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Book Review: Moon-Mars Commission Report
The single most prolific spinoff attributable to NASA is not Teflon, Tang, or Velcro. No, it's high-level reports on how to fix NASA. The latest report, written under the authority of a 9-member commission named by President Bush, proposes how to implement NASA's latest orders: complete the Space Station and retire the Shuttle by the end of the decade, return humans to the Moon by 2020, and eventually send humans to Mars.
The Background
The President's proposal, while lacking details, has been greeted with enthusiasm by many aerospace workers, for whom the application of the term "beleaguered" is more than appropriate. What other major industry has lost half its workforce in the last 15 years? (Oh yeah, the airline, IT and telecom industries, who managed about the same attrition rate in only 2 years: evidence of efficiency, or something.) Space scientists have awaited the implementation report with some trepidation: their Hubble servicing mission has already been traded for the uncertain prospect of a robotic mission, and some NASA science missions have already been pushed back by the budget impact of the Moon-Mars mission.
Meanwhile, public opinion has not quite caught fire. Opinion polls taken in January show at best indifference and at worst hostility to the new plan. Greg Klerkx wrote "Perhaps the most disheartening aspect of the explosion of Columbia, other than the human tragedy, was that it changed very few opinions about NASA or NASA's human spaceflight activities. Both should continue, the polls unanimously concluded, but with no more or less vigor than at present." [p. 12, Klerkx 2004]
The Commission, led by longtime government official E.C. Aldridge, also includes four space scientists, a retired Air Force General, a former Congressman, a business and government executive, and the well-known CEO of a high tech firm. Notably, no astronauts or former NASA executives were on the panel.
Contents
Transmittal Letter
Executive Summary
Section I - Introduction: The Space Exploration Vision
Section II - Organizing the US Government for Success
Section III - Building a Robust Space Industry
Section IV - Exploration and Science Agenda
Section V - Inspiring Current and Future Generations
Section VI - Concluding Comments
Appendices
Historical Context
After any disaster or major program failure, commissions are empaneled and they tend to produce two sorts of reports. The first type of report is a failure analysis, including specific prescriptions for recovery. The second is a more broad examination of strategies and goals. This report falls into the second category. While the Aldridge Commission report includes some recommendations that duplicate some previous ones, the new report differs in some important ways from those.
In 1986, the Paine Commission examined how NASA should respond to the Challenger failure. The commission's report in places reads like a primer on space technologies, and proposes specific goals similar to those of the Bush plan: completion of the Space Station, return to the Moon, and a manned mission to Mars. The Paine Commission seems to have felt that the basic problem facing NASA was a lack of a long-term vision and political commitment.
In 1990, the Augustine Commission studied how NASA should respond to a variety of troubling problems on the Shuttle and other programs. This study endorsed space science strongly, while also supporting Space Station. The report focused strongly on workforce issues like morale, attrition and aging. It also noted weaknesses in NASA's executive leadership practices. The report made some specific reform proposals, some of which reappear in the Aldridge report.
The Report
The Aldridge Commission report differs from previous examinations in important ways. First, it has a very limited scope. The Commission did not perform an open-ended study of what NASA ought to do, or how much emphasis to place on astronomy vs planetary science vs human spaceflight. They only studied how to accomplish President Bush's new goals for the space program. Paradoxically, their limited brief resulted in a far more profound proposal to reorganize NASA than previous reports. The range and depth of reforms proposed by this report greatly exceeds those of previous reports.
The top-level recommendations include:
1. Establish a Space Exploration Steering Council, reporting to the President
2. NASA should establish much more private industry participation in space operations, beginning with unmanned launch services
a. Reorganization of NASA HQ
b. Spin off NASA Centers as Federally Funded Research & Development Centers (similar to JPL and the DOE National Labs)
c. NASA should establish 3 new organizations:
+ a technical advisory board, modeled on the Defense Science Board
+ an Independent Cost Estimating organization, modeled on DoD Cost Analysis Improvement Group
+ a research organization, modeled on DARPA and formed from the NASA Institute for Advanced Concepts
d. NASA should adopt DoD-style project management methods
3. NASA should identify and begin development of critical technologies
4. Renew and sustain development of a robust space industry
a. NASA should actively solicit ideas from all sources
b. Congress should fund prizes targeting specific missions and technologies, and work on space property rights
5. NASA should pursue international partnerships
6. NASA should consult regularly with scientists and the National Academy of Sciences
7. The space exploration program should be tied into educational programs and public relations
Section I "Introduction: The Space Exploration Vision" presents three basic justifications for the exploration program: The human urge to explore, economic growth, and national security. Three "imperatives for success" are also presented: sustainability, affordability, and credibility. Sustainability is described as being able to sustain both technical momentum and long-term political support for what will be an expensive program. Affordability is described as "go as you can pay," where each milestone is reached through "spiral, evolutionary developments." The report compares the funding to cancer research, where the pace is determined by a political judgment of "annually, how much can we afford?" The report describes credibility as an amalgam of best practices. While the Commission recognized that space exploration is full of risk, NASA must not appear careless or foolish. NASA must embrace both management practices as well as technical ideas regardless of their source.
Analysis
The Commission's Report is itself a model of the practices they exhort NASA to follow. Whether by intention or not, many of the ideas in the report have been the stated position of advocacy groups like the National Space Society and the Mars Society. Some of the reforms have been specifically proposed by previous Commissions.
The biggest problem I wondered about was funding. So far, about $12B has been proposed for this vision. Yet, many of the recommendations seem likely to cost a great deal of money. For example, on p. 23, the report states that much of NASA's infrastructure needs substantial modernization. Elsewhere, technology R&D is addressed by proposing a DARPA model or even the In-Q-Tel Venture Capital firm funded by the CIA. The Pentagon's "System-of-systems" approach is proposed as a model for project architecture. Special attention is given to the need for reliable heavy lift launch capability. In discussing how to pursue international participants, the Joint Strike Fighter program is listed as a model. Each of these areas requires either significant direct investment (infrastructure, heavy lift, R&D) or large bureaucracies to administer complex contracts (system-of-systems, JSF model). There is an unavoidable tension between the need for R&D, "go as you can pay," available funds, and "credibility."
The money issue is partially addressed by proposing tax incentives, privatization and private competition. But competition cannot reduce the amount of honest-to-goodness investment needed to remediate the technology deficit. It can only promote the most efficient approach. We need more R&D, yet private competition is seen as a way to "reduce government investment" (p. 20). The elephant in the room is that aerospace is a highly regulated market with relatively low profit margins. This means that direct reinvestment is fairly low. A glance at a list of the top R&D companies shows that top-tier aerospace companies do not reinvest a lot of their own money.
The second issue that troubled me is the applicability of the models they proposed. JPL, the National Labs, various DoD organizations and methods, the X Prize, and other examples are listed as models for various reforms of NASA. This raises some questions. First, are these models applicable? No evidence is presented to indicate that the Commission considered whether different organizations with different goals, constraints, missions, and sizes can use a given model successfully. The proposal to spin off most NASA centers as FFRDCs seems quite radical. Would any commercial firm spin off everything except a design team? Is this what the Aldridge Commission proposes of NASA? How many NASA employees would be left, and in which disciplines? Can the JPL model be applied well to other NASA centers? Would the centers work together better or worse? Would there be limits to how many centers a given contractor would be permitted to operate? I suspect it's much easier to designate JPL as a model than it is to enact in the real world. Do the security and procurement scandals at some DOE labs give us anything to worry about? What about the need for the National Labs to chase proposals in light of funding cuts? Does that make organizations more market oriented and relevant, or does it simply waste the time of researchers?
Finally, the Commission's report failed to address the biggest political problem our human spaceflight program faces: a lack of relevancy to ordinary people. The transmittal letter to the President states that the Commission's web site received over 6,000 written inputs, and that public comments were 7:1 in favor of the new vision. This is of course not a scientific survey, rather it is a self-selected and rather small sample of people who are presumably interested in space exploration. Elsewhere in the report, supportive public testimony is cherry-picked without context or attribution. In one case, I recognized a quote that, taken out of context, sounds much more supportive of a government monopoly on human space travel than the speaker probably meant: "We all wanted to go" (p. 13) was characterized as an expression of the deep and broad effect that the Apollo program had on Americans. I believe this was Tony Tether, Director of DARPA. The full quote was: "What NASA seemed to forget was that then, we all wanted to go," Tether told commissioners. "We were forgotten about." But if NASA can find a way for American citizens to take the baby steps that would eventually allow them to reach the moon - or even just space - themselves, it would do wonders for the space agency's support, he added. "If you can do that, you will have a constituency that you don't have today," Tether said. The longer quote is here.
These anecdotes do not invalidate the report, but I do wonder if the Commission is overselling the enthusiasm that the public will have for this program. Section I, and the report's title, endorse the "inspiration, education, and innovation" arguments for space travel that have so far failed to garner support for a more expansive space vision. One brief mention was made of space tourism and of making NASA an engine of the economy (p. 20). There are hints at the relevance problem sprinkled throughout the report, but public support is more or less presumed, not demonstrated.
What's Good:
If your attitude about NASA reorg proposals is "wake me if it's a big deal," then this is your wakeup call. The Aldridge Commission Report proposes the most profound and far-reaching reorganization of NASA since its founding.
To a larger degree than I would have expected from this board, the proposals are strongly market- and business-oriented. I presume this is the implicit desire of President Bush (MBA, former CEO) and possibly NASA Administrator Sean O'Keefe (an accountant).
The report is written in an engaging, enthusiastic style.
What's Bad:
Where's the Beef? "Go as you can pay" does not seem like an adequate response to an agency that has faced aging infrastructure and workers for more than 14 years (see Augustine report). Increased funding and profit margins might address many issues better than bureaucratic realignments or spinoffs. There is no discussion of how to value intangibles like scientific discovery and inspiration, yet tangible values are of prime concern to contractors. NASA's credibility is discussed only in terms of competency, not based on perceived relevancy to the public.
What's Missing:
There is no consideration of potential disadvantages of the various proposals. Supporters of space science may find the report dismissive of their priorities and concerns. There is no critical evaluation of the benefits of space program investments vs direct investments in education, science and technology.
This report is remarkably thin on supplementary materials: there are 13 pp of appendices. More is available on the Commission's web site.
Refs:
[Klerkx 2004]: "Lost In Space: The Fall of NASA and the Dream of a New Space Age," Greg Klerkx, 2004. ISBN 0375421505
[Paine 1986]: http://history.nasa.gov/painerep/cover.htm
[Augustine 1990]: http://www.hq.nasa.gov/office/pao/History/augustin e/racfup1.htm
[Aldridge 2004]: http://www.moontomars.org
The reviewer is an aerospace engineer with experience in human spaceflight engineering and operations, commercial satellite development and operations, and scientific satellite development and operations. No current relationship to NASA, and no significant interests in companies with an interest in this proposal.
You can download A Journey to Inspire, Innovate and Discover from moontomars.org. Slashdot welcomes readers' book reviews -- to see your own review here, carefully read the book review guidelines, then visit the submission page. Thanks to everyone who takes the time to contribute.
Lets look at it in terms of MREs. According to a company that makes MREs (My Own Meal), each of their MREs are 8 ounces and provide 1200 calories each. In space, certainly 2400 calories would be plenty - I'd be surprised if they burned anywhere close to that, but lets be pessimistic. That's 16 ounces per day. Given an estimated 9 month mission (3 months transit in each direction, 3 month stay), that's 270 lbs per astronaut. The fuel mass alone will dwarf that; it's a non-issue.
Where you got your "3 year trip" line from, I'm not sure (perhaps if you wanted to get there with ion drives...) Even three years of MREs, however, would only weigh one ton per astronaut. We're looking at a spacecraft that on its own will weigh hundreds of tons. It's still not that big of a deal.
You know when it's okay to shout fire in a crowded theatre? When it's on fire.
I know some folks who work on water filtration and recycling systems for missions like this. It's quite a challenge, as things that we don't even consider as contaminants will build up in the water supply over enough cycles.
Remote probes aren't efficient anyway, since you've got to pay the energy cost to boost that stuff halfway to Mars anyway. May as well just make a bigger main spacecraft. On the bright side, those supplies can be boosted into Earth orbit in advance of the manned mission taking off.
Back-of-the-envelope math: A person in space goes through, iirc, about 1800 Kcalories a day. Dried food provides somewhere around 4 Kcal/gram, so you're looking at 450 grams (=1 pound) per person per day. For a four-person mission over three years, you're looking at two tons of food.
Considering that any Mars ship is going to be huge anyway, this isn't that bad. It's the water that's nasty.
However, once you've won the X-prize, you've still only achieved about 3% of the potential+kinetic energy that it requires to reach orbit.
Considering that you've got to carry your rocket fuel with you as you go, achieving orbit is even harder than the 3% number would suggest. There's still a long way to go.
It's going to be a long time before private astronauts competing for prize money spend more than a few fleeting minutes in space, much less think about going to Mars.
Sparing is a very black art. The (US) Navy has been working on the problem of properly managing spares, minimizing MTBF and MTTR, and minimizing the ammount of preventative maintenance required etc. for a couple of decades now. And though great strides have been made, there's still a long way to go.
With a modest amount of recycling and some care in planning, you can get the requirements for life support down to around a ton of supplies per person, per year. Much of those supplies can also serve 'double duty' by serving as radiation shielding around the 'storm cellar'."Where you got your "3 year trip" line from, I'm not sure"
Three years is the minimum-energy transfer orbit to and from Mars... any faster than that starts to require a lot more fuel.
I'm an undergraduate aerospace student, and I'm working at NASA every other semester. Among friends, this plan is a big deal. I hear that NASA is gearing up to hire lots of young engineers, and from where I'm sitting, I see a lot of 20-somethings in my office. Whether this thing keeps going or runs out of steam will mean work or grad school (or another major) for a lot of current students.
WeRelate.org - wiki-based genealogy
"According to this NASA page, the fast transit considered is only two months."
Maybe you should read that page more carefully, since it says nothing of the kind: 'the transit time to Mars will be about 180 days', then there's nearly a two year stay waiting for a launch window back to Earth.
"It took Spirit and Opportunity a mere three months to get to Mars."
Spirit: launched June 10 2003, landed January 3rd 2004
Opportunity: launched July 8, 2003, landed January 24th 2004
That sure was a long 'mere three months'.
Food is easy. Try packing all of the water and air you will use for the next 9 months in a small suitcase...
Both of these consumables can be recycled slightly (water more than O2) but there will still be loss because we have not come close to building a closed loop environmental support system that is ready for space or small enough to make it up there. A closed-loop water system is close enough to reality that some of it could be applied here, but a closed-loop system for breathing is not going to be flying anytime soon (these involve things like growing plants to convert CO2 to O2, which increases the volume and weight of the spacecraft significantly.)
A body at rest consumes about 0.3L of O2 per minute. That is 432L per day of metabolic consumption and 116000L over nine months. Using 3000psi composite cylinders (larger, but lighter and we are weight-restricted here) you are looking at about 1.5 tons of weight for gas storage with no reserve and with no allowance for regulation or distribution of the O2. If the astronauts were actually going to do more than lie very still for nine months then your O2 budget goes up.
For water the problem is both easier and harder. It is easier because we have actually made good progress on small, lightweight water recycling systems, and it is harder because each litre of water lost carries a significant cost in terms of weight. An average person consumes 2L of water per day, so you would need 540L for your nine-month mission. We will start by saying that your water needs for cooling and other uses can be handled by non-recoverable losses in the recycling system. Now, if your water recycling system is 80% efficient you will still need to lug up 250 pounds of water and another hundred pounds of container and piping.
Now we are talking about 2 tons of consumables per astronaut, assuming the astronauts do nothing more than lie in their chairs and watch TV for nine months...
BTW, the grandparent came up with three years because for a Mars trip there are two options, short stay or long stay. For your short trip the astronauts would have a couple of weeks on the surface before they would have to leave so that their return transfer orbit would be able to catch up to the earth. The other option is to keep the astronauts on the surface for a year and meet up with earth after both planets have cicled around and are close enough for a transfer orbit. The grandparent poster was also assuming a more fuel-efficient transfer to Mars using a Hohmann transfer orbit, which takes 8.5 months.
No one gets a "three month" stay on Mars, at least not if they want to return to Earth. It is either weeks or a year. Any other option requires a lot (and I do mean A LOT) of fuel to catch up with the Earth.
"Of course, then you'd have to stay on Mars for the next window if you really wanted to be thrifty."
Exactly, that's why it takes three years for the round trip.
Read something interesting about DDT the other day...it was designed to be sprayed on walls. Do it once, mosquitos die when they land on the walls, and one spray will last for months.
Hence, it was purposely designed to be persistent, not to degrade...and to be used in small quantities.
The reason we had trouble is that farmers in the U.S. started using it in other ways, instead of how it was designed to be used...spraying repeatedly, in large quantities. The results were predictable, and the final result was the banning of DDT even for its original usage...which, as you say, would have saved many lives.
Projects like these are more subjective, but lets face it, Boeing and Lockheed lobby hard for this gravy - these open-ended projects are where they really make their bank.