NIST Releases Guide to Cyber Attacks
treerex writes "NIST (the US National Institute of Standards and Technology) has just released a 148 page report entitled Computer Security Incident Handling Guide (PDF). It covers the gamut, from setting up a response team to dealing with specific types of attacks: DoS, trojans, worms, malicious code, and unauthorized access. While written by a team from NIST and the contractor Booz-Allen Hamilton (BAH), they appear to have taken input from CERT and luminaries like Spafford. It is an interesting read."
So we establish "standard procedures" to deal with a standard gamut of attacks. That's great.
Are we so naive to believe that following such advice will make us secure?
I have been pwned because my
This might be unnescessary for "professionals", people who know these things from before and work with it. But for the average sysadmin, this is just great! He/she could know how to:
;)
1. Find out what happened
2. Close the breach
3. Report the breach.
If the sysadmin doesn't know how to do this, they also know where to seek help.
I'll probably get messages back saying this is just dumb and generic, but it's better than not knowing anything at all. A lot better. All too few people know how to handle situations like this, and they will need somewhere to start.
I'll give this thing a skim read (just read contents and some interesting paragraphs now) and get back to this
The International Journal of Digital Evidence is also worth keeping up with, if this type of stuff interests you.
Beyond the typical vapid governmental reports, this is a step in the right direction. Anything to create a buzz around security, especially computer security, will serve the public well. This is what needs to happen: standardization. The government has done a commendable job in creating standards for dealing with national security - why not extend that to computer security. All these posts that do nothing to note the fact that this is a good thing don't see past the .gov TLD
Not too long ago, they were in hot water with the US Navy for letting some websites get hacked by leaving the default admin passwords in place. No joke, my friends work there!
It's all Hood
The fact that the guvmint machines are the easy targets is apparently the point.
This if for federal agency use, and anyone elses.
This also effectively says "You WILL do it like this" to the federal agencies.
There will be a quiz.
Guide for Sysadmins: Upon learning that your systems have been penetrated, proper incident response is as follows:
Microsoft Windows is, fittingly, the official Desktop OS of Olig
I haven't been able to read the report yet, but the government often employs really smart people to produce some excellent information on information security, which they then ignore.
...what to do in case of a Slashdotting?
Sheesh, evil *and* a jerk. -- Jade
Major hack attack on the U.S. Senate
In the free world the media isn't government run; the government is media run.
You're going to need a text editor that supports lines longer than 80 charachters, but if you have one, I've made a decent zipped text file from the PDF for people with slow connections. As always NO WARRENTY WHATSOEVER.
Computer Security Incident Handling Guide.zip (113K) (zipped text file)
I think it's actually a good use of taxpayer money, which is the first time that I've said that in public.
If nothing else, it provides a good framework to start from, especially small companies/non-profits etc, where they don't have the resources to hire a full-time crack security team. This helps them set priorities and useful business things like that.
I'm really quite surprised people are being negative about it.
I don't understand why people immediately dismiss a report coming from NIST as being worthless USG noise while many of the same "arguments" against this paper could be made against books like Incident Response: Investigating Computer Crime or Counter Attack or any of the other n+1 books on this topic that exist.
Harumph.
How come Homer and Krusty look like clones?
I think Homer and Krusty look a like because originally, the Simpson's premise was about a boy who hated his father but was in awe with a clown who looked exactly like his father. Thus they look a like.
I can tell that certain parts of the document were not written by people who have actually done the work. For example, a portion of it talks about write-protection software. Unfortunately it is in the wrong section where they talk about a live response. I'd love to see them apply a write protection device on an active Windows system!
Typical Booz-Allen crud. We hated these guys when I worked in the gov. Our command once paid over 250k for a 2" high report that simply re-hashed the interviews they conducted.
People who know what they're talking about.
Egress filtering. Application-level firewalls. This is EXACTLY what they exist for.
"People who do stupid things with hazardous materials often die." -- Jim Davidson on alt.folklore.urban
Description courtesy of Bruce Schneier's Crypto-gram:
Apparently, somebody who knows how smart slacker geeks get their porn, and wants to put a stop to it.
No really, blocking SSH/ESP and tracking HTTPS is a reasonable suggestion -- if anything, I'd say the above doesn't go far enough. The excerpted paragraph doesn't mention the more serious risks of SSH (port forwarding, tunneling, etc).
I'm not particularly worried about a smart internal user establishing an SSH session to the Internet and downloading "illegal materials",
I'm worried about the airhead secretary who brings in a floppy provided by her uberhacker boyfriend, and runs a rootkit, setting up an outbound SSH session providing him with a command prompt on her workstation...
That's just one risk of permitting outbound crypto channels...
I do not deploy Linux. Ever.
Ummm... They do. If you've ever worked anywhere involving classified information, you'd know that EXTREME measures and controls are normally in place in order to completely eliminate possible bleeding between classified and unclassified networks...
Sig.i>
A section on telling organizations to test the policies and procedures that are put into place to work out any kinks in detection and reporting.
If you put all these policies, processes, and procedures into place and don't have a Mock intrusion or emergency, you won't know how good or bad your incident response will be.
Dolemite
____________________
Save the World! Use a Quote!
Reasonable? Pointless.
Applications which tunnel through the HTTP application layer (not just SSH o port 80) using fully obscured forms encryption are prevalent and readily available to the non-technical PC user. Such applications are very popular in Saudi Arabia and China, for example. Primarily because there are, at this time, no proxies capable of blocking them.
And as soon as such proxies appear, the HTTP application layer tunnels will go polymorphic in their protocols. There is no hint of evidence that the proxies have any chance of keeping up.
It is well-known to the steganography community that any open channel, even email, are insecure. Unless such channels are closely monitored by a professional cryptographer, there is no chance that they can reliably be monitored to prevent unfriendly traffic.
Sadly, they exist more to make a quick buck by giving ignorant admins a false sense of security.
Transports which tunnel through the HTTP application layer (not just SSH on port 80) using fully obscured forms of encryption are prevalent and readily available to the non-technical PC user. Such applications are very popular in Saudi Arabia and China, for example, primarily because there are presently no proxies capable of blocking them.
As soon as such proxies appear, the HTTP application layer tunnels will implement polymorphic protocols. There is no hint of evidence that the proxies have any chance of keeping up.
It is well known in the steganography community that any open channel, even email, is transparently insecure. Unless such channels are closely monitored by a professional cryptoanalyst, there is no chance that they can reliably prevented from carrying unwanted traffic.
Allowing encrpyted communication with untrusted hosts is rather like meeting a stranger in a dark alley; whatever happens there won't be any witnesses.
Whats the standard response to republicans peeping at your internal files?
Drinking habits can be dangerous. You can choke on the cloth and the nuns will wonder where their clothes are.
While you all give mad props to each other about how much you know and how silly this is, there really are thousands of admins and others who need to be told to scratch their ass with THIS finger. Whether it's institutional paranoia, fear or lack of knowledge, skill or training - most of the problems we experience out there are easily preventable if someone enforced it, someone audited it, someone got educated in it or someone was simply TOLD to do it.