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Microsoft Drops Next-Generation Security Project [updated]
grooveFX points to this CRN article which starts "After a year of tackling the Windows security nightmare, Microsoft
has killed its Next-Generation Secure Computing Base (NGSCB)
project and later this year plans to detail a revised security plan for Longhorn,
the next major version of Windows, company executives said..." grooveFX writes "Glad to see they actually listen to the gripes from the media and users." Update: 05/05 19:13 GMT by T : phil reed writes "Oops. According to this article on Microsoft Watch, Microsoft really isn't giving up on NGSCB (aka 'Palladium') after all. Microsoft spent much of Day 2 of its Windows Hardware Engineering Conference (WinHEC) here refuting a published report claiming the company has axed its Next Generation Secure Computing Base (NGSCB) security technology."
What makes you think they are listening. They are presumably publically "killing the project named NGCSB", quietly inventing a new name and happily keep working on that, less publically this time now that they have used the publicity of Palladium/NGCSB to make initial "front door" contacts in the entertainment industry, they know who to expect at the "back door".
The ol' "keep renaming the thing so people don't have a steady label for what they are fighting". The british sellafield->windscale->thorp nuclear shenanigans, the last Palladium->NGCSB namechange, TIA->something-or-other. All the same propaganda trick.
The solution for opponents is to either keep using the old name so that the public latches onto it (everyone still calls it "Sellafield" and, to an extent, "TIA"), or invent your own name and get it to penetrate the public consciousness (much harder, only example I can think of it "Infidel")
Linux breaks all three of your suggestions and it still seems pretty secure.
Mod down posts with a "Free Mac Mini/iPod" sig, they're spam!
Can we please get this modded past all the responses that seem to think that NGSCB has something to do with security. NGSCB aka Palladium is/was Microsoft's locked down "trusted" computer project, meant to facilitate DRM. It never had anything to with security save for in name and spin.
This is a good thing of course, but I seriously doubt it means that that Microsoft won't find other ways of sneaking locked down computer on us in the future...
And another thing...the mail client should NEVER be allowed to execute code with out asking the user forty times!
And I bet you'd still have users that would click the "Yes, i'm an idiot" button forty times just so they could see the pretty new screen saver their friend so thoughtfully sent them!
What's the odds that Microsoft will continue to seek a way to push their concept of trusted computing onto the consumer -- by giving it another new name? Palladium got too much bad PR, so they changed the name. Enough people caught on, so now they are abandoning that name (not the project, for sure).
I was taking one day at a time, but then several days got together and ambushed me. (from a Rhymes with Orange comic)
The fact is that the only way to implement this sort of DRM is through tamper-proof hardware, and even then its not like someone with a camera phone or even a good old small film camera to get a copy of that 'private' email (which is mostly what they are touting its use for). As for music and videos theres the if-i-can-see-it-i-can-copy-it which just cant be stopped, people will tolarate surprisingly low quality. And this isnt rocket science either, most people will be able to defeat these systems, software or hardware. Its not in Microsoft's interest to pursue this unless they want to piss people off or look very stupid when their "virus proof" OS gets hit one week after launch. It was a stupid idea before and it always will be a stupid and hated idea. Im glad they dropped it.
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Microsoft dropping this is good in every way, except that it's ghost will return in other forms for sure...
People always forget that this is just a tool. It can be used for good or ill. Hospitals could've used it to secure your medical records. You could have used it to secure and authenticate your tax returns before you sent it to the IRS. People who use the GPL could've used it to enforce the GPL! No more guessing if someone has stolen your GPL'd code - you'd know. NGSCB is just a tool. Both NGSCB and Palladium are security projects, it's just that the DRM/RIAA/MPAA use of the tool is objectionable. IT does not mean that the technology is worthless or "evil".
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Cain.
If you dont believe my security statement, just wander on over to securitytracker.com - there are more discovered flaws in the recent past with Linux than with Windows.
a) Despite the increased amount of bundling Microsoft's done over the years, a "Linux distribution flaw" is still awfully different from a "Windows security flaw". A Linux distribution is composed of many, many more lines of code and pieces of software than Windows. If you want to include security problems with Open Office, it's only reasonable to include security problems with MS Office.
b) Local exploits attract attention on Linux. A lot of "exploits" in Linux are local attacks. Local security on a Windows box is pretty much a lost cause.
c) When Microsoft discovers a security problem and fixes it internally, they don't say "fixes a security hole in...". They just bundle it with some other set of fixes and stay quiet. You won't hear about it.
d) MS has a PR department that spins bugs as "issues" and tries to dampen criticism of security. In the open source world, people generally call "bugs" "bugs" (and frequently wishlist items "bugs", which would drive companies with marketers bananas).
e) Many previous Microsoft security holes just wouldn't happen in the *IX world because of the more security-oriented culture (note that I suspect that Microsoft is improving here). MSIE and Outlook grant a lot of power to remote websites to cause execution, to modify bookmark lists, and the like. Windows NT infamously shipped with a blank Administrator password (and no prompt to set one during the install process), all drives shared by default *invisibly* (they were administrative shares, and the only security in place was the fact that Microsoft clients didn't display administrative shares remotely), and automatically reshared drives upon reboot if sharing was turned off on a drive.
f) Microsoft has been known to blame sysadmins for security problems ("Well, yeah, your network was compromised and your data destroyed by the latest virus, but you didn't firewall our systems, and we released a patch a week ago which you should have deployed.") *IX boxes was designed to sit on a network and be fully accessable, and "firewalling to fix implementation flaws" is not an interesting approach to most *IX admins. Plus, most open source contributors *are* sysadmins to some extent.
Want to do some *real* security criticisms of Linux? How about the following:
* Red Hat was trying to set a new golden security standard for Linux by adding SELinux *by default* starting in Fedora Core 2. This would have allowed giving limited access to things to processes (a sore Linux lack), helped make software SELinux-compatible, and paved the road for other distro vendors. Red Hat, after two test releases, finally just backed down on including SELinux enabled by default in FC2, saying that it just caused too many problems at the moment. This represents a loss of a year at least in moving to a much more powerful and secure security system.
* Stack overflow protection mechanisms are still not standard in the Linux world. The only distro vendor that I know of that definitely includes such a patch enabled by default currently is Red Hat with exec-shield. In contrast, *Microsoft* just added stack execution blocking to Windows.
* Filesystem ACL support in Linux today sucks. A lot. A software author cannot rely on filesystem ACLs being present (since they are not by default on most Linux boxes) -- just old-style *IX permissions. One can improvise to get *some* of the ACL functionality by cleverly nesting directories and adding users to extra groups for each directory in question, but most Linux boxes *still* have a 32 group-per-user limit. The *IX permission scheme is simple, fast, and easy-to-audit. However, it is lacking for many users -- there are a lot of sysadmins out there who'd like to be able to say "Anyone in Development can read or write this directory, Mary and all of the Marketing gro
May we never see th