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Passenger Risk Database to be Implemented in U.S.
bluephile writes "CNN is running an article on the The Transport Security Administration's (TSA) renewed efforts to implement the CAPPS II color-coded passenger risk-assessment program, despite outcries by numerous privacy activism groups at the program's collection and redistribution of personal information. The TSA has made several claims that the system respects passengers' privacy, but their track record isn't impressive. Congress suspended the program last year in order to investigate its privacy implications. One MIT paper suggests that CAPPS II could make flying MORE dangerous, rather than less."
Impressingly, there seem to be no existing terrorists flying business class, because there are extremely relaxed checks, if at all.
Click here to do something about this.
I don't know why you ended up posting at "0", unless your post is a kernel of corn in a pile of shit... I hope at least you get moderated up. You are quite right!
As soon as the passengers of Flight 93 found out what was going on (thank god for cell phones), they jumped the terrorists and undoubtedly prevented more death and destruction.
As soon passangers on Flight 63 noticed Richard Reid trying to light his shoe on fire, he was jumped, pinned, and prevented an explosion which most likely would have killed everyone on board.
The terrorists got their free shot. It's not going to be so easy next time.
Firing a bullet from a handgun thru the side/window of an airplane at 25k-30k feet will not cause explosive decompression. You have to pretty much set off a bomb that will blow a sizeable hole in the plane. And even then, if you have your seatbelt fastened you aren't likely to be sucked out. A similar situation actually happened on a flight at that altitude, but it was due to metal-fatigue, not foul-play. The only death was a flight attendent standing in the section immediately under the roof when it came off.
You may want to take a look at the MIT paper referenced in the blurb: here.
It seems to be a pretty compelling argument that a CAPPS-like system would actually do more harm than good, nevermind the privacy issues.
Open and free discussion of the issues is what makes a democracy work!
They actually recently tried this on mythbusters on discovery and proved just how hard it was to decompress the plane. Even with a gigantic bomb near the seat of their crash test dummy he wasn't sucked out... however he probably wasn't too healthy :) But firing a gun at the window right next to him did absolutely nothing.
Jack Valenti and Orrin Hatch will be first up against the wall when the revolution comes.
Sorry; this link was supposed to go under my comment "They Certainly are" -- evidence that journalists are being harrassed by the US military currently. That's what I get for not hitting preview.
Well then they can join the peace activists already stuck in the airport waiting lounge. TSA's No-Fly Blacklist
Not sure about the 727, but the 707 has been rolled.
anti war activist and Bush opponents.
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I personally find it interesting how such vast wodges of resources are being allocated to the cause of increased security for commercial airliners, when there is another venue of attack of equally devastating potential. Any terrorist who is not an idiot would be wary of attempting to hijack a passenger-carrying airliner, for two very compelling reasons: 1) vastly increased security, and 2) drastically altered passenger psychology. Setting aside for a moment the multifarious (and often legitimate) debates concerning the effectiveness of many of these new security measures, it cannot be denied that scrutiny, at least, has increased dramatically. The other, equally important factor is the passengers; as mentioned previously herein by other esteemed /.ers, nobody is going to allow a plane to be hijacked without resistance. Indeed, we've seen already that it works; the fourth jet hijacked on 9/11 never found its target because the passengers decided to resist; it was a heroic move that cost them their lives but saved probably hundreds (and maybe thousands) more. I think the only reason any terrorist would ever try this method again is for the not-insignificant fear factor; as mentioned before in this discussion, it would be most embarrassing and frightening to have another incident of similar nature occur despite all efforts to the contrary.
The other method, to which I alluded previously, is, I think, oft overlooked. It is a simple fact that airplanes used for the transit solely of cargo are almost entirely unprotected. Nothing more than a chain-link fence stands between any ill-intentioned person and a very large, fully-fueled airplane. These planes have small crews, and to my knowledge, no effort has been made in the last two years to increase their security; no reinforced cabin doors, no additional security personnel, not even a taller fence! I have surveyed the condition of cargo planes at a major international airport, and have verified this personally. A capable and careful person would have little trouble compromising the security of one of these installations. Granted, there are difficulties involved with this approach not associated with a commercial airliner: for one, there is not a large flux of people to and from these planes, so any such activity would be immediately suspect if detected. However, I believe this is a serious threat, and should be addressed. I'm all for well-placed, well-intended, and above all, well-executed programs for increasing security; but the best screen door in the world won't keep the flies out if you leave the back window open.
Perhaps we won't see any improvements in this area until something happens to impel serious change. It seems to underscore the reactionary nature of what I will collectively refer to as our "security policy". Until something happens, nobody seems to care (that is to say, not enough people pay attention). Once something does occur, it is quickly met with panic, fear, and disorganization; blind fear is a terrible impetus for anything, and I do not think our current administration is above using such fear for their own political gain...
For instance, these guys (use pointless as the user name and password) could have been a problem:
"Investigators found nearly 500,000 rounds of ammunition, 65 pipe bombs and briefcases that could be detonated by remote control.
Most distressing, they said, was the discovery of 800 grams of almost pure sodium cyanide -- material that can only be acquired legally for specific agricultural or military projects.
The sodium cyanide was found inside an ammunition canister, next to hydrochloric, nitric and acetic acids and formulas for making bombs. If acid were mixed with the sodium cyanide, an analysis showed, it would create a bomb powerful enough to kill everyone inside a 30,000-square-foot facility, investigators said."
And they were found almost entirely by accident.
Look, I'm not suggesting that Islamic terrorists aren't probably the biggest current threat. But don't be stupid.
The Third Reich utilized a myriad of colored triangles to classify the various groups of peoples they interned in concentration camps. (2) The colors of the triangles were as follows: red for political dissidents, green for criminals, purple for Jehovah's Witnesses, blue for emigrants, brown for Gypsies, black for lesbians and other "anti-socials," and pink for homosexual men. The pink triangles symbolized the femaleness of this group of detainees whose masculinity was diminished within the context of Nazi heterosexism. Additionally, the pink triangles were generally larger than other triangles because the Nazis wished gay men to be especially visible (Rector, 1981). Jews, by contrast, were marked by six-pointed, yellow Stars of David within which the word "Jew" was inscribed.(3)
Just do the search.
More information about this flight and the metal fatigue situation can be found here.
ALOHA AIRLINES, FLIGHT 243, BOEING 737-200, N7371, NEAR MAUI, HAWAII, APRIL 28, 1988