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The Death Throes of crypt()

dex writes "Tom Perrine and Devin Kowatch of the San Diego Supercomputer Center have issued "Teracrack: Password cracking using TeraFLOP and PetaByte Resources" (PDF, HTML version via Google). Using SDSC's prodigious computing facilities, they precomputed 207 billion crypt() hashes in 80 minutes."

13 of 388 comments (clear)

  1. Change of Methods Needed? by Erioll · · Score: 5, Interesting

    In the wake of stories like this, and yesterday's story about RSA-576 being cracked (here), is this a message that we need more secure forms of encryption than we already have? RSA is great so far, but how long until 1024 is broken? Or any other schemes, like the MD5 hashing that's used for digital signatures?

    Topics that people with lots of credentials behind their names are going to have to solve. Keeping ahead of the crackers is a big concern not only for security of transactions, but for personal privacy as well.

    Erioll

  2. Re:But... by LilJC · · Score: 3, Interesting
    It's more than proof of concept. They did this in 80 minutes. Sure, you and I can't do it in 80 minutes, but even if it took us weeks we'd have a shot at cracking something that hadn't yet changed. Maybe not the first time, but eventually someone would get a start on it shortly after it been changed and considered "safe" long enough to be cracked.

    Besides, never underestimate the power of distributed computing by MS worms.

    --

    The only thing more dangerous than a file named -rf is renaming it -rf\ /
  3. Still by mugnyte · · Score: 5, Interesting

    Even so, using a 10 character input of about 72 possible input chars, isn't 207 billion still only like .0000055% of the total search space?

    So that 20000 * 80minutes gives ~1% of the space cracked?
    2000000 * 80 minutes = 304 years to fully close the space.

    With a perfect distribution, the mean of about 150 years seems like a long time.

    Someone please check my assumptions here.

    1. Re:Still by Detritus · · Score: 3, Interesting

      You're assuming that the passwords are random. They aren't. Even with rules like a password must include upper-case characters, numerals and punctuation, they are not even close to being random.

      --
      Mea navis aericumbens anguillis abundat
  4. So much for longer passwords being more secure? by doormat · · Score: 3, Interesting

    I remember back in high school I had created a bunch of accounts on my linux box and used some program to try and decipher the passwords. 1-4 charecter passwords were found in 30 minutes (on my blazing-fast-at-the-time 200MHz Pentium 1), 5 charecter passwords took 2 days, 6 charecter passwords took... well, forever more or less. I figured at the time, a 7 charecter password would be sufficient forever (at least for my life time), but I guess not. Now I use 10 charecter passwords for most of my stuff... Do I need to move to 15 charecters? A passphrase instead of a password?

    --
    The Doormat

    If you're not outraged, then you're not paying attention.
  5. Re:A testament to crypt() by jaredmauch · · Score: 3, Interesting
    lets see, if ms-sql(slammer) and w32.nachi were built to hide passwords and the crypt() result in their icmp messages, and provide a distributed database of this information, how hard would this be?

    also, if you set aside the cpu costs, and need a few terabytes of disk space to store this data, how much does that cost today? according to pricewatch, you're talkinga bout $266 for (about) 300GB of disk. So for just over $1k, you've got 1TB.

    Table 7 comes up with 2.263TB of disk space storage, so maybe i'll need a bit more than $2k just for disk. Calcualate your I/O and crypt()/sec, how long would it take for you to generate them all if you generated a distributed application (eg: setiathome-like) and have them be 'uploaded' to you? Obviously you can't do this on your DSL/cable, and you start to see the network performance issues they mentioned, but if you set up a small cluster of your older PCs in a room, use FE to link them up, you'll have that disk and ethernet card spinning (interrupting that is) at a steady clip trying to fill up your disk.

    Make a worm/virus that spreads and distributes work units out to other hosts it's able to infect, and you could probally just keep the database in-memory across a wide set of hosts.

  6. Re:You missed the point by dlippolt · · Score: 4, Interesting

    as far as i'm concerned, sun's pam configuration and flexible login setup only applies to solaris 9 and above. after trying to come up with a sitewide md5 solution i found solaris 8 to be terribly difficult to work with. dont get me started on their broken ldap libraries.

    several datacenters i work with independently only offer solaris 8 so "why aren't you using the latest sun distro's" falls on my deaf ears. the huge body of vendor supplied software which calls for solaris 8 just makes it worse.

    nis implementations that pass these crypt values around the network just makes keeping them inaccessible to users a nightmare.

    crypt-for-passwords is one of those "standard unix" methodologies that needs to have already died a horrible death. the original title of this topic was hopefully appropriate.

  7. Cheating the Crypto? by suwain_2 · · Score: 3, Interesting

    I'm really not all that familiar with the inner workings of cryptography, but it seems like it'd make sense to do more system-specific hashing. (Not in all cases, of course.)

    For example, I was looking at the MySQL tables on a site I run, and realized that my password hash there is the same as on other boxes I have accounts on. For example, 5f4dcc3b5aa765d61d8327deb882cf99 is the MD5 sum of "password," anyone with access to a set of passwords could simply skim through looking for this and other well-known hashes.

    In many cases, wouldn't it make a fair amount of sense to use machine-specific algorithms for generating password hashes? It could even be something simple, like taking the hash of "$hostname-$username-$password". You could generate all the hashes you wanted, but if you didn't know my username and the hostname, the hash would end up being different. The end result is that, even though I (insecurely, I know) use the same password (and often, the same username), I would have a different password hash on each machine; you'd have to know all three fields before you could brute-force my password.

    Is there something I'm overlooking? This idea seems like it'd work out really well; I can't possibly have just described some revolutionary new idea, though.

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  8. Re:You missed the point by AKAImBatman · · Score: 4, Interesting

    But my point still holds. Sun wants to maintain backward compatibility. Period. That's separate from suck-add implementations of the PAM authentication method. And you're lucky. Last time I administrated Solaris boxes (other than my home workstation), I was stuck with Solaris 7. Trust me, that hurt.

    nis implementations that pass these crypt values around the network just makes keeping them inaccessible to users a nightmare.


    I feel your pain. That's going to be a difficult one to solve though. How does a user authenticate on a network if they can't pass their hash? One could add public key encryption on top of the authentication protocol, but one slip up in key management and the whole deck of cards collapses. After all, how long will it be until we see a worm that uses distributed power to begin generating all possible MD5 hashes? A daunting task to be sure, but certainly not beyond the current state of computing power.

  9. on OS X by VValdo · · Score: 3, Interesting

    In Jaguar (OS X 10.2) and earlier, type:

    nidump passwd .

    In Panther (10.3+) it will not show the hashes, and I believe a different algorythm is used anyway.

    W

    --
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    This is my SIG. There are many like it, but this one is mine.
  10. not a new concept, but a new practical limit by sir_cello · · Score: 4, Interesting

    Not a new concept, but novel given the use of modern computing resources.

    I (and probably others, I claim no novelty, only an inventive step :-) wrote software in 1991/1992 to do this: unfortunately sun4 MP's and about a gigabyte of disk were the best we had.

    Rather than precompute the entire crypt() space, we precomputed the space for well known words (and combinations of those words with different prefix and suffix), because for any individual word, there are only 32 [I think from memory - 5 bits?] combinations that it can crypt to given the random salt that was possible.

    Because of available disk space, we couldn't store the entire precomputed output: so we chose to only store the first N bits of it. This was configurable. I cannot remember the exact figure - sure I could dig the code up out of an old CDROM archive :-). The output was also stored in bitwise numerical order - matching divide/2 matching very fast.

    So the password cracker would then mmap() the couple of gigabyte file, then easily find (or not find) a candidate prefix. If it found the prefix, it ran a few trial crypt()'s to ensure an exact match. In practice, because of the lack of diversity in passwords, there were few false candidate matches: so the password cracker had some extremely large hundreds/millions of equivalent cracks per second as a result of mostly just not finding comparisons, and a few trial runs for succesful targets (I think the running rate of the other two popular crackers at that time was about 100K cracks/second).

    Anyway - that was a long time ago - fun and games as a student. I still have the source code :-).

  11. Crypt was in "games" by twenex · · Score: 3, Interesting

    In the Bell Labs UTS Ninth Edition (V9 Unix) released in 1986, the crypt command was moved to manual section 6, games, along with trek, bridge, boggle, etc. Crypt (the lib in section 3) still existed, however.

    1. Re:Crypt was in "games" by raytracer · · Score: 3, Interesting
      In the Bell Labs UTS Ninth Edition (V9 Unix) released in 1986, the crypt command was moved to manual section 6, games, along with trek, bridge, boggle, etc. Crypt (the lib in section 3) still existed, however.

      That's because the two items (crypt(1) and crypt(3)) utilize entirely different algorithms. The crypt(3) library is of course your everyday average DES, which as this thread notes, has gotten a bit long in the tooth. The crypt(1) command however was an entirely different algorithm based upon the idea of a rotor machine. It only has a single rotor however, which makes cracking it pretty darned easy, probably _way_ simpler than the original German 3 rotor enigma machine. The implementation that is still distributed in FreeBSD (/usr/src/usr.bin/enigma) is from the Crypt Breaker's Workbench, a near automated cracking utility for this code.

      Cracking ordinary DES isn't a game quite yet, but it's certainly not the best choice for a password scheme.