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BSD Interview Roundup
Some anonymous readers wrote in to let us know about a couple of different interviews in the OpenBSD and NetBSD communities. O'Reilly's ONLamp has an interview with OpenBSD's Marc Espie, who maintains a good share of OpenBSD's build tools, as well as having made numerous contributions to the project. OSDN's own NewsForge also has a interview with NetBSD's Luke Mewburn of the NetBSD Core Group.
But auditing is not an "end to all problems" or a sustitute for good defaults. To me good defaults make or break an OS (just look at Windows). NetBSD have more secure defaults IMHO
Life is what happened when Good Intentions met Harsh Reality (the brother of the more infamous Chaos).
Here's a tip, SCO is dying and they want Linux to die too. Meanwhile, after already surviving a legal battle, BSD is thriving with mature developers who really know their stuff.
Do I detect a hint of condescension at the end?
That the *BSDs are able to pull off such feats is a testament to the continued good design from the projects.
Don't try to flaunt it.
Remember, we're on the same side.
So, they got "new boxes" from Dell without administrator passwords and Dell could send them administrator passwords after their employee had changed them? My head spins with the multitude of ways this story contradicts itself.
New boxes don't come with administrator passwords preset.
If they did, their employee couldn't have changed them without knowing them.
If they are new boxes, why would it cause havoc?
If they're smart enough to use OpenBSD, why aren't they smart enough to know to just burn something like knoppix and boot the servers that way to reset the local administrator password?
Or, since they were "new" boxes, just boot from the install media, format and reload them?
Does this guy really think people are dumb enough to fall for such obvious inconsistencies?
The party of stupid and the party of evil get together and do something both stupid and evil, then call it bipartisan.
I would say that the BSDs are all pretty close security wise. The typical answer is "OpenBSD" is the most secure, but the truth is that it's the sys admin that makes the biggest difference.
A bad sys admin is like a bad driver, and we all know what happens when you let a bad driver borrow your BMW.
Whenever a really great security feature gets added to OpenBSD, it won't be long before it will end up in the others. So when you get the time it's likely best to try them all and choose which you like best, as there is no OS that is completely immune to security problems.
I eat bees -- they taste stingy.
It mentions things even I didn't
know, but after some googling they
turned out to be true. Those
DragonflyBSD mailing lists are
indeed hilarious!
There is no point in trying to convince you that BSD as you have already made up your mind.
/var for example where /usr and/var are different partitions) but even then a 17 meg file can be moved in a few seconds.
/dev/random to /dev/null? are you trying to copy a file to a recursive symlink?
Copying a 17 meg file should not take _any_ time as all it requires is an update to the file systems tables. It might take some time if you are moving the file from one file system to another (/usr to
I am not sure what you (or the person who set the box up) screwed up, but something is definitely wrong. I would suggest you find a unix admin and figure out what is really happening. Are you trying to copy
If you've never seen a FreeBSD box run faster than it's Windows counterparts then again we can not help you. You claim this 800 MHz box is slow. That is certainly possible. How about finding a properly configured system and givnig that a try? How about letting someone who knows what they are doing use the box?
I do a lot of Windows work. These days it is mostly active directory related stuff. Setting up servers, replication, DNS, etc. I have never seen an instance where Windows was faster to set up, easier to patch, or more stable. You want reasons, how about starting with those three.
-sirket
Its very clearly open. Code is being audited all the time, daemons are being modified to run with priviledge seperation, setuid root programs are almost non-existant now on open. Then on top of that, there is the non-executable stack, propolice, and W^X protection of memory pages, and stack gap randomization. The first things make exploits much less likely, and the second make it very difficult to successfully exploit something that has an exploitable bug. Anyone who pretends netbsd is more secure is delusional or lying to you.