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Electronic Voting in the News
heymarcel writes "After a negative review of the Diebold voting machines by the State Gaming Control Board, it looks like Nevada has gone with a competitor for the upcoming election. And Secretary of State Dean Heller is requiring paper receipts. According to the Associated Press story, Nevada is the first state to do so." There's another story about Nevada voting machines as well. zapf writes "It appears that the major e-Voting machine vendors have banded together to form the 'Election Technology Council.'" Reader SemperUbi writes: "Demand for a voter-verified audit trail is really gaining momentum these days. The Voter Verification Act, introduced yesterday by Senator Bob Graham (D-Florida), would require a voter-verified paper audit trail, ban the use of 'undisclosed' software and wireless communications for voting machines, and require mandatory surprise recounts -- all in time for the November 2004 election. Rep. Holt's HR2239 in the House requires much the same thing. Resistance to both bills may focus on the aggressive timetable, but the effort is worth it -- as Warren Slocum once said, democracy ain't cheap. Take that, Diebold!" And finally, a Maryland newspaper dredges up an internal Diebold email that recommends gouging Maryland if the state wants paper printouts for its Diebold voting system.
According to news reports, a hacker broke into the Ohio company's servers using an employee's ID number and copied a 1.8-gigabyte file of company announcements, software bulletins and internal e-mails dating back to January 1999.
I'm sure the subject has been discussed before, but what if the original hacker is caught? It's clear that the information "stolen" is of critical importance in the debate over the trustworthiness of Diebold, and electronic voting in general. But will that hacker be able to use the importance of his/her discovery as a mitigating factor in court?
It seems like a parallel situation would be this: My neighbor has a tall fence, topped with electrified razor wire, plastered with "NO TRESPASSING" signs, and a tiger prowling the grounds for added security. I suspect that he is planning to commit a crime on his property -- say I've heard he's planning to kill his wife for the insurance money. If I ignore the signs, scale the wall, avoid the tiger, and take pictures of his detailed murder plans (which he conveniently leaves on his dining room table), I may prevent Ms. Neighbor's untimely demise.
Am I guilty of trespassing? And even if I am, was it worth it? I'd say yes -- I'd commit a small crime to prevent a much larger one. Was the Diebold hacker thinking along those lines? Or were they just out for a walk with the tiger?
Stressed? Me? Of course not. Stress is what a rubber band feels before it breaks, silly.
for electronic voting. Sure, it's "modern" to have a computer-driven thing, but the old-fashioned way seems to have far less problems in theory. I'll grant that the implementations have sometimes been poor (I now have a new phrase 'hanging chads', which sounds rather unfortunate), but if you're going to spend this much money, why not simply make a good implementation of a normal system ?
:-)
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In the UK (about 1/6th the population stuffed into 1/50th the area, so our voter-density is far higher, and hence counts will be higher) there has never been much of a problem. Sure, it takes 12 hours or so for the tallies to come in from all around the country, but how else to deploy the 'swingometer'
Simple system. Pencil. Anonymous paper. big dirty cross in the box for the candidate you want. Big separation between the candidates. 2 crosses or ambiguity means a spoiled vote (effectively "none of the above"). Count them all (done by volunteers) and you're done.
Sure, we get some recounts, but the system is so simple it's hard to justify flipping a vote from one candidate to another.
Just seems like it's a mountain out of a molehill
Simon. (dons flameproof suit
Physicists get Hadrons!
I'm surprised that the response has been so tame, actually. Given what is in the leaked email, I would think that the jurisdictions that had dealt with Diebold would be suing for breach of contract, demanding their money back and terminating existing contracts. And I wonder if some of the activity disclosed doesn't warrant criminal charges. Isn't screwing around with what is supposed to be a frozen, certified system election fraud?
In a similar vein, is Maryland really locked in to its deal with Diebold the way the Diebold people seem to think it is? If the system was secured as advertised and if Diebold screwed around with it in Maryland as they apparently did in some places, I would think that Maryland could easily void the contract.
Especially since I haven't heard one remotely reasonable explanation why companies (like Diebold) that make a large number of electronic transaction devices (ATMs, food/entry access, etc.) all of which have/require paper trails and full auditability suddenly found themselves incapable of providing paper trails and auditability to something as important and potentially controversial as elections.
When this is actually fixed, maybe I'll be less cynical. Maybe.
How about this? The hardware is really simple - you have a piece or thin cardboard that has these spots that are easy to punch out - you provide a simple jig that lines this card up with a printed list of names - you take the simplest of tools - a sharp object - and poke a hole in the cardboard next to the name you want. When you're done, you look at the piece of cardboard and if it looks ok you put it into a box where another simple machine is used to count it.
Why, these actions are so simple I believe a monkey could do them, being simple tool users themselves. Anyone who can't probably shouldn't be casting a vote in the first place.