worst than anything weak security.
C. Sagan : A demon haunted world:
http://www.amazon.com/gp/product/0345409469/
visit randi.org
Bioscrypt now claim an error rate of 0.1% on fingerprint IDs.
I suppose it depends how large your access list needs to be. It would be pretty good for a server room inside a secure building with 2 staff members on the access list, but with 10,000 on site (such as some places have) a false positive would be almost assured unless they had to carry a token of some kind. (Physical or otherwise, eg pin or swipe card.)
Beep beep.
That article was more or less product placement. Biometric passwords, while looking very cool in sci-fi flicks, have the following misfeatures:
I would say these are the real reasons no one else than gadgeteer type bosses would ever consider using biometric passphrases.
instead of looking in your desk and finding out that your password is 'pencil', Rutger Hauer types are going to rip your eyes out. Yay for progress!
How long until someone sets up a phony ATM to capture retinal patterns? And unlike passwords, your retinal pattern is not something you can change as needed.
Don't get me wrong, biometrics has its place but that place is part of a multi-factor security system. I predict that we will eventually see ATMs that require a card, password and biometrics. Three factors: something you have, something you know and something you are.
Biometrics by itself is useless for security.
In 50 years time we will have to give all kinds of bio information for everything, so we will carry a handy machine readable card with every bit of data on it to make it more convenient...
Thus defeating the entire purpose, and a stunning testament to human nature.
Beep beep.
The problem with using body parts like fingers, retinas, or faces for access control security is that one's physical body can be coerced. No one can force me to reveal my secure password. I can choose to die rather than reveal it, and if I die, the protected data will die with me.
A few scenarios come to mind. I'm walking in a city late at night near an ATM. A thief puts a gun to my head and tells me to go to my ATM and withdraw funds for him. I can refuse, but if he kills me he will get no money. With a fingerprint, retina, or facial scan, he can shoot me first and just drag my body to the ATM.
Another scenario is private data on my computer that I want to be kept safe from everyone including governments. A government can physically coerce a citizen into using his fingerprint scanner to retrieve the data that they want. They can do nothing about a strong password, and, again, if they kill you they lose any chance of getting the data.
Of course, this is where torture comes in, but I'd rather have the choice of being tortured or even dying to protect sensitive data. Biometrics take away that choice.
Having said all this, voice print ID avoids many of these pitfalls. It seems the most promising since no one can physically force you to speak your password, and if you die the data remains protected.
Quite an experience to live in fear, isn't it? That's what it is to be a slave.
would you like Windows to change your retinas now?
Creepy.
The economist article fails to mention the other major reason these systems have not taken off - comparability.
Or, I should say, the Lack of it.
Each fingerprint device on the market uses its own format for storing it's data - making each device incompatible. At first, this would seem to be an easily surmountable problem - but then you must realize that until recently, Every device on the market had its own API for development.
Let me give you an example to illustrate this issue: company X has 2000 employees, and it goes to look at biometric systems - they are either faced with the choice of paying for very expensive equipment from 'long time players' in the industry - who would be around in 2-5 years when the devices start failing due to wear and tear - or choose from some of the 'upstarts', and risk being out in the cold if the company they choose isn't around in several years. a hardware switch down the line not only would incur the cost of re scanning everyone, but the application itself would need to be modified to work with the API for the new device.
Enter the BioAPI (www.bioapi.org) - which proposed a standard api - now widely adopted. You may notice that the Bioapi page mentions it was founded in 1998. It has taken several years for this standard to come to the foreground and there are still roadblocks - not all manufacturers participate freely.
As an example: one rather large manufacturer, Identix (www.identix.com) seems to have been stonewalling for years. Why would a manufacturer do such a thing against what is good for the industry? Because they were leading the industry. When you have all of the high end government contracts coming your way, a standard the opens the doors for the little guy is a Bad Thing for your business - or so they thought.
Take a look at the members list on the bioapi site - identix is listed - then take a look at the supported devices list... not a single identix product.
In 1999 I witnessed this stonewalling firsthand at a meeting in washinton DC. This meeting had manufacturers and interested parties from all over the globe in attendance, including representatives from the US military. The whole agenda for the meeting was how to promote/define standards so that the industry could grow.
I had the unfortunate luck to be seated next to the Identix representative. He had apparently flown in just so he could stonewall - every opportunity he got, he grabbed the microphone and ranted about how we should let the free market dictate standards - that they would come about naturally in the free market (he loved the term free market).
Meanwhile the rest of the group was discussing issues about how to resolve device inter operability - even so far as to discuss how data could be shared between devices. No concrete decisions were made at the meeting, but it did get people talking.
Anyway, my whole point is, one of the major reasons the biometric security industry hasn't grown (as fast as has been predicted for the past 8 years) is because without standards no one wanted to invest in writing applications. It was just too risky.
Note: I am flipping a coin as to wether to post this anonymously or not, since Identix could decide to try and silence this sort of talk...
man is machine
So let me get this straight, an industry expert whose job is to sell these things, thinks its premature, and we (americans as a whole) and our political representatives want to make these requirements? What happens when we found out there are errors, or exploits, its not like you can just reissue 100,000 visas, or maybe you can?
Having said that, if someone is taking my picture and storing it in a database, there should be a sign by the entrance warning people of that.
Something else from the link that I find disturbing:
In the wake of the terrorist attacks of September 11th 2001, however, these objections have been swept aside. After all, if you are already being forced to remove your shoes at the airport, and submit your laptop for explosives testing, surely you will not object to having your fingers scanned too?
I think this is really dangerous that every law that takes away civil liberties is linked to September 11th. And they give those laws such nice names, like "the patriot act".
American citizens will also be affected, as new passports with a chip that contains biometric data are issued from next year.
This is something that will be too easy to abuse. Remember, our government illegally bugged black panther offices, and did all sorts of illegal crap. I wonder if our government will use this kind of data to track private groups, such as those that protest the WTO. Could it be that if you show up to protest the WTO, then you will get audited by the IRS the next year?
Rosco: "If brains were gunpowder, Enos couldn't blow his nose."
Until there are social (legal and business) safeguards that require the verifier to discard my personal identity info once verified, this will be another false start to a real security model. A standard license that prohibits storage and transmission of my personal data beyond the limits of the verification transaction might be sufficient, if it had enforcement teeth. Where's a transactional security component whose documentation includes a license requiring interoperation with a law that protects the software user?
--
make install -not war
is a big problem, partially real and partially imagined. The real issue is transmission of viruses and bacteria through body fluids - what if I have an eye infection when I peer into the retina scanner? What if I pick my nose, then scan my fingerprint? The imagined issue is the 'cootie factor', where you wont want to touch something that 1,000,000 other people touched (think toilet seat).
Lastly, our new biometric overlords (The US Govt) will undoubtedly put 1,000,001 policies and procedures in place creating a huge barrier to market entry, unless of course you're the gov't approved contractor. None of which will be followed by the unscrupulous, thus continuing the tradition of fucking the honest and awarding (by default) the sketchy.
I want to delete my account but Slashdot doesn't allow it.
As has been mentioned before at many places and on this site a few times, but not in this article, bio metrics are great for ID but lousy for trusting. If any security device is compromised for a given user, e.g fake finger, fake face, fake eyeball, stolen tissue with DNA, stolen biometric data, that user cannot be revoked without locking out that user for life!
The article claims to address the authentication step, briefly mentioning "one-to-one comparison" but fails to define what that would mean for a given situation.
Bruce Schneier said it back 1998, and updated with application to airports.
Even if you can get the technology to the point where false positives occur less than 1% of the time
airports etc will be made unusable because there will be more candidates for a intensive search and id check than can be dealt with in a day.
But the real killer will be the problem of persistant false positives. How many times will someone who looks a bit like a known terrorist have to be taken out of queue and subjected to intensive questioning and searches before the lawyers and courts get involved?
If you haven't read this book, rush out and do so now. It explains a lot of things very clearly, though it does make you sick to your stomach when you hear the politicos talk...
Proponents have long argued that because biometrics cannot be forgotten, like a password, or lost or stolen, like a key or an identity card, they are an ideal way to control access
From what I have read and understood about security, it is inherently insecure to rely on a single form of validation. In general a secure system, like an ATM, one should require a token and a secret, or perhaps, two tokens. So on tv you see the secret agents required to swipe a card, and speak a code word. This uses biometrics as the second token. The advantage to biometric, therefore, is that one could go to an ATM and use a fingerprint and card to access the account, thus saving the PIN.
The disadvantage i have read the most is that once you lose control of the biometric, say your voice, or fingerprint, or whatever, security is forever compromised. You can't call you bank and ask for a new fingerprint.
"She's a scientist and a lesbian. She's not going to let it slide." Orphan Black
That is effectively what biometric security is. Consider then that the entire network must be physically secure or my (eye/finger/etc.) "password" will quickly be known and re-used. The "password" I used decades ago is still valid!
Also, I'd rather give a mugger my wallet & pin, than my wallet & thumb...
Two big problems with biometrics are (1) the inability to change passwords, and (2) the inability to use a pseudonym.
The first has been pretty well covered. The second less so. Whenever I register for something (NYT for example) that has no business knowing my personal information (name, address, phone number, email, etc.) I lie. I don't want their marketing junk. I don't trust what they'll do with my personal information. What they are offering is not so valuable that I'll overcome my reluctance. I am not giving anything to them.
And, I can be a different person on Monday than I was on Tuesday.
Eh, I am tried of writing...
All who are familiar with the ATM scams know why it is inherently insecure. The more likely scenario is that eventually you will all be tagged like cattle. GPS tracking will ensure security by monitoring to make sure you are never in two places at the same time, or making quantum leaps through space-time.
Funny that nobody else has pointed this out - its well known that fingerorint scanners are fairly easily foolable - in fact if one has the finger available, leaf gelatine and a paperclip are all you need.
Shit, you can strip a print off a pint glass and use that to make a copy...
Ben Elton indicated a perfectly feasible way to fool DNA testing in This Other Eden, one would imagine a variation on coloured contact lense could be used to dupe a retina scanner.
Nevermind the obvious issue of chopping off body parts, and sticking pens in eyes, if I can forge a fingerprint right now and it can fool 80% of scanners, for under $5?
Yeah. Sounds infallible to me.
fortune -o
I'll be able to pick up a free case of pinkeye from the eye scanner at the local Wal-Mart. My life is complete
...just becasue you HAVE the technology, and COULD use it... ...doesn't mean you necessarialy SHOULD.
another creepy-ass thought
Retinal scanners: Remember that Tom Cruise sci-fi flick where everyone was constantly getting retinally scanned wherever they went? You guys think DoubleClick are a bunch of scumbags now, just wait 'till they link up with RetinAll Marketing.
Coming out of a big speaker in the near future:
"Welcome to Blockbuster, Mr Slappyjack. You may be interested in the Jenna Jameson collection we have in the back room. We did notice you were looking at internet porn about her all day while your wife was out. We do not, however, have any Ass-Reaming-Mature-Tranny-Bukkake videos, which we know you enjoy. If you like we'd be glad to order one for you. Have a nice day."
yeah. nice.
Remember when we all thought RadioShack asking for our addresses just becasue we needed a couple of AA batteries was high annoyance? NOTHING compared to what the future holds.
s'wut i sed.
Several years ago login (PAM) support was seemingly unavailable under *nix. All the Biometric vendors did have a proprietary Windows implementation, but no *nix. The closest was a U. of Michigan project; it then trailed off. Sun, other *nix vendors either had no solution or were unwilling to make info available. It appeared that the US Gov. was such a huge potential customer, that giving info, code, etc. was not in their best interest.
Strange; I never did figure it all out.
"So what happens when someone who has lost one or both eyes tries to withdraw money from their bank account?"
Well, that gives the mob/bookies/dealers/etc a real way to get you back. "Pay up or we'll take your eyes/fingers." Not only do you experience major pain/permanent disability, but you lose your identity and they can clean out your bank account.
GL
Repeat after me....
Biometrics are unique but not secret.
The time it takes to make a perfect duplicate is about 15 minutes (with special material it can be reduced to less than 10 minutes). To make a duplicate of a lifted fingerprint took me several days in 1992 and I had to do a lot of experiments to find the right process/technique. Now it takes me half an hour and the material costs are $20 (also sufficient for about 20 duplicates), the only equipment you need is a digital camera and an UV lamp. Not only do I now make the duplicates in a fraction of the time, but also the quality is better.
No electrons were harmed creating this post, though some may have been subjected to electrical and/or magnetic fields.
Israel has had it at its Airport for a few years now. As like everyone else who had to do the army, the Govt already has my fingerprints.
Unlike everyone else who needs to wait up to 30 minutes to get through passport control to leave and sometimes even longer when arriving, its so nice to know that it only takes two minutes. (Two minutes bec you have to try so many times until it authenticates you, even though it knows ahead of time who you should be).
The only thing is, now instead of worying about loosing your passport, you need to worry about loosing you credit card, otherwise its time to join the queue with everyone else. (2 factor authentication ?)
Cost is not always measured in dollars and cents, and these days time is money.
The funny thing is that when you live in a society where the Govt is supposed to know everything about you (but is so inept that it takes them 4 years to update your address), you end up realizing that its not what they have on you, but rather who is incharge of the information. When someone bad is incharge, a little is more then enough [think Southern Hemisphere].
[This is not a troll, just a different perspective]
the key thing is.. to remember your password... because people cant steal your knowledge.. depending on how strong your will power is.. however.. they can steal your body parts.
and your fingerprints CAN be duplicated.
so biometrics is an expensive technology with too many vulnerabilities
now.. for the common home user, who wants it for the hell of it... or medium level security.. yeah...
but for bank vaults, and other things.. murder would be on the rise.. and theft would be more successful.
I don't care if it's fingerprints, voice print, retinal scan, or even DNA. What technology gives with one hand it takes away with the other. Before "big" ID systems are even fully deployed you can bet there's going to be a bit weenie somewhere thinking, "I wonder if...." Enough of them doing that and one of them will think of something you didn't.
One of these days we'll wake up to the fact there is no magic technology we'll ever be able to trust. But we always seem to want push-button solutions.
That's our life, the big wheel of shit. - The Fat Man, Blue Tango Salvage
That'll be US$500k (with a US$50k/annum license fee), please.
Yeah, right.
So stick the fake thumb in your pocket for five minutes to warm it up to body temperature first. Probably that's what you'd do anyway - it would look pretty weird if you walked up to a bank machine with a rubber thumb in your hand or the brim of your hat...
What is the robbing of a bank, compared to the founding of a bank? -- Bertolt Brecht
Your idea has problems for several reasons:
- biometric data is not stored as a simple image. It's not stored as a compressed image, or a md5 of the image. It is most often stored as a series one-way-hash values, each of which is derived from some characteristic inherint in the scan. Someone could steal this data, but creating the original image is near impossible, like breaking a 100 kilobyte rsa key.
- biometric data is stored in a different format by every manufacturer. There is no standard - heck, they can barely get a standard API for how to interface with the hardware and drivers (www.bioapi.org), let alone agree on a standard format. Thus, if visa were to start using scanners, and your fingerprint scan were stolen, only visa systems would be affected.
- most authentication systems (other than the implied example of logging onto a computer) use multiple pieces of information, usualy two or more of the following type:
- something remembered ( a password or pin)
- something kept (a security card, a credit card)
- somethign intrinsic (a biometric)
Now, how useful is that fingerprint scan if the visa card it's associated with is not in the theif's hands? How useful is it if you cancel your card and get a new one?
- if someone did manage to steal an image of your fingerprint or retina, it won't do much good: systems these days are able to tell the difference between a dead/living finger, a photo, and even a plastic mold (many systems look for temperature of what is scanned, and can even look for capilary blood flow).
- if someone gets access to a computer system where they can use the information stolen and bypass the scanning device, well, you have much bigger problems: such a breakin would probably compromise things to the point where they can simulate a positive authentication from the driver/hardware, for any user.
- (this one only applies to fingerprints): you have ten fingers, use a different one. For eyes, switch eyes.
Having said all of that, please realize that biometrics are intended to enhance security by adding another layer to the authentication systems in place, not to replace them. A bankcard+pin+fingerprint is more secure than a bankcard+pin.
Anytime you hear/read the mass media promoting the death fo passwords via biometrics, realize that either A) the reporter doesn't get it or B) they have talked to a marketing person at one of the manufacturers who is (most likely in my experience) pandering to the media in an attempt to grow the market and get sales, despite the falsehoods involved.
By the same token, anyone who tells you a password by itself is secure, is also wrong.
man is machine
While biometrics methods may help to increase security, they are certainly not foolproof by any means. Any determined hacker/criminal can fake actual results without too much difficulty (if they have the proper equipment/tools). However, by far the most secure (as in hardest to fool) biometrics device is the faceprint scanner (sorry, I can't seem to remember the actual real name). In any event, it does an infrared scan of the human face and maps the network of blood vessels under the surface of the skin. While it is quite secure, it is also probably ridiculously expensive (can someone verify that?)
# fuser -v
#
"Many people would prefer not to have to submit their eyes for scanning in order to withdraw money from a cash dispenser."
Pfffft whatever.
The reason I don't want to press my baby blues up against a retinal scanner is because I'm relatively sure a needle will pop out and pierce my eyes.
I don't think I'm alone in feeling this way.
Knunov
Why do users with IDs under 100,000 or over 700,000 usually have the most worthwhile comments?
The article talks about implementing passports incorporating biometric data.
THIS IS TRUE OF EVERY SINGLE PASSPORT TODAY!
Every passport contains a photo of the person to who it belongs. This photo is (supposedly) certified by the government who issues the passport. Incorproating additional biometric data won't make it more secure, it just increases the cost.
Why don't these people actually get someone who knows something about security to check these ideas over before they get turned into laws?
`Something instrinsic' is a biometric sellers way to tell you that that
Even worse than that is the fact that much of the process for obtaining a US visa is being outsourced. As with a lot of the post 9/11 measures, there is little real effect other than to reduce overall security and allow some more port to be distributed.
See my journal, I write things there