AOL Tests Sender Permitted From / E-mail Caller ID
securitas writes "ZDNet reports that AOL is testing Sender Permitted From (SPF), 'an antispam filter intended to accurately trace the origin of e-mail messages.' AOL is performing the widescale SPF test with its 33 million subscribers worldwide. The system works by letting recipients use the SPF record to cross-check DNS data associated with AOL's IP addresses and confirm that the message originated from AOL's servers. The system is one of three competing e-mail authentication protocols. The other IP-identifying protocols are the Designated Mailers Protocol (DMP) and Reverse Mail Exchange (RME/RMX). All systems alter the DNS database to let e-mail servers publish the IP addresses that they use to send e-mail."
This is not a whitelist filter.
It's not any kind of a filter.
It just means that AOL has published SPF records for its mail servers in their DNS entries. Any mail server speaking SPF, receiving mail from AOL.COM, will check the SPF record.
If the SPF record (which will contain the IP addresses of AOL's mail servers) doesn't match the originating IP address of the mail message (as in, a spoofed header) the message is invalid. Then it can be either dropped or bounced or whatever.
If the SPF record matches the initiating IP address (as in the case of a message legitimately sent by the mail server) it's clear and goes through.
Don't forget to publish SPF records for your domain if you have the ability to do so. If you have already done so, please register your domain via the validator.
Prevent email address forgery. Publish SPF records for y
Prevent email address forgery. Publish SPF records for y
Heh. Actually (if I have understood correctly) SPF should prevent anyone from spoofing aol.com as the sender address during the SMTP session. So if a spammer attempts to spoof aol.com and your mail server is SPF-aware, then it would be good for you and AOL because you won't get spam and AOL won't get bounces for the addresses that had problems with delivery (and with spam, problems with delivery are not rare).
At least this is how I have understood it.
Prevent email address forgery. Publish SPF records for y
It means that any system administrator can configure their mail transfer agent to bin any spam pretending to come from aol.com with a 100% success rate. And this goes for anyone else publishing an SPF record for your domain.
SPF is a proposed standard for a domain owner to tell mailers where mail From: that domain may originate. The domain owner publishes a DNS TXT record for their domain with (at the simplest) list of IP addresses. Participating mail transfer agents can then look this record up and make a policy decision on whether the mail is likely to be legitimate. The presence of an SPF record on a domain at present means that while you still can't be sure when you're handling spam, you can be sure when you have a piece of non-spam because the SPF record tells you so.
SPF is not a wholly original idea (e.g. up "designated mailer protocol"), and certainly not the simplest implementation but the important factor is that its proponent, Meng Wong, is an excellent lobbyer and spokesperson, as well as someone who as the nous to put forward a useful protocol (he founded pobox.com). It's currently at the point where lots of implementation are being written, with the canonical version being Meng's Perl modules. Currently I'm helping to finish the C implementation which will shortly be integrated into qmail and exim.
The tipping point (I hope) will be when a domain not publishing an SPF record or publishing a globaly permissive one will be considered "obviously" untrustworthy. Combining SPF authorisation with a more traditional "From: domain blacklist" will give spammers a very very hard time indeed forging mail. But AOL publishing a record (we hope) shows the way the wind is blowing: the rest of the world does seem to have to change their mail server configuration to keep mail flowing to AOL.
So go on, it's dead easy, publish a record for your domain now. Tell people where your mail comes from. Look, there's even a wizard to help you.
The recipient's MTA will check the sender's SPF record. You can auto-generate all the email accounts you'd like, only the domain name portion of the email address is authenticated in SPF.
In fact that was one of the arguments against SPF, people said that it did not go far enough and actually authenticate users.
Personally, as someone who has to administer an email server and whose domains are sometimes used in forgeries for spam ( last one was a few days ago ), I'm all for SPF.
Based on upvotes, Ageism is the only "-ism" Slashdotters care about and think isn't SJW
SPF is just one tool to help tighten up the security of the SMTP system. It lets domain owners say who is authorized to send email using their domain name. This is a useful thing to do, and it allows for other things to build on it. For example, RHSBLs that blacklist domain names instead of IP addresses are much more useful after SPF checking has been done. SPF checking can also help detect phishing schemes.
SPF support for most open source mail servers can be found at libspf2.
This is a great feature! I never understood how it would really work until I started using Shadango (based on a recommendation posted on /.)
See, I generate a disposable ("Spamtrap") account, and post that all over the internet. When the crap gets too unbearable, I just regenerate it. I can't even imagine how I survived without a disposable account in the past.
Also, and more related to the story, what will happen to sites that let you consolidate all your other accounts? I use Shadango to check my POP/IMAP/Y!/Hotmail/AOL/mail.com accounts (because it filters them, plus I have a bigger quota), but I guess it's just a matter of time until I won't be able to 'send' from those addresses anymore.
Hmmm... it sucks that spammers have slowly taken away all the freedom that the email
It's hard to win a fight when you don't know who to swing at.
Susie Johnson
New: 2911 Total: 8639
That is from the last 6 weeks. Less than 1% are real messages (domain renewals).
Before looking at SPF you may want to read what Claus Assmann [theaimsgroup.com], and Wietse Venema [theaimsgroup.com] have to say on the subject.
You might also want to read what Steve Bellovin (one of the guys who invented USENET among other things) and Eric Raymond have to say about it. They spend a little more time understanding SPF...
Wired story with Raymond's comments.
Bellovin's comments in an email to the SPF mailing list.
The idea behind Internet Mail 2000 [cr.yp.to] is obviously correct. Why waste time on DNS-based approaches when we COULD be developing the Solution?
Because it's not backward compatible.
SPF is a simple and backward compatible solution to email forgeries. People who don't use it are still able to use email, while people who use it are protected against forgeries.
Everyone and their brother are reinvented email theses days without realising that you need to improve the existing email system. It's not possible to throw away the existing system.
Well, in the near-term, SPF won't do anything to slow the quantity of spam. Regardless of what the most die-hard rabid supporters would like everyone to believe.
SPF is an attempt to stop the practice of domain-forging or "joe-jobbing". Which, for a business domain is important. Right now, anyone can pretend to be joe@mycompany.com and either tarnish our company's name, or simply make life extremely difficult for us when our ISP cuts us off for spamming (when we didn't do it).
However, it is likely to have some beneficial side-effects like making domain-based whitelisting/blacklisting more effective. It raises the bar one more notch for a spammer (now they have to either find a non-protected domain to forge, route their spam through authorized servers for a domain where it's likely to be noticed and blocked, or register throw-away domains to push their product).
(And SPF is very similar to what AOL already requires if you want to have your domain whitelisted with them. You're required to list the IP addresses that send outbound e-mail for your domain, anything else gets dumped in the bit-bucket or at least is likely to get tagged as spam by the filters.)
Wolde you bothe eate your cake, and have your cake?
SPF is based on the envelope sender not the From address - I suggest you read the FAQ first.
Yes, you have to change the envelope on each hop, but that's a good thing, as it means that each hop is validated which makes it harder to spam.
Not really.
If you use the smtp server (with authentication) provided by whoever owns the domain name on your 10-year-old email address, and they set up SPF, you'll be fine.
SPF doesn't have anything to do with what IP address you connect to the smtp server from. It just validates the smtp server.
It just means you can't use your own local mail server to send from a domain you don't own.