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More E-voting Problems in California
thefultonhow writes "Wired News is running a story about Napa County, CA's problems with their new E-voting system. Not only did an optical scanning machine fail to record absentee ballots properly, necessitating a recount of 13,000 ballots, but now Registrar of Voters John Tuteur is saying that the machine used in precincts failed to count 6,692 votes. The incumbent Napa County Supervisor had originally lost his bid for reelection by only 50 votes (the recount of absentee ballots bumped that up to 107 votes), so with nearly 7,000 votes gone AWOL, this is a big deal." The first Wired link above shows that the discovery of the problem was apparently mostly chance: if none of the 10 (ten!) ballots picked for rescanning had exhibited the problem, they might not have figured it out. It also suggests a new strategy for rigging the vote: pass out pens of a certain type in districts unfavorable to your candidate, then calibrate the machine not to read that type of ink.
I don't recall seeing something that extensively mentions what all testing procedures were done before this was put in place? Seeing statements about at least some of these errors being caught almost purely by chance is very disconcerting. I know that poor testing procedures is a definite trend in development unfortunately. Could someone who is in the know post information that is permissible on some of the testing procedures of this system or systems like this?
( o ) one could say I'm rather baked
And if you want to bring it into the new millenium, then put a touch screen kiosk in there with a 'printer' which after you make your selections, it punches the holes for you and spits the ballot out. You then review it, put it in the privacy sleeve and walk it to the ballot box. Or you feed it back into the 'printer', where it's destroyed and you try again.
Why is this concept so hard?
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Is that black-hat geeks?
or white-hat geeks?
Or tinfoil-hat geeks?
Or will the geeks that run e-voting machines wear different colour hats at home and work?
Will these be the same geeks that write spamming software?
How will you know?
It's all about trust, and right now someone else is making the decision about who we can trust.
Sam
blog.sam.liddicott.com
I'll be the first to criticize the unauditability of purely e-voting machines, but this story is not about that.
"If the problem had occurred with their electronic ballots or with the tabulation software (that sits on the county server) they would have been hard pressed to reconstruct their election," she said. "Or they might not have ever known there was a problem at all. If they were doing the manual count on the electronic ballots there would be no record to look at to determine what the accurate vote count should be."
In this case they could audit the results because there was a direct physical record of the vote, if this were a story about e-voting, then the author would only be speculating that votes weren't counted because there would be no record of the votes anyplace. This is a story which affirms that having a paper trail is a good thing.
The New Jersey standard to set aside an election is simply for it to be "rendered doubtful" (see In re Hunt). I'm not sure of the standard here, but I'm sure it's something similar. With these electronic voting machines, I cannot see how any close election could not be "rendered doubtful" - since there is very little physical evidence to actually look at, or recount.
Don't be surprised if the set-aside elections are then resolved with the old tried and true paper ballots of lever machines. I think a lot of e-voting is going to turn into re-voting.
Ryan Kennedy opposes comm
There should be a test vote answer, which for which the voter is required to vote, for their ballot to be valid.
This would check that the machine is properly calibrated, because if it didn't read a check mark in the test vote, reject the ballot right then and there, so the voter can fill in the box(es) such that the machine reads it.
No, E-Voting is a big problem looking for smaller problems to forcibly mate with. At least, E-Voting without a paper trail is.
Despite hanging chads or bad ink, giving a receipt to the voter, along with keeping a paper copy for the polls, is the only way to insure that voting is handled properly. Of course, the Diebold machines don't produce a paper trail, primarily because it's harder to stage a respectable coup that way (rimshot!).
On top of that, most, if not all, of the commercial voting systems are needlessly complex, and have insane operating procedures -- they suffer from a horrible case of Second-System Effect, and it shows in how inaccurate they are.
All you need is a simple storage device, a receipt printer, and a bin to collect hard-copies of said receipts should a recount be needed. Some simple encryption on top of that should keep the data reasonably secure, and a bit of random sampling out of the pile of receipts can be used to ensure that the electronic copies of the votes are, in fact, good.
A competent coder could write this system in a day, and then a team of coders could spend a month pouring over it to make sure that the code is good. Open-sourcing said code so that programmers in the general population could find additional problems would be even better, and the government could offer a small reward for those that track down and report bugs. Sort of like software bounty-hunting.
On the flip side, this wouldn't jive with Diebold, because the CEO has already promised the next election to His Favorite Candidate. And, before the Rabid Right flames me for being pissed at the CEO of Diebold, remember -- I'm mad because it's a conflict of interest, not because he's a Republican. I'd be screaming murder if the Democrats, who I don't like much either, tried to pull the same crap.
--
I Hit the Karma Cap, and All I Got Was This Lousy
Exit polls are a BAD thing. They should be illegal. People who have not yet voted are influenced by people who voted previously. Decisions are made like "This guy's not gonna win, so I'm not gonna vote for him" which is NOT how voting is supposed to work! People should vote for the person that they think is the best for the job, regardless of how other people vote. "Exit polls" is what keeps the 2 party system entrenched in this country.
The problem here as I understand it was the machines inability to detect a certain type of ink that was used on some of the ballots. If they had used your idea, to use two machines and check to make sure the counts match, the counts would have matched. Both machines would have missed the same number of ballots due to the ink problem. Before you do a recount, you need a reason to do one. I think beyond just using two machines, you also need a count on how many total ballots you have and check that count against the total counts that you get from the two machines. If your lower on your total counts than on the count of the total ballots, you know it's missing some. But don't these people test the damn machines with the pens they are handing out? Or did someone bring their own pen or something?
How is it that one careless match can start a forest fire, but it takes a whole box to start a campfire?
These are the same ATMs that ask if you want a receipt, and if you hit the No button, the next screen reads: "Thank you! Please take your card and receipt." So you don't want or expect to get a receipt, but you have to wait around anyway to see if it spits one out that might list your account info and balance.
These are also the ATMs that give you time to prepare your deposit envelope ("press this button when your deposit is ready.") But when you push the button, the ATM then reads, "Please wait," and makes you wait for 3-4 seconds. It's like it's spiteful.
These are also the ATMs that occasionally spit out more money than you requested. In addition to having heard many stories of this, I've seen it happen to both a coworker and a relative (via two different ATMs.)
I weep for the future of our voting rights...
- David Stein
Computer over. Virus = very yes.
If I thought that an election was in the bag for a candidate, it would make me *more* likely to vote for a third party candidate. If it is a close election, then I will restrict my voting to the two major candidates. If I don't know if the race is close, then I stick with the two major candidates. Thus, only when an exit poll tells me that one of the major party candidates is going to win handily will I consider voting for a third party candidate.
There are a lot of reasons why the 2 party system is entrenched, but exit polls are not even a small part of this.
Voting issues have been becoming more and more prevalent in the past decade. In the past election (2000), many issues came into the open about voter registration fraud that for one reason or another the current administration has snuffed. Florida removing people from the ballots was a huge one. When watching the flow of money with these issues, they tend to resolve to the same small group of elites, thought not necessarily the same person, company or political alignment.
Now, I don't want to say they are trying to rig elections, but they all seem to be benefitting from the same shoddy practices. It does tend to make the paranoid in one come out, but I like to believe that net profit is the real reason behind the issues. It is cheaper up front to do less testing and coding. It is cheaper up front to not make certain that all things work as they should, or to not spend to much time thinking about the issues. Then again, maybe I am experiencing optimistic ignorance. ;-)
InnerWeb
Freud might say that Intelligent Design is religion's ID.
Except that the machine (is supposed to) keep a count of the number of pieces of paper inserted into its craw (LEDs on the front so the voter can see that their ballot was registered). If the number of paper ballots counted don't match the number on the LEDs, the ballot workers must start counting. There are all sorts of safeguards possible when a paper trail exists.
Save Maine's economy: write stuff down. All comments are exclusively my own, not my employer.
Actually, in Oklahoma we have a much better way of rigging the vote - we don't require any form of identification to vote. In addition, we don't do any particular kind of checking to register a voter. In a district where the incumbent won by only three votes, there have been at least 5 empty lots that had never been inhabited found who were registered voters and voted in that election. Our governor was elected by less than 3 votes per precinct.
Scary, huh?
Engineering and the Ultimate
What really worries me is the attitude of the election commisioners who put these systems in place. I wrote the following letter to the local supervisor of elections:
Dear Mr. Galey,
I am writing to you as I am concerned about the recent suggestions by the Florida Secretary of State to institute the use of electronic touch-screen voting machines statewide. I do not know whether it is planned to use these machines in Brevard County, however, their use in any county has the potential to alter any statewide election. I do not believe these devices in their current form, as provided by the current vendors in the US market (such as ES&S and Diebold), are ready for use in a real election. I believe that this view is supported by the various anomalies and questionable election results which have occurred in many places where these machines have been used. I am comfortable with the scanned paper methods which I have used voting in precinct 32 in Indian Harbour Beach. My main objection to the use of these touch-screen devices has to do with the lack of independent verification methods for their results. I work for a company whose primary products are independent verification systems for cancer treatment irradiation. Whether the right amount of radiation has been delivered to a patient can be a matter of life or death. I feel that elections are also very important, and deserve similar verification.
The lack of an audit trail allowing independent verification of the systems results means that if there is a mistake, we would never know. The Florida Secretary of State believes that it is ok to proceed with the use of touch-screen devices in the November elections without attaching printers, as she opined in her recent editorial in Florida Today. I believe that this basically boils down to rushing things and hoping for the best. I do not think that the best way to avoid a reoccurrence of the voting fiasco which happened during the 2000 recount is to make it impossible to have a recount at all. Hiding a problem does not make it go away.
I do not have a problem with making elections easier and quicker using electronic systems. In fact, I am strongly for it. However, I would prefer an older, slower system which I have faith in to a new, fast one in which I do not. Until electronic touch-screen voting systems can supply a voter verified independent audit trail, I and many other voters will not trust their output.
If you have any questions, or wish to allay my fears, please feel to contact me.
This was his response:
You should have no fear, the systems are secure and well managed. Do not believe the scare tactics. FRED
Somehow, that doesn't make me feel any better. Instead of answering my objections to the unrecountability of these systems, I got a little pat on the head and a "don't worry". I realize that he's a busy guy, but when I ask why I shouldn't worry, and am told, "just don't worry about it", I worry more.
I have now written my state and federal representatives about this. I suggest you do the same. Until people like Mr. Galey realize that lots of people are actually worried, they can get away with patting a few of us on the head and sending us on our way.
It seems like every second week we read of some precinct that discovers some troubling issue associated with their electronic vote tallying. The sinister mind might think that there is a hidden agenda and that election results are being rigged. The more generous interpretation is that the technology and procedures for using it are just not debugged. Unfortunately, for the citizen, the result is the same: They have no confidence that their vote is being counted.
It has long been argued that a physical paper audit trail must accompany all elections, as it is the only way to guarantee a fair and audit-able result. Sure, politicians and the supplier companies will argue about the cost, but given the dismal results so far, perhaps the proponents of e-voting should bear the costs of the paper audit trails themselves, at least until the systems are proven accurate in a large number of elections. It's particularly disturbing to see the e-voting supplier companies, such as Diebold, expending so much effort trying to hide problems and frustrate transparency.
Without proper safeguards, the citizen's most basic right, namely that of deciding who represents them in government, is going to be forfeit to buggy technology. This is particularly important in the US in 2004, as it is a presidential election year there, and based on the 2000 fiasco, problematic vote counting has the potential to ruin the US elections (again).
It's interesting to note that California, home of high-tech silicon is one of a few if not the only state that requires a hand count. I guess they know technology is not infallible.
---- It won't be as bad as you fear or as good as you hope, but it will take twice as long as you plan.
We've use E-voting for the last few years in Belgium.
The process is simple:
* First you get to wait a long time in a long line. (unless you spend the night in a disco, come home around 7h30 and then leave immediatly for voting. The line is a lot shorter then and you make a good impression on the elder people who think you got up early)
* Then you hand your ID card to one of the victims of democracy (citizens who get the "honor" of spending a whole sunday working for free in a voting office) and you receive a bank-card-like electronic card (a boring plain white one, but it has a big black arrow on it).
* Then you get to vote on a computer with a light pen (not even a touch screen, the cheap bastards). Insert the card in it, vote and then get it back. (You can check its honesty by re-inserting the card)
* Then you put the card in some sort of card receiving machine and get your ID card back.
* Afterwards you can either spend the rest of the day watching polls on TV (Who ever tought that a show about which city has counted how much % of the votes, would be intresting enough to spend a whole sunday evening on it?), or find something better to do.
Why do people keep trying to put machines into the mix here? The simple tried and true method scales linearly.
What method is this? Checkmark next to name, counted by a representative of the Electoral Office, watched over by volunteer supporters of each candidate in the riding/precinct. Use a telephone to call the riding head office, saying "35 foo, 135 bar, 18 quux..."
Paper trail everywhere. Scrutiny everywhere. There was a reason why Canada had no difficulties at all in the 2000 Federal Elections, results out next night.
Doing the Right Thing should not be preempted by making a buck.
That's exactly what the Open Voting Consortium's system does. Check out http://evm2003.sf.net for the software. They've even got an online demo of the system so that you can see what the ballot looks like.
The process is:
- Use a touchscreen (or audio for blind voters) station to enter your votes. This prints out a human readable ballot.
- If you want, take your ballot to a verification station that will read your ballot back to you. This is a stand-alone system, so it can't "cheat" coordinating with the voting station.
- Bring your ballot to a poll worker, who will scan it, and store your ballot in a locked box.
For an audit, you can count the physical ballots and match them against the electronic vote tallies, and of course the physical ballot "wins" if there's any discrepancy.
And, of course, since the software is open source, anyone can read the code, or set up their own test system.
Enable 3D printed prosthetics!
why couldn't the database on the back end be configured to flag any ballots that seemed irregular for inspection? for instance, if the counting machine recorded ballot #41768 as being entirely blank, this could be flagged [...]
Better yet - why is the mark read as "yes/no" rather than "yes/no/maybe" by the optics?
Back in 1966(!) I had a job that included operating an IBM optical mark reader. It did exactly that, grading each potential mark as black/grey/white. If there was a single mark on the paper that it considered grey, it could be programmed to kick the sheet out into a separate hopper for correction and reentry.
Of course for an election the stack in the separate hopper would be set aside for manual examination (to see if the "grey" marks were a light vote, an erased change, or a paper flaw) and manual tabulation.
Here we are 39 years later and the technology has gone BACKWARD on its way to incorporation into what is arguably the most important tabulation job in the country.
Bantam Dominique roosters crow a four-note song. Once you've heard it as "Happy BIRTHday" you can't NOT hear it that way