Digital Camera Image Verification
Polo writes "While reading dpreview, I noticed that among several new products, Canon has announced a Digital Image Verification Kit to prove that an image taken by a particular camera has not been modified. It's disturbing to think about the conditions that would allow digital images to be accepted in a courtroom. I guess one defense would be to figure out how to 'verify' a photo of shark attack..."
The card reader connects to a computer USB port (only Windows 2000/XP compatible at the moment).
Suddenly, this throws out the validity of anyone who owned a Mac or was using FreeBSD as their primary desktop operating system.
The World is Yours.
It won't work. From everything I've seen, attempts to verify ANYTHING digital will be cracked within a week or three.
1. take picture
2. modify picture
3. regenarate image verification data
4. profit?
Canon is very cool - they are one of the only camera manufacturers that still supports the cheapest, non-proprietary form of flash media in all of their cameras - CompactFlash.
To everyone out there: you are an idiot if you buy a camera that does not support CompactFlash. You'll end up paying twice as much for the media.
In other good Canon news, they've announced that they'll be releasing 20 new digicams this year. Hail to the king, baby!
Life is the leading cause of death in America.
There's nothing concerning about digital images in the courtroom.
Ask the photographer, under oath, "is this representative of what you saw?".
If it was, he says so.
It's really the same as with any other evidence that can be tampered with. If someone testifies under oath that it is what it is then there's no difference between a digital image and any (many?) other types of evidence.
Slashdot? Oh, I just read it for the articles.
any image, not just a digital one, can be changed, modified, or completely faked. Yes, digital technology makes it easier, but this is not a new phenomenon. Juries know (and should be told) that any image introduced into evidence might not be real and could have easily been altered by the other side. Depending on who took the image and the chain of possession, weighed against how believable the picture actually is, will determine how much weight the jury gives to a given photograph.
These digital picture verifiers are nice but not the end of the question. A validation from one of these machines is just some more evidence that the picture is real. It's not conclusive and shouldn't be taken as so. In fact, the evidence of validation from one of these machines might not even be allowed into court if they're extremely unreliable. Daubert to the rescue.
Stupid people make stupid things profitable.
When the appropriate function (Personal Function 31) on the EOS-1D Mark II or EOS-1Ds is activated, a code based on the image contents is generated and appended to the image. When the image is viewed, the data verification software determines the code for the image and compares it with the attached code. If the image contents have been manipulated in any way, the codes will not match and the image cannot be verified as the original.
Note to self: run the signing software *after* altering the image. If the image was alrady signed, display it, take screenshot, alter the image, and re-run the signing software.
"A door is what a dog is perpetually on the wrong side of" - Ogden Nash
But seriously, you'd need a pretty good digicam/scanner for that not to be completely obvious
You would, but in a few years time when this technology has legal precident spending a few grand on modding a 'secure' camera to forge evidence in order to get away with millions sounds like a good investment.
I'm thinking this is for Canon to target the camera at a specific market where legal evidenciary issues come into play: crime scenes, insurance, autopsy, etc. This is likely not to be a feature that will appear for most consumer products.
What it really shows is more about how the professional film camera market is facing realistic competition from digital cameras.
All this hinges on the testers having an _original_ copy of the image in addition to the supposedly modified version.
/dev/null
Let's say someone tries to use a doctored digital photo as evidence. They eliminate the original md5 with the aforementioned screenshot trick, and then recreate it. The photo is contested on the grounds it is a fake. To prove it, they go off and get their wonderous DVK-E2 kit, and then they get their md5. The test works just fine, so they know the md5 has been altered, so they go and ask for the original image. And so where is the original image? Do they have it? No, of course not, because it went on a little stroll down memory lane and landed without a sound in the fastness of
Have we accomplished anything here?
Defenestrate Windows...
What exactly would keep anyone (using film or digital) from taking a picture of a picture?
Occam's razor is the blind faith in the natural selection of least resistance and in universal oversimplification. -- EF